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Abstract 
 
The thesis explores everyday resistance in post-conflict statebuilding. Despite the turn 
in peace and conflict studies to study everyday forms of resistance, the concept and the 
account of its practices remain limited. In addressing these limitations, the thesis 
develops an alternative account of both resistance and post-conflict statebuilding. 
Following the framework of James Scott, resistance is understood as the pattern of acts 
of individuals and collectives in a position of subordination against the everyday 
experience of domination. What is resisted is not an externally driven liberal 
intervention, but the coercive and extractive practices fostered by statebuilding.  
 
These dynamics are examined through the case of Eastern Democratic Republic of 
Congo, focusing on the provinces of North and South Kivu. Generally studied as a 
paradigmatic case of state-failure, the DRC provides an insight into post-conflict 
statebuilding as a plural, improvised and contradictory process. In the thesis, this is 
linked to historical and sociological practices of statebuilding more generally, and to 
the specificities of the African political space. Although statebuilding claims to be a 
strategy to restore state authority, peace, and democracy, the result has so far been a 
militarised environment, a pluralisation of state authority and a deterioration of living 
conditions. The thesis examines discursive, violent and survival practices that deny 
statebuilders the claim to legitimate authority and to the monopoly of violence, while 
enacting alternative channels of re-appropriation based on solidarity and reciprocity. 
Post-conflict statebuilding does not require a special framework of resistance. It 
requires a historicised account of practices, which grasps their heterogeneity and 
gradients, and which ultimately accounts for resistance as a prosaic presence in the 
relations of domination that sustain statebuilding. 
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Introduction 
Patterns,  Practices and Everydayness 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis explores everyday resistance in ‘post-conflict statebuilding’.1 It 
analyses which practices account for it, and whether the framework of everyday 
forms of resistance can be applied to such context.2 This research stems from two 
distinct but interconnected problems. First, the recent attention in peace and 
conflict studies to everyday forms of resistance, and the methodological turn to 
‘everyday practices’ as a framework of analysis have only provided a 
rudimentary account of resistance. Secondly, this limited theorisation of resistance 
is partly the result of not having integrated the historical and sociological features 
of everyday practices into the analysis. Additionally, although the turn to study 
resistance has been hailed, and rightly so, as necessary for having a more accurate 
understanding and enabling a deeper critique of statebuilding, the accounts 
provided so far have been limited on both counts. The thesis provides an 
alternative account of both resistance and ‘post-conflict statebuilding’. It argues 
that resistance is the commonplace and prosaic response to the practices of 
                                                   
1 As explained more extensively below, the phrase ‘post-conflict statebuilding’ is 
paradoxical. Not only is the context of Eastern DRC one of conflict and not of post-conflict, 
additionally, different practices contradict the aim of building the state. However, such 
paradoxical discourse will be retained following what Jacques Derrida calls  ‘under 
erasure’ – that is, consciously using a concept that is ‘inadequate, yet necessary’. Gayatri 
Spivak “Preface” in Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), xiv. This necessity comes from the fact 
that this phrase represents a shared understanding amongst the literature the thesis is 
addressing; from being part of the official discourse and policy documents that are used 
in the DRC; and from the fact that there are few alternatives. See this chapter, pp. 14 – 16. 
2 As outlined in James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of 
Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Michel De 
Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984). Expanded below. 
 2 
domination and power relations, produced and reproduced in the processes of 
war and statebuilding. Practices of resistance are heterogeneous, and are shaped 
by the particular political context.  
 
The work of Oliver Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty is representative of this turn.3 
They have provided the most extensive accounts of resistance within the peace 
and conflict literature, shifting the debates away from the concept of the spoiler. 
In doing so they have provided more nuanced accounts of the dynamics of liberal 
peace interventions and local societies. However, they are also illustrative of the 
problems just mentioned. Regarding the account of resistance, there have been 
issues of form and content. Different terms have been used interchangeably - 
“resistance”, “challenge”, “distortion” and “subversion” – denoting lack of 
conceptual clarity. Resistance has been referred to as a form of ‘critical agency’ 
and ‘hybridisation’, without establishing the relationship between intentions, 
actions and outcomes.4 Resistance is also said to be conscious and unconscious, 
and something done by elites and non-elites without sufficient explanation.5 
Additionally, the relationship between everyday resistance and violence has not 
been sufficiently analysed. Whereas, for example, Roger Mac Ginty includes 
violent forms of resistance in his account, Richmond’s analysis concentrates on 
non-violent resistance.6  
 
                                                   
3 Oliver Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, epub - Adobe Digital Editions 2.067275 (London: 
Routledge, 2011); Roger Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid 
Forms of Peace (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). These authors will be the main 
interlocutors in this thesis, as those who have most directly addressed resistance, though 
others who have engaged with Michel De Certeau to explore hybridity will also be 
discussed. E.g. Audra Mitchell, Lost in Transformation: Violent Peace and Peaceful Conflict in 
Northern Ireland (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).  
4 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace; Oliver P. Richmond, “Critical Agency, Resistance and a 
Post-Colonial Civil Society,” Cooperation and Conflict 46, no. 4 (2011): 419–440; Mac Ginty, 
International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance. 
5 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, Ch. 5; Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local 
Resistance, 6 and 9 – 11.  
6 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, Ch. 4 and 8; Richmond, A Post-
Liberal Peace, 119 – 122; Oliver Richmond, “Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace,” 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 38, no. 3 (2010): 665 – 692; See also: Mitchell, Lost 
in Transformation, Ch. 2.  
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Regarding the account of ‘post-conflict statebuilding’, one of the most problematic 
issues is that it is theorised as an international and/or liberal process, thus 
generating dichotomised analyses across international/local and liberal/non-
liberal divides. Although the work of Richmond and Mac Ginty attempts to break 
with these binaries, these have been reified. Characterising peacebuilding as 
liberal and international, these analyses have studied the dynamics between 
‘international peacebuilding’ and ‘local resistance’ (Mac Ginty) and their 
consequences theorised as a ‘local-liberal hybrid’ (Richmond).7 This has 
considerably limited the critique of statebuilding, missing the nuances of 
examining this process as featuring historical patterns of domination and 
mediated by myriad of actors. Since the notion of practice itself makes reference to 
historical patterns, it needs to be historicised to observe both the contingency and 
patterns in ‘post-conflict statebuilding’ and the societies that experience it. 
 
Therefore, the undertaking could be seen as a double move. The thesis develops a 
framework of resistance to account for what it is and what practices constitute it, 
while developing an account of statebuilding considering its historical and 
sociological aspects. This is explored through the case of ‘post-conflict 
statebuilding’ in Eastern DRC and, in particular, North and South Kivu between 
2009 and 2011. Portrayed as a paradigmatic case of state failure, the DRC 
represents a ‘tough test’ on which to premise an account of resistance and 
statebuilding.8 Following from its historical image as a place of plunder and 
tragedy, captured in Joseph Conrad’s The Heart of Darkness, the DRC today is often 
seen as a place of war, state failure and greed.9 The DRC’s status as a pathological 
representation of the relationship between violence, extraction, authority and 
                                                   
7 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, 14 and Ch. 6; Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and 
Local Resistance; See also: David Chandler, International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal 
Governance, Epub - Adobe Digital Editions 2.0.67 (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
8 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 76. 
9 Joseph Conrad, The Heart of Darkness, ed. Cedric T. Watts (London: Everyman, 1995); 
Kevin Dunn, Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003). 
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resistance makes it a ‘crucial case’ for exploring everyday practices of domination 
and resistance in the process of ‘post-conflict statebuilding’.10  
 
Resistance is not so much a particular resistance against “international” ‘post-
conflict statebuilding’, as it is embedded more broadly in patterns of state-society 
relations. This relationship is not an insulated one of authority and subject. In fact, 
one of the insights from looking at statebuilding from a historical sociological 
perspective and from the DRC is to illustrate that this relationship is not a binary, 
but a plural relation of ‘multiple authorities and centres of political control’.11 The 
particular context is marked by, on the one hand, an increasing militarisation, 
authoritarianism and impoverishment of the civilian population, and, on the 
other, by a political discourse of peace, democracy and development. ‘Post-
conflict statebuilding’ in the DRC is undertaken and mediated by myriad of 
international, national, state and non-state actors. The process of reconstituting 
state authority leads these actors to engage in contradictory practices of 
militarisation, peacebuilding, shared sovereignty and proxy wars. ‘Post-conflict 
statebuilding’ is in this sense the representation of the practices of statebuilding 
more generally. Resistance counters, not the intervention of international actors, 
but the different forms of extraction and violence undertaken by multiple actors. 
As a way of introducing these topics, this chapter outlines how resistance and 
statebuilding have been theorised in the thesis, why the case of the DRC was 
chosen and what methodology has been followed.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
10 ‘A crucial case is one in which a theory that passes empirical testing is strongly 
supported and one that fails is strongly impugned’. cf. Harry Eckstein cited in George and 
Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 9. 
11 Timothy Raeymaekers, “The Power of Protection: Governance and Transborder Trade 
on the Congo-Ugandan Frontier” (PhD Dissertation, Ghent University, 2007), 173. 
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1.  Resistance Patterns in the Everyday 
 
The peacebuilding literature has chosen the framework of everyday forms of 
resistance, but it has not developed sufficiently what resistance is, and how can 
this framework apply in a context of conflict and statebuilding.12 As a way to 
address these shortcomings, the thesis follows the work of James Scott.13 Scott’s 
work serves firstly to concretise the account by premising it on patterns and 
subordinate groups, however uncoordinated and limited their practices might 
be.14 Secondly, although a contentious aspect of the framework, it provides an 
account of the intent and motivations resisters have. Fourthly, it also accounts for 
the claims posed by authority, which are the target of resistance. It encompasses 
both material and symbolic claims, individual and collective actions. Finally, it 
facilitates an examination of a diverse range of acts, including how violent and 
non-violent practices relate to the framework of everyday resistance.  
 
However, Scott’s definition could improve by referring directly to the patterned 
character of resistance. Intentions and motivations could be more directly linked, 
and, since Scott’s framework is developed in a pacified context, more could be 
said about the relationship between everyday resistance and violence. Following 
Michel De Certeau, Scott’s account could also include acts that do not oppose or 
address authority claims directly but are undertaken to fulfil one’s own needs in 
                                                   
12 Most explicitly in the works of Oliver Richmond.  See, in particular, Richmond, A Post-
Liberal Peace; Richmond, “Critical Agency”; Oliver Richmond, “A Pedagogy of 
Peacebuilding: Infrapolitics, Resistance, and Liberation,” International Political Sociology 6, 
no. 2 (2012): 115 – 131. 
13 Mainly: Scott, Weapons of the Weak; Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance; James C. 
Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
14 This does not mean inexistence of loose social movements. A tapestry of civil and 
political organisations and ongoing social and political struggles take place in a more 
public sphere. This is seen through the struggle of collectives that have been particularly 
vocal and also particularly persecuted, for instance, human rights organisations, 
journalists, feminists, women-rights organisations, students, peace activists, pygmies, etc. 
However, not only the practices Scott focuses on are more prevalent, they form the basis 
of these more public struggles. See for example: Gauthier De Villers and Jean Omasombo 
Tshonda, “When Kinois Take to the Streets,” in Reinventing Order in the Congo: How People 
Respond to State Failure in Kinshasa, ed. Theodore Trefon (London: Zed Books, 2004), 137 – 
154. 
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detriment of the fulfilment of authority claims. Refining Scott’s account, but 
retaining its basic wording, the definition of resistance that is used throughout 
this thesis is as follows:  
 
Resistance is the pattern of acts undertaken by individuals or collectives in a 
subordinated position to mitigate or deny the claims made by elites and the effects 
of domination, while advancing their own agenda.15  
 
Therefore, for resistance to be identified as such, at least three elements need to be 
present: authority claims (e.g. paying taxes, showing respect, complying with the 
law), denial and mitigation of those (e.g. tax avoidance, mockery, insult, 
reappropriation) and agenda setting (e.g. self-help, land, reparation of injustice). 
Without identifying these elements it is difficult to differentiate resistance from 
any other action of denial. Nonetheless, these elements recover meaning when 
seen as a pattern of actions within relations of domination.    
 
P a t t e r n s  o f  a c t s ,  a  p r a c t i c e  
 
The emphasis on patterns places some limits on what counts as resistance. 
Everyday resistance is not an automated effect or a random action. Its acts are a 
patterned practice against domination in a conscious manner.16 Ultimately, 
avoiding taxes, refusing a command or postponing work, for example, are 
widespread practices of elites and non-elites. For resistance to have analytical 
value as a political category, it needs to be linked to patterns of insubordination 
against privilege in economic, social, and political relations. Thus it also requires 
an account of subordination and class, also implying that elites are not part of the 
framework. 
 
 
                                                   
15 Cf. Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 290. 
16 As will be elaborated in Chapter Four, this is different from accounting for practices that 
may have a lesser clear intent. 
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S u b o r d i n a t e  c l a s s e s  
 
Although the thesis problematises the categories that Scott uses, resistance is 
theorised as a practice of subordinate classes, or non-elites. The thesis identifies 
these classes with the working class (both skilled and unskilled), the peasantry,17 
and with what Barrington Moore calls ‘lower classes’18 - ‘those with little or no 
property, income, education, power, authority, or prestige’.19 Statebuilding lays 
claims of legitimate authority, extraction, backed by force, on these classes 
without giving them access to decision-making processes.    
 
Notwithstanding how problematic it is to talk about ‘classes’ in Congo, because 
social and political relations are fluid and muddled, everyday resistance needs an 
account of its ‘actors’.20 The thesis follows Prunier in that, seeing the fluidity of the 
social and political world in Africa, he argues that linking classes with their 
networks in the informal economy does not rule out the existence of classes but 
only its problematisation and nuance.21 The implication of Prunier’s argument is 
that in the exercise of accumulation and power, distribution may follow networks 
of kin and proximity (where ethnic groups and their own rankings come to add 
an extra layer of social stratification) and may also create fluid boundaries, but it 
maintains an unequal class system.  
 
In the DRC, subordinate classes represent the majority of the population.22 
According to the African Development Bank, ‘70% Congolese live on less than $1 
                                                   
17 Cf. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, “Class Struggle and National Liberation in Zaire,” in The 
Proletarianization and Class Struggle in Africa (Cambridge: Synthesis Publications, 1983), 58–
59. Nzongola adds a third category, the ‘lumpenproletariat’, not included here because 
this serves a Marxist category of a class not interested in revolutionary politics, and does 
not have analytical value in this thesis.  
18 Barrington Moore, Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (London: Macmillan, 
1978), 35.  
19 Ibid., xiii. 
20 For debates about the extent to which the notion of ‘class’ is applicable in an African 
context see: Bernard Magubane and Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, eds., Proletarianization and 
Class Struggle in Africa (Cambridge: Synthesis Publications, 1983); Michael Schatzberg, 
Politics and Class in Zaire (London: Africana Publishing Company, 1980). 
21 Gérard Prunier, “Violence et Histoire En Afrique,” Politique Africaine 2 (1991): 4. 
22 For a detailed analysis of Congolese class structure see: Nzongola-Ntalaja, “Class 
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per day, 75% experience food insecurity, 73% are unemployed, 80% operate in the 
informal sector, 2/3 live in overcrowded accommodation, only 47% have access to 
clean water, and 9% to electricity’.23 These circumstances hit women and young 
especially. 54% of girls are out of school, and ‘only 2.8% of total waged jobs are 
undertaken by women’.24 In the context of war, women have been particularly 
over-represented in refugee groups, and as targets of sexual violence, while being 
excluded from power-sharing agreements.25 Lack of employment opportunities 
for young people means that young boys constitute the bulk of the membership in 
Mai Mai militias in the East, and in the Kuluna movement in Kinshasa.26 Although 
some of these indicators reflect greater historical trends, the experience of conflict 
and its subsequent statebuilding process has reproduced, not eliminated social 
hierarchies.  
 
The concept of subordinate/non-elite is therefore complex and contingent. It is 
intersected by the different kinds of subordination that cut across economic, 
social, and political relations including class, gender, ethnic group, race, age, 
sexuality, or physical ability. The complexity of social, economic and political 
relations means that one could be a street-beggar, yet be in a dominant position 
with respect to a partner or a child. Scott argued that the everyday framework 
could apply to other situations of subordination beyond class, such as gender, 
race, age, sexual orientation and other social hierarchies.27 While acknowledging 
these complexities, the thesis does not provide an exhaustive comparison of 
different kinds of subordinate experiences during statebuilding. Rather it links 
these to broader dynamics of resistance, violence and extraction in the exercise of 
building state authority. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Struggle and National Liberation in Zaire.” 
23 African Development Bank, Democratic Republic of Congo (Tunisia: AFDB, 2012), 13 and 
15, http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/ Accessed 20/10/2012. 
24 Ibid., 14. 
25 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Women and Peace and Security (New York: UN 
Security Council, September 28, 2010), para. 3, 69 - 73, and section III. 
26 African Development Bank, Democratic Republic of Congo, 15. 
27 Chapter Four will provide a more extensive account of Scott. 
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A  c r i t i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  F r a m e w o r k  a n d  T h i n k i n g  w i t h  D e  
C e r t e a u :  C l a i m - r e g a r d i n g  a n d  S e l f - r e g a r d i n g  a c t s    
 
Resistance is explored through different discursive, violent and survival practices. 
These include denigration, slandering, mockery and reworking of mainstream 
statebuilding discourse; the activities of Mai Mai militias and their use by rural 
communities to provide security; as well as creative survival practices that range 
from tax evasion, land reappropriation and the provision of all sorts of social 
services. The diverse range of resistance practices, and the fact that they may not 
be straightforwardly seen as practices towards the denial or mitigation of 
domination require a critical examination of the everyday framework. 
 
One of the main criticisms that Scott has received is that one could never account 
for the myriad intentions that people would have in, for instance, mocking 
MONUC/MONUSCO, denigrating the government or even launching an armed 
attack on the army. These practices are said to be opportunistic, self-serving and 
ultimately too ambiguous and ambivalent to serve as a category of analysis in 
political research. Another critique has been that Scott excessively simplifies social 
reality. This is prominent in the context of statebuilding in the DRC, which is 
marked by heterogeneity, ambiguity and contradictory processes. However, 
critics of the Scottian framework have also argued that everyday resistance is an 
irrelevant category, it is ungraspable or does not exist.28  
 
Against these critiques, this thesis proposes to embrace ambiguity and plurality, 
while emphasising that resistance is a prevalent historical practice in everyday 
life. That is, acknowledging the ambiguities of everyday life and the impossibility 
of accounting for every individual action, resistance should be accounted for as a 
                                                   
28 Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 103 – 
108; Jesse Weaver Shipley, ed., “Africa in Theory: A Conversation Between Jean Comaroff 
and Achille Mbembe,” Anthropological Quarterly 83, no. 3 (2010): 666; Sherry B. Ortner, 
“Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal,” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 37, no. 1 (1995): 173–193; Be ́atrice Hibou, Anatomie Politique de La Domination (Paris: 
La Découverte, 2011), Ch. 1. See Chapter Four. 
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political category. This is added to the fact that, as Hollander and Einwohner 
argue, resistance is ‘socially constructed’.29 In the process of identifying what is 
resistance and what is not, its recognition by those who resist, those who are 
targeted and those who observe creates a complex interconnection of subjective 
meaning.30  
 
In order to better account for the variety of resistance practices in the DRC, the 
thesis also proposes a gradation of some elements depending on the visibility of 
intentionality, the intensity and exposure of the acts used, and how directly 
authority claims have been addressed. For example, violent acts of Mai Mai 
militias on the military imply a different level of intensity and exposure than an 
insult. Similarly, there might be different gradients of visibility of intent. Whereas 
some of the strategies followed for tax evasion present a thought-out strategy, the 
subversion of mainstream statebuilding vocabulary to launch alternative agendas 
and critique statebuilding may not present intent in the same degree.  
 
Different levels of engagement against authority claims will also provide the 
categorisation of two different practices. On the one hand, and closer to Scott’s 
account, there are practices that address authority claims more directly (claim-
regarding acts) – for example, tax evasion against tax levy, denigration against 
legitimacy. On the other hand, and closer to Michel De Certeau, there are practices 
that follow ‘self-logics’ and in doing so mitigate authority claims and the effects of 
domination (self-regarding acts). According to De Certeau, ‘writing a letter to a 
friend’ during work, ‘borrowing’ material from work for one’s own purposes or 
taking a non-marked path are practices of resistance.31 These are done out of a 
sense of solidarity with one’s friends and family or prioritising one’s own needs.32 
These practices are ways of subverting the law and order of work, the factory and 
                                                   
29 Jocelyn A. Hollander and Rachel L. Einwohner, “Conceptualizing Resistance,” 
Sociological Forum 19, no. 4 (2004): 548. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Michel De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984), 25 and 28. 
32 De Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life, 25 – 26. 
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everyday rules, which simultaneously introduce a ‘sociopolitical ethic’ not based 
on profit or social hierarchy.33 Survival strategies in the DRC, which are generally 
undertaken following relations of proximity and based on an ethic of reciprocity, 
not only provide ways to mitigate poverty and the deteriorating conditions of an 
militarised context, they simultaneously enact alternative forms of social 
organisation and political authority. 
 
In exploring these different elements, as mentioned earlier, the thesis argues that 
the practices of everyday resistance are determined by the political context. 
Moreover, there is no universal all-encompassing framework of resistance. Any 
framework needs to connect its main defining elements of patterns, motivations, 
acts and actors, and be contextualised. The context of the DRC, and the Kivus in 
particular, although defined as ‘post-conflict’, ‘peace-consolidation’, ‘peace-
building’ or ‘stabilisation’, is one of ongoing war, increasing militarisation and 
plural authority.34 In this context, the ways in which rural communities engage in 
violence either directly or indirectly needs to be seen in a continuum with 
multiple ways subordinate groups deny and mitigate domination.  
 
 
2.   Histories,  Practices and Everydayness in Statebuilding 
 
That statebuilding has become the preferred formula for ‘post-conflict 
peacebuilding’ illustrates an understanding of the state as ‘[t]he foundation-stone 
of international peace and order’.35 Thus if the state has failed or has lost its 
                                                   
33 De Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life, 27. 
34 UNSSSS/ ISSSS, “Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility for the Democratic 
Republic of Congo: Terms of Reference,” November 5, 2009, 
http://mptf.undp.org/document/download/2543 Accessed 02/02/2010; UN Security 
Council, Resolution 1925, S/RES/1925 (2010), 2010, http://documents.un.org/ Accessed 
13/12/2010; Chris Dolan, “War Is Not yet over” Community Perceptions of Sexual Violence 
and Its Underpinnings in Eastern DRC (London: International Alert, November 2010). 
35 UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking  and  Peace-keeping. A/47/277 - S/24111 (New York: United Nations General 
Assembly, June 17, 1992), http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html Accessed 
19/03/2009. para. 17. 
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legitimacy, it needs to be reconstructed. As Navari argues, the conception of the 
state, as the embodiment of peace is not extraneous for either International 
Relations or Political Theory, for whom the state is ‘an arena of moral choice’.36 It 
only depends on whether the state is seen as the ethical order (Hobbes/Hegel), in 
which case intervention might be ruled out; or whether the state is seen as the best 
ethical order available (Locke), in which case intervention might be required to 
preserve or infer some changes inside states.37 Arguably, interventions have taken 
this Lockean view. For instance, for Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan ‘the state is the 
most effective mechanism for ensuring security, combating poverty and 
promoting equality of opportunity, investment in human capital and participation 
in opportunities afforded by the market’.38 Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan argue 
that it is in the performance of these functions that a ‘virtuous circle’ is created 
which citizenry bolsters and which can actually ‘be delineated through a capacity 
program with timelines, benchmarks and indicators that serve both as goals 
towards which the public can be mobilized’.39 However, turning the state into a 
peace-broker denotes what Navari also identified as ‘a series of epistemological 
devices amalgamated with political theory’.40 She was referring to the theoretical 
practice of stripping the state of its historical and sociological elements as a 
historically contingent institution of domination, and turning it into a necessary 
organising mechanism to maintain national and international order.  
 
                                                   
36 Cornelia Navari, “Intervention, Non-Intervention and the Construction of the State,” in 
Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention, ed. Ian Forbes and Mark 
Hoffman (London: The Macmillan Press, 1993), 44. 
37 Ibid., 48. 
38 Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart, and Michael Carnahan, “State-building in Fragile and 
Conflict-Affected Conditions” (World Bank, 2005), 1, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/Background.doc Accessed 
4/10/2010. 
39 Ibid. p. 2 
40 Cornelia Navari, “Knowledge, the State and the State of Nature,” in The Reason of States: 
A Study in International Political Theory, ed. Michael Denis Donelan (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1978), 108. 
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‘Post-conflict statebuilding’ can be seen both as a discourse that informs policy as 
well as a core element of peacebuilding actions, although not necessarily 
advancing peace. Call and Cousens define both as follow: 
 
Peacebuilding: Actions undertaken by international or national actors to 
institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict and a 
modicum of participatory politics. Post-conflict peacebuilding is the sub-
set of such actions undertaken after the termination of armed hostilities. 
[…] State-building: Actions undertaken by international or national actors 
to establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state which may 
or may not contribute to peacebuilding.41 
 
This understanding underpins the critical peacebuilding literature that this thesis 
addresses. Mac Ginty, for example, speaks of statebuilding as one of the ‘pillars’ 
of the liberal peace.42 For Richmond the ‘liberal peace project’ has ‘a statebuilding 
focus’.43 However, not only these terms do not identify the everyday practices of 
statebuilding, their conceptualisation assumes some form of concerted effort or 
strategy which presents several analytical and practical problems.  
 
P r o b l e m a t i c  ‘ P o s t - c o n f l i c t ’ ,  ‘ I n t e r n a t i o n a l ’ ,  ‘ L i b e r a l ’  a n d  
‘ S t a t e b u i l d i n g ’  t e r m s  
 
As was advanced in the introduction, the problematic use of the phrase ‘post-
conflict statebuilding’ is due to the fact that both ‘post-conflict’ and ‘statebuilding’ 
do not reflect the complex context of conflict, multiple clashing agendas, plurality 
and improvisation. As was also mentioned, retaining its usage as a form of 
Derridean ‘under erasure’ means to accept it as a shared terminology in the 
literature and policy circles, while highlighting its paradoxical and inadequate 
nature.44 In fact, the inadequacy of this terminology has already been identified 
both in policy and scholarly research, but few alternatives are available.  
 
                                                   
41 Charles Call and Elizabeth Cousens, Ending Wars and Building Peace, Coping with Crisis 
(New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 3. 
42 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, 12. 
43 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, 4. 
44 Spivak in Derrida, Of Grammatology, xiv. 
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For example, the OECD sees statebuilding as ‘the central objective of international 
assistance [in] post-conflict contexts’.45 They also see the category of ‘post-conflict’ 
as ‘problematic, given the question of war recurrence’,46 but it seems to have been 
retained as way to identify the moment in which applying these policies would 
become legitimate. However, the term has policy and analytical implications. In 
the case of the DRC, Autesserre has demonstrated that  
 
labelling the Congo a “postconflict” situation instead of a “war” situation 
made a specific set of policies and procedures (such as the organization of 
elections) seem natural and appropriate while another set of strategies 
(such as work on local conflicts) seemed inappropriate and illegitimate.47 
 
Autesserre also demonstrates that at a general level, notwithstanding the 
differences between different organisations and foreign policy agendas, there are 
collective understandings that create a culture of shared perceptions towards the 
causes of conflict, the right strategies and the right involvement. ‘Post-conflict 
statebuilding’ seems to indicate the understanding that certain policy strategies 
should be followed after a truce. In this sense, the labels of ‘post-conflict’ and 
‘international’ both signal consensus in a discourse that authorises international 
actors to intervene in areas of sovereign political authority in a foreign state after a 
peace agreement. Although the critical literature has unearthed the power 
dynamics underpinning those practices, it has not been without issues. 
 
Whether as ‘liberal peace’, ‘international statebuilding’, or ‘global governance’, 
critics have seen that these practices advanced hegemonic Western security 
agendas and understandings of political order.48 For instance, Tim Jacoby argues 
that ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction reflects Western interests in ‘national security 
                                                   
45 OECD-DAC, State-Building in Situations of Fragility: Initial Findings (Paris: OECD-DAC, 
2008), 12, www.oecd.org/dac/fragilestates Accessed 26/4/2011. 
46 Ibid., 19. 
47 Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of 
International Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 29. 
48 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance; Chandler, International 
Statebuilding. 
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and [the] defence of hegemony’.49 Richmond sees the liberal peace discourse and 
international statebuilding actors as hegemonic, albeit challenged.50 Hegemony 
identifies the power relations that form the creation of consensus, justifying 
interventions and how should they be carried out; but it does not capture the 
nature of statebuilding. As Heathershaw argues, the ‘hegemony of the ‘liberal 
peace’ is only meaningful […] in the imaginations of donors, policy-makers and 
the citizenries of Western states’.51 Its discourse serves as a claim to authority, as a 
justification to intervene and as blame externalisation, but it remains contested. 
The framework of the ‘liberal peace’, or of the hegemony of international actors, 
overlooks important statebuilding’s failures, and has been called into question for 
theorising interventions as overpowering, ideologically coherent or indeed as 
liberal.52  
 
Additionally, referring to ‘statebuilding’ or ‘peacebuilding’ suggests that “actual 
happening statebuilding” or “peacebuilding” is assumed, rather than questioned. 
Reading ‘post-conflict statebuilding’ as statebuilding more generally links it to 
historical practices that entail formal and informal forms of governance, 
accumulation, and broader relations of domination. The thesis disaggregates and 
scrutinises ‘statebuilding’ in its practices and incidence, rather than just in how 
and by whom they are operated.  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
49 Tim Jacoby, “Hegemony, Modernisation and Post-War Reconstruction,” Global Society 
21, no. 4 (2007): 534.  
50 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace; Oliver Richmond, Peace in International Relations 
(London: Routledge, 2008).  
51 John Heathershaw, “Seeing Like the International Community: How Peacebuilding 
Failed (and Survived) in Tajikistan,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2, no. 3 (2008): 
347, emphasis in the original. 
52 David Chandler, Susana Campbell, and Meera Sabaratnam, eds., A Liberal Peace? The 
Problems and Practices of Statebuilding (London: Zed Books, 2011), especially Part III; John 
M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security (Ithaca, N.Y: 
Cornell University Press, 2000). 
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S t a t e b u i l d i n g ,  S t a t e - F o r m a t i o n  
 
Reading statebuilding as a global governance strategy and international 
intervention paradigm is then not the best entry point to theorise resistance to this 
process. Missing in these analyses are the important implications the processes of 
war, accumulation and state authority production as co-constituted by 
international, local, state and non-state actors alike have for resistance. Moreover, 
they have been limited to accounts of statebuilding as a process of change, 
missing also important continuities that directly affect practices of domination 
and resistance. ‘Post-conflict statebuilding’ is better observed from the patterns of 
statebuilding at large.  
  
Recent analyses of ‘post-conflict statebuilding’ through the lenses of state 
formation have afforded a better understanding of this process.53 Berit Bliesemann 
de Guevara, for example, has conceptualised ‘statebuilding’ and ‘state-formation’ 
as ideal-types that represent  
 
political and social processes that accompany the politics of statebuilding 
by international, national and subnational actors and which, in turn, are 
shaped by the temporally and spatially overarching structures of world 
society.54  
 
Drawing on Braudel, Bourdieu, and on political sociology and anthropology more 
generally, this framework is a step further in linking contemporary processes with 
                                                   
53 Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, “Introduction: The Limits of Statebuilding and the 
Analysis of State-Formation,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4, no. 2 (2010): 111–
128; Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, ed., Statebuilding and State-Formation: The Political 
Sociology of Intervention (Routledge, 2012); Dietrich Jung, “State Formation and State-
building: Is There a Lesson to Learn from Sociology?,” Danish Institute for International 
Studies Report no. 11 (2008): 33 – 42; Joel Migdal and Klaus Schlichte, “Rethinking the 
State,” in The Dynamics of States: The Formation and Crises of State Domination, ed. Klaus 
Schlichte (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 1 – 40; Klaus Schlichte, “With the State Against the 
State? The Formation of Armed Groups,” Contemporary Security Policy 30, no. 2 (2009): 
246–264; See also: Mark T. Berger and Heloise Weber, “Beyond State-building: Global 
Governance and the Crisis of the Nation-state System in the 21st Century,” Third World 
Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2006): 201.  
54 Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, “Introduction,” in Statebuilding and State-Formation: The 
Political Sociology of Intervention, ed. Berit Bliesemann de Guevara (London: Routledge, 
2012), 4. 
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the historicity of societies and world structures, while examining micro-level 
routine practices and repertoires.55 Following Bruce Berman and John Londsdale, 
Bliesemann de Guevara also argues that ‘statebuilding’ features intentional 
elements of statebuilding as a ‘conscious effort’, as well as immanent non-
intentional elements of state formation.56 What these analyses do not emphasise 
enough is that both statebuilding and state-formation (as ideal-type processes) 
share patterns in governing practices that produce domination. These practices 
need to be explored more thoroughly if resistance wants to be understood. 
 
Resistance features intermittently in these analyses as a way to argue that 
different actors mould the state, that there are hegemonic as well as subordinate 
agencies that struggle in this process, and that these may not necessarily follow a 
top-down approach.57 Resistance is also mentioned to highlight that statebuilding 
is contested and mediated, but not as a developed account of it. They do not link 
structures of domination and subordination, with patterns of accumulation and 
violence in statebuilding. It is this particular aspect that a historical sociological 
approach brings about to an analysis of ‘post-conflict statebuilding’ understood as 
statebuilding more generally.58  
 
H i s t o r i c a l  S o c i o l o g y  a n d  S t a t e b u i l d i n g  
 
Similar to the political sociological approaches to statebuilding, historical 
sociology, and in particular ‘historicist historical sociology’, sees history, structure 
and world politics as interacting. Its contribution is to see ‘history as a social 
process in which historical events form part of broader patterns of continuities 
and change’.59 Pace Mills, Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg propose a framework 
                                                   
55 Ibid., 2 – 7. 
56 Ibid., 5. 
57 Ibid., 6. 
58 The analysis will continue to use post-conflict statebuilding without quotes to indicate 
such discursive uses in the literature and official policy. A more general category of 
statebuilding –without quotes – will identify processes of authority assertion, 
accumulation, and violence. 
59 John M. Hobson, George Lawson, and Justin Rosenberg, “Historical Sociology,” ed. 
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of analysis ‘at the intersection of three dimensions of the human world’.60 It 
includes history, sociology (structure) and international relations. History means 
accounting for patterns, for the contingency of events and for the particularities of 
time and space. Sociology accounts for the ‘configuration of social relations and 
the impact on micro-processes’.61 International relations accounts for a theory of 
the international that is part and not external to the other two dimensions.  
 
The thesis draws on Charles Tilly’s account of state-formation, and Achille 
Mbembe’s theorisation of Africa’s political space to analyse statebuilding.62 The 
fact that the DRC has been the site of several multi-state wars, explained through 
narratives of violence linked to plunder, and that their corollary solution, 
premised on statebuilding, has itself generated further militarisation linked to 
continuous extraction, makes Tilly’s account of coercion and accumulation as the 
basis for state-formation a necessary reference. This does not suggest that war has 
necessarily contributed to the centralising and organising of the coercive and 
extractive apparatus of the state in a Tillean sense. In fact it could be the 
opposite.63 Tilly facilitates an account of historical patterns of statebuilding, and a 
reference point on which to articulate relations of domination and resistance. 
 
Following Mbembe, the thesis takes the historicity of the DRC as part of the 
explanation about the nature of resistance and the context. This counters the main 
narratives of the DRC, which have seen the DRC’s conflict as a representation of a 
transhistorical conflict over land and identity, and so as a transhistorical dynamic 
of plunder and violence and ultimately as failure. The insight the DRC provides 
                                                                                                                                                   
Robert Denemark, The International Studies Encyclopaedia (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell and 
International Studies Association, 2010), 3362, emphasis in the original. 
60 Ibid., 3357.  
61 Ibid., 13. 
62 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, Mass: B. 
Blackwell, 1990); Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in 
Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169 – 187; Mbembe, On the Postcolony. 
63 Brian Taylor and Roxana Botea, “Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the 
Contemporary Third World,” International Studies Review 10, no. 1 (2008): 27–56.  
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from this perspective is that post-conflict statebuilding is not so much a ‘hybrid’ 
of international and local action as it is a process of state reconstruction that 
reflects the co-constituted nature of any given political institution and order in 
world politics.  
 
 
3.  The Democratic Republic of Congo: Pathologies and 
Patterns 
 
Choosing the DRC for an account of resistance and post-conflict statebuilding 
does not aim to establish how ‘atypical’64 a case it is, but to better understand 
what the ‘everyday’ means and then historicising it. The standard view of the 
DRC as a case of state failure has provoked accounts in which multiple processes 
have been explained only by reference to this issue without exploring the more 
complex aspects of the DRC.65 According to Mbembe, generally Africa is 
explained by indicating what it ‘lacks’ and pointing out its failures in comparison 
to something else, generally some Western model.66 Adam Hochschild’s metaphor 
of the DRC as a ‘ghost’ remains prevalent, especially in those who see it as 
nonexistent.67 So, as Mbembe notes, when it comes to the DRC, we know more 
about what it lacks and what it does not properly do than what it has and what it 
does. This is not to deny the problems and issues that the Congolese experience 
on a daily basis. The fact that the country has seen both the bloodiest multi-state 
war in African history, one of the few of its kind on the continent, and one of the 
                                                   
64 An ‘atypical case’ is ‘enlightening about the conditionalities of a phenomenon, 
promoting not only understanding but also theory refinement. Often, cases which defy 
expectations, conflict with the ordinary, illustrate contrasting approaches, or suggest 
alternatives’.  Pertti Alasuutari, Leonard Bickman, and Julia Brannen, eds., The SAGE 
Handbook of Social Research Methods (London: SAGE, 2008), 217.  
65 René Lemarchand, “The Democratic Republic on Congo: From Collapse to Potential 
Reconstruction,” in State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, ed. Robert I. Rotberg 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 29 – 7; Robert Rotberg, ed., When States 
Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
66 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 3. 
67 Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, “There Is No Congo,” Foreign Policy, 2010, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/03/17/there_is_no_congo Accessed 
30/11/2010; Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in 
Colonial Africa (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999). 
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worst humanitarian catastrophes since World War II, underscores the scale of the 
problems facing the country.68  
 
Statebuilding and war in Congo, and the everyday conditions of living that are 
shaped by them, could be seen as raucous but are not pathological. Practices of 
authority assertion, violence and wealth distribution are patterns in statebuilding 
processes. The DRC thus illustrates the particularities of its context and how post-
conflict statebuilding, as a set of policies and strategies that enshrines collective 
security mechanisms, becomes enmeshed in and is not extraneous to these 
practices. As one of the largest and longest UN interventions in the organisation’s 
history, it also represents a case on which to observe post-conflict statebuilding as 
a contradictory, improvised and plural endeavour. This means highlighting that 
UN missions do not operate uniformly or monolithically. Not only do they 
operate ‘experimental’ strategies at times, they also encounter contradictory side 
political agendas.69 
 
The material gathered from fieldwork reflects the dynamics of the period between 
2009 and 2011 in the Eastern provinces of North and South Kivu. As will be clear 
in tracing the history of this context, this period represents political dynamics 
prevalent since the beginnings of the 1996 war. These dynamics have been 
marked by militarisation, foreign interventionism, extraction and plural authority, 
and civilian targeting and their mobilisation into war. The actions of the DRC 
government, MONUC/MONUSCO and Rwanda, as representative of main actors 
                                                   
68 The term ‘multi-state war’ will be used to refer to the 1996 – 1997 and the 1998 – 2002 
wars, noting the fact that these wars have confronted coalitions of states in the DRC, but 
these did not entail an ongoing ‘inter-state’ war throughout the whole period. At times 
these states were involved in occupying the territory, more than in a military campaign 
against other states.  
69 Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 195; John Heathershaw, “Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The 
Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding Discourses,” Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 36, no. 3 (2008): 602; Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, 118 
– 122; Xavier Zeebroek, La Mission Des Nations Unies Au Congo: Le Laboratoire de La Paix 
Introuvable (Brussels: Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Se ́curite ́ 
(GRIP), 2008). 
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operating in these provinces, have contributed to these dynamics. The 
strengthening of the statebuilding strategies since 2008 has entailed the creation of 
new sources of violence without resulting in more stabilisation. Some of this 
violence has come from the CNDP rebellions, the FDLR and Mai Mai militias, but 
it has also come from three major military operations, undertaken between the 
DRC, Rwanda and MONUC/ MONUSCO.  
 
The process of post-conflict statebuilding in the DRC has prioritised the 
consolidation and extension of state authority throughout the territory. However, 
insufficient means available to the DRC government, the second agendas present 
in donor countries, political compromises, and the interests of neighbouring 
countries have meant that the extending of state authority has militarised peace 
and political authority. It has also consolidated Rwanda’s quasi-hegemonic 
presence over a significant part of North Kivu. The implication is that there is not 
‘one’ ‘international’ statebuilding, but rather multiple intersecting ‘statebuildings’. 
Some of the consequences of these policies have been that contrary to the claims of 
peace, development and democracy, the Kivus have experienced a deterioration 
of living standards and the furthering of authoritarian rule, especially in areas 
where authority has been held by the military.70 State authority is revealed along 
an axis of absences and presences, and not as a committed centralising social 
engineering.  
 
T h e  P u r p o s e  o f  t h e  C a s e  S t u d y :  T h e o r y  D e v e l o p m e n t  
 
The purpose of the case study is not to make any causal inference or to test 
hypotheses. The question it addresses is not why, but how resistance happens. If, 
as Jack Levy notes, a case is defined by its research purpose, the selection of the 
DRC case has followed theoretical aims, providing criteria that are not 
                                                   
70 As it will be noted in Chapter Two, this deterioration contradicts the otherwise 
improving macro-economic indicators of the DRC, suggesting a link between processes of 
accumulation and increasing inequalities.  
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‘necessarily dependent/independent variables’.71 The thesis examines 
systematically different practices of resistance against practices of domination 
fostered by the process of post-conflict statebuilding. Thus, following Patrick T. 
Jackson, the thesis is more an inquiry than a test of nullifiable hypothesis.72 This 
does not mean that resistance does not exist beyond our thinking, but that 
researching and theorising resistance is not an exercise of objective measurement 
of independently existing facts.  
 
The evidence provided throughout the thesis is verifiable in so far these are not 
hidden, or invisible acts. Other researchers may interpret these acts differently. 
Still, following Jackson, it claims that ‘its validity is internal to its own 
methodology’, and while its interpretation is open to challenge, it is consistent.73 
This may not be ‘science’ but it is ‘something to use as guidance for systematic 
thorough inquiry that has the potential to produce a certain kind of knowledge’.74 
 
The conflict in Eastern DRC and the way statebuilding strategies have been 
drafted and applied can serve for comparing other case studies. The context of 
North and South Kivu is complex, but cannot be separated from the politics of the 
DRC and the Great Lakes region as a whole. They also reflect African politics 
more generally. However, the generalisations are also limited.75 As Scott argues, 
the study of ‘practices’, meaning the mechanisms, informalities and 
improvisations that allow for certain schemes to be put ‘in practice’, is the best 
point of entry for knowledge.76 This means that, although it is possible to argue 
that the nature of political authority in post-conflict statebuilding is plural, what 
                                                   
71 Jack S. Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 25, no. 1 (2008): 7 and 12. 
72 Patrick T. Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science 
and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics (London: Routledge, 2010), esp. 
Introduction. 
73 Ibid., 191. 
74 Ibid. 
75 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 318. 
76 Ibid., 6. 
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this really means in Eastern DRC (e.g. plural centres of power including state and 
non-state actors in parts of North Kivu, or statebuilding through the deployment 
of the military) may imply important nuanced differences to what it means in 
Bosnia (e.g. the influence of the European Union and the US amongst different 
Bosniak and Croats’ political projects). In other words, highlighting certain 
practices as resistance may provide a methodological container that will only 
recover meaning once they are contextualised.  
 
Eastern DRC provides a rich insight on which to premise an account of resistance 
in post-conflict statebuilding. Such an account shifts our understanding of Eastern 
DRC from a pathological case of bad governance, corruption and violence to one 
of patterns, practices, continuities and change. As will be shown, resistance in 
Eastern DRC is revealed in the mockery done by subordinate classes of both the 
government and the MONUC/MONUSCO, especially in light of the lack of 
balance between political promises and the reality lived. It is also seen in the ways 
popular militias are used or created for security purposes, as well as in the ways 
civilians mitigate the effects of military rule through negotiation and activate 
modes of self-organisation to confront poverty. Yet these are not as specific to 
Eastern DRC as they represent patterns in relations of domination.  
 
 
4.  Research Design and Methodological challenges 
  
The thesis addresses the following question: 
 
What is everyday resistance in ‘post-conflict statebuilding’?  
 
From this, subsequent questions arise: 
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What practices constitute everyday resistance? What is resisted? Is the framework 
of everyday forms of resistance an appropriate one to analyse resistance in ‘post-
conflict statebuilding’ contexts?  
 
As noted above, the overarching argument of the thesis is that resistance counters 
or mitigates domination, and its practices are shaped by the political context. 
Resistance in the DRC takes many forms, responding to a context of plural 
authority, militarisation and extraction that do not match the discourses which 
justify statebuilding or lived experience. Statebuilding is a claim to and a practice 
of authority. It claims legitimacy based on its capacity and knowledge to generate 
democracy, peace and development, but it is exercised incoherently and plurally 
through practices of violence and dispossession.  
 
The research has gathered evidence focusing on discourses, violence and 
survival/livelihoods. It has focused on evidence that negates authority and its 
legitimacy by mockery, slandering and the redefinition of the meanings of the 
state, democracy, peace and development. It has also analysed resistance by 
armed groups, and through DIY-survival practices against dispossession and as 
practices of re-appropriation.   
 
Although the thesis follows Scott and the methodological approach to focus on 
practices, it is not ethnography.77 This is because the time spent in the field is 
considered insufficient, and because a full and critical engagement with the legacy 
of ethnography from Anthropology falls outside the scope of the thesis.78 Despite 
this, there is still an acknowledgement of what Behar calls, the ‘epiphany’ that 
material, research and analysis have undergone, between the observation, the 
field and the final text.79 There is also an exercise of ‘zooming in’ to observe 
                                                   
77 Ibid., 312.  
78 Cf. Wanda Vrasti Wanda Vrasti, “The Strange Case of Ethnography and International 
Relations,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 37, no. 2 (2008): 279–301. 
79 Ruth Behar cited in Wanda Vrasti, “Dr Strangelove, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying 
About Methodology and Love Writing,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39, no. 
1 (2010): 84; See also the transition from “history” to the “text” in Michel De Certeau, The 
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someone criticising the government, or another entering into a negotiation to tame 
the authoritarian nature of military rule, followed by a ‘zooming out’, to 
extrapolate these to patterns of actions whereby domination is resisted.80  
 
E v i d e n c e  o f  R e s i s t a n c e  
 
The main data gathering method has been semi-structured interviews, focusing 
on five groups: the population/subordinate class component, representatives of 
Mai Mai popular militias, the government, the army, and MONUC/MONUSCO. 
Other representatives have also been interviewed as a way to contrast 
information. These have included opposition leaders, diplomats, local and 
international entrepreneurs, international NGOs, and representatives of UN 
agencies. Altogether 158 formal interviews, 3 focus groups, 10 participant 
observations, 1 small survey and 75 informal conversations form the corpus of the 
evidence.81  
 
The corpus of the research was established based on the primary representatives 
of post-conflict statebuilding and resistance in the DRC. Amongst these, the main 
sampling mechanism has been snowballing and random sampling. This was 
undertaken under the assumption that the ‘sampling unit is different from the 
observational unit’.82 This means that participants are only to a certain extent the 
locus of the inference. Whereas government representatives, FARDC, Mai Mai 
combatants and MONUC/MONUSCO were easily targeted – albeit the difficulty 
in access – targeting representatives of subordinate groups represented a 
challenge in several fronts. Firstly, as some participants representing subordinate 
groups did not speak French, let alone English, a choice had to be made between 
                                                                                                                                                   
Writing of History, trans. Tom Conley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), Ch. 1. 
80 For De Certeau, using ‘zoom lenses’ provides the ‘sociological and anthropological 
perspective that privileges the anonymous and the everyday’. De Certeau, Practice of 
Everyday Life, v. 
81 See Appendix III for a breakdown of fieldwork. 9 OCHA- humanitarian and security 
briefings were also attended.  
82 Alasuutari, Bickman, and Brannen, The SAGE Handbook of Social Research Methods, 203, 
emphasis in the original. 
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going through the mediation of interpreters, or focusing on French speakers, thus 
targeting the more elite end of subordinate groups. The preference has been to 
have the least mediated communication possible. As noted earlier, the non-elite 
component of the research has been defined in broad terms. The research has 
incorporated members of internationally-funded NGOs, university professors and 
journalists, alongside, market and street sellers, peasant representatives, 
unemployed youth, community leaders and formal and non-formally organised 
NGOs. 
 
Summaries of interviews have been partially transcribed, adding all necessary 
information and relevant verbatim quotes. These have been then interpreted 
under the framework outlined in Chapter Four. No unwanted conversations have 
been recorded. In several occasions a translator has been used from Swahili, 
Bembe and Kinyarwanda to French. All translations from French and Spanish are 
my own. In addition to this an excel sheet was compiled in order to extract 
patterns in discourses and other practices. 
 
D a t a  a n a l y s i s  
 
The empirical chapters are based on the examination of activities that are 
commonplace in daily life, not only in the DRC but everywhere. The challenge is 
not to present the quantitative incidence of these activities, but to prove that they 
can be interpreted as resistance. The practices explored are what George and 
Bennett call ‘building blocks’ in the framework, meaning to ‘study particular 
types of subtypes of a phenomenon [to] identify common patterns or serve a 
particular kind of heuristic purpose’.83 The interviews and observations are 
valued both individually, as representative of the resistance account, as well as 
instances of broader patterns. This means that alongside mapping observations 
and responses from interviews onto the framework of resistance, the aim has been 
                                                   
83 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 76. 
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to gather the same responses across a variety of places and actors to reflect such 
widespread practice. 
 
Although some points may be illustrated with few quotes, they represent at least 
two thirds of the interviews undertaken within the same group. Biased 
interpretations have been mitigated by triangulating responses and keeping in 
dialogue with the literature. During all periods of fieldwork checks were done 
formally, in interviews, as well as informally in conversations. Choosing the case 
of Eastern DRC in a way solves this bias. As will be elaborated in the thesis, policy 
and scholarly analyses of the DRC have tended to highlight how domination takes 
place and how this rests on the participation of subordinate groups.  
 
 
T i m e  a n d  l o c a t i o n s  
 
The period of fieldwork has taken place over 30 weeks: June – July 2009, June – 
September 2010 and August – September 2011. Fieldwork was undertaken in 
Kinshasa, North Kivu (Goma, Masisi, Beni and Butembo) and South Kivu 
(Bukavu, Bunyakiri (including the localities of Maibano and Bulambika), Uvira, 
Baraka and Fizi). An additional three months between September and December 
2011 were spent as an electoral observer, covering the province of Equateur. 
Although this time was dedicated to electoral observation tasks, this experience 
confirmed observations gathered elsewhere. Additional contact was made with 
members of the Congolese diaspora in London and Paris. The logistics of the 
research has entailed a limited scope of the fieldwork in terms of the number of 
interviews and places visited. Even so, aiming at gathering patterns has included 
observing these activities in eleven different locations in the two Kivus 
representing a relatively large population.  
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Map 1. Map of fieldwork in Kinshasa, North and South Kivu84 
 
These locations represent key areas for the post-conflict statebuilding 
programmes of both MONUC/MONUSCO and the DRC government (ISSSS and 
STAREC). Due to time, budget and research design constraints, the research could 
                                                   
84 Cartographer Jillian Luff from MAPgrafix in Jason Stearns, North Kivu: The Background 
to Conflict in North Kivu Province of Eastern Congo (London: Rift Valley Institute - Usalama 
Project, 2012), 3. The added locations are approximate. No map has been found that 
locates all fieldwork sites. For a more detailed map of the North and South Kivu 
provinces and DRC as a whole see Appendix IV.  
 
Kinshasa 
Baraka 
Bunyakiri 
(Maibano 
and 
Bulambika 
included) 
Mabuku 
 29 
not cover all of the areas included in these programmes (Maniema, Province 
Orientale and North Katanga). However, North and South Kivu currently 
represent some of the most problematic areas with intensive armed activity from 
different foreign and local armed groups. These provinces are representatives of 
the dynamics explored in the thesis including: the coercive and extractive 
practices of statebuilding; the dynamics of the region; the coexistence of different 
statebuilding projects; and the different practices of resistance.  
 
A  n o t e  o n  G e n d e r  a n d  S e x u a l  V i o l e n c e  i n  t h e  D R C  
 
The fact that sexual violence in the DRC is part of the experience of domination of 
women, and that this type of violence has been perpetrated largely by members of 
the Congolese armed forces, makes it important to situate the thesis in relation to 
gender and sexual violence. The thesis has explored women’s role in resistance to 
statebuilding as discourse generators, organisers, supporters and detractors of 
popular militias, and providers of everyday living. This has meant a lesser focus 
on their experience as survivors of sexual and gender-based violence. In several 
occasions I specifically interviewed women’s organisations that were either 
directly or indirectly dealing with sexual violence. Here women were not asked to 
narrate their experience of sexual violence but their experience more generally 
with authority, war, and survival. This is not to deny the extent to which women 
have been the target of rapists in the almost twenty years of conflict. However, it 
situates the research in a particular relationship to gender and sexual violence in 
the DRC in two ways.  
 
On the one hand, gender and sexual violence are seen as forms of oppression, 
intersecting with a range of violent and dominating actions. Although every such 
form, whether sexual violence, torture, intimidation, abuse, or killing, deserves its 
own analysis, the thesis is asking broader questions about how these relate to 
macro-processes of statebuilding and resistance.85 As a consequence, not 
                                                   
85 Thanks to Paul Kirby for this point.  
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addressing sexual violence is not due to a lack of attention but a demarcation of 
the limits of the research. In addition, the thesis takes seriously the findings of 
new research, which suggests that superficial or singled-out attention to sexual 
violence, linked to a narrative of the DRC as ‘the rape capital of the world’, has 
hindered our understanding of sexual violence in war in the DRC itself, and been 
detrimental to other forms of violence.86 Autesserre for example has noted that 
‘the disproportionate attention to sexual violence’ has neglected non-sexualised 
forms of torture, and ‘raised the status of sexual abuse to an effective bargaining 
tool for combatants’.87 Maria Baaz has also argued that a single sexual-violence 
focus in the DRC is counterproductive because it reinforces a colonial imaginary 
of Congo as a place of brutality and lack of civilisation, and monopolises attention 
on sexual violence.88 This also undermines the extent of the gravity of other forms 
of violence, provokes a limited understanding of the relationship between sexual 
violence and those other forms of violence, de-genders non-sexually related 
violence, and conflates sex with gender in a way that hides gendered violence 
against men and boys.89 Thus acknowledging these complexities and the limits of 
the research focus, the thesis sees different forms of subordination and 
domination having a diverse and intersecting relationship with violence. 
                                                   
86 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War?: Perceptions, 
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“How Is Rape a Weapon of War?: Feminist International Relations, Modes of Critical 
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Narratives on the Congo and Their Unintended Consequences,” African Affairs 111, no. 
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in War,” The Disorder Of Things, June 4, 2013, 
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87 Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales,” 205. 
88 Maria Eriksson Baaz, The Complexity of Violence (Uppsala: SIDA, 2010), 12 – 13. 
89 Ibid., 13 – 14. See also Vinck et al. who show that although sexually-related abuses are 
still very prevalent, they are less so than other human rights abuses. Out of 2,500 
interviewees, out of which 49.7% are women, 23.4% report having witnessed sexual 
violence, 15.7% report to have been sexually violated, and 11.6% having been violated 
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forced labour and enslavement, and 46.2% being beaten up by armed groups. Patrick 
Vinck et al., “Living with Fear: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes About Peace, 
Justice and Social Reconstruction in Eastern Congo,” Berkeley: Human Rights Centre, 
August 2008, 33 – 35. 
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On the other hand, and following from the above, the thesis focuses on the ways 
both power and resistance operate. Rather than exploring how this takes place 
through gender roles and sexual violence, the research has noted gender divisions 
across resistance practices – e.g. Whereas the vast proportion of armed resisters 
are young men, a significant amount of resistance through survival relies on the 
work done by women. It has also noted how sexual violence is present when 
speaking of resistance through armed groups. Additionally, although it is 
important to note how statebuilding and the assertion of political authority rest on 
the subjection of women through violence, this is an area that has received 
extensive research and theorisation.90  
 
The research has premised its study of resistance across different core foundations 
of statebuilding: discourse, violence and appropriation, as a way to provide an 
alternative account of both statebuilding and the DRC, while providing a 
framework for understanding resistance. This is already a vast enterprise, and one 
that was necessary, given the lack of depth in the accounts of both resistance and 
statebuilding in peace and conflict studies. The sacrifice has been to neglect a 
much deeper account of intra-group privilege and hierarchies. This would have 
entailed a much lengthier time of fieldwork, a narrower limit of places visited, 
and a distinct focus, which may not have spoken as directly to the debates it was 
addressing. Still, the discussion broadens the analysis by engaging in an 
interdisciplinary discussion with how everyday resistance has been conceived and 
criticised in the social sciences more generally.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
90 Maria Stern, Naming Security - Constructing Identity: “Mayan Women” in Guatemala on the 
Eve of “Peace” (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Mbembe, On the 
Postcolony, esp. Ch. 8; Jennifer Browdy de Hernandez et al., eds., African Women Writing 
Resistance: Contemporary Voices (Cape Town: Pambazuka Press, 2010). 
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5.  The Structure of the Thesis 
 
In order to develop these arguments, the thesis is structured in four parts: 
introduction, theory, empirical analysis and conclusion. In the introduction, 
Chapter One first examines the contradiction of how post-conflict statebuilding 
has been consolidated as the standard policy measure in spite of its poor rate of 
success. It then analyses the accounts of resistance in peace and conflict studies, 
identifying their limitations and suggesting the use of a Scottian framework as an 
alternative. Chapter Two examines the case of the DRC. It first discusses three 
standard explanations of the DRC case. It also introduces the necessary 
background to the conflict between 1996 and 2003, and to the UN missions in the 
DRC since 2001. It finally discusses the dynamics of the Kivus between 2009 and 
2011, which constitute the context of the empirical chapters.  
 
Part Three elaborates the theoretical framework for the thesis in two chapters: one 
for statebuilding (Chapter Three) and another one for resistance (Chapter Four). 
Chapter Three argues that resistance is rooted in the coercive and extractive 
practices of statebuilding, discussing Tilly’s and Mbembe’s theories, and the 
multiple challenges they bring to the account. Chapter Four is a development of 
the framework of resistance. Aside from reworking Scott’s definition of resistance, 
it addresses important critiques and shortcomings made to the framework, 
offering several solutions. These include the gradation of some of its elements 
with elements of De Certeau, and a way to account for the diversity of resistance 
practices in the DRC, including subversion and violence.  
 
The empirical part of the thesis explores the three areas of resistance practices. 
Chapter Five examines the discursive realm through statebuilding discourses 
developed as a claim to authority, and how they are challenged by mockery, 
denigration, slandering and subversion of meaning. Chapter Six examines violent 
resistance through the actions of Mai Mai militias and the ways the civilian 
population relates to them. Chapter Seven explores creative survival and the ways 
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reciprocity and solidarity allow for mitigating extractive practices and military 
rule.  
 
The thesis concludes with an opening. Applying the Scottian framework to the 
study of resistance in post-conflict statebuilding proves to be a rich exercise. It 
offers an account of the practices of resistance, while adding conceptual precision. 
The critical appraisal of the framework simultaneously opens avenues to reflect 
on other frameworks and explore other cases. The thesis does not suggest that a 
Scottian framework, and the critical development this thesis offers, should be the 
standard framework of resistance. The thesis argues that precisely because the 
study of everyday practices implies contextualisation, this affects the framework 
too. The fact that the study of resistance represents a long-standing multi-
disciplinary debate, an account of resistance also needs to address the core 
critiques made to different aspects of it. The thesis sees patterns, intentions, 
motivations, acts and actors as representative of core defining elements of 
resistance and the core elements in the critiques. Yet the complexities and 
muddleness of resistance need to be explained, not ignored or left as too complex 
to reduce them to an analytical category. A call to study everyday resistance and 
the need to account for the ‘epiphanies’ in the exercise of analytical abstractions 
between micro and macro realities is finally a call to embrace the exciting 
complexity of the world as a knowable sphere.91  
                                                   
91 Cf. ‘That the world is complex does not mean it is unknowable’. In Hobson, Lawson, 
and Rosenberg, “Historical Sociology,” 3362. 
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Chapter 1 
Statebuilding and Resistance:  A Patterned Relationship 
 
 
 
1.  Post-Cold War Interventionism and the UN: From the 
Guardian of State Sovereignty to the Bricklayer of the Social 
Contract 
 
Since 1945, a significant quantitative and qualitative development in the doctrines 
of intervention and conflict management has made state-society relations the 
particular sphere of international intervention.1 Looked at from the evolution of 
the system of collective security enshrined in the UN, out of the 67 UN 
peacekeeping operations from 1948 to 2012, only 18 took place between 1948 and 
1989. The remaining 49 took place in the post-Cold War period.2 Although this 
variance reflects Cold War politics and the use of veto, the fact that almost all of 
the 49 operations were internal conflicts highlights an important shift in the 
perception of international security threats and order maintenance.3 Each 
operation has been justified under the inter-state framework of the UN Charter.4 
What has changed is that these operations have been increasingly targeted at 
spheres previously thought of as the exclusive domain of the sovereign political 
                                                   
1 Intervention is understood in this thesis in the broad sense that it has within peace and 
conflict studies. It includes forms of interference in the domestic affairs of another state, 
military acts of aggression and collective security mechanisms activated by the UN 
Security Council. It also includes a broad spectrum of conflict and post-conflict formulas 
including humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, peace-building strategies and 
capacity-building, amongst others. See for example: David Chandler, Simon Chesterman, 
and Liisa Laakso, “Editors’ Introduction,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1, no. 1 
(2007): 1–2; Lakhdar Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (New 
York: United Nations, 2000), http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/ 
Accessed 30/12/2010; UN General Assembly, “Charter of the United Nations,” United 
Nations, 1945, 1.1 and 2.7, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ Accessed 
18/11/2011.  
2 See Appendix V for a complete list of operations. 
3 According to Charles Call 95% of conflicts were civil wars. Charles Call, “Ending Wars, 
Building States,” in Building States to Build Peace (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2008), 1. 
4 UN General Assembly, “UN Charter”, Chapters VI, VII and VIII. 
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authority. These operations have included programmes for economic, security 
sector and civil administration reform, as well as building civil society capacity.  
 
Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace marks this transition, establishing that the 
sources of conflict are social and economic and that peacebuilding efforts needed 
to aim not just at striking a truce, but at a whole set of post-conflict issues 
including: 
 
[T]he restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of 
weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security 
personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, 
reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting 
formal and informal processes of political participation.5 
 
However, the application of these aims over the last two decades has experienced 
multiple contradictions. In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, which the UN 
had failed to prevent, and with a worsening crisis in Bosnia, Boutros Ghali issued 
the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, clarifying that ‘[t]he UN is, for good 
reasons, reluctant to assume responsibility for maintaining law and order, nor can 
it impose a new political structure or new state institutions’.6 Boutros-Ghali 
conveyed the idea that the UN could not take over roles that are specifically state 
duties. In contrast, the UN has taken on the role of trustee and even actual 
government in cases suchtr as East Timor, Kosovo, Cambodia, and the DRC.7 The 
                                                   
5 UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, para. 55. 
6 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to “An Agenda for Peace”: Position Paper of the Secretary-
General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (New York: UN Gene
ral Assembly, January 3, 1995), para. 14. http://documents.un.org Accessed 05/11/2009. 
7 Edward Newman, “‘Liberal’ Peacebuilding Debates,” in New Perspectives on Liberal 
Peacebuilding, ed. Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver Richmond (New York: 
United Nations University Press, 2009), 44 – 46. The missions are as follows: United 
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), The United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), The United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the CIAT in the DRC. CIAT was a shared trustee 
between representatives of the UN Security Council and Angola, Belgium, Canada, 
Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia, the African Union and the European 
Union. Accord Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en Re ́publique De ́mocratique du 
Congo, 2002, Annex IV, 15, www.grandslacs.net/doc/2826.pdf Accessed 11/12/2008; UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, “Statement Attributable to the Spokesman for the 
Secretary-General on the Launch of the Joint Verification Mechanism to Address DRC-
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effects of the terrorist attacks of September 11 in the US were crucial for a doctrine 
that identified state failure as a risk to international peace and security.8 
Statebuilding has subsequently become the paradigm post-conflict strategy, to the 
extent that other international organisations and coalitions of states, with or 
without the UN authorisation, have undertaken it, in cases like Afghanistan, Iraq 
and Bosnia. Thus, as stated, the reconstitution of political authority and the 
renovation of a social contract have increasingly defined the aims of international 
interventions.  
 
However, the relationship between statebuilding and peacebuilding remains 
‘complicated’.9 Aside from the setbacks suffered, the interventions have often 
encountered resistance.10 The policy solutions given to the dynamics of state 
power and societal resistance have been premised under the formula of good 
governance. These formulas are based on the idea of a social contract where states 
‘deliver services [,] social and political groups constructively engage with their 
state’, and meet ‘certain expectations’ the international community has about their 
                                                                                                                                                   
Rwanda Border Security Issues,” September 22, 2004, para. 1, 
https://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=1093 Accessed 12/12/2008.  
8 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All. A/59/2005 (New York: United Nations General Assembly, March 21, 
2005), http://documents.un.org/ Accessed 15/04/2010; US President George Bush, The 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: The White House, 
September 17, 2002), 1, www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf Accessed 
20/08/2010; Andrew Sens, “Riga and Beyond: The Political Transformation of NATO,” 
NATO Review, 2006, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue4/english/analysis3.html Accessed 
27/10/2010.  
9 Call, “Ending Wars, Building States,” 3. 
10 Richard Falk, “The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent for the 
United Nations,” Harvard International Law Journal 36, no. 2 (1995): 341. Although the 
debate on the extent to which statebuilding has or not been successful is polarised, there is 
widespread consensus that it has suffered many setbacks and challenges. Call, “Ending 
Wars, Building States,” 3 – 5; Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, “Introduction: 
Understanding the Contradictions of Postwar Statebuilding,” in The Dilemmas of 
Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, ed. Roland Paris 
and Timothy D. Sisk, Security and Governance Series (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 1 – 20. 
The 2012 Human Security Report shows that between 2000 and 2004, 60% of terminated 
conflicts relapsed into conflict, the highest percentage since 1950. Human Security 
Research Group, Human Security Report 2012 - Sexual Violence, Education and War: Beyond 
the Mainstream Narrative (Vancouver: Human Security Report Project, 2012), 175, 
http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/overview.aspx Accessed 
22/09/2012. 
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performance.11 For instance, a comprehensive DFID report states, on the one hand, 
that,  
 
state effectiveness exists along a continuum in which conflict and violence 
– far from an aberration of state formation and development – are an 
integral reality of these processes.12 
 
On the other hand, the same DFID report notes that:  
 
Durable political settlements should not only represent elites as inclusively 
as possible, but should require the relations between the state and society – 
‘the social contract’ – to be robust and legitimate.13 
 
The tendency in policy-making has been to see challenges and resistance to state 
authority as an issue of legitimacy rather than understanding these features as 
integral to the reality of statebuilding. The scholarly research on resistance is still 
incipient. 
 
This chapter surveys the context in which this scholarly research has emerged, 
examining the accounts on resistance provided so far and outlining its alternative, 
which will be developed in the following chapters. The chapter first discusses the 
critical literature on statebuilding to observe the shifts that have provoked the 
study of resistance. Secondly, the chapter explores Richmond and MacGinty’s 
analyses as the most developed attempts to theorise resistance. The work of Oliver 
Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty has been at the forefront of making ‘resistance’ 
part of the vocabulary of the peacebuilding literature.14 However, more than a 
theorisation of resistance, what they have developed is the concept of hybridity. 
Lack of conceptual clarity, not having engaged with the critiques that have been 
                                                   
11 OECD-DAC, State-Building in Situations of Fragility, 1. 
12 DFID, The Politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens and States - Findings from Ten Years of DFID-
funded Research on Governance and Fragile States 2001–2010 - A Synthesis Paper (London: 
Department of International Development, 2010), 22. 
13 Ibid., 17, emphasis in the original. 
14 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace; Richmond, “Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace”; 
Stefanie Kappler and Oliver Richmond, “Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
Resistance or Emancipation?,” Security Dialogue 42, no. 3 (2011): 261 – 278; Mac Ginty, 
International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance. 
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made to the frameworks both Richmond and Mac Ginty draw on, and not having 
integrated a historical explanation into the framework of resistance has provided 
only a rudimentary account of it. Taking these issues into consideration, a third 
section discusses the importance of historicising the everyday as a way to explore 
statebuilding and resistance as a patterned relationship. Finally, the chapter 
outlines the framework of James Scott’s theory of everyday resistance, and 
historical sociology, as the basis for an alternative account.  
 
 
2.  The Critical Appraisal of Post-Conflict Statebuilding  
 
The literature on post-conflict statebuilding has proliferated and become 
increasingly nuanced in a relatively short period of time. Paris and Sisk, for 
instance, identify three generations in this literature in just a period of twenty 
years, from descriptive studies to the development of critical theoretical 
frameworks.15 This third generation mounted a strong critique of the so-called 
‘liberal peace’, which generated further debate between those defending liberal 
peace and those who thought the critiques had not gone far enough.16 These 
debates have recently extended to an analysis about whether statebuilding is 
liberal at all.17 Notwithstanding the different positions within these debates, there 
is consensus around two theoretical and methodological elements, which have 
encouraged a focus on resistance. One is to claim that statebuilding is less 
coherent and unitary than previously thought; the other is a focus on the actual 
practices on the ground. The emphasis on the challenges, setbacks and hybridity 
                                                   
15 Paris and Sisk, “The Dilemmas of Statebuilding,” 6 – 8. 
16 Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” Review of International Studies 36, no. 2 
(2010): 337–365; David Chandler, “The Uncritical Critique of ‘Liberal Peace’,” Review of 
International Studies 36, Supplement S1 (2010): 137–155. 
17 Oliver Richmond, “Beyond Liberal Peace? Responses to ‘Backsliding’,” in New 
Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding (New York: United Nations University Press, 2009), 54 
– 77; Chandler, Campbell, and Sabaratnam, A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of 
Statebuilding; Chandler, International Statebuilding. 
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is a response to an extensive literature that had portrayed statebuilding as 
overpowering and unitary.18  
 
From different strands, some representatives of the critiques of post-conflict 
statebuilding are Mark Duffield, David Chandler, Oliver Richmond, Michael 
Pugh and Roger Mac Ginty.19 They have argued that post-conflict statebuilding 
and peacebuilding are Western-driven strategies that fundamentally serve 
Western interests, whether as a form of control, discipline, extraction, or even as a 
new form of imperialism.20 Until the recent developments explored below, this 
literature has been more concerned with making a critique of how post-conflict 
statebuilding reflected the power dynamics in world politics than examining the 
ways in which these have been resisted. It could be argued that this focus has 
come from an understanding that doing critical theory implies, as Halliday put it, 
                                                   
18 Examples of the former include: John Heathershaw, Post-conflict Tajikistan: The Politics of 
Peacebuilding and the Emergence of Legitimate Order (London: Routledge, 2009); 
Heathershaw, “Unpacking the Liberal Peace”; Béatrice Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen 
from Below: UN Missions and Local People (London: Hurst & Co, 2006); Edward Newman 
and Oliver Richmond, eds., Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict 
Resolution (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006); Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace; 
Séverine Autesserre, “Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International 
Intervention,” International Organization 63 (2009): 249–80; Chandler, Campbell, and 
Sabaratnam, A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Statebuilding. Examples of the 
latter include: Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the 
Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Christopher Clapham, Africa 
and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); Paris, At War’s End; Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order 
and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century (London: Atlantic, 2004); David Chandler, Empire in 
Denial: The Politics of State-Building (London: Pluto Press, 2006); Roger Mac Ginty and 
Oliver Richmond, “Myth or Reality: Opposing Views on the Liberal Peace and Post-war 
Reconstruction,” Global Society 21, no. 4 (2007): 491–497. 
19 These are seen as directly engaged in the theorising of post-conflict statebuilding in the 
way the argument is developed here. There is a side effect in this choice, which is the 
creation of a false “core” and a subsequent “marginal” “other”, which, by default, 
prioritises Western, white, male, UK-based voices, leaving important works out, e.g. 
Susana Campbell, Sandra Halperin, Vivienne Jabri, Gilbert Kadiaghala, Thi Ha Yen 
Nguyen, Zubairu Wai, etc. For a reflection on the meaning of engaging and excluding 
material in academic writing see Christine Sylvester, “Anatomy of a Footnote,” Security 
Dialogue 38, no. 4 (January 12, 2007): 547–558. 
20 E.g. Richmond speaks of a ‘colonial gaze’ and a ‘colonial anxiety’ Richmond, 
“Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace,” 666; A Post-Liberal Peace, 118; Chandler, Empire in 
Denial; Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of 
Peoples (Cambridge: Polity, 2007). Esp. Ch. 7 and 8. 
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delegitimising what is presented as universal, natural and unchangeable.21 Post-
conflict statebuilding, being presented as a kind of universal, unchangeable 
solution, has generated a critique that has highlighted its parochialism and its 
unaccountable nature. However, far from ‘subvert[ing] the status quo’, as the 
ultimate aim of critical theorising might be, these works have reified an image of 
the West as a hegemonic, unchangeable and unitary actor.22  
 
Duffield is an illustrative example. He defines the ‘liberal peace thesis’ as the 
‘combin[ation] and conflat[ion of] ‘liberal’ (as in contemporary neoliberal 
economic and political tenets) with ‘peace’ (the present policy predilection 
towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction)’.23 In this framework, 
Western security interests are served by a radicalization of an agenda that merges 
development with security, and engages liberal reformers with networks of 
mostly non-state warring parties.24 Following Foucault, Duffield argues that 
‘human security’, ‘underdevelopment’ and ‘state fragility’ are technologies of 
power where development or peace are not the actual objective of developmental 
aid and peace strategies, but rather strategies of containment to keep poverty and 
war far from the developed world.25 Duffield attempts to expose the 
‘developmental rhetoric of scarcity or breakdown […] to address the possibility 
that protracted instability is symptomatic of new and expanding forms of political 
economy; a function of economic change rather than a developmental malaise’.26 
For Duffield, war, insecurity and underdevelopment are generated by the 
dynamics of appropriation by dispossession in capitalism. These dynamics 
generate a ‘surplus uninsured population’, who suffer the effects of this 
                                                   
21 Fred Halliday, “For an International Sociology,” in Historical Sociology of International 
Relations, ed. Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 247. 
22 Mark Hoffman, “Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate,” Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 16, no. 2 (1987): 246. 
23 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and 
Security (Zed Books, 2001), 11, emphasis in the original. 
24 Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Mark Duffield, “Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development: Aid as a 
Relation of Global Liberal Governance,” Development and Change 33, no. 5 (2002): 1051.  
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dispossession and relies on its own devices to cope with, and is ‘potentially 
dangerous’.27 Thus the liberal peace is a way to manage this risk, not to change or 
address these dynamics.28   
 
In showing that processes of intervention, war and underdevelopment are co-
constituted by and constitutive of larger structures of capitalism and world order, 
Duffield insightfully captures the links between politics and economics, security 
and ideology operating across international and national divides. Duffield 
explores resistance though only superficially. Resistance is conceptualised as sites 
of boycotts, insurgencies and forms of non-cooperation to create autonomy.29  However, 
there is no explanation of when, for instance, the uninsured population acts as a 
vehicle for governmentality and when as a vehicle for creating autonomy from it. 
Lack of attention to resistance risks producing an over-rationalised account of 
what capitalism is and how Western states operate.  
  
Also using a Foucauldian framework, Chandler argues that post-conflict 
statebuilding is a way for Western governments to control the autonomy of non-
Western sovereign states in their relations with citizens and foreign countries.30 
Chandler provides several useful arguments about the nature of post-conflict 
statebuilding and the shortcomings of the critical literature, but has not escaped 
the trap of a Western-orientated focus. Chandler argues that post-conflict 
statebuilding is not liberal. Contrary to the critical literature that has seen 
interventions framed in the standard ‘good governance’ parlance of democracy, 
rule of law, human rights and development, Chandler argues that ‘it is important 
to consider their reinterpretation within the international statebuilding 
paradigm’.31 One of the main arguments Chandler makes about post-conflict 
statebuilding is that it is a new paradigm of policy and practices where there is an 
                                                   
27 Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War, 11. 
28 Ibid., 33. 
29 As seen on: Ibid., 75, 137, 154 and 187. 
30 Chandler, International Statebuilding, 14 – 15.  
31 Ibid., 26.  
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‘inversion of liberalism’.32 This is defined as ‘post-liberalism’.33 Unlike Richmond, 
for whom post-liberalism is an ethical ideal, for Chandler, this is a new paradigm 
that describes the nature and logic of statebuilding.34 Whereas for classical 
liberalism and previous approaches to post-conflict intervention, the ‘autonomy 
of the subject’ is the foundation upon which modern liberal democratic forms of 
government are constituted’, for the new paradigm of post-conflict statebuilding 
‘autonomy appears to be the problem which requires management’.35 In a later 
edited volume, Chandler further asserts that post-conflict interventions are 
neither liberal nor ideologically coherent.36  
 
Chandler also identifies the contradictory nature of such project whereby  
 
[t]he view that states and societies, subject to the gaze of international 
statebuilders cannot be left to develop their own solutions to social, 
economic and political questions has increasingly gone along with the idea 
that international intervention cannot solve these problems or questions on 
their behalf.37 
 
With this idea, Chandler also suggests that post-conflict statebuilding discourses 
serve both as a way to provide their own rationale and place blame on targets. 
The fact that reconstructing sovereignty is both ‘altruistic’ and ‘self-interested’, for 
Chandler, explains why, despite its poor record, ‘western governments still feel 
compelled to carry it out’.38 Chandler accounts for failure and incoherence in post-
conflict statebuilding, providing a theoretically rich explanation of it. However, 
within it, post-conflict statebuilding seems overpowering and the result of an 
identifiable single strategy. Additionally, the fact that statebuilding is theorised as 
externally driven not only introduces a problematic separation between the local 
                                                   
32 Chandler, International Statebuilding. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace. 
35 Chandler, International Statebuilding, 15. 
36 Susanna Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam, “Introduction: The Politics 
of Liberal Peace,” in A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Statebuilding, ed. Susanna 
Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam (London: Zed Books, 2011), 3. 
37 Chandler, International Statebuilding, 26. 
38 Ibid., 15 and 1. 
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and international spheres, but it also makes the dynamics between these two 
spheres one of the most salient features in statebuilding processes.  
 
Pugh has focused on the political economy of peacebuidling. He has argued that 
the changes in the economic approach within liberal peacebuilding projects, 
embodied in the Millennium Development Goals of the 2000s, is a more refined 
approach than the aggressive Washington consensus-inspired approach of the 
1990s. According to Pugh, nonetheless, this new approach still fails to tackle the 
real needs of war-torn societies. Pugh argues that ‘[a]n inclusive/emancipatory 
participation of local actors and structural diversity in political economies 
indicates alternative options to the revisionist ideology that is embedded in a 
liberal structuring of global political economy’.39 In a similar way to Duffield, 
Pugh analyses the forms of resistance to the socio-economic effects of 
statebuilding projects. He argues that: 
 
Resistance to the power of neoliberalism as a framework for sustainable 
development and peacebuilding have also apparently been influential. 
These include in the present case: pressures for “fair trade”, fulfilment of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), debt reduction, demands for 
social protection for the poor, and abandonment of aid conditionality.40 
 
The risk here is to provide an analysis dichotomised between a powerful capitalist 
West and a non-capitalist other, and in the process make resistance the sole 
activity of those politically engaged and organised.  
 
It is towards these analyses and to a more general critique of liberal interventions 
that the works of Richmond and Mac Ginty have been directed when analysing 
resistance. They have aimed to provide a more grounded account of how post-
conflict statebuilding is resisted. They have argued that the categories of the 
international and local created in policy-making and peacebuilding studies need to 
                                                   
39 Michael Pugh, “The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: a Critical Theory Perspective,” 
International Journal of Peace Studies 10, no. 2 (2005): 24. 
40 Ibid., 26, emphasis in the original. 
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be questioned. The study of ‘practices’ as the locus of research of both post-
conflict statebuilding and resistance has been a way to avoid unhelpful binaries 
and provide greater contextualisation. However, both Richmond and Mac Ginty 
have ended up re-creating the same narrative of the West as a self-constructed 
agent at the forefront of interventions. Before exploring the implications of this 
‘practice turn’, the next section turns to the work done on resistance.  
 
 
3.  From Spoilers to Everyday Resistance  
 
Throughout the different generations of peacebuilding literature there have been 
two approaches to resistance, one focused on ‘spoilers’ and the other on 
‘resistance and hybridity’. Both Oliver Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty have 
arrived at the concept of resistance through the concept of the spoiler. The 
‘spoiler’ debate reflects a generation of more descriptive, less critically engaged 
research that characterised early peacebuilding research. The spoiler debate had 
its peak in the late 1990s with the publication of Stedman’s Spoiler Problems in 
Peace Processes.41 Stedman pioneered the concept of the ‘spoiler’, which he defined 
as ‘leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations 
threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine 
attempts to achieve it’.42 Under this view, the setbacks that peace processes had to 
face were located at the elite and violent level. They were conceived of in value-
laden terms in which interventions represented the general interest, whereas 
spoilers were self-seeking individuals spoiling a ‘virtuous process’.43 This was the 
view of Newman and Richmond when they argued that: 
  
spoiling and spoilers cannot be delinked from normative considerations of 
conflicts or peace processes. In particular, we cannot necessarily assume 
that all peace processes are equitable or fair to all parties. Thus, the act of 
                                                   
41 Stephen J. Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22, no. 
2 (1997): 5 – 53. 
42 Ibid., 5. 
43 Cf. Ghani, Lockhart, and Carnahan, “State-building in Fragile and Conflict-Affected 
Conditions,” 2. 
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labelling a particular group as a ‘‘spoiler’’ may reflect a political agenda 
which is an extension of the conflict itself, or the interests of third parties.44 
 
Increasingly, there has been a shift towards seeing international and national 
actors as involved in an ongoing process of social change, in which neither of 
these categories is clearly defined. Mac Ginty has advocated the use of the concept 
of ‘spoiling’, rather than ‘spoiler’, to signify precisely how the changing relations 
and identities are fundamental for grasping peacebuilding operations.45 The 
concept of the spoiler still holds some value in policy circles.46 In academic 
research, there has been a shift towards the study of resistance as broadly 
denoting the not always accommodating response of societies to post-conflict 
statebuilding. A plethora of concepts are being used to identify this dynamic. For 
instance, Richmond and Mac Ginty use resistance as or alongside ‘critical agency’, 
‘subversion’, ‘contestation’, ‘distortion’, and ‘hybridisation’.47 Other scholars also 
have referred to ‘transformation and subversion’48 and ‘social resistance and 
unruliness’.49 Ultimately, this signals, firstly, a lack of a reference framework for 
                                                   
44 Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, “Obstacles to Peace Processes: Understanding 
Spoiling,” in Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution, ed. 
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2006), 153 – 172. 
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Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo. S/2011/738 (New 
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48 Mitchell, Lost in Transformation, 30 – 32. 
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the study of resistance, and, secondly, that these concepts have tended to add to a 
critique of post-conflict statebuilding, but not to develop the concepts as such. The 
work of Richmond and Mac Ginty is particularly illustrative of these issues and 
they also represent the most developed effort to theorise resistance within this 
literature.   
 
T h e  I n f r a p o l i t i c s  o f  P e a c e b u i l d i n g  
 
Oliver Richmond’s work has focused on hybridity and resistance in peacebuilding 
contexts in the last few years. His book Post-Liberal Peace, which reflects and 
builds upon earlier work, serves as a framework of reference with which to 
observe Richmond’s evolution.50 Richmond’s notion of resistance pivots on 
different and overlapping concepts including: local, everyday, agency and 
hybridity. This framework is mainly drawn from Michel De Certeau and post-
colonial theory, also deploying the Scottian notion of infrapolitics to cover a wide 
range of actions that are rooted in everyday needs. The overall argument 
Richmond makes is that post-conflict statebuilding is top-down, coercive and 
contested by a myriad of actors that end up making it hybrid, far from the liberal 
state it projects upon the target societies.  
 
This agency can only be grasped by a pluralist ethnographic approach and should 
highlight the need for contextualised, locally sensitive and welfare-based 
responses in order to construct positive peace. Ultimately, for Richmond, 
‘[r]esistance to the liberal peace in post-colonial terms implies a hybrid form of 
peace with its own transformative qualities, which are resistant to exclusion’.51 
That is, for Richmond, resistance is a form of critical agency that in striving to 
                                                   
50 Oliver Richmond, The Transformation of Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
See the references to anti-colonial resistance and democratic movements as an alternative 
peace on p. 31 - 32 and 71 - 73; See also Oliver Richmond and Jason Franks, “The Impact 
of Orthodox Terrorism Discourses on the Liberal Peace: Internalisation, Resistance, or 
Hybridisation?,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 2, no. 2 (2009): 201–218; Richmond, 
“Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace.” 
51 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, 197. 
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fulfil local interests and needs hybridises liberal peace. Richmond arguably uses 
the concept of resistance to articulate a critique and a theoretical framework to 
understand statebuilding. Although this is a considerable step in theorising 
resistance, Richmond is not creating an analytical category of resistance from 
which to ascertain what it is.  
 
L o c a l ,  E v e r y d a y ,  A g e n c y  a n d  H y b r i d i t y   
 
The local for Richmond grasps the different intersecting relations from within 
society, between the interveners and societies, and the processes of hybridisation 
amongst them. There are three related concepts: locality, local and local-local.52 
‘Locality’ represents the nature of a physical space that is both local and global, 
referring not to ‘territoriality’, but to a form of ‘agency’ within that space.53 The 
‘local’ refers to how the international community identifies the actors in the 
societies in which it operates (elites and civil society). The term ‘local-local’ is 
different and it identifies ‘the existence and diversity of communities and 
individuals that constitute political society beyond this often liberally projected 
artifice of elites and civil society’.54 These three concepts identify the local as a 
methodological approach that unites the concepts of hybridity with agency 
capturing quotidian clashes and symbioses. The local also serves as a platform for 
advocating a peace-building agenda that is locally relevant and a research agenda 
that is action-driven and ethnographically-based towards an emancipatory goal.55  
 
Alongside local, as a kind of critical agency, the ‘everyday’ is deployed as a site of 
resistance and of emancipatory activity. Richmond makes a call for a ‘fourth 
generation of peace’ or ‘eirenism’, which implies a better contextualised, more 
culturally-centred and empathic peace, where people’s needs, rather than the 
needs of geo-strategic interests, international agendas and international 
                                                   
52 Ibid., 14. 
53 Ibid., 13; Richmond, “Critical Agency,” 423. 
54 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, 14. 
55 Ibid., 14 – 15. 
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liberalism, are at the centre.56 Everyday is both a space and an action of power and 
resistance, ‘a terrain in which an everyday life exists that is both commensurate 
with, in opposition to, and modifying of colonial practices of government’.57 As 
such, the everyday is the site for emancipation, which necessarily takes place 
through critically acting upon such colonial practices.  
 
Richmond associates this ‘critical agency’ with non-violent forms of resistance. 
These are activated ‘in unanticipated and sometimes controversial ways’, 
hybridising statebuilding and resulting in ‘the birth of a post-liberal peace’.58 
Richmond does not omit the fact that there is violent resistance in post-conflict 
contexts; but he privileges non-violent forms as ‘constructive practices’ and 
ultimately emancipatory.59 Richmond refers to a wide range of practices from non-
compliance and subsistence strategies to Ghandian and Latin American pro-
democracy-inspired civil movements.60 Richmond characterises the nature of this 
agency, and hence of resistance as being ‘hidden, fragmented, often disguised and 
localised’.61 The implications of this account, which follows closely Scott’s 
framework, will be analysed in Chapter Four. What is to be remarked here is that 
there is insufficient explanation to equate hiddenness and disguise with non-
violent resistance, while simultaneously equating it with more organised and 
public forms of mobilisation. Although this is done via social movements 
literature and, in particular, the work of Alberto Melucci, how these different 
arguments and frameworks relate to an account of resistance requires further 
explanation.62  
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International Studies 35, no. 03 (2009): 557–580.  
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Despite the emphasis on hybridity and on the transversal character of the local 
and peacebuilding processes, the relationship between these two is defined by 
statebuilding being international and liberal, and the local being a hybridised, 
culturally grounded agency against statebuilding. That is, there has been a 
reification of the local/international and liberal/non-liberal binaries. As a 
practical application of the argument, in an article with Stephanie Kappler, 
resistance is conceived of as different actions against the international 
peacebuilding efforts of the European Union in Bosnia. Although there is an 
acknowledgement of the fact that ‘locals’ have different agendas, some of them 
connecting with those of the peacebuilding mission and some not, the result is a 
reification of these categories. The authors suggest that  
 
[p]eacebuilding at the grassroots has become partly synonymous with 
independence. It has repoliticized and given substance to the local 
agencies that have emerged. This can be viewed in two ways: either 
peacebuilding as resistance revitalizes the liberal social contract and gives 
externally constructed states such as Bosnia and Herzegovina internal 
substance, or it enables a more proactive encounter between the liberal 
peace and its ‘others’, in which the hegemonic weight of the liberal peace 
project is countermanded by local desires for autonomy and local agency 
for emancipation.63  
 
These local agencies seem to be activated only towards the international 
peacebuilding project. Their two possible responses, either as constitutive of the 
liberal social contract, or as a counter-hegemonic form to a liberal project, 
underscore the fact that resistance is under-theorised.  The article moves between 
resistance that is done by elites and non-elites, intentionally and non-
intentionally, as supportive as well as transformative of the international 
strategies. For Kappler and Richmond, the contention between EU-local is about 
how these cultural features, understandings and self-images influence the 
meaning of peace. This has potential but remains vague. The final conclusion of 
Kappler and Richmond is a call for more locally-sensitive peacebuilding, 
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especially with the needs and culture of societies. The implication of this 
negotiation/resistance having a sort of endpoint in social relations is debatable 
and arguably ignores what have historically been processes of statebuilding and 
resistance. 
 
Richmond’s greatest contribution not only is to have been ahead of the field with 
a first attempt at theorising resistance in post-conflict contexts, but also to have 
done so within the framework of everyday resistance. This avenue has facilitated 
a first account of resistance in post-conflict statebuilding. Richmond has explored 
diverse everyday practices ranging from imperceptible to organised and vocal 
forms of resistance that converge in their capacity to corrupt, transform and 
subvert international interventions. This is a step forward. However, as an 
account of resistance, it remains vague. Having taken violence out of the 
‘everyday’, emancipatory resistance has automatically created, without much 
explanation, not just two categories, but also a Manichean division between 
“good” and “bad” resistance. This is added to the reification of binaries and the 
absence of a historically grounded account. Examining similar issues found in 
Mac Ginty’s recent work will help elaborating these critiques. 
 
H y b r i d i s i n g  S t a t e b u i l d i n g  
 
Mac Ginty deploys a series of concepts to articulate, similarly to Richmond, that 
statebuilding is challenged and ultimately hybridised. International peacebuilding 
is for Mac Ginty a process of hybridisation for the societies it is applied to as much 
as for international peacebuilding and its agents. Hybridity for Mac Ginty is ‘the 
composite forms of social thinking and practice that emerge as the result of the 
interaction of different groups, practices, and worldviews’.64 Thus hybridisation is 
a process of intertwinement of individuals, as well as institutions, within and 
across societies. It is the recognition of the heterogeneity that defines societies and 
guidance for research to stay away from concepts that portray societies as pure 
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and enclosed.65 This applies to how scholars think about interventions, because 
both interveners and intervened are already hybrids in themselves due to their 
previous historical trajectory and their complex composition.66 However, in peace 
processes they are both subject to further transformation. Local societies do so 
because of the power and hegemony of the liberal peace. International 
interventions transform because of the “resistance”, “distortion”, and 
“blowbacks” posed by local societies.67  
 
Despite Mac Ginty’s attention to resistance, his analysis is concerned with 
developing the framework of hybridity and challenging what have been rather 
neatly constructed categories in the statebuilding literature. Mac Ginty illustrates 
that giver and recipient work both ways, and that, notwithstanding the 
constraints to provide a legible and simplified analysis, categories constructed so 
far in the literature of peace interventions need to be put into question. However, 
it is precisely at this point where Mac Ginty’s analysis falls prey of its own 
critique. Although categories such as “liberal peace”, “international community” 
or “international peacebuilding” are disaggregated, the book maintains a dividing 
line between the “international” and “the local”. Hybridity as a framework of 
analysis has four main defining elements: ‘the coercive power of the liberal peace, 
the incentivising power of the liberal peace, the ability of local actors to resist the 
liberal peace, and the ability of local actors to provide alternatives to the liberal 
peace’.68 However, the several notions Mac Ginty deploys relating to resistance 
and the four-point-account of hybridity are not connected to a conceptual 
framework of resistance.  
 
Resistance runs across different acts, being defined as ‘the ability of local actors, 
networks, and structures to resist, ignore, subvert, and adapt liberal peace 
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interventions’.69 Mac Ginty highlights that resistance can be conscious or 
unconscious, that its acts can have unintended consequences, and that they can be 
both an engagement against and a disengagement from peacebuilding.70 For 
instance, speaking of the case of the informalisation of the economy in Iraq, Mac 
Ginty categorises it as a form of unconscious resistance that has allowed people to 
provide for themselves and keep away from the ‘lack of reach of the formal 
economy’.71 Mac Ginty here breaks with what might be called the De Certeau-
Scott problem. That is, the extent to which actions need to be consciously directed 
against a claim from authority or whether actions by themselves, depending on 
their outcome, could be seen as resistance. Thus Mac Ginty affirms that 
‘‘resistance’ is simply people getting on with their lives, opting out of the formal 
structures and norms offered by the liberal peace, and creating their own 
solutions to local issues’.72 What is problematic is that by this account, resistance is 
presented as ungraspable, without explaining why. So, for Mac Ginty,  
 
resistance can come in many forms, and […] we may not always have the 
correct antennae with which to pick up the extent of resistance. There is a 
tendency to focus on obvious forms of resistance such as violent 
insurgency, but more subtle and everyday forms abound in terms of non-
compliance or ‘waiting it out’’.73  
 
The account is not to be disregarded, but it needs further explanation. As seen 
below, Mac Ginty could link these practices to De Certeau’s ‘perruque’ or Scott’s 
‘pose’. However, without further elaboration it is not possible to elucidate why is 
‘waiting it out’ resistance and not resignation, for example; or whether these are 
the kinds of practices both high-level bureaucrats and ordinary citizens might 
engage in. 
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S u b v e r t i n g  l o g i c s  a n d  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  D e  C e r t e a u  
 
It could be argued that in both Richmond (alongside with post-colonial theory 
and references to James Scott) and Mac Ginty (despite the absence of a reference 
framework of resistance), the driving work is done with De Certeau. In fact De 
Certeau seems to have inspired a literature on hybridity and transformations in 
peacebuilding studies.74 The uses of De Certeau have opened fruitful avenues 
through which to explore how the logics of post-conflict statebuilding have been 
subverted, especially from the view that these logics are self-serving practices of 
the international interveners. However, as mentioned, De Certeau has been 
deployed to advance an argument about hybridity, as opposed to resistance. As a 
framework of resistance, De Certeau’s theory has been slightly twisted in its 
application to the nuances about consciousness and class. This has implications to 
understand practices of resistance. 
 
For example, there are important differences between De Certeau and James Scott, 
especially when delimiting what counts as a practice of resistance, how and why. 
Whereas for De Certeau, there are ‘practices’ above ‘practitioners’ – or rather the 
practices become a representation of the practitioners; for James Scott the practices 
become meaningful when explored within a particular relationship. For De 
Certeau, innumerable daily practices including walking or consuming can be 
representative of the ways in which people rework their own environment. These 
daily practices subvert, even if microscopically, the order imposed. For James 
Scott, foot-dragging or denigrating authorities become representative of how 
subordinate groups attack or palliate domination. There are therefore important 
differences regarding intentionality, how these practices are used and by whom 
and how they might be understood as resistance. 
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De Certeau analyses two kinds of practices, which he links to a Clausewitzean 
understanding of strategy and tactic in war. ‘Strategy’ is that of the general. It 
represents power (‘a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution’), and its 
practices relate to the delimitation of a place ‘from which relations with an 
exteriority composed of targets or threats (customers [,] competitors, enemies, the 
country surrounding the city […]) can be managed’.75 A ‘tactic’ is a ‘calculated 
action determined by the absence of a proper locus’.76 This is ‘the art of the weak’, 
of the soldier, the private, it operates within ‘the enemy’s field of vision’ but it 
does not have the vision of the enemy as a whole, it plays with it, mostly in the 
form of ‘trickery’.77 Although there is in both an element of consciousness, tactics 
remain ambiguous because they are ungraspable, and respond to their own logic.  
 
In De Certeau’s analysis, power and resistance, strategy and tactic, respond to an 
‘everyday war’ of targeting and trickery, of delimitation and avoidance, of control 
of autonomy and of reappropriating the everyday order of life. The figures of the 
‘weak’ and the ‘soldier’ against the ‘strong’ and ‘the general’ point to a notion of 
subversion that is linked to the material relations and social hierarchy between 
them. Understanding ‘tactics’ as a form of resistance by elites does not follow 
straightforwardly from this framework. 
 
De Certeau’s notion of consciousness partly originates as a critique to how 
Foucault and Bourdieu understood power as pervasively present, even in the 
minuscule aspects of the accent acquired in speech or the bodily control in prison. 
De Certeau criticises Bourdieu for painting his subjects as having ‘no intention’, 
living in an ‘assumed world’ and their actions being simply, a habitus, ‘a repetition 
of the past’.78 For De Certeau, Bourdieu compromised his work, leaving subjects 
without agency, history or decision-making capacity. He reproaches Foucault for 
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providing little distinction between rationalities, mechanisms, dispositifs and 
apparatuses, resulting in a set of ‘scattered technologies’ and creating a false 
problematic ‘dichotomy between “ideologies” and “procedures”’.79 For De 
Certeau, discourse does not require practice and not all discourses are based on 
practice. However, it is possible for discourse and practice to be the same thing.80 
For De Certeau it is important to understand what procedures might respond to 
other logics, outside or even subverting that of power. De Certeau’s concepts of 
practice and resistance rely on the meaning of tactics. They are a ‘calculation’, 
hence conscious, but they are also millenarian and hence ingrained in the 
subconscious, provoking simultaneously an unconscious use.81 They are a form of 
subversion of the logic of power more than an attack.  
 
De Certeau’s notion of resistance is seen in his discussion of ‘la perruque’ (the 
wig). Workers may sometimes play the role of the employee, as if wearing a wig, 
but may not be performing the work assigned. De Certeau defines it as follows: 
 
It differs from absenteeism in that the worker is officially on the job.  La 
perruque may be as simple a matter as a secretary's writing a love letter on 
‘company time’ or as complex as a cabinetmaker's ‘borrowing’ a lathe to 
make a piece of furniture for his living room.82 
  
Here it is possible to see how for De Certeau, the doing, that is the writing of the 
love letter, which responds to the logic of the secretary’s own life and interests, is 
a way of subverting the logic of work and the power relation between employer 
and worker. Yet it is not an oppositional organised collective act against 
capitalism. It is a quotidian strategy that subverts subordination.  
 
However, this opens an ambiguous ground due to the fact that these practices 
need to be grasped by their outcomes. If only when the logic of power has been 
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subverted can we assume resistance, a trap is created by the fact that power is 
generally successful in being imposed. Conversely, following the same argument, 
there may not be any situation in which the logic of power is not subverted. In the 
context of post-conflict statebuilding, the logic of subversion and outcomes 
applies best when theorising hybridity (an outcome) but resistance becomes 
elusive. This is not to disregard De Certeau. Quite the contrary, the proposal here 
is to make a more defined use of this framework and an analysis of its 
implications. As will be shown through the course of this thesis, De Certeau is an 
imperative reference to articulate modes of subversion and gradients of 
intentionality as part of a more concretised framework of resistance. However, on 
its own, the account of resistance it provides is vague. 
 
T h e  R u d i m e n t a r i n e s s  o f  R e s i s t a n c e  a n d  t h e  E v e r y d a y   
 
From the above, there are two issues that need to be addressed in order to deploy 
resistance in a more consistently articulated way. The first one is the absence of a 
clear framework that systematically analyses the implications of the different 
concepts used and their intellectual baggage. Neither Richmond nor Mac Ginty 
grapple with the problems the frameworks they rely upon grappled with. For 
instance, one of the main contentions in the debates that have taken place in the 
study of resistance is whether intent or consciousness needs to be present for 
resistance to be so.83 More scrutiny needs to be done of the merging of elites and 
non-elites together in the same account of everyday resistance. Ignoring the class 
element both in resistance and in the frameworks of De Certeau and Scott is a 
slippage. Passing superficially through these issues is a disservice to the 
theorisation of resistance. So is the use of myriad of concepts interchangeably with 
resistance without proper account.  
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The second issue is the theorisation of the nature of post-conflict statebuilding 
only as a liberal international enterprise. Following Richmond’s argument that 
resistance is ‘commensurate with the practices of government’, Richmond argues, 
for instance, that the individualising and fragmenting practices of liberal 
programmes towards civil society building have fragmented civil society.84 For 
Richmond, resistance’s hidden and disguised nature implies not rising against or 
to capture state power but being expressions of affection and solidarity that can 
develop into social action.85 But the question this raises is why is there then only 
an account of international liberal statebuilding as a form of authority without 
regard to statebuilding practices writ large. This does not mean dislodging the 
international element in post-conflict statebuilding, but demanding an account of 
the ways in which violence, accumulation and political authority assertion is 
contested. Otherwise, as Chandler notes, critical analyses of statebuilding could 
end up being an apology for intervention, suggesting that the interventions could 
be better if they were not as liberal and were more empathic and locally 
sensitive.86  
 
 
4.  The Everyday Re-Turn and the Elision of the Historical 
Explanation87 
 
One aspect that is raised by the analyses discussed above is the establishment of 
‘practice’ and ‘the everyday’ as the locus of research of both post-conflict 
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statebuilding and the resistance to it.88 The recent everyday turn in peace and 
conflict studies has fostered a focus on resistance, highlighting statebuilding’s 
weaknesses, ‘blind spots’ and incoherencies.89 Using practice-based and 
ethnographic methodologies, this focus has simultaneously explored in more 
subtle ways than before the interrelationship between international and national 
actors, looking more closely at how societies respond. However, the way research 
has been focused on everydayness and practices seems to have elided an important 
historical explanation. 
 
For instance, Chandler’s Foucauldian approach shows how practices become 
coordinated through a regime of truth, to create a reality that did not exist 
before.90 Such practices form the post-liberal paradigm. Chandler’s methodology 
has been to trace the relationship between discourses and practice through policy 
documents, statements and drafts, and the examination of actual deployment. 
Similarly, Duffield situates his study within a governmentality framework using 
Foucault and Agamben. Duffield has used semi-structured interviewing and 
fieldwork based research focusing on INGOs, international organisations and 
their personnel. The focus on the practices of international actors attempts to 
establish how the rationalities of the liberal peace and the genealogy of its 
practices.91 
 
From those who have theorised resistance, practice has also been a primary area 
of research. Mac Ginty for instance sees peace as a practice and the peace-making 
patterns as a way to impose such practice and its values.92 For Mac Ginty, 
hybridity is a methodological approach, which he describes as being interpretive, 
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case-study based, comparative and critical.93 Contextualising the account is for 
Mac Ginty fundamental, not to present societies defined by the otherwise 
‘exceptional moments’ of ‘sectarianism, violence, or societal fracture’.94 Richmond 
openly calls his work ethnographic, further claiming that this research avenue is 
amenable to an active-research that has an emancipatory aim in mind.95 This 
ethnography has to be used to research the ‘practices, discourses and rationalities 
[that] produce governmentality’ as well as the practices of subversion that against 
each other create hybridity.96 History is acknowledged as part of what constitutes 
‘local’ culture and identity, and as an account towards a post-liberal and 
emancipatory future.  
 
These analyses demonstrate that the relationship between ‘practice’ and 
‘ethnography’ and between ‘practices’ and ‘patterns’ needs to be clarified. On the 
first issue, something else needs to be said about how methodologies match the 
critical frameworks used in research. Wanda Vrasti has argued that the use of 
ethnography in International Relations since the end of the 1980s has been 
selective and instrumental, mainly for data-collection purposes or as ways of 
critiquing the standard methodological foundations of the discipline while 
maintaining the credentials for remaining within the parameters of scientific 
research.97 According to Vrasti, these usages have not taken full account of the 
political implications of employing such a method, its imperial legacy, and the 
critical transformation it has gone through within Anthropology. Taking ‘the 
Comaroffs puzzle’ Vrasti wonders: ‘How do we explain that, just when 
ethnography was being challenged within cultural anthropology for its 
structuralist, Orientalist and masculinist foundations, other disciplines, IR 
included, turned to ethnography as a potential source of political 
emancipation?’98 Vrasti’s article has raised debate around the relationship 
                                                   
93 Ibid., 44 – 45. 
94 Ibid., 3. 
95 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, 129. 
96 Ibid., 12. 
97 Vrasti, “The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations.”  
98 Jean and John Comaroff cited in Ibid., 294.  
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between International Relations’ ontology and methodological avenues.99 This is 
not to deny the value of ethnography for International Relations - in fact, Vrasti 
calls upon international scholars to engage critically with ethnography, not to 
disregard it. What Vrasti’s critique illustrates is the need for engaging with the 
intellectual baggage of theoretical and methodological approaches used and 
incorporated in research. 
 
The second and related issue is the need to emphasise De Certeau’s and Scott’s 
conception of ‘practices’ in everyday life as having a history and being 
representatives of patterns. Both De Certeau and Scott focused on practices as a 
representation of the practical ways of dealing with the experience of domination 
in everyday life as well as a reflection of millenarian practices followed by 
subordinate classes. It would follow that any framework based on these authors 
would see practices as historically constituted. Adler and Pouliot identify five 
characteristics that clearly convey this meaning. Practices are: 1) a ‘performance’, 
which is the doing or making of something; 2) they are a ‘pattern’, constituting 
‘regularity of behaviour’ and ‘the flow of history’; 3) they are ‘socially 
recognisable’; 4) ‘represent a skill (more than knowledge); and 5) ‘weave together 
discursive and material worlds’.100 Under this account, practices and actors 
represent not just a hybrid outcome, but are part of a process that speaks of 
patterns of continuity and change. The final section discusses how this approach 
is used in the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
99 See the discussion in Millennium: Vrasti, “The Strange Case of Ethnography and 
International Relations”; Jason P. Rancatore, “It Is Strange: A Reply to Vrasti,” Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 39, no. 1 (2010): 65–77; Vrasti, “Dr Strangelove, or How I 
Learned to Stop Worrying About Methodology and Love Writing”; See also the 
engagement of Richmond with Vrasti, A Post-Liberal Peace, 129. 
100 Adler and Pouliot, “International Practices,” 6 – 7. 
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5.  The Mêtis of Statebuilding and Resistance: James Scott,  
Historical Sociology and Eastern DRC  
 
A focus on everyday resistance allows for the grasping of ‘practical knowledge’ or 
‘metes’.101 For resistance, this methodology implies a focus on individual, 
collective ideological and material insubordination; for statebuilding, it focuses on 
the practices that facilitate and concretise the operationalisation of formal 
schemes. However, this methodology imposes a limitation on generalisations. For 
Scott, ‘although there is something to say about states, revolutions, urbanisation, 
etc […] in the end we would have knowledge about this revolution, this 
urbanization, etc’.102 Simultaneously, ‘practices’ cannot be disentangled from the 
relationships, context and processes which they are part of. They become the 
evidence of the contingency and historical nature of the present. A focus on 
everyday practices should provide an opportunity ‘to reveal the present as a 
malleable construct which is embedded in a historical context, thereby serving to 
unearth the process of temporal continuity and discontinuity with previous social 
practices’.103 The continuities, and not just the transformations need to be 
accounted for as part and parcel of the intentions, incoherence, purpose and 
mismanages of statebuilding. Accounting for resistance thus requires historicising 
the everyday. In this regard, the ‘mêtis’ of post-conflict statebuilding and 
resistance needs to be ‘historical’, ‘sociological’ and ‘international’.  
 
A  H i s t o r i c a l  S o c i o l o g i c a l  E x p l a n a t i o n  
 
What the Scottian framework does not straightforwardly provide is an account of 
the influences of the international as an ‘interactive multiplicity of social orders’.104 
Although Scott’s framework is in many ways a ‘big picture narrative’,105 this is 
                                                   
101 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 313. 
102 Scott, Seeing Like a State. 
103 John M. Hobson, “What’s at Stake in ‘Bringing Historical Sociology Back into 
International Relations’? Transcending ‘Chronofetishim’ and ‘Tempocentrism’ in 
International Relations,” in Historical Sociology of International Relations, ed. Stephen 
Hobden and John M. Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 7. 
104 Hobson, Lawson, and Rosenberg, “Historical Sociology,” 3358. 
105 Ibid., 3360. 
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closer to traditional sociological and anthropological accounts, than to the big 
picture historical sociology has been concerned with.106 Scott’s premise on general 
patterns of continuity, with a weak account of the international, could 
complement a historical sociology that has a bias towards social change and 
revolutionary processes. Thus this is not the historical sociology of a realist 
ontology, despite, as seen later, Tilly’s account of coercion and accumulation can 
provide significant insight to the analysis of statebuilding practices.107 Rather, the 
account of statebuilding is informed by a third wave of international historical 
sociology.108 
 
Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg propose a ‘triangulation’109 formula for a 
research agenda that has three drivers: structure (‘basic patterning of the human 
world’), history (‘how societies/social orders have varied across historical time) 
and the international (‘interactive multiplicity of social orders’).110 There are two 
important features of this framework that would become valuable to observe 
statebuilding, and in the DRC in particular, as well as to understand what 
historicising the everyday can contribute to the study of resistance. Firstly, it is to 
understand history ‘as a social process’, shedding light on continuities and 
discontinuities in social and political interaction.111 Secondly, to understand micro 
and macro structures and processes in a dynamic interaction and co-constituted. 
                                                   
106 Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1984). 
107 Dannreuther, R. and J. Kennedy (2005) ‘British Decline and US Hegemony with 
Lessons for International Relations’ in Journeys in Historical Sociology, Goldsmiths 
Workshops, September 22. P. 12. Available from: http://www.historical-sociology.org 
Accessed 10/10/2008. Lawson, G. (2007) ‘Historical Sociology in International Relations: 
Open Society, Research Programme and Vocation’ in International Politics. Vol. 44. Pp. 
357 - 358. Adams, Clemens and Orloff (2005) Remaking Modernity: Politicts, History and 
Sociology (ed.) Durham: Duke University Press. 
108 Hobson, Lawson, and Rosenberg, “Historical Sociology”; Gurminder Bhambra, 
“Historical Sociology, International Relations and Connected Histories,” Cambridge Review 
of International Affairs 23, no. 1 (March 2010): 127–143. 
109 Hobson, Lawson, and Rosenberg, “Historical Sociology,” 3357 – 3358. 
110 Ibid., 3358. 
111 Ibid., 3362.  
 63 
The framework proposed by Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg could be 
summarised as follows:112 
 
History Event, process and contingency as theoretical explanation 
Sociology 
Impact of relatively fixed configurations of social relations 
(structures) on micro-processes 
Patterns of human worldings 
International 
Relations 
Central role of “the international” in this dynamic 
Interactive multiplicity of social orders 
  
In Chapter Three, this framework is followed to explore statebuilding as a process 
of building political authority, which implies practices of coercion and 
accumulation. The implication is to see these practices in the DRC as part of 
contradictory and plural statebuilding processes in the DRC and not just as 
evidence of state failure. Chapter Three will turn, firstly, to Tilly’s account of war 
and state-making and states as protection rackets. As will be discussed, Tilly’s 
narrative has been criticised for failing to account for processes of statebuilding 
outside Europe. Here, Tilly’s account establishes these practices as broader 
patterns of what states are, what processes of statebuilding entail, and how these 
processes take place.  
 
T h e  R e l e v a n c e  o f  t h e  D R C  
 
Applying this framework to the DRC provides several rich combinations. For 
instance, as an addition to the insights of the Scottian framework, the key 
argument developed throughout this thesis is that resistance reflects its political 
context. Although this is a natural implication from the Scottian framework, the 
DRC does not just illustrate a variety of practices of resistance, which range from 
armed attacks to mockery and creative survival, but also the relationship between 
                                                   
112 The table includes direct quotes from: Ibid., 3360, 3362 and 3364.  
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them. A more comprehensive analysis would entail examining resistance as part 
of the patterns of relations to which it belongs. In this way, Lawson argued that it 
‘is not possible to universalise revolutions into single features’ and as such they 
are ‘better seen as dynamic processes with features contingent on both their 
world-historical context and their particular social setting’.113 Similarly, resistance 
in general, and perhaps not just the more narrowed category of everyday, is better 
seen as contingent upon the context in which it is embedded. Ultimately, as Scott 
argued, this is the caveat to generalisations. It is these more nuanced, historically 
rooted understandings of the context that would allow to analyse violence and 
extraction as fundamental for the process of statebuilding and resistance, and not 
simply as an account of the pathological practices of actors in the DRC. 
 
As will be noted in the following chapters, historical, sociological and 
international elements have been fundamental to generating the current context 
and to shaping resistance. For example, the everyday resistance in the DRC is 
partly the result of the break down of a democratic movement in the early 1990s. 
Different practices of resistance, such as survival or Mai Mai militias, are a 
contextualised version of broader patterns in state-society relations that have a 
historical legacy. Similarly, a militarised environment reflects local, international 
and regional agendas. The two main wars in the DRC that have been fundamental 
for mobilising civilians into war simultaneously reflect the historical changes that 
took place as a result of changes in local/global alliances at the end of the Cold 
War.  
 
These issues put both the standard narrative of the DRC and the critiques of the 
liberal peace on the same footing. The former have argued that processes of 
violence and dispossession in the DRC are due to the nature of the DRC as a failed 
state. The latter have argued that the coercive and neo-liberal nature of 
statebuilding underlies the ongoing processes of dispossession and violence, co-
                                                   
113 George Lawson, “Negotiated Revolutions: The Prospects for Radical Change in 
Contemporary World Politics.,” Review of International Studies 31, no. 3 (2005): 477. 
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opting peace rather than building it. Against these analyses, this thesis counter-
poses an account that does not necessarily challenge such critiques, but sees these 
processes neither as the pathological nature of the DRC, nor of the 
liberal/international nature of statebuilding, but as relating to what could be seen 
as standard practices in processes of statebuilding. This thesis will not attempt to 
make a transhistorical argument about statebuilding, quite oppositely, it attempts 
to contextualise current practices and processes in light of the continuities and 
changes fostered by the process of statebuilding, while taking the historicity of the 
DRC seriously.  
 
 
6.  Concluding note 
 
This Chapter has posed some of the key questions that will be addressed in the 
course of the following Chapters. It started with a brief account of the shift 
towards statebuilding as the paradigm of intervention in the last decades. The 
Chapter has also examined the critical appraisal and theorising the literature has 
done of statebuilding. These analyses have argued that the process of building 
states seems to only serve the purpose of maintaining the status quo, furthering 
economic reforms that do not necessarily promote welfare or development, and 
ultimately reinforcing Western power and capitalism. However, some of these 
accounts have portrayed statebuilding interventions as coherent, monolithic and 
overpowering. 
 
A focus on practices and the everyday has nuanced these analyses. This new turn 
has unearthed the nature of these missions as improvised, juxtaposed, incoherent, 
as well as challenged, resisted and hybridised. While this has been a step forward, 
the account of resistance remains rudimentary and more as an ad-hoc response. 
The shift from looking at elite violent responses to everyday resistance has 
reflected an attempt to theorise statebuilding in more complex and fluid ways. We 
now know that post-conflict statebuilding intervenes in the relations between 
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state and society; that it has implications for the distribution of wealth, rights and 
freedoms; that it has intended and unintended consequences due to its 
experimental approach, and that it has international, national, liberal and non-
liberal elements. However, the most certain thing we know about resistance is that 
it hybridises statebuilding. If resistance is to be theorised from the actual process 
of statebuilding, there needs to be an account of statebuilding practices, not so 
much as a liberal international undertaking but as a process of building state 
authority, where coercive and extractive practices respond to broader patterns in 
such exercise. 
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Chapter 2 
North and South Kivu: An Unlikely Space for 
Resistance?  
 
 
 
 
1.  The Failure of the DRC and the Militarisation of Peace 
 
Speaking in 2010 of the International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy 
(ISSSS) for the DRC, a MONUC officer argued that escalation of violence in the 
Kivus for the last few years was a problem of the DRC state being ‘inexistent’.1 For 
this MONUC representative, some functions of the state did not work properly. 
So the task of international actors was to operationalise the state towards making: 
‘the police, police, the judiciary, judge… get the software… the public servants, 
pay them!’2 The image of the DRC as a failed state looms large over policymaking 
but also over academic research. This is added to by activist media campaigns, 
picturing the DRC as a case of desperation, war, neglect and tragedy: ‘the world’s 
worst country to live in’,3 ‘a Zaire-shape hole in the middle of Africa’4 and ’the 
world’s largest failed state’.5 
 
The complexities of the multi-state wars that have taken place since 1996, and the 
ongoing conflict in the Eastern provinces, which defies any single causal 
explanation, have tended to be accounted for under the paradigm of state failure. 
                                                   
1 Interview with MONUSCO - ISSSS/STAREC liaison Officer, Goma, July 21, 2010. 
2 Ibid. 
3 War Child, “D.R. Congo Officially the World’s Worst Country to Live In,” News, 
November 3, 2011, http://www.warchild.org.uk/news/dr-congo-officially-worlds-
worst-country-live Accessed 30/01/2012. 
4 The Economist cited in William Reno, “Mines, Money, and the Problem of State-Building 
in Congo,” Issue: A Journal of Opinion 26, no. 1 (1998): 14. 
5 Max Fisher, “The World’s Largest Failed State,” The Atlantic Wire, August 11, 2009, 
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2009/08/the-world-s-largest-failed-
state/27298/ Accessed 24/10/2009.  
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In such circumstances, choosing the DRC as a case to observe everyday resistance 
in post-conflict statebuilding might seem, if not an impossible task, a rare case 
from which to generate insights for other cases. The standard cases on which 
resistance has been studied including Bosnia, Iraq, East Timor or Kosovo, have 
been instances of a particularly engaged international intervention, or a seemingly 
organised politically minded resistance.6 Nonetheless, the DRC has so far seen one 
of the UN’s largest and longest interventions, including one of the few cases of 
trusteeship in the post-Cold War period.7 It has also seen the only EU 
peacekeeping operations outside Europe.8 DFID plans to make the DRC its top 
bilateral recipient by 2015.9 Additionally, the DRC has been picking up pace 
regarding macroeconomic variables. It is hailed as one of the ten fastest growing 
economies in Africa, with a growth rate of 6.1%, predicted to rise to 7% over the 
next five years.10 
 
In the Eastern provinces, where conflict is ongoing, the ISSSS strategy has 
strengthened international action towards statebuilding. Joint efforts between the 
UN, the World Bank and INGOs, with the Government’s Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC) have aimed to coordinate 
military, humanitarian and development action towards building state authority 
and stability in the region. However, its most visible results are the militarisation 
of peace, and the continuation of Rwandan interventionist practices, especially in 
North Kivu, generating ongoing instability. Alongside the already militarised 
                                                   
6 E.g. Kappler and Richmond, “Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina”; Richmond, A 
Post-Liberal Peace; Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance. 
7 E.g. Kosovo, East Timor, Cambodia and the DRC. Below there is a comparison of UN 
engagement in the DRC in absolute and relative terms. 
8 ARTEMIS in the district of Ituri and EUFOR during the 2006 elections. European Union, 
“EU Relations with Democratic Republic of Congo,” European External Action Service, 2012, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/congo_kinshasa/index_en.htm Accessed 12/10/2012. 
9 DFID, “DFID: Development in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 2011, 
http://ukindrc.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/working-with-congo/development1/ Accessed 
07/03/2012.  
10 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2012 (New York: World Bank, June 2012), 66, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-
1322593305595/8287139-1339427993716/GEP12bSSA_RegionalAnnex.pdf Accessed 
20/05/2012.  
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environment caused by the wars of 1996 and 2003, both North and South Kivu 
have been the target of the UN-backed military operations of the DRC and 
Rwanda against remaining armed groups. This is added to ongoing proxy wars 
between the DRC and Rwanda, which both cooperate and antagonise at multiple 
levels, and a corresponding mushrooming of popular Mai Mai militias. These 
have risen as a way of providing security to the civilian population in some cases. 
Some groups have been co-opted by the DRC government and Rwanda to fight a 
proxy war. Militarisation has also followed from an increased tendency to deploy 
the military as a representation of state authority. Militarisation is linked to 
extraction, and, in the 2009–2011 period, this has seen increasing control of 
mineral resources by the FARDC, even if these are not channelled back to the 
central state administration. 
 
This chapter provides the necessary background for understanding the context of 
post-conflict statebuilding in Eastern DRC. It first discusses some of the major 
accounts of the DRC, as they have been the primary lenses through which 
statebuilding policy has been viewed. The second section provides a general 
background of the Congo wars since 1996 to observe distinctive constant features 
that remain today. Thirdly, the Chapter analyses the UN strategies in the DRC 
since its deployment. The final section explores the 2009–2011 period, which is the 
context in which fieldwork has taken place. It will be concluded that the 
prioritisation of military solutions at crucial times, including those in 1996, 1998, 
and throughout the 2009–2011 period against more political solutions have been 
decisive in shaping resistance into its everyday covert self-help, yet militarised, 
form.11 Yet the absence of overt formally-organised resistance does not mean the 
absence of resistance or the lack of political aspirations.  
 
 
                                                   
11 Later in the thesis it will be shown how this self in resistance can be both individual and 
collective, and that community links, reciprocity and solidarity serve as channels of 
reappropriation for survival. 
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2.  Accounting for Resistance Amongst War and State Failure  
 
The complexity of the Congo wars is that state and non-state actors alike have 
been engaged in processes of authority assertion, war and accumulation. Since 
1996, different states have been at war with each other in the DRC, directly and 
through proxy armed groups. What has been striking is that despite this 
complexity, the Congo wars have been overwhelmingly analysed under a single 
explanatory cause: state failure. It is partly this paradigm of state failure, which in 
the DRC has been an impediment to the study of resistance.  
 
The few accounts on resistance in the DRC within the period of war provide 
detailed and historically grounded analyses but have not theorised it. They have 
rather captured the responses of Congolese people against the imposition of 
conditions of war and domination from different perspectives: the informal 
transactions in transnational commerce (Mac Gaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga);12 
the Mai Mai militias in Eastern Congo (Vlassenroot);13 DIY informal strategies to 
provide social services and survival (Trefon);14 and the historical perspective, 
covering the colonial period to post-conflict statebuilding (Nzongola-Ntalaja and 
Renton, Seddon and Zeilig).15 These analyses provide a sense of the historical and 
ongoing political activity of Congolese non-elites, illustrating that people’s 
responses to deteriorating living conditions can be seen as patterns of actions that 
attempt to transform or evade the social order. They provide a historical but not a 
theoretical account. 
                                                   
12 Janet Mac Gaffey and Rémy Bazenguissa-Ganga, Congo-Paris: Transnational Traders on 
the Margins of the Law (Oxford: International African Institute in association with James 
Currey, 2000).   
13 Koen Vlassenroot, “Violence et Constitution de Milices Dans L’Est Du Congo: Le Cas 
Des Mayi-Mayi,” in L’Afrique Des Grands Lacs: Annuaire 2001- 2002, ed. Stefaan Marysse 
and Filip Reyntjens (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2002), 115 – 152; Franck Van Acker and Koen 
Vlassenroot, “Les «mai ̈-mai ̈» et Les Fonctions de La Violence Milicienne Dans l’Est Du 
Congo,” Politique Africaine no. 84 (2001): 103 – 116. 
14 Theodore Trefon, Reinventing Order in the Congo: How People Respond to State Failure in 
Kinshasa (London, New York and Kampala: Zed Books and Fountain Publishers, 2004). 
15 Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History (London: 
Zed Books, 2002); Dave Renton, David Seddon, and Leo Zeilig, The Congo: Plunder and 
Resistance (London: Zed Books, 2007).  
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Therefore, the absence of a theorisation of resistance from the post-conflict 
statebuilding context of the DRC does not stem from the lack of resistance, but 
rather from the accounts that have been given of the DRC itself. Three of these 
accounts stand out; on the one hand, the resource wars thesis, which focuses on 
the motivations for war, and on the other hand, what could be called localist and 
regionalist accounts, which focus on the actors involved. The spectre of the failed 
state underpinning all of them and the absence of a broad political movement 
have made these analyses examine the actions of subordinate groups both as 
victims and co-producers of a context of domination, plunder and violence. Thus 
resistance has not been seen as relevant within these dynamics. 
 
T h e  R e s o u r c e  W a r s  T h e s i s  
 
The resource wars thesis is widely supported by academic, policy and activist 
research.16  The UN has been at the forefront of the analyses. A series of high-level 
                                                   
16 An overview of academic debates and case studies can be found in: Thomas Turner, The 
Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality (New York: Zed Books, 2007) Ch. 1; John F. Clark, 
ed., “Introduction,” in The African Stakes of the Congo War (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), 1 – 10; John F. Clark, ed., “Museveni’s Adventure in the Congo War: 
Uganda’s Vietnam?,” in The African Stakes of the Congo War, First (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), 145 – 165; Osita Afoaku, “Congo’s Rebels: Their Origins, Motivations, 
and Strategies,” in African Stakes of the Congo War, ed. John F. Clark (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), 109 – 128; Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo, Ch. 7; Dan Fahey, “Guns and 
Butter: Uganda’s Involvement in Northeastern Congo 2003 - 2009,” in L’Afrique Des 
Grands Lacs, Annuaire 2009-2010 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010), 343 – 370; Mbaya J. 
Kankwenda, L’Économie Politique de La Prédation Au Congo Kinshasa: Des Origines à Nous 
Jours 1885 - 2003 (Kinshasa, Montréal and Washington: Icredes, 2005), 364 – 382. At the 
forefront of activist campaigns have been Global Witness and the Enough Project. They 
have succeeded at lobbying the UN, and the OECD to adopt guidelines for tracing, and 
the US Congress to pass the Dodd-Frank Act, by which companies have to publicly 
disclose their mining sources. Global Witness, The Dodd Frank Act’s Section 1502 on Conflict 
Minerals (London: Global Witness, August 10, 2011); The Enough Project Team and 
Grassroots Reconciliation Group, “A Comprehensive Approach to Congo’s Conflict 
Minerals - Strategy Paper,” April 24, 2009, 
http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/comprehensive-approach-conflict-
minerals-strategy-paper Accessed 26/04/2011; Fidel Bafilemba, Sasha Lezhnev, and Sarah 
Zingg Wimmer, From Congress to Congo: Turning the Tide on Conflict Minerals, Closing 
Loopholes and Empowering Mines (Washington: Enough Project, 2012); UN Group of 
Experts, Due Diligence Guidelines for the Responsible Supply Chain of Minerals from Red Flag 
Locations to Mitigate the Risk of Providing Direct or Indirect Support for Conflict in the Eastern 
Part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (New York: UN Security Council, 2010), 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/drc/Consolidated_guidelines.pdf Accessed 
12/12/2012; OECD, The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of 
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reports have consistently emphasised the link between resource exploitation and 
the continuation of wars.17 These resources include minerals, agriculture, forestry, 
wildlife, financial resources and Congolese labour. Just to give an idea of the 
extent of this exploitation, in the period between 1998 and 2002, US$ 5 billion 
worth of state assets from the mining sector (especially diamonds, cobalt, copper 
and germanium) were transferred to private companies under Zimbabwean 
control with no compensation for the DRC treasury.18 Rwanda’s military expenses 
were financed at around 80% by the Congolese enterprise (calculated in $320 
million).19 Although Uganda does not produce gold, gold exports became its 
second largest income source.20 Instead of the sanctions and embargoes against 
Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi that the final report of the UN Panel on Illegal 
Exploitation suggested imposing, the World Bank and the IMF granted Rwanda 
and Uganda debt reduction benefits due to their good economic performances.21 
In recent years, mining has become Rwanda’s ‘largest foreign exchange earner’, 
with up to 30% coming from illegal mining in Congo.22  
 
The resource wars thesis has informed UN policy towards statebuilding, 
reflecting not only the vision of the DRC as failed but also the influence of neo-
liberal understandings of how states and their economies should work. Neo-
liberal approaches to statebuilding have called for contradictory approaches. They 
                                                                                                                                                   
Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (Paris: OECD, 2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/mining.htm Accessed 12/01/2013. 
17 To the five reports from the Panel of Experts on Illegal Exploitation between 2001 and 
2002, the reports of the Group of Experts on the Arms Embargo have continued this line 
of inquiry producing 17 reports and one addendum between 2004 and 2012. UN Group of 
Experts, “Reports of the Group of Experts Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” UN, Security Council Committee - UNSC 1533 
(2004), 2004 2012, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/egroup.shtml Accessed 
19/07/2012. 
18 UN Panel of Experts, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2001/357 (New 
York: UN Security Council, 2001), 7, http://documents.un.org Accessed 30/12/2007. 
19 Ibid., 15. 
20 Clark, “Museveni’s Adventure in the Congo War: Uganda’s Vietnam?,” 152.  
21 UN Panel of Experts, Panel on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, 38 – 39.  
22 Jason Stearns, From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo 
(Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute - Usalama Project, 2012), 57. 
 73 
have pursued a policy of rebuilding the state, while de-regulating its industries, 
de-linking forms of economic control from the central apparatus of the state, and 
fostering self-market regulation. For example, mining management has been 
carried out through several attempts to formalise private control.23 The reliance on 
private actors means that, despite the shaming and finger-pointing contained in 
these reports, some sensitive material was removed from the final report and few 
judicial procedures have been started.24 Moreover, some of the companies, 
governments and individuals that these reports accused of fuelling the conflict 
have continued to work, if not directly in government positions, then as forms of 
subcontracted authority in parts of the territory.25 While the resource wars thesis 
unearths a fundamental dynamic of the Congo wars, explaining the continuation 
of conflict, it portrays practices of accumulation as a criminal and not as a political 
undertaking.  
 
Something that the resource wars thesis does not point out is that, as Johnson and 
Kayser note, informal exchanges and trafficking are part of a longer trend of 
bypassing state regulations, poverty and building local influence.26 Similarly 
Kabamba notes that merchant elites who are part of larger networks succeed at 
                                                   
23 World Bank, “Poverty and Social Impact Analysis: Congo Mining Reform,” 2012, 
http://go.worldbank.org/70UZAP3Y00 Accessed 21/10/2012; World Bank, Democratic 
Republic of Congo Joint IDA-IMF Staff Advisory Note on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(Washington: World Bank and International Monetary Fund, April 17, 2007); Jacques 
Tshibwabwa Kuditshini, “Global Governance and Local Government in the Congo: The 
Role of the IMF, World Bank, the Multinationals and the Political Elites,” International 
Review of Administrative Sciences 74, no. 2 (2008): 195–216; A more general overview can be 
found in: David Williams, The World Bank and Social Transformation in International Politics: 
Liberalism, Governance and Sovereignty (London: Routledge, 2008); Pugh, “The Political 
Economy of Peacebuilding”; World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a 
Changing World (Washington: World Bank, 1997). 
24 Dominic Johnson and Christiane Kayser, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Shadow 
Economies in the ‘Heart of Darkness’,” in Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. 
Matthias Basedau and Andreas Mehler (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 2005), 146. 
Note that Jean Pierre Bemba, for instance, has been indicted by the ICJ for crimes in the 
CAR, and his arrest is seen more as a political move to support Kabila than to his criminal 
activity reported in the panels on illegal exploitation.  
25 E.g. Minister Katumba Mwanke and Banro. UN Panel of Experts, Panel on Illegal 
Exploitation of Natural Resources, Annex II, p. 2 and Annex III, p. 7. Subcontracted authority 
is developed in the next Chapter. 
26 Johnson and Kayser, “Shadow Economies in the ‘Heart of Darkness’,” 169.  
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providing the community with much needed resources outside of state channels.27 
These practices may have fuelled the continuation of war and may have not 
fostered an industry. However, they have made the DRC and other neighbouring 
countries’ economies grow.28 Additionally, as the localists and regionalists have 
argued, this vision has missed the important identity, political and security 
concerns that go hand in hand with economic motivations. 
 
L o c a l i s t s  
 
The localists argue that the sources of ongoing conflict are rooted in historical 
grievances or in particular local features. There is a broad spectrum between those 
who see violence in Congo as a pre-colonial issue, and those who see historical 
and localised dynamics disrupting national and regional ones.29 Séverine 
Autesserre is a primary representative arguing that violence in the Kivus is the 
consequence of population movements and land disputes ongoing since the 
1930s.30 The problem with the post-conflict statebuilding strategies is that they 
have aimed only at the national or regional levels, ignoring the local dimensions. 
Autesserre sees this failure as stemming from three dominant narratives that have 
limited the view of conflict and its solutions: ‘a primary cause of violence, the 
illegal exploitation of natural resources; a main consequence, sexual abuse against 
women and girls; and a central solution, reconstructing state authority’.31 
                                                   
27 Patient Kabamba, “Articulation Des Modes de Production Politique En République 
Démocratique Du Congo,” Congo-Afrique no. 456 (August 2011): 445–459.  
28 Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf, eds., Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights 
after Mass Violence, 1st ed. (University of Wisconsin Press, 2011); Jean François Bayart, “La 
Guerre En Afrique: De ́pe ́rissement Ou Formation de l’Etat?,” Esprit no. 247 (1998): 55 – 98. 
29 An example of the former is: Morten Bøås, “Returning to Realities: a Building-block 
Approach to State and Statecraft in Eastern Congo and Somalia,” Conflict, Security & 
Development 10, no. 4 (2010): 443. Examples of the latter are: Séverine Autesserre, “Local 
Violence, National Peace? Postwar ‘Settlement’ in the Eastern D.R. Congo (2003–2006),” 
African Studies Review 49, no. 3 (2006): 1 – 29; Autesserre, “Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, 
Local Violence, and International Intervention”; Lemarchand, “The Democratic Republic 
on Congo: From Collapse to Potential Reconstruction”; Filip Reyntjens, The Great African 
War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009).  
30 Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo.  
31 Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales,” 205.  
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Autesserre identifies mainstream policy drivers, but most vividly, she captures 
the historical and symbolic importance of identity and land as sources of political 
authority.  
 
Although providing an important warning bell for considering the historicity of 
Congo, Autesserre falls in a ‘tempocentric’ account by tracing an unchanging 
continuous line between the 1930s and today.32 History, in other words, seems to 
have left no footprint. Additionally, Autesserre and other localists do not explain 
convincingly why the inter-state war that started in 1996 did not happen earlier. 
Conversely, an ongoing violent conflict over land is taken as a permanent feature 
of Congolese politics. Localists end up portraying the image of a violent inside 
that disrupts a more pacified outside, remaining within a framework in which the 
right kind of interveners with the right kind of sensitivity could apply policies 
that would build the right kind of state. The ‘local’ element in the localist account 
seems to operate as an autonomous domain, as if its dynamics were not, at least 
partly, the result of broader global processes.  
 
As will be noted throughout the next Chapters, one of the powerful insights from 
the current context in the DRC, and one that precisely complicates a theorisation 
of resistance, is that the global and the local are enmeshed. At the local level, it is 
possible to find actors as disparate as the MONUC/MONUSCO, the military, a 
corporation or an externally-backed armed group playing state-like roles in the 
absence of an administrative state-based authority. Additionally, the trans-
historical account occludes the real input of historical factors on the sources of 
violence. Armed militias may be linked to particular ethnic groups, but this does 
not turn the conflict over land into an ethnic conflict. One of the features that 
characterises the DRC is that its context is a very fluid and changing one. 
Identities, alliances and agendas shift rapidly and constantly. The fact that land in 
                                                   
32 ‘Tempocentrism’ happens when a ‘naturalised present is extrapolated backwards in 
time to present all historical systems as ‘isomorphic’ or ‘homologous’’ in Hobson, “What’s 
at Stake in ‘Bringing Historical Sociology Back into International Relations’?,” 7. 
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the DRC is simultaneously a source of customary authority, the target of different 
state agendas, a tool to foster elite support and the illustration of international 
political economic trends, makes the Congolese village at any one time a 
‘shorthand’ for a complex historical space.  
  
Re g i o n a l i s t s  
 
It is this spatial connection that regionalists capture. Most regionalists do not 
disregard the local features as intervening in the continuation of conflict. What 
they argue is that the dynamics in the DRC are linked to the dynamics of the 
Great Lakes region. In this view, it is not just state actors like Rwanda and Uganda 
who have affected the development of events, but also their interconnections with 
their corresponding diasporas in each country, their common and conflicting 
commercial interests, their links to non-state actors, including armed groups, as 
well as their common security threats.  
 
A vivid example of the differences between regionalists and localists has been 
exposed by the criticism Jason Stearns made of an article published by Séverine 
Autesserre in The New York Times. The journal piece is a summary of the 
arguments Autesserre has made over the last six years:33  
 
The international community has failed to help Congo achieve peace and 
security because it fundamentally misunderstands the causes of the 
violence [ – ] distinctively local conflicts over land, grassroots power, 
status and resources, like cattle, charcoal, timber, drugs and fees levied at 
checkpoints. Most of the violence in Congo is not coordinated on a large 
scale. It is the product of conflicts among fragmented local militias, each 
trying to advance its own agenda at the village or district level. Those then 
percolate and expand.34 
 
 
                                                   
33 See: Séverine Autesserre, “Local Violence, International Indifference? Post-Conflict 
‘Settlement’ in the Eastern D.R. Congo (2003 – 2005)” (PhD Dissertation, New York 
University, Department of Politics, 2006).  
34 Séverine Autesserre, “The Only Way to Help Congo,” The New York Times, June 22, 
2012, sec. Opinion, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/the-only-way-to-
help-congo.html Accessed 01/07/2012. para. 7. 
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Jason Stearns responds with the following: 
 
While [Autesserre] is right to emphasize the local dynamics of conflict, her 
argument is flawed. She falls victim of her own critique: she, too, ends up 
being overly reductive, failing to account for the different kinds of armed 
actors, each with its unique underlying dynamic, in the Eastern Congo. In 
fact, reading her op-ed, one might think that the reason for the uptick in 
violence in the Kivus this year is due to land conflicts and struggles for 
power at the village level. But the main protagonists since the beginning of 
the transition in 2003 have not been fragmented local militia with parochial 
concerns, but rather armed groups that are tightly linked to regional 
political and business elites, such as the CNDP, PARECO, and, most 
recently, the M23.35 
 
In developing his response, Stearns gives a brief background of the CNDP, which, 
as he notes, was formed ‘by senior members of the RCD military, in coordination 
with officials in Kigali and Goma’ to ‘safeguard’ their interests.36 Even when local 
grievances around land may be at the root of certain armed groups, Stearns 
argues, they ‘have since become integrated into regional business and political 
networks’.37 Stearns represents here the regionalist position, which constitutes the 
bulk of the literature. Regionalists provide a moderate argument that includes the 
context of the region and the trans-border dynamics that have affected the Congo 
wars. They account for the internal dynamics without making them a solely 
Congolese transhistorical affair. There are important differences amongst 
regionalists, depending on whether the emphasis is put on the role of external 
countries, even if from the region, or the internal factors of the DRC as a failed 
state.38 For instance, Nzongola Ntalaja speaks of factors of instability in the region 
                                                   
35 Jason Stearns, “So How Do We Help the Eastern Congo?,” Congo Siasa, June 26, 2012, 
http://congosiasa.blogspot.co.uk/2012/06/so-how-do-we-help-eastern-congo.html 
Accessed 01/07/2012. para. 4. 
36 Ibid. para. 6, emphasis in the original; See also: Jason Stearns, “Laurent Nkunda and the 
National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP),” in L’Afrique Des Grands Lacs: 
Annuaire 2007- 2008, ed. Stefaan Marysse, Filip Reyntjens, and Stef Vandeginste (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 2008), 245 – 267; UN Group of Experts, Report of the Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2012/348 (New York: United Nations, June 21, 2012), 
para. 103 - 107.  
37 Stearns, “So How Do We Help the Eastern Congo?” para. 9; See also: Oumar Sylla, 
“Land and Property Disputes Impeding Return and Reintegration,” Forced Migration 
Review, 2010. 
38 An emphasis on regional actors is seen in  Colette Braeckman, Les Nouveaux Prédateurs: 
Politique Des Puissances En Afrique Centrale (Paris: Fayard, 2003). An emphasising on 
internal factors is seen in: Lemarchand, “The Democratic Republic on Congo: From 
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of which state weakness is paramount.39 Turner affirms that both the 1996 and 
1998 wars were the work of Rwanda with the involvement of different regional 
and continental actors. The underlying factors of war are to be found in a 
combination of state failure, cultural and socioeconomic issues and the political 
economy of the DRC.40 The insight from the regionalist account is the need to 
problematise the different divides across the local–global but also within society 
across elites and non-elites. The regionalist account suffers however from not 
linking the dynamics of the region with what are patterns of state behaviour more 
generally.   
 
L o c a l i t i e s ,  H i s t o r i e s  a n d  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l   
 
These accounts highlight important features of the DRC context, but they are a 
reminder of the need to reconnect international historical and sociological 
dynamics. This entails seeing local and global, present and history as co-
constituted. An exploration of resistance should take this complexity into account, 
considering the different levels in which actors operate. The analyses explored 
above also underline the fact that lack of more organised movements means the 
absence of resistance, and that this is partly the result of a complex system of 
ethnic alliances, war and extraction. On the contrary, as will be shown in the next 
chapters, these are factors impacting on resistance but they do not exhaust it. 
 
3.  Landmarks of War and Statebuilding 
 
Practices of resistance and the dynamics of statebuilding in the DRC are marked 
by four events, which surround the recent armed conflicts. These include: the 
ousting of Mobutu, which suffocated an important democratic movement, the 
Rwandan genocide, the AFDL war of 1996-1997 and the RCD rebellion, which 
                                                                                                                                                   
Collapse to Potential Reconstruction”; Turner, The Congo Wars; Gérard Prunier, Africa’s 
World War: Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
39 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo, 214. 
40 Turner, The Congo Wars, 17 – 19. 
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turned into Africa’s World War (1998 – 2003). The 2009–2011 period mirrors some 
dynamics generated earlier and it is therefore important to provide a brief 
background. These four events have created a militarised extractive context of 
plural authorities, which explains why resistance generally takes both a covert 
and militarised form. 
 
The first event is the ‘elbowing’ of Mobutu.41 The choice of a military solution was 
underpinned by a series of factors relating to the end of the Cold War, a deep 
crisis in Zaire and the Rwandan genocide.42 The Rwandan-initiated military 
campaign in 1996 gathered regional and international support, but suffocated a 
democratic movement.43 The efforts of thousands of civil society organisations, 
dissident parliamentarians and political parties long opposed to Mobutu, 
culminated in the 1992 Conference for National Sovereignty (CNS).44 This was a 
conference of over 2,000 delegates representing opposition parties and a plethora 
of civil society organisations, which managed to appoint a new government.45 
However, Mobutu’s coup three months later and the 1996 international campaign 
against him meant the ushering in of a new authoritarian regime and the loss of 
the more vocal and formally-organised resistance.  
 
The second event was the spilling-over of the Rwandan genocide to the DRC. The 
Rwandan genocide needs to be understood in two stages: One in which the Hutu 
Interahamwe killed up to 800,000 Tutsis, Twa and moderate Hutus in Rwanda 
and its Congolese aftermath; and a second in which the Tutsi-led AFDL with the 
APR killed 300,000 Hutu refugees, militias and civilians, during the 1996–1997 
                                                   
41 Steven Erlanger, “U.S. Decides Time Is Ripe to Elbow Mobutu Aside,” New York Times, 
April 30, 1997, International edition, 15. 
42 Crawford Young, “Contextualizing Congo Conflicts: Order and Disorder in Postcolonial 
Africa,” in African Stakes of the Congo War, ed. John F. Clark (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), 13 – 31. 
43 John Pomfret, “Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo,” Washington Post, July 9, 1997, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/congo/stories/070997.htm 
Accessed 07/03/2010. 
44 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo, 171. 
45 Etienne Tshisekedi of the UDPS was elected by the CNS in 1992, but three months later 
reverted by a coup by Mobutu. Ibid., 195.  
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military campaign in the DRC.46 As such, its effects were regional, not only being 
an igniting factor for the explosion of the Congo Wars, but also for how politics 
and war in the Great Lakes Region became determined by a pro/anti Kagame-
Tutsi cleavage.47 The genocide has ever since marked Rwanda’s need for security 
in Eastern DRC, added to economic agendas. An additional effect has to do with 
the fact that Rwanda’s intervention in the DRC carries its own statebuilding 
project. For Rwanda, the fulfilment of these security and economic agendas 
largely depend on intervening in the DRC. Yet the two wars that Rwanda has led 
in the DRC have both bolstered and endangered Rwanda’s interests. 
 
The third and fourth events are the two complex multi-state wars of 1996 
(AFDL/APR war) and 1998 (RCD – Africa’s World War). They have represented 
Fanon’s view of the Congo as Africa’s revolver trigger in that, as Kankwenda puts 
it, they have mobilised Africa militarily.48 The full-blown militarisation these two 
conflicts provoked was due not just to the instances of inter-state war, but also to 
the fact that they extensively targeted civilians and engaged them into the war 
effort. The AFDL campaign was aimed at: 1) dismantling the refugee camps 
where Interahamwe genocidaires from Rwanda to prevent them reorganising; 
and 2) ousting Mobutu who had become a source of insecurity in the region.49 Not 
only they had US support but also, crucial to its success were the interventions of 
Angola and France, the mobilisation of Mai Mai militias and factions of the 
Congolese military.   
                                                   
46 Crawford Young, «Contextualizing Congo Conflicts: Order and Disorder in Postcolonial 
Africa», in African Stakes of the Congo War, ed. John F. Clark (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), 13 – 14. 
47 Prunier, Africa’s World War, xxxi; Jason Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The 
Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa, 1. ed (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 8. 
48 Kankwenda, L’Économie Politique de La Prédation Au Congo Kinshasa, 362. 
49 Lanotte notes how by the mid 1990s, rebel groups from Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Angola and, to lesser extent, the CAR and Zimbabwe had refuge in or directly fought in 
the DRC. E.g. UNITA against Angola; the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA), and the West Bank Nile Front (WBNF) against Museveni; and 
Sudan was raiding John Garang’s rebel posts from northern Zaire. Olivier Lanotte, 
Guerres Sans Frontières En République Démocratique Du Congo: De Joseph-Désiré Mobutu À 
Joseph Kabila (Bruxelles: Coédition GRIP-Editions complexe, 2003), 36.  
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Africa’s World War was first a US-backed Rwandan-Ugandan-Burundian effort to 
oust Laurent-Désiré Kabila, allied to an internal movement called the Rally for 
Congolese Democracy (RCD). It then encountered the response of Angolan, 
Namibian, Chad, Zimbabwe, and the Mai Mai militias. These militias sided with 
Laurent-Désiré Kabila because they had a historical and ideological connection 
with him as a revolutionary figure.50 They also responded out of nationalist 
sentiment to what was seen as an invasion. The maps below give an orientation of 
the complex system of alliances in the region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 
           
 
 
 
Map 2. Regional Interventions by year51                  
                                                   
50 Kabila was as a historical nationalist leader, who had fought at the time of the 
independence, formed part of Lumumba’s cabinet and then joined Pierre Mulele in one of 
the most serious uprisings against Mobutu. Elikia M’Bokolo, Le Continent Convoite ́: 
l’Afrique au XXe Sie ̀cle (Paris: Études Vivantes, 1980), 157.   
51 Dan Smith, The Atlas of War and Peace (Oxford: Earthscan, 2003), 91. 
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This map does not include the broader international alliances. Aside from the 
already mentioned US support to the Rwandan-led coalition, Chad and the CAR 
supported Kabila with the help of France, and Namibia and Sudan with Libyan 
aid.52 In the East, as Map 2 shows, it was the Mai Mai militias, mostly of General 
Dunia and General Padiri that were able to contain the actions of Rwanda, 
Uganda and Burundi. Despite this, Mai Mai representation was subsequently 
undermined in the peace negotiations. This has created resentment amongst those 
who fought for Kabila and after different failed DDR attempts, many have 
rejoined the Mai Mai militias.53  
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Map 3. Approximate deployment 1998 - 200254 
 
 
                                                   
52 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo, 240; Christian Scherrer, Genocide and Crisis in Central 
Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 255. 
53 This is developed in Chapter 6.  
54 “The Second Congolese War and the Wars Within the War,” Who Rules Where, 2012, 
http://whoruleswhere.wordpress.com/category/congo-democratic-republic/ Accessed 
20/12/2012. This map is based on the United Nations – IRIN-CEA map illustrated in 
Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, 52.  
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These wars are the prototype of the resource wars thesis. They had an extractive 
character, which included the partition of the DRC between the different 
coalitions, during the 1998-2003 period (Map 2). Especially in the Kivus, the 
dynamics of foreign occupation and the different conflict management solutions 
have created what Ndaywel calls a ‘giant octopus’.55 A pluralisation of authority 
through power-sharing agreements and the deployment of different forms of 
representation of state authority have fostered overlapping military and 
commercial networks with state-like functions on the ground.56  
 
W a r  a n d  t h e  H e t e r o g e n e i t y  o f  R u l e  a n d  R e s i s t a n c e  
  
The significance of these four events goes beyond a dynamic of war and 
statebuilding. They include genocide, the toppling of Mobutu’s historical 
dictatorship and two processes of multi-state war, with one of the highest civilian 
death tolls since World War II. Although the high impact on civilians is a trend in 
contemporary wars, in the DRC it has been remarkable. Whereas there had been 
145,000 battle-deaths between 1998 and 2001, by 2003 between 2.4 and 3.9 million 
total war-related deaths had been reported.57 A common pattern has been the 
                                                   
55 Isidore Ndaywel è Nziem, Historia Del Congo, trans. Elena Cabrera Cruz (Madrid: 
Catarata, 2011), 282. The metaphor refers to how the conflict and its aftermath - where 
multiple actors, local, regional, and international intervened- created a domino effect for 
other latent issues, and the emergence of new clashing interests between the parties. 
56 See the point of military and commercial networks articulated more extensively in 
Raeymaekers, “The Power of Protection.”   
57 See battle deaths in: Les Roberts, Mortality in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Results from Eleven Mortality Surveys. (Bukavu: International Rescue Committee, 2001), 
159. The broad spectrum of figues takes into account the debate over war-related deaths 
in the studies done by the IRC/Burnet Institute (the higher end) and the Human Security 
Research (the more conservative figure). See: Ben Coghlan et al., Mortality in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo: An Ongoing Crisis (London: International Rescue Committee, 
2007), http://www.theirc.org/resource-file/irc-congo-mortality-survey-2007 Accessed 
15/01/2011; Tony Stewart, “Update on Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Results from a Third Nationwide Survey.,” Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 
3, no. 2 (2009): 88 – 96; Human Security Research Group, “Human Security Report: The 
Causes of Peace and The Shrinking Costs of War,” 2010 2009, 
http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/text.aspx Accessed 
9/07/2013, esp. Ch. 7. For the debate on the figures see: IRC and Burnet Institute, “IRC 
and the Burnet Institute Strongly Affirm Congo Mortality Study Findings,” January 20, 
2010, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/images/100120_IRC_and_the_Burnet_Institute_Stateme
nt.doc Accessed 09/07/2013; Human Security Research Group, “Human Security Report 
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conquest of territory, typically through raids and the typical response from 
civilians has been flight.58 However, this targeting has also been a main factor for 
engaging people in war, making civilians rely on their own devices for protection. 
Additionally, the AFDL war and Africa’s World War, which were brought under 
the rubric of national liberation, first against Mobutu and then against Laurent-
Désiré Kabila, have also been factors in funnelling political aspirations through 
the participation in war.  
 
War and statebuilding have therefore been determinants for the militarisation of 
the environment and hence of forms of resistance. The plurality of new 
authorities, elites and alliances that have been forged across ideological and ethnic 
lines has fragmented both rule and resistance. This period should be also seen as 
part of an ongoing unfinished process. The ‘post-conflict’ context has been 
marked by the use of violence towards the pursuit of state security and economic 
agendas, even if through proxy armed groups. Resistance is then not an anti-state 
or an anti-war movement, but rather a negation or, at least, mitigation, of the 
everyday context of domination. The question that follows is to what extent the 
UN post-conflict statebuilding strategies have contributed to this context.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Project Response to ‘IRC and the Burnet Institute Strongly Affirm Congo Mortality Study 
Findings’,” May 7, 2010, 
http://www.hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSR2009/Debate/2009HumanSecurityRe
portDebate-HSRPResponseToIRC.pdf Accessed 09/07/2013. 
58 Navanethem Pillay, Rapport Du Projet Mapping Concernant Les Violations Les Plus Graves 
Des Droits de l’Homme et Du Droit International Humanitaire Commises Entre Mars 1993 et 
Juin 2003 Sur Le Territoire de La Re ́publique De ́mocratique Du Congo (Geneva: UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 2010), 2; Redress, Victims, Perpetrators or Heroes? Child 
Soldiers before the International Criminal Court (London: Redress Trust, September 2006), 20 
– 22. The DRC has one of the largest numbers of IDPs and refugees in the world.UNHCR - 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, “2012 UNHCR Country Operations Profile - 
Democratic Republic of the Congo,” UNHCR 2001 - 2012, 2012, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c366.html Accessed 9/09/2012. 
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4.  The UN and the Contradictions of Post-Conflict  
 
The UN’s post-conflict statebuilding strategies in the DRC reflect more the 
evolution in the frameworks towards conflict resolution than the actual evolution 
of the conflict. Having been reluctant to intervene for a number of years, the UN 
turned the DRC into one of the first laboratories for post-conflict statebuilding. 
After the more significant deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in 2001, the two 
missions deployed – MONUC (until 2010) and MONUSCO (from 2010) – have 
been the epicentres of international peacebuilding in the DRC. Although the UN 
declared the DRC a threat to international peace and security in order to justify its 
intervention, a late and controversial arms embargo, and lack of response to a war 
of aggression against a member state were evidence that the image of Zaire/ DRC 
as a failed state became the guidance for action.59 The UN actions have been 
contradictory. Its main priorities of civilian protection and the reconstruction of 
state authority have been compromised by improvised and experimental 
approaches. MONUC’s referent role does not mean that international action has 
been homogenous. Conversely, the contradictory nature of UN actions in the DRC 
responds to the ways in which member states have instrumentalised and 
‘marginalised’ MONUC in the pursuit of side agendas.60  
 
The priorities of civilian protection and reconstitution of state authority are seen 
in both MONUC and MONUSCO landmark resolutions.61 The weight and 
                                                   
59 Calls for action were based on the nature of Zaire as failed and not on the nature of the 
conflict. E.g Ugandan Ambassador Permanent Representative to the UN Matia M. 
Semakula Kiwanuka, “Letter Addressed to the President of the Security Council. 
Document Number: S/1996/1038” (UN Security Council, December 12, 1996); Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen at the time stated that 'To say that 
[Congo-Kinshasa] has a government today would be a gross exaggeration’ cited in Young, 
“Contextualizing Congo Conflicts,” 24.  
60 Trefon speaks of mutual instrumentalisations national and international actors, see 
Congo Masquerade: The Political Culture of Aid Inefficiency and Reform Failure (London and 
New York: Zed Books, 2011); Stearns argues that the UN has been “politically 
marginalised” since 2006, see From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in 
Eastern Congo, 63. 
61 UN Security Council, Resolution 1279, S/RES/1279, 1999, http://documents.un.org/ 
Accessed 04/05/2010; UN Security Council, Resolution 1291, S/RES/1291, 2000, 
http://documents.un.org/ Accessed 14/10/2009; UN Security Council, Resolution 1925 
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responsibilities of MONUC/MONUSCO have consistently grown, turning into 
the longest and one of the largest missions in UN history. Its tasks include civil 
administration reform, democracy promotion, civil society capacity-building, 
demobilisation (DDR(RR)) and security sector reform (SSR). MONUC has helped 
maintain the integrity of the DRC and was a major actor behind the first 
democratic elections since independence in 1960. MONUC/MONUSCO have 
been in many instances the sole guardians of peace and security in many parts of 
the Kivus. However, the impact remains limited. The graphs below illustrate how 
the DRC ranks high on the list of DPKO deployments by personnel, military 
deployment and budget. Yet when taking other aspects into account and, in 
comparison to other missions. They reflect the patchy, contradictory and 
multidimensional character of post-conflict statebuilding.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
(2010). 
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Figure 1. DPKO Uniformed and Total Personnel1                        Figure 2. Budget DPKO by mission2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Peacekeeper/Population Ratio3                              Figure 4. Reconstruction Budget 20044 
                                                   
1 DPKO, “Peacekeeping Fact Sheet,” October 31, 2012, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml Accessed 
20/11/2012.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas 
About Failed States,” International Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 131. 
4 Ibid., 130. 
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Similarly, the devastating humanitarian effects of the two full-fledged multi-state 
wars did not make the DRC rank high in the amount garnered by OCHA appeals 
in the 1998–2003 period or in humanitarian assistance.  
 
Jan. 1999 – Jun. 2003 (millions of US dollars) 
DRC Great Lakes S.E. Europe East Timor Afghanistan Iraq 
1.4 0.5 77.2 2.7 65.4 10.3 
Total humanitarian assistance: Jan. 1999 – Jun. 2003 (millions of US dollars) 
349 574 1,493 180 1,741 1,044 
 
Table 1. Comparative of Private contributions to OCHA appeals 5 
 
The disparities between needs, goals and actual funding reflect the political nature 
of aid.6 What is relevant is that the agenda of social and political transformation 
stemming from the definition of the DRC state as non-existent, where statebuilders 
start ‘from scratch’, runs up against agendas of donors.7 A complex political 
environment and long-term objectives also largely exceed the resources at hand. 
This has been noted in the shortcomings towards civilian protection and state 
authority reconstruction. Despite the large deployment of peacekeepers and 
despite being authorised to use force, MONUC/MONUSCO only started military 
operations in conjunction with the FARDC in 2005, and have only once launched 
an operation autonomously, in September 2010.8 Although the DRC government 
                                                   
5 Virgil Hawkins, “Stealth Conflicts: Africa’s World War in the DRC and International 
Consciousness,” The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 2004, 
http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/71 Accessed 20/12/2008. 
6 These disparities reflect intersecting political agendas of interveners and challenges of 
coordination between different UN agencies, donors and aid agencies. These are widely 
researched issues. In relation to the DRC see: Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen from Below; 
Trefon, Congo Masquerade. Some of these have been addressed by MONUC/MONUSCO 
due to its status as an integrated mission, meaning ‘to have a clear chain of command and 
central decision-making authority from which all UN country-activities can be 
coordinated’. Heiner Ha ̈nggi and Vincenza Scherrer, eds., Security Sector Reform and UN 
Integrated Missions: Experience from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti and 
Kosovo (Berlin: Lit, 2008), 8.  
7 Interview with MONUC Political Affairs Officer (no. 7), Kinshasa, July 9, 2009.  
8 Zeebroek, La Mission Des Nations Unies Au Congo, 9. In September 2010, MONUSCO 
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has the primary responsibility for providing security to its citizens, there have 
been particular situations where MONUC/MONUSCO have been seen as directly 
responsible for the failure to provide civilian protection. In 2004, for instance, 
General Nkunda attacked Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu, hosting one of the 
largest MONUC deployments in Eastern DRC, subjecting its population to 
systematic crimes against humanity for a week.9 In 2008, the Kiwanja massacre 
entailed the killing of 67 people 3 km away from the MONUC military camp.10 In 
2010, just over 32 km from the MONUSCO base, and for several weeks, a coalition 
of Mai Mai Cheka and FDLR combatants committed 387 rapes, mostly of women 
but also of men, girls and boys, in addition to other forms of torture and abuse.11  
The fact that peacekeepers obey their own countries’ rules of engagement makes 
them subject to the risk each country wants to expose their soldiers to.12 Even so, 
failure to respond in these situations is linked to the UN’s strategy of not 
engagement against armed groups except when in support of the DRC 
government.  
 
The aim of reconstructing state authority has seen the UN mission and donors 
entering the same logic of informal politics and governance agreements that they 
were trying to tackle. Ever since its first deployment, MONUC has prioritised 
strategies conducive to the formation of government and to restructure the 
                                                                                                                                                   
launched a unitary operation called Shop Window against the FDLR for the first time. 
OCHA information meeting, Kinshasa, September 17, 2010.   
9 Zeebroek, La Mission Des Nations Unies Au Congo, 9. 
10 United Nations Joint Human Rights Office, “Consolidated Report on Investigations 
Conducted by the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) into Grave 
Human Rights Abuses Committed in Kiwanja, North Kivu, in November 2008” (United 
Nations, September 7, 2009), 3. 
11 United Nations Joint Human Rights Office, Final Report of the Fact-Finding Missions of the 
United Nations Joint Human Rights Office into the Mass Rapes and Other Human Rights 
Violations Committed by a Coalition of Armed Groups Along the Kibua-Mpofi Axis in Walikale 
Territory, North Kivu, Fom 30 July to 2 August 2010 (New York: MONUSCO and UN 
Human Rights Office Office of the High Commissioner, July 2011), 4, 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ZR/BCNUDHRapportViolsMassifsKibuaMpofi_
en.pdf Accessed 27/08/2011. 
12 Interview with MONUSCO Political Affairs Officer (no. 63), Goma, July 21, 2010; 
Interview with FARDC General (no. 146), Bukavu, September 7, 2010; Interview with 
Amani Leo Operations Officer, Goma, September 13, 2010; Informal Conversation with 
Pakistani Battalion Blue Helmet, Bukavu, August 13, 2010. 
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security sector. This has relied on power-sharing agreements between the warring 
parties, which not only has given an incentive to take up arms, but has also 
created a contradiction with the aims of fostering peace and promoting 
democracy.13 As declared by the Deputy Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary General Heile Menkeros: ’MONUC [is] buying peace’.14 This is not just a 
matter of asserting trade-offs in a difficult political process, but of articulating the 
contradictory relationship statebuilding has with peace. As shown below, the UN 
has been instrumental in providing legitimacy and, to some extent, logistics to 
articulate patchy formulas of informal and shared authority with neighbouring 
states and through the military. The result has been the creation of new sources of 
violence. From different positions, Verhogen, Vlassenroot and Rayemakers 
illustrate how post-conflict statebuilding has relied on forms of privatised 
governance, which have been constitutive of structural violence dynamics, 
ultimately producing and reproducing sources of insecurity.15 For Trefon this is 
due to post-conflict statebuilding in the DRC being a strategy of ‘mismanagement, 
hypocrisy, powerlessness and sabotage’.16 Reform and aid strategies, both 
intentionally and unintentionally, either fail, or reproduce the problems they were 
trying to solve.17 This is facilitated by a culture of secrecy and impunity and a 
climate of mutual instrumentalisation and competition between national and 
international actors.18 
 
                                                   
13 Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, “Briefing: Kivu’s Intractable Security 
Conundrum,” African Affairs 108, no. 432 (2009): 474; Cristina Barrios and Saïd-Abbas 
Ahamed, “Democracy Promotion Vs. State-building: Decentralization in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo,” in 7th Pan-European IR Conference (presented at the Politics in Hard 
Times: International Relations Responses to the Financial Crisis, Stockholm: European 
Standing Group on International Relations, 2010), 
http://stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/BarriosAhamedDRAFT_dem&Statebuilding.pdf 
Accessed 26/05/2011.  
14 Cited in Chris Alden, Monika Thakur, and Matthew Arnold, Militias and the Challenges of 
Post-Conflict Peace: Silencing the Guns (London: Zed, 2011), 125. 
15 Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, “Briefing: Kivu’s Intractable Security 
Conundrum,” 484; Harry Verhoeven, “The Self-fulfilling Prophecy of Failed States: 
Somalia, State Collapse and the Global War on Terror,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 3, 
no. 3 (2009): 406.  
16 Trefon, Congo Masquerade, ix. 
17 Ibid., 9. 
18 Ibid., 14 – 18. 
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The development of post-conflict statebuilding as seen in the actions of 
MONUC/MONUSCO is contradictory. These are seen in the disconnection 
between aims and funding, in the intersecting agendas of member states and the 
challenges of the context. Different levels of commitments at different times, 
reflecting the broader status of interventions in the political agenda has been felt 
in how the UN has responded to the ongoing crises in the DRC. This has been 
further challenged by the fact that the process and certain policies towards the 
building of state authority have themselves entered into contradiction with other 
priorities such as civilian protection and peacebuilding. The fact that the main 
sources of legitimate authority for the intervention rely on these priorities, yet 
they are also its main shortcomings, points to those deeper incoherencies in the 
nature of the process.   
 
 
5.  Deepening Statebuilding, Militarising Peace: North and 
South Kivu, 2009 – 201119 
 
The context of militarisation, extraction, and plural authority that was shaped 
through the four events seen above, and to which the international strategies of 
post-conflict statebuilding have contributed in a contradictory manner, not only 
maps onto the 2009–2011 period, but has also deepened. In particular, the DRC 
and Rwanda have engaged in a relationship of mutual instrumentalisation and 
mutual confrontation through proxy wars, which has carried the mark of both 
countries’ statebuilding projects. The international response to this context has 
been to encourage political compromises between the two countries, and to 
                                                   
19 The information in this section relies on: Stearns, From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an 
Armed Movement in Eastern Congo; Stearns, “Laurent Nkunda and the CNDP”; UN Group 
of Experts, Final Report of the Group of Experts S/2010/596 (New York: UN Security Council, 
November 29, 2010); UN Group of Experts, Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. S/2012/348; UN Group of Experts, Addendum to the Interim Report of 
the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2012/348/Add.1 (New York: 
UN Security Council, June 27, 2012). For background to and text of the agreements relies 
on: Rigobert Minani Bihuzo, Du Pacte de Stabilité de Nairobi à l’Acte d’Engagement de Goma: 
Enjeux et Défis Du Processus de Paix En RDC (Kinshasa: CEPAS/RODHECIC, 2008). 
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support a military strategy against the FDLR and Mai Mai groups. These groups 
have been seen as the source of the sour relations between the DRC and Rwanda.  
 
B a c k g r o u n d  
 
Since 2004, Nkunda has been operating a parallel administration in Masisi, 
Rutshuru and Nyirangongo (three territories of the North Kivu province), 
entailing a parallel decision-making structure, parallel police, a parallel army and 
different regimes of labour and taxation. The DRC government has responded to 
this in two contradictory ways. On the one hand, encouraged by MONUC and the 
diplomatic community, there have been a series of programmes to integrate 
Nkunda’s troops in the FARDC. On the other, the DRC government has 
supported militia groups, especially PARECO, as a military strategy against 
Nkunda.20 Out of these negotiations, two agreements have constituted the 
reference of action. Firstly, the Goma Accords of January 2008 constituted a 
comprehensive strategy of reintegration of all armed groups including CNDP, 
PARECO and several Mai Mai militias. They established the Amani programme 
in which STAREC came to light, and a series of military operations in which the 
DRC and Rwanda and the DRC with MONUC/MONUSCO targeted the FDLR 
and Mai Mai militias. Despite the initial hype about the value of these agreements, 
by August 2008 the CNDP had withdrawn from the Goma Accords and was 
threatening to take over Goma. The March 23 agreement of 2009 (henceforth 
March 23 agreement) came to the rescue of the Goma Accords as a bilateral 
agreement between the CNDP and the DRC government. However, this section 
will explore what was previously advanced: that these undertakings have 
resulted in the consolidation of CNDP’s positions; in Rwanda’s continuous 
intervention in the region, becoming an ongoing source of instability; in an 
increasing militarised and extractive environment; in a pluralisation of state 
authority; and a mushrooming of Mai Mai militias. 
                                                   
20 UN Group of Experts, Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo S/2008/772 (New York: UN Security Council, December 12, 2008), para. 18. 
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C o n f r o n t a t i o n ,  I n s t r u m e n t a l i s a t i o n  
 
The support of Rwanda to the CNDP is linked to its own security and economic 
interests. Ever since the AFDL war in 1996, Rwanda has claimed that a weak DRC 
is a threat to its security, providing refuge to dissident FDLR-Interahamwe.21 The 
FDLR is a reformation of the old Rwandan Hutu-dominated Interahamwe militias 
that crossed the border into Congo at the time of the Rwandan genocide. 
Although they state their ultimate aim to be the ousting of Kagame and the re-
establishment of a Hutu government in Rwanda, their presence and evolution in 
the DRC relates to a series of complex factors. Added to their fears of being tried 
in Rwanda for crimes of genocide, during their almost twenty years in the DRC 
where they have managed to establish rule in many areas, they have also formed 
families and created a series of military and commercial networks with the DRC 
government, the FARDC and some Mai Mai militias.22 The DRC government has 
used the FDLR to fight against Rwanda and Rwandan-backed groups many times, 
including the 1998–2003 war, and contingently throughout the transition. The 
FDLR and the FARDC have been in conditions of symbiosis to exploit mines in 
several locations in North and South Kivu.23 Hence, the FDLR has been a major 
source of the souring of DRC-Rwanda relations. The uprising of Nkunda, 
mobilised under a discourse for the protection of the Tutsi minority in North 
Kivu, is partly based on the continued presence of the FDLR in the area. However, 
observers note that the problem of the FDLR may be overstated, facilitating only a 
justification for ongoing interventionism.24 
 
                                                   
21 Pomfret, “Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo”; Colette Braeckman, “Cartes Sur Table: Les 
Quatre Vérités Du Général James Kabarebe,” Le Soir - Le Carnet de Colette Braeckman, 
August 29, 2012, http://blog.lesoir.be/colette-braeckman/2012/08/29/cartes-sur-table-
les-quatre-verites-du-general-james-kabarebe/; Clark, “Introduction African Stakes.”  
22 Interview with Group Jeremie Representative 1, Bukavu, August 25, 2010; Steve Hege, 
Understanding the FDLR in the DR Congo: Key Facts on the Disarmament and Repatriation of 
Rwandan Rebels (Charlottesville: Peace Appeal Foundation, February 24, 2009). 
23 Global Witness, Lessons Unlearned: How the UN and Member States Must Do More to End 
Natural Resource-fuelled Conflicts (London: Global Witness, January 2010). 
24 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 322; René Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central 
Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 275 – 276; Autesserre, “Local 
Violence, National Peace?,” 6 – 7. 
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The use/abuse relationship between the DRC and Rwanda is not new. The wave 
of migrations and refugee flows from Rwanda to the DRC in the 1950s and 1960s 
meant that a significant part of the population especially in Masisi and Rutshuru 
(North Kivu) were of a Rwandan descent.25 A change in the nationality law in 
1985 that went from granting Congolese nationality to the descendents of those in 
the territory before 1908 now included those who were in the territory before 
January 1st 1950.26 This, added to the process of Zairianisation in the 1970s, which 
meant a change in land ownership not only created resentment between 
‘autochthones’ and ‘allochthonous’ but this came also because many Kivutian 
political elites and businessmen were linked to Rwanda and not to the DRC.27 
Although the wars in 1996 and 1998 and major peace agreements gave Rwanda a 
stake in the DRC government, its backed elites have felt wary of possible shifts in 
power.28 Ultimately, the DRC government has turned its back to Rwanda several 
times before.  
 
General Nkunda, who had already fought under the APR and RCD in 1996 and 
1998, became the perfect solution for Rwanda to maintain a political, military and 
economic influence in the Kivus. Rwanda’s support afforded him the capacity to 
rise as a defender of the Tutsi community.29 As a charismatic, university-educated 
evangelical pastor and military leader with a national discourse for the defence of 
minorities, he gathered as much popular as elite support, especially from within 
his Tutsi community of Rutshuru and Masisi.30 This support and Nkunda’s own 
                                                   
25 Isidore Ndaywel è Nziem, Nouvelle Histoire du Congo: Des Origines à la Re ́publique 
De ́mocratique (Bruxelles: Cri e ́dition, 2009), 539 – 540.  
26 Ibid., 540. 
27 Ibid.; Prunier, Africa’s World War, 49 – 50. Stearns notes that eites were linked to Rwanda 
in business relating to goods imports and exports, banking, minerals, coffee, cattle 
herders, exploitation of large agricultural holdings as well as transport and transit these 
goods towards Kigali. See: Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters, 260.  
28 RCD’s elite became split between those under Rwandan and Kabila’s influence. This 
was also the case of General Masunzu, which provoked a split amongst elites in 
Minembwe (South Kivu) with the subsequent formation of the Banyamulengue militia 
FRF as will be seen in Chapter 6. 
29 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 322. 
30 Joseph-Roger Mazanza Kindulu and Jean Cornelis Nlandu Tsasa, Les Cadres Congolais de 
La 3ème République (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009), 200; Prunier, Africa’s World War, 323.  
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personality reflect that he is no pawn operating within anyone else’s agenda. 
Additionally, elements of the DRC government have also supported Nkunda. For 
instance, Vice-president Ruberwa and Governor Serufuli supplied with arms.31 
The support that Nkunda gathered from the population of Masisi and Rutshuru, 
linked to the network of elite alliances that go as far Kigali has made Nkunda both 
a threat and a necessary ally for the DRC government. 
 
P e a c e  t h r o u g h  M i l i t a r y  M e a n s :  U m o j a  W e t u ,  K i m y a  I I  a n d  
A m a n i  L e o  
 
The 2008 Goma Conference was a response to the spiral of military confrontation 
over the previous four years. It formalised a rapprochement between the DRC and 
Rwanda, encouraging a series of formal military operations backed by MONUC, 
and giving the operations special powers, funding and immunities. The fact that a 
military operation was prioritised illustrates a strengthening of statebuilding, but 
that continues to be done through sharing means of coercion and extraction, and 
informalised governance formulas based on scattering the army across the 
territory of North and South Kivu.  
 
Between January 2009 and April 2012 three military operations were launched: 
Umoja Wetu, Kimya II and Amani Leo.32 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
31 Stearns, “Laurent Nkunda and the CNDP,” 248; US Ambassador Haykin, “Former 
North Kivu Governor Serufuli on Decoupage,” 09KINSHASA573, Wikileaks, June 18, 2009, 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09KINSHASA573. 
32 Radio Okapi, “Joseph Kabila Suspend Toutes Les Opérations Militaires Au Nord-Kivu,” 
April 12, 2012, http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/04/11/joseph-kabila-suspend-
toutes-les-operations-militaires-au-nord-kivu/ Accessed 13/04/2012. Although in 
February 2012 he had launched another offensive against the FDLR in South Kivu. Radio 
Okapi, “Sud-Kivu: L’opération «Amani Kamilifu» Lancée Pour Traquer Les FDLR,” 
February 17, 2012, http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/02/17/sud-kivu-loperation-
amani-kamilifu-lancee-pour-traquer-les-fdlr/ Accessed 23/02/2012. 
 96 
Name of the 
Operation Dates Duration 
Area of 
Operation Troops Success 
Umoja Wetu  
(Our unity) January 2009 35 days 
Meridional 
North Kivu 
FARDC - 
RDF 
500 FDLR dislodged 
then relocated 
Kimya II 
(Silence) March 2009 3 months South Kivu 
FARDC/ 
MONUSCO 
Mai Mai and FDLR 
attacked  
Amani Leo  
(Peace 
Today) January 2010 
15 
months 
STAREC 
areas 
FARDC/ 
MONUSCO 
FDLR substantially 
touched, leadership in 
judicial process. Several 
groups relocated and 
still operating as allies 
with Mai Mai militias. 
Table 2. 2009 – 2011 Goma Accords Operations33 
These operations provoked an outcry. Although they managed to dismantle 
certain FDLR chains of command and camps, as well as dislodging them from the 
mine sites they had occupied, they did so by taking a big toll on civilians.34 The 
FDLR retaliated against the population in areas where the FDLR had set up a 
parallel administration. The FARDC and the RDF for their part engaged in severe 
human rights abuses in the course of their military action. Several NGOs, local 
and international, called for their suspension, and some for the demilitarisation of 
villages.35 The popular rejection of these operations led the government to 
introduce operation Amani Leo. In the eyes of a commander deployed in South 
Kivu, the problem with the previous operations was that the population were not 
involved or consulted.36  
 
Nevertheless, with or without popular support, these operations represented one 
of the backbones of the restoration of state authority. Amani Leo FARDC 
Operations officer defined the strategy as follows: 
 
                                                   
33 Based on ICG, Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to Disarm the FDLR, Africa Report 
(Nairobi: ICG, July 9, 2009); ICG, Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda, Africa Briefing 
(Nairobi: International Crisis Group, April 8, 2010). 
34 Oxfam International, Enquete de Protection - Oxfam et Partenaires: Nord Kivu, Sud Kivu, 
Ituri, Haut-Uele, Maniema, Confidential (Goma: Oxfam, May 2009). 
35 Radio Okapi, “Insécurité à Beni: La Société Civile Propose La Démilitarisation de La 
Ville,” April 23, 2010, http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2010/04/23/insecurite-a-beni-la-
societe-civile-propose-la-demilitarisation-de-la-ville-3/ Accessed 23/04/2010.  
36 Interview with FARDC Colonel in Baraka (no. 129), August 31, 2010.  
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It is not about exterminating all FDLR like saying – there is no one FDLR 
member that breathes – no, that is not possible; what we mean is that in 
one or two months we can eradicate the FDLR phenomenon, as a military 
organisation here in our country, with all its capacity to operate, to set up 
barriers on the roads and get taxes, to continue exploiting the minerals like 
they want, to have the political control of certain localities. Once 
eradicated, we can restore state authority all across the country.37  
 
MONUSCO’s founding mandate supports this vision with its goals including: the 
termination of military groups, support for the government to better protect 
population, and the support for the restoration of state authority in areas held by 
armed groups.38 The question is whether state authority has indeed been restored. 
On the one hand, military operations have had the effect of giving the FARDC 
increasing control over mining.39 On the other, this is a sign of CNDP and 
Rwandan interventionism. As the map below shows, the largest control of mines 
is in the hands of FARDC. However, as many of the FARDC deployments in 
control of the mines are in fact ex-CNDP troops, these have continued to serve the 
CNDP structure, and alongside that, have continued to grant Rwanda access to 
mineral exploitation.40 
 
                                                   
37 Interview with Amani Leo Operations Officer, Goma.  
38 UN Security Council, Resolution 1925 (2010), 3. 
39 Global Witness, The Hill Belongs to Them (London: Global Witness, 2010). 
40 UN Group of Experts, Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. S/2012/348, para. 141; UN Group of Experts, Addendum to the Interim Report of the 
Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2012/348/Add.1. 
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Map 4. Mineral Exploitation and Other Entities41 
 
The reinforcement of CNDP positions through reintegration efforts is a trend that 
comes from before. For example, with the 2007 reintegration attempt, called 
mixage: 42 
                                                   
41 Humanitarian Information Unit US Government, “Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Mineral Exploitation by Armed Groups and Other Entities, Map,” 2011, 
https://hiu.state.gov/Pages/Africa.aspx Accessed 20/10/2012.  
42 ‘Mixage’ is a process of demobilisation and reintegration in the army without 
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Nkunda’s commanders continued to respond to their own chain of 
command, meeting regularly in Nkunda’s headquarters and launching 
operations independently […]. Most importantly, they were put back on 
the army payroll. With 3,500 declared soldiers at the beginning of mixage, 
Nkunda benefited from over $70,000 each month in salaries.43  
 
The result, Stearns argues, is that the CNDP consolidated their positions, 
especially along the border with Rwanda.44 Similarly, the fact that the March 23 
agreement established that CNDP troops would integrate the FARDC but would 
not be deployed outside the Kivus has essentially provoked only a change of 
uniforms.45 For Rwanda this means the fulfilment of important security and 
economic agendas. For the DRC it has been a compromise, encouraged by the 
diplomatic community, to reinforce state presence in the area. The military 
operations have also left a presence of military authority not only in the mines, 
but also in the villages around them. The fact that part of this military is linked to 
Rwanda signifies a political compromise and an exercise of shared sovereignty. 
This is further illustrated by the use of non-military means.  
 
T h e  n o n - m i l i t a r y  m e a n s  
 
Under the Programme Amani Leo, there were the statebuilding programmes 
proper: STAREC from the government and ISSSS, from the ‘international 
community’.46 The pacific resettlement of refugees has also been of crucial 
importance due to the massive fleeing of refugees and the territorial nature of the 
war, linked to the occupation of mining, cattle and farming-rich areas.47 Premised 
on the doctrine of state weakness, the ISSSS articulated its mandate through the 
connection between security, state authority and development. In its foundational 
                                                                                                                                                   
redeployment. Troops are allowed to remain in their area but ‘mixing’ up with FARDC.  
43 Stearns, “Laurent Nkunda and the CNDP,” 253. Emphasis in the original citing an 
interview with General Siatilo Ngizo, in Goma, February 2007. It is note-worthy that Jason 
Stearns was coordinator of the Group of Experts on the Arms Embargo at the time. 
44 Ibid., 254. 
45 Interview with MONUSCO - ISSSS/STAREC liaison Officer, Goma; Interview with 
MONUSCO Political Affairs Representative (no. 149), Bukavu, September 8, 2010. 
46 UNSSSS turned to ISSSS  - including main donors and the participation of INGOs.  
47 Pole Institute - Dossier, RDC, Nord Kivu: Les Guerres Derrie ̀re La Guerre (Goma: Pole 
Institute, September 26, 2008), 8. 
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statement, it noted ’the fragile nature of peace-building in eastern DRC’ and its 
purpose ‘to consolidate current peace gains and create the conditions for longer-
term recovery and development’.48 Its priorities were set as enhancing security, 
promoting the restoration of state authority and creating conditions for refugee 
return and economic recovery in the key conflict-affected areas it was concerned 
with.49 Similarly, STAREC’s foundational document affirms that ‘the global 
objective of this plan is to stabilise the East of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
by improving the security environment and by restoring state authority in the 
areas controlled by armed groups’.50 While agreeing to a policy in which the 
military means are at its heart, most countries financing STAREC have 
contributed to portfolios outside military operations.51  
 
A significant initiative has been the Permanent Local Committees for 
Reconciliation. These committees were planned to ensure the peaceful return and 
accommodation of refugees in North and South Kivu. The need for a negotiated 
approach is due to the fact that the land holdings and even the houses of these 
refugees may have been redistributed by the customary chief, occupied by the 
military or the police, sold or taken by an authority.52 Particularly in North Kivu, 
negotiations at the grassroots level have turned into a geopolitical exercise. This is 
due to the fact that identification and nomination of refugees is made through the 
UNHCR/DRC/Rwanda Tripartite, but is enacted locally. This means that on the 
part of the DRC, this nomination is done largely by the CNDP. As such, many so-
called autochthonous residents of Masisi, but also from Walikale and Rutshuru, 
have argued that it is a tactic to settle Rwandan population in Congo.53 
                                                   
48 UNSSSS/ ISSSS, “Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility for the Democratic 
Republic of Congo: Terms of Reference,” 2. 
49 Ibid., 2 – 3. 
50 Government of the DRC, “Programme de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction des Zones 
Sortant des Conflits Arme ́s (STAREC)” (DRC Government, June 2009), 2.  
51  Interview with Starec - Amani Leo representative, Goma, July 20, 2010. 
52 Interview with Louis Batenda General Director of Ucoopanoki Cooperative, Goma, July 
23, 2010; Interview with Professor from the Université Catholique de Bukavu,, Bukavu, 
July 18, 2009; Interview with UN Habitat representative, Goma, September 10, 2011. 
53 Interview with President of Civil Society - Masisi Centre, Masisi, September 12, 2011. 
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Interestingly, residents are not the only ones to have this perception. According to 
a UNHCR officer, Rwanda is using this strategy to such effect: 
 
The people that want to come into Walikale and Lubero are not Congolese; 
it is Kigali that dictates that. There is not a lot of population there, so those 
who live there feel really threatened. There is a lot of space. The strategy is 
that they allow for those new settlers to come in and compensate them 
with development projects. We need to do that very slowly. People in 
Walikale are the people from the hills, with provincial characters, we need 
to convince them. We need to reduce the dependence of people on the 
customary chief. We need to give a land title to each of them and create the 
conditions so that investors can come to bring development. But for that 
we need to form the customary chief and give him an alternative also. It is 
a political but also a humanitarian project. It is the only way, otherwise we 
risk that there is war again. We can put pressure on Rwanda in regards to 
the FDLR but their policy of establishing themselves in Congo is not 
possible, they receive 50% of their budget from overseas, but if the West 
stops their aid, they can always go to China. Rwanda has a de facto 
occupation of Rutshuru and Masisi, and it is now trying to take Walikale 
and Lubero because there are a lot of minerals there, we can only try that 
this is done in a calm and peaceful way.54 
 
The political implications of this policy have meant that its operationalisation has 
been slow. Nevertheless, it is an important policy that has come to formalise 
similar structures already in place.55 The above passage summarises many 
underlying assumptions about the DRC held by international staff. The vision of 
the DRC as a ‘Zaire-shape hole in the middle of Africa’ still influences 
international-backed policies. The belief that investors are the engines of 
development subordinates social and political questions to the conditions in 
which investors need to operate. Rwanda’s position allows it to take autonomous 
decisions by bypassing development aid conditionality. Similar views are found 
in a US embassy cable. Reporting on a brief given by Head of UNHCR – DRC, 
which analysed issues in the signing of the Tripartite with Rwanda, Ambassador 
Garvelink stated: 
 
Recognizing that the CNDP had much invested in the return to bolster its 
constituency in the Kivus, a senior UNHCR official said the agency was 
worried about the potential for violence stemming from an acceleration of 
                                                   
54 Interview with UNHCR Officer, Goma, August 4, 2010. 
55 Interview with UN Habitat representative, Goma. 
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the process by either the CNDP or the Government of Rwanda. The official 
said that it would be very easy for indigenous groups opposed to the 
return to "stage a small massacre" to terrorize Congolese Tutsis into 
staying in camps. When asked what UNHCR could do to prevent such 
attacks, the official said that the process hinges on the CLPCs, who will be 
key to ensure local buy-in of the process, and critically, to determine which 
areas are safe for return. But it remains to be seen how the guarantors of 
the return process could prevent manipulation of the CLPCs, many of 
whom will operate in CNDP strongholds. A UNHCR official candidly said 
that that the Congolese delegation had signed the Tripartite "for the 
gallery" and that much of the refugee return process was "out of the 
government's control" - overseen by the CNDP parallel administration, 
which the official suggested would become even more entrenched 
following the recent GDRC cabinet reshuffle which excluded the CNDP.56  
  
Both analyses represent the widespread acknowledgement of Rwanda’s presence 
in Eastern DRC. They also show that there are different statebuilding projects 
taking place simultaneously, each having a difficult relationship with the 
promotion of peace and stability in the region.57 However, more than a political 
compromise, in so far as this geopolitical social engineering is activated under the 
premise that the alternative is war, it is coercive. Operating at the level of ethnic 
social composition may have an impact on land access and local political 
representation, and so it also has an extractive effect. The fact that these local 
identities with their subsequent political reorganisations act as conveyor belts for 
state political, commercial and security agendas at different levels finally 
illustrates that local, national and international dynamics are enmeshed.  
 
C o n c l u d i n g  T h o u g h t s  o n  t h e  2 0 0 9 – 2 0 1 1  P e r i o d  
 
The different strategies pursued through the 2009-2011 period have not furthered 
peace in the Kivus. On the contrary, they have reinforced the presence of armed 
                                                   
56 US Ambassador William John Garvelink, DRC/UNHCR/Rwanda Tripartite Agreement: 
View from the DRC. Kigali120/ 09KINSHASA1052, Unclassified Cable (Kinshasa: US 
Embassy Kinshasa, February 24, 2010), 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/search.php?q=clpc+&qo=57344&qc=0&qto=2010-02-28 
Accessed 10/09/2012, para. 7. 
57 Ben Shepherd, State-building, Externalisation and National Interests: Beacons of Good 
Governance or Exporters of Violence? (London: London School of Economics, May 2010), 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/dinamfellow/dinamfellowship.aspx  
Accessed 08/11/2011. 
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groups, and have guaranteed strategic positions for Rwanda. This has fuelled 
tensions, violence and instability. Though these strategies may have resulted in 
the assertion of state authority in some areas for the purpose of stabilisation, they 
have relied on the presence of the military. The increasing militarisation of the 
area has externalised violence and humanitarian costs on the local residents. As 
Autesserre notes, Eastern DRC has seen a deterioration of the living conditions 
with more displacement than in 2006, ongoing human rights abuses and with the 
DRC falling in its development index ranking to be ‘the least developed country 
on earth’.58 Autesserre’s reflection highlights a contradiction of post-conflict 
statebuilding with its claim to be a necessary stepping-stone towards 
development. Even so, the context of 2009-2011 represents a deepening of 
statebuilding strategies. Not only both the DRC and Rwanda have been 
instrumentalising and confronting each other aggravating a context of violence 
and deteriorating life conditions. The formal strategies developed through 
STAREC and ISSSS have sustained informal governance arrangements and a 
military strategy towards peace that has generated further violence.  
 
6.  Militarisation, Plural Authority and Extraction: The 
Context of Resistance 
 
This chapter provided a background against which to observe the context that 
shapes resistance in the DRC. It has been argued that militarisation, multiple 
authorities and extraction are prominent. The different dynamics in place 
illustrate that defining post-conflict statebuilding as international does not 
identify the factors that may be at the root of generating sources of domination 
and hence of resistance. Throughout the whole period, but significantly during 
2009 and 2011, multiple actors, including the UN, have fostered governance 
arrangements that have not always led to the creation of state authority, or 
provided civilian protection. The underlying reasons for this require grasping the 
different historical, international and sociological factors.  
                                                   
58 Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales,” 202 – 203. 
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Two full-fledged wars, genocide and regime change, first suffocated a democratic 
movement and funnelled popular political aspirations through military means. 
The latent layer of everyday resistance became prevalent but significantly 
militarised. An important implication of these multiple periods of conflict is that 
alongside multiple wars, there are multiple statebuildings. These have been 
mutually reinforcing but also mutually undermining. In the DRC, war does not 
necessarily make the state nor is the state the only actor at war; war has been seen 
as a useful and effective tool to pursue certain state agendas. Rather than 
centralising state power and military power, wars have acted primarily against 
the population. They have left at times a scattered presence of military authority 
and have forced state and non-state actors to form contingent alliances. Although 
this period is part of an ongoing and unfinished process, the dynamics of 
fostering informal governance arrangements have generated a co-habited context 
of citizens and military exposing the relation between war, statebuilding and 
resistance most clearly.  
 
As will be seen in the next chapters, resistance is an everyday response, a negation 
and a subversion of a lived context of domination. As has been highlighted, this 
context of domination is not just a side effect of war and statebuilding but also 
reflects the ways in which people have been primary targets of war and 
instruments of both war and state authority assertion. The 2009-2011 period is 
characterised by a deepening of statebuilding strategies, a militarisation of peace 
as well as by an upsurge of popular militia action. Although there have been 
studies reflecting on this period and the reasons behind this upsurge of militias, 
very few accounts have seen civilian response as resistance and when so, it has 
not been theorised. Conversely, this is a particularly relevant period for analysing 
trends of what the relationship has been between war, statebuilding and 
resistance since 1996. Using the DRC case study, the task in the next chapters will 
be to show the relationship between different practices of resistance. 
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Chapter 3 
Asserting Authority: Violence,  Extraction and 
Legitimacy in a  Plural Space  
 
 
[T]o govern men as to produce and collect goods is inseparable from the specific modes of 
the distribution and modulation of violence.1 
 
 
1.  Ruling over People 
 
Examining the literature on post-conflict statebuilding and the trajectory of its 
practice in the DRC highlights the need for embedding the study of this process in 
its historical and sociological context. What the critical literature has rightly 
identified is that post-conflict statebuilding policies resemble the hegemonic 
position of mainstream policy-making. The fact that this literature has accentuated 
the ways in which there is no ideological or operationalising coherence in these 
policies has been a step forward to provide nuanced analyses of the nature of 
statebuilding. Even so, the focus on hybridity has provided a critique of the 
relationship between “international” statebuilding and “local” societies. To better 
account for resistance the analysis needs to be focused on ruling and resistance 
practices. However, as Eric Wolf states, social science cannot be restricted to the 
study of ‘self-contained’ societies.2 They need to be studied as social relations 
interconnected with global political and economic processes. Resistance therefore 
reflects not just issues of bad-governance, but the experience of war, poverty, and 
political processes as illegitimate or intolerable. These processes go beyond a 
relationship between state and citizens. They reflect historical continuity and 
                                                   
1 Achille Mbembe, “Désordres, Résistances et Productivité,” Politique Africaine no. 42 
(1991): 7.  
2 Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1982), 385. 
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change, and a myriad of political compromises, agreements, struggles and 
improvisation.  
 
Still, it could be argued that whatever other challenges post-conflict statebuilding 
faces, whether administrative reform, economic reactivation or the stabilisation of 
ongoing conflicts, it poses statebuilders with the basic question of how to assert 
rule. Ultimately, as Weber argues, states are ‘associations of rule’.3 Post-conflict 
statebuilding in the DRC is a good illustration that an important element in this 
process is the production of authority. For Weber, state rule implies the 
transformation of domination into authority, which meant that norm-making and 
economic management backed by force rested on rationalised rule and 
population’s consent.4 It also implies that states have to monopolise the claim to 
the legitimate use of force. However, following Laski, there remains an element of 
domination in the exercise of state rule because ‘[t]he state, indeed, has rarely 
hesitated to claim paramount authority, even if, on the occasions of conflict, it has 
not been overwhelmingly successful’.5 Consent is limited and contingent and does 
not entirely set the basis for the practice of state authority.  
 
Post-conflict statebuilding has resolved the problem of legitimacy and rule 
through the production of a discourse of protection and social change. For 
statebuilders, the problem is not whether violence and extraction are a practice of 
statecraft, but whether these can be exercised in a legitimate manner. The power-
sharing formulas amongst warring parties, later sanctioned through national 
elections, have attempted to provide this legitimacy. In the DRC, the two national 
                                                   
3 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth 
and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 51. 
4 Ibid., 90 – 91 and 313. Weber distinguished between power as coercion and power as 
authority. Speirs notes that a closer translation of Weber would identify these as ‘power’ 
and ‘domination’, where domination (herrschaft) means legitimate power, and so they can 
be seen respectively as ‘domination’ and ‘authority’. See: Peter Lassman and Ronald 
Speirs, eds., Weber, Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 21 
and 370. 
5 Harold Joseph Laski, Authority in the Modern State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1919), 8. 
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elections have generated accusations of fraud. Elections have represented a rush 
to legitimise the power-sharing agreements. Autesserre, for example, speaks of a 
rush of international actors to have state representatives as interlocutors.6 For 
Kabila, elections were a way to consolidate his power, gathering elite support at 
the national and international level, rather than popular support. Additionally, 
having a national government has not meant that state authority has been 
extended throughout the national territory. Asserting rule, especially in the Kivus, 
has not been so much a centralising rational exercise in the Weberian sense, as 
much as a form of ‘improvised discharge’.7 This form of asserting state authority 
reflects what Mbembe calls private indirect government. It refers to the practice of 
establishing private forms of ruling by troops, economic actors and others, 
generally using illegal taxation or forced labour, fostering a culture of immunity 
and authoritarianism.8 The reconstruction of state authority has not represented 
an authority resting on popular consent, but on the political compromises of 
different parties in matters of power-sharing. The discourse of post-conflict 
statebuilding informs these strategies and underpins the need for these 
compromises, also affording a platform for legitimising international actors.  
 
As was argued in the last chapter, the quasi-hegemonic presence of Rwanda has 
been a political compromise facilitated by international actors and by the DRC 
government, even if the DRC government has simultaneously confronted it 
militarily. The consolidation of state authority has entailed contradictory and 
improvised arrangements where, for instance, mines in Eastern DRC have been 
increasingly placed under FARDC control. While this control largely represents 
the strengthening of the CNDP and Rwandan influence, it also illustrates shared 
sovereignty, plural authority and informal practices as practices of statecraft. 
                                                   
6 Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales,” 17; Barrios and Ahamed speak of “Kabila-state-
building” Cristina Barrios and Saïd-Abbas Ahamed, “International Intervention in the 
Congo: A Flawed Paradigm and ‘Kabila-state’-building” (presented at the International 
Studies Association Annual Conference, San Francisco, 2008). 
7 A Weberian form of indirect rule emphasising improvisation and simulacra more than 
strategic planning. Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 81 – 82.  
8 Mbembe, On the Postcolony. Ch. 2. 
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These forms of authority and governance do not make the DRC pathological, they 
illustrate how statebuilding processes take place more generally.   
 
This chapter has several aims. A first aim is to illustrate that resistance is rooted in 
the coercive and extractive practices of statebuilding. Secondly, it explores plural 
and informal ruling as patterns of statebuilding practice. Thirdly, it shows how 
these practices characterise the nature of post-conflict statebuilding as a plural 
and improvised form of ruling and authority assertion. Finally, it highlights 
several challenges of theorising resistance in this context that will be necessary to 
address in the next chapters. In order to do so, the last section of the chapter 
discusses Achille Mbembe’s theory of the nature of political authority and of the 
political space in Africa. Addressing Mbembe’s challenge that ambiguity, 
plurality and the co-production of power are characteristic of the African political 
context, and that speaking of resistance is irrelevant, will provide an opportunity 
to reflect on the categories established by the Scottian framework of resistance in 
the following chapters. These ambiguities and complexities will give particular 
shape to practices of resistance. They need to be embraced as part of the analysis 
but not foreclose it.  
 
The chapter develops these arguments over four sections. First, it looks at patterns 
in the practices and processes of statebuilding through Charles Tilly’s ‘bellicist’ 
account.9 As this has been criticised as an account that negates more than explains 
statebuilding in Africa, a second section discusses some relevant critiques. The 
problem with Tilly’s account is that it is focused on the process of power 
concentration that ultimately reflects the unfolding of the European modern 
nation state. The argument here is that statebuilding is a process of asserting, 
consolidating and exercising rule through the management of violence and 
wealth. Tilly’s account of coercion and accumulation as sources of authority 
                                                   
9 The centrality of war in this account leads Centeno to speak of it as the ‘bellicist’ account. 
Miguel Angel Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America 
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 11 – 26.  
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provides a good standpoint to study general patterns. A third section discusses 
the application of Tilly’s framework with some examples from the DRC. This 
section will establish that if the practices of coercion and extraction are considered 
under the light of different exercises of distribution and concentration of violence 
and wealth; and if ‘the international’ is thought of as a timely ally - not just a 
violent competitor - or as already embedded in the process, the framework can 
elucidate the heterogeneity of statebuilding. A final section explores the challenge 
plural forms of coercion and extraction pose to the Scottian framework through 
the theory of Achille Mbembe. Mbembe brings a necessary warning against 
simplifying the analyses as a state-society binary or as one of domination and 
resistance. A fuller response to this challenge will be elaborated in the next 
chapters.  
 
 
2.  Practices and Patterns of Statebuilding 
 
In order to examine the patterns of statebuilding more generally, this section 
examines the links between statebuilding, violence and extraction, following what 
Teschke calls the ‘core hypothesis constitut[ing] the dominant paradigm of state 
formation theory in contemporary scholarship’.10 This is not to fall back in 
‘tempocentrism’ and argue that, for instance, the ruling efforts of Kabila bear no 
differences to the centralising exercises of the Kongo Empire.11 Nor is it to reify 
myths about Europe, sovereignty, or any ‘intellectual legitimations for 
mainstream IR’.12 Less so is the aim to portray Europe as the model to say 
something about what Africa lacks. On the contrary, the aim is to see the present 
as a construct of historical continuity and change, and to reflect on common 
                                                   
10 Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International 
Relations (London: Verso, 2003), 119. 
11 Hobson, “What’s at Stake in ‘Bringing Historical Sociology Back into International 
Relations’?,” 9 – 15; Ndaywel è Nziem, Nouvelle histoire du Congo, 134. 
12 Teschke, The Myth of 1648, 119. 
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shared practices of statebuilding that can provide a better theoretical grounding 
for understanding what is resisted.13 
   
T h e  W a r - m a k i n g  a n d  S t a t e - m a k i n g  T h e s i s :  A n  O v e r v i e w  
 
The DRC has been the contemporary theatre of multi-state war in Africa. Its 
narrative of violence and plunder, and the corollary solution, premised on 
statebuilding, enmeshed itself in a process of militarisation and extraction, makes 
the bellicist account of war, coercion, accumulation and state-making a necessary 
reference. These practices need to be accounted for and compared with discursive 
peacebuilding formulas of statebuilding as a process towards peace, democracy 
and development. As Tilly states: 
 
At least for the European experience of the past few centuries, a portrait of 
war makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs 
bears a far greater resemblance to the facts than do its chief alternatives: 
the idea of a social contract, the idea of an open market in which operators 
of armies and states offer services to willing consumers, the idea of a 
society whose shared norms and expectations call forth a certain kind of 
government.14 
 
Tilly’s landmark study on state formation opens with the story of Hammurabi’s 
conquest of the nearby Mesopotamian city-states around late XVIII B.C., asserting 
that it was representative of patterns of state formation in history.15 Tilly 
acknowledged that important to the process of subjecting the population of these 
states to Hammurabi’s own Babylonian rule was the deployment of a discourse 
that justified his rule as divine and just. Hammurabi claimed a right and an 
obligation to make laws, under the divine dictate of god Marduk, further vilifying 
all resistance as going against divine will.16 For Tilly, although this conquest 
contained an important cultural, religious and rule-making exercise, it was 
coercive power that allowed Hammurabi to create his state. The underlying 
                                                   
13 Hobson, “What’s at Stake in ‘Bringing Historical Sociology Back into International 
Relations’?,” 7. 
14 Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” 169.  
15 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 1. 
16 Ibid. 
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theory is that statebuilding is one of power concentration determined in large part 
by mutually influencing external and internal pressures. Different combinations 
of these dynamics provided different type of states, but the pathway was similar.17 
Elites’ rivalry and conquest provoked wars; this provoked the need for military 
conscription and taxation, centralising state power, and turning it into an 
instrument of coercion against the population and the subjugation of rivals. The 
absolutism that this new institution developed was only transformed several 
centuries later through wars and revolutions, not through a social contract.18 State-
society bargaining, added to the development of commercial, military and 
diplomatic alliances, gave way to the modern European state system.19 
 
Tilly identifies patterns of statebuilding, acknowledging that other historical cases 
would be far less neat than that of Hammurabi. So are most of Tilly’s case studies. 
Normally there are multiple state makers, multiple claims on authority and 
multiple challengers. Taming competitors is not about annihilating them as much 
as a process of fostering alliances. Tilly attempts to capture a process, not just 
single actors. This is well exemplified by Tilly’s thesis of state-making as organised 
crime.20 States by this measure were protection rackets. State-makers rise as 
protectors of allies and competitors when the threats are real but also when they 
are invented. In order to foster rule, channels of accumulation and gain allies, the 
government could invent a threat turning itself into a protector before elites, 
making wealth transfers and punishing population if necessary.21 Organised 
crime was not a challenge to the state but its actual source of operation to gather 
elite support, maintain extraction and yield coercive power. In this equation, the 
distinction between ‘”legitimate” and “illegitimate” force makes no difference to 
the fact’.22 This fact for Tilly is that state authority requires the management and, if 
                                                   
17 Tilly differentiates states according to their organisational structure including: City-
states, Tribute-taking empire and nation states. Ibid., 21 – 25.  
18 Ibid., 110 – 119. 
19 Ibid., 15 – 22. 
20 Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.” 
21 Ibid., 171. 
22 Ibid., 171, emphasis in the original. 
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possible, the monopoly of violence.23 Tilly’s narrative therefore speaks to broader 
patterns of statebuilding. Some elements of it, including centralisation of rule, 
monopoly of the use of violence and the underlying assumed progression towards 
the European state deserve however more scrutiny, before this account is applied 
to contemporary DRC. But before doing so, it is important to observe how Tilly 
conceptualised the relationship between statebuilding and resistance.  
 
S t a t e s  a n d  R e s i s t a n c e   
 
By any means, this violent and extractive enterprise encountered resistance. Tilly 
argues that resistance took several forms as ‘popular collective action’ and as ‘new 
claims on the state’.24 In this process, subject population and their traditional elites 
could engage in agreements to launch a rebellion, or elites could be co-opted in 
the statebuilding exercise through the protection racket mentioned above.25 The 
heterogeneity of population was a difficulty for establishing state rule across 
Europe, and this became the target of increasing homogenisation in terms of 
language, religion, and administration.26 The more these type of mechanisms 
disturbed subordinate population, the more resistance it gathered.27 According to 
Tilly, the nature of this resistance was often covert and localised, ‘employing the 
“weapons of the weak”’.28 Subordinate groups were likely to turn these into 
outright revolt when state’s actions were particularly damaging to their collective 
identities, when they had strong ties between them or with national or 
international elites, and, when they had identified states’ vulnerabilities. Tilly 
notes that states have impacted on the form resistance has taken but also that 
resistance has determined the form of the state.29  
 
                                                   
23 Ibid., 171. 
24 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 99. 
25 See also: Teschke, The Myth of 1648, 60. 
26 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 107. 
27 Ibid., 100. 
28 Cf. James Scott cited in ibid., 101, emphasis in the original. 
29 Ibid., 117 – 122. 
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The Tillean account of coercion and accumulation offers the possibility to 
understand coercion and extraction as connected to statebuilding and not only to 
a narrative of state failure. The problem is that it has been precisely a Weberian - 
Tillean account of the state that has been leveraged to argue that the DRC does not 
exist or that it does not function in the right way.30 The relationship between war 
and statebuilding in the DRC has generally been seen as ‘unproductive’ in that 
war has not generated a state in the Tillean sense.31 The literature on statebuilding, 
with the discourse of state failure, and the Africanist literature, with the discourse 
of ‘neo-patrimonialism’, have made coercion and accumulation pathological 
practices of statecraft.32  
 
For Migdal and Schlichte a Weberian ‘image’ of the state as ‘coherent, fairly 
unified actors, set apart from, or above, other social organizations’ has permeated 
both academic research and policy-making.33 However, this does not account for 
the fact that the use of informal extra-official channels does not mean that these 
are not geared towards ruling and asserting authority. Migdal and Schlichte agree 
with the view that violence is central to state power, which they see as common to 
state theory, including Weber, Elias, Tilly and others.34  Their view is that this 
power, which affects practices of norm-making, tax and labour extraction, 
                                                   
30 Stein Sundstøl Eriksen, “‘State Failure’ in Theory and Practice: The Idea of the State and 
the Contradictions of State Formation,” Review of International Studies 31, no. 1 (2011): 237  
– 239. 
31 The concept of ‘unproductive violence’ is taken from Mbembe, discussed below. 
Violence as not generating state-making can be seen in: Taylor and Botea, “Tilly Tally”; 
Christopher Cramer, “Trajectories of Accummulation through War and Peace,” in The 
Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, ed. 
Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 129 – 148. 
32 Zubairu Wai, “Neo-patrimonialism and the Discourse of State Failure in Africa,” Review 
of African Political Economy 39, no. 131 (2012): 27 – 43; Migdal and Schlichte, “Rethinking 
the State,” 2 – 13. 
33 Migdal and Schlichte, “Rethinking the State,” 4. Migdal, later with Schlichte, defines the 
state as a ‘field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by 1) the image 
of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people 
bounded by that territory, and 2) the actual practices involving those staffing its multiple parts 
and those they engage in their roles as state officials.’ Ibid., 15. Joel S Migdal, State in Society: 
Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 15 – 16. 
34 Migdal and Schlichte, “Rethinking the State,” 16. 
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bureaucratic administration and the use of force, will vary across states.35 A focus 
on actual practice beyond legal/illegal, formal/informal or public/private divides 
is what can illuminate the ways in which states operate.36 While the bellicist 
account is not without issues, as the next section shows, it brings an opportunity 
to focus on the process of post-conflict statebuilding as sharing historical features 
with broader practices of rule making and hence accounting for resistance also as 
a patterned response. 
 
 
3.  Challenges to the Bellicist Account  
 
The challenges to the bellicist account have been extensive. Of particular interest 
are those that have taken issue with the narrative for its eurocentrism, for the 
emphasis that has been placed on the centralisation of coercion, and the ethical 
critiques leveraged against its methodology. Nevertheless, in comparison to other 
accounts of the practices of statebuilding, the bellicist account highlights some 
particularities of the DRC as a context of war and statebuilding while being 
illustrative of broader patterns of statebuilding.  
 
I s s u e s  w i t h  t h e  N a r r a t i v e  
 
Some important critiques of the bellicist narrative relate to the ‘elision of empire’ 
and of the non-military, even personal aspects of statebuilding.37 Bhambra, for 
instance, argues that the Weberian-inspired narrative has a civilisational bias, a 
narrowed view of processes outside violence and war and has artificially created a 
“success” story on which to measure others.38 The standard statebuilding story 
resonates with Weber’s account of the rationalisation of authority. The processes 
                                                   
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 16 and 31.  
37 Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and John M. Hobson, “The Big Bangs of IR: The 
Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You About 1648 and 1919,” Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 39, no. 3 (2011): 737. 
38 Gurminder Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological 
Imagination (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
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of coercion and accumulation were increasingly undertaken, not as forms of 
personalised rule, but formalised and legalised into central bureaucratised 
institutions.39 However, if a European type of state, so crucial for making the DRC 
the embodiment of failure, is the model to follow, it is important to recognise that 
even in the relatively parochial narrative of European state formation its sources 
of authority, as Tilly points out, are not consent and democracy, but war, coercion 
and accumulation. When colonisation is added to this narrative, which as 
Bhambra argues, is constitutive and not a consequence of modernity, it shows that 
European states were not entirely self-made, but benefited from extraction and 
war in the colonies.40 Thus industrialisation, and consecutive reform of 
absolutism, was a process dependent and determined by war, violence and 
extraction. 
 
John Hobson’s challenge to the ‘Eurocentric’ versions of the rise of Europe and 
capitalism does not necessarily undermine the argument that war, coercion and 
accumulation played a role in the emergence of states. His research shows how 
tools and ideas fundamental for the rise of ‘the west’ were the result of copy, 
appropriation and exchange of inventions and technologies developed in Far East 
Asia and North Africa.41 Teschke advances a different narrative altogether. He 
argues that not just war, but also royal marriages and the process of class 
formation in Europe gave light (somewhere close to the early XIX century and not 
the Westphalian peace) to the state system that has been depicted as the paradigm 
of international relations.42 Marriages were an important mechanism of 
appropriation and balance of power across Europe. Teschke also challenges that 
concentration of means of coercion, as in the statebuilding thesis of what he calls 
the Weber-Hintze paradigm, was the requisite for the development of European 
states. Conversely, Teschke argues that,  
                                                   
39 Weber, Economy and Society, 217 – 222. 
40 Bhambra, “Historical Sociology, International Relations and Connected Histories.” 
41 John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
42 Teschke, The Myth of 1648, 11; 220 – 225. 
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due to peasant possession of the means of subsistence, feudal mobility 
enforced access to peasant produce by political and military means. Since 
every lord reproduced himself not only politically but also individually on 
the basis of his lordship, control over the means of violence was not 
monopolised by the state, but oligopolistically dispersed among a landed 
nobility.43 
 
In a more contemporary argument and with the example of Central America, 
Holden sees that the climax of state power, well into the twentieth century, was 
not so much the concentration of coercive power in the hands of the state, but its 
dispersal amongst the population.44 Common to these accounts is what Das saw 
as the fundamental flaw in Weber’s argument: ‘The state’s monopoly over what 
Weber called “legitimate” violence does not end violence—it redistributes it’.45 
The flaw is in having concentrated exclusively on the mechanisms of 
centralisation rather than on coercive and military practices as important to the 
process. 
 
T h e  E t h i c a l  C h a l l e n g e  t o  M e t h o d o l o g y  
 
There is a deeper question of the feasibility and ethics of offering, 
  
an intelligible reading of the forms of social and political imagination in 
contemporary Africa solely through conceptual structures and fictional 
representations used precisely to deny African societies any historical 
depth and to define them as radically other, as all that the West is not.46  
 
Not least, the European state, most prominently embedded in an idealised service-
provider form in policy documents, makes the African state a bad state. Dunn noted 
that ‘[s]ince citizenship, territorial integrity, and monopoly on the tools of 
coercion are all considered prerequisites for statehood, this raises serious doubts 
                                                   
43 Ibid., 46. 
44 Robert H. Holden, Armies Without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central 
America, 1821-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
45 Veena Das, Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2007), 4, emphasis in the original. 
46 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 11. 
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about whether African states are in fact states at all’.47 Dunn shows how common 
misunderstandings in both International Relations and Africanist state theory, 
which take the state as a given, impose a European model as shorthand for what 
states are. As a result “African” states are applied all sorts of "madlibs" – 
adjectives to be inserted in a blank space next to the word “state” – all of them 
accentuating its lack of something, its failure or lack of accomplishment. Dunn’s 
survey of these “labels” include: 
 
‘failed’ (Leys 1976), ‘lame’ (Sandbrook 1985), ‘fictive’ (Callaghy 1987), 
‘weak’ (Roth- child 1987), ‘collapsing’ (Diamond 1987), ‘quasi’ (Migdal 
1988), ‘invented’ and ‘imposed’ (Jackson 1990), ‘shadow’ (O'Brien 1991), 
‘over- developed’ and ‘centralized’ (Davidson 1992), ‘swollen’ (Zartman 
1995), ‘soft’ (Herbst 1996), ‘extractive’ and ‘parasitic’ (Clark 1998a), 
‘premodern’ (Buzan 1998) and ‘post-state’ (Boone 1998).48 
 
The pervasiveness of these labels speaks not just of how accurate the framework 
of coercion and accumulation is, but also of how this is applied to African politics. 
Therefore, a focus on historical practices embedded in the present could bring 
about a richer view of contemporary statebuilding. 
 
C o m p e t i n g  o r  C o m p l e m e n t a r y  A c c o u n t s ?   
 
Other critiques of the bellicist account have argued that war, in particular, has not 
played the same role in other parts of the world. Particularly, some have argued 
that state formation outside Europe was not marked as frequently by war.49 
Patterns of state formation in central Africa have been varied. The Great Lakes 
region, together with the Ethiopian highlands, seems to have had ‘the longest 
                                                   
47 Kevin Dunn, “MadLib #32: The (Blank) African State: Rethinking the Sovereign State in 
International Relations Theory,” in Africa’s Challenge to International Relations Theory, ed. 
Kevin Dunn and Timothy Shaw (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 55. 
48 Ibid., 46. 
49 Christopher Clapham, “War and State Formation in Ethiopia and Eritrea” (presented at 
the La Guerre Entre le Local et le Global, Paris, Centre d’Etudes et the Recherches 
Internationales: The Global Site, 2000), 
http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/010clapham.pdf Accessed 9/04/2009; Jeffrey 
Herbst, States and Power in Africa (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000); Ken 
Young, “State Formation in Southeast Asia,” Thesis Eleven 50, no. 1 (1997): 71–97. 
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traditions of relatively centralized state structures’.50 These have been the result of 
migration flows and the influence of the centralising exercises of political rule in 
the Kongo, Luba-Lunda and the Kunda kingdoms.51 Wa Muiu and Martin argue 
that the Kongo kingdom had developed a highly centralised structured around a 
single currency, a centralised army and the King.52 However, this power was 
articulated on a mutual authority assurance between the king and local elites. As 
Ndaywel è Nziem notes, government was over people and, as long as aristocrats 
acknowledge the King’s authority and paid him tribute, the King had sovereignty 
over them.53  
 
Protection and tribute formed a network of political authority where elites shared 
power, and their allegiance to the king was linked to religious, identity, security 
and economic agendas.54 Statebuilding was not just about concentrating power 
from competitors, but also about sharing sovereignties. Resistance on the part of 
the population took the form of flight from authorities. Distance to the centralised 
administration of power meant laxer power, and so this encouraged authorities 
and elites to extend rule through alliances rather than war.55  
 
Looking at actual practices of governance, James Scott provides a different 
account, arguing that what drives state-makers is ‘high modernism’, that is, the 
‘faith’ in administration, science and technocracy to organise people and nature in 
a productive way.56 Citing Proudhon, for Scott,  
 
To be ruled is to be kept an eye on, inspected, spied on, regulated, 
indoctrinated, sermonized, listed and checked off, estimated, appraised, 
censured, ordered about. . . . To be ruled is at every operation, transaction, 
                                                   
50 Herbst, States and Power in Africa, 11.  
51 Mueni wa Muiu and Guy Martin, A New Paradigm of the African State: Fundi Wa Afrika 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 104.  
52 Ibid., 104 – 105. 
53 Ndaywel è Nziem, Nouvelle histoire du Congo, 134 – 135.  
54 Ibid., 135 – 136. 
55 Muiu and Martin, A New Paradigm of the African State, 104. 
56 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 4 – 6. 
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movement, to be noted, registered, counted, priced, admonished, 
prevented, reformed, redressed, corrected.57 
 
Statebuilding in this version is an exercise of control that aims at making the 
population and the environment legible, hence simplified and homogenous. These 
practices are still underlined by a logic of asserting rule, extracting consent, taxes 
and labour, and hence of coercion. Additionally, in the DRC these homogenising 
practices have not been the hallmark of the statebuilding exercise. The largest 
census undertaken was only done in 2011 for voting purposes.58 Even the 
biometric census done recently for the military and the new phone-payment 
system, financed largely by the EU as part of a security sector reform scheme, do 
not change the fact that governance practices do not rely on turning Congolese 
into consuming and working taxpayers.59 Tax extraction is not the main means of 
state appropriation. The military is still used for the purpose of asserting 
authority, but state authority continues to be only partial.  
 
Taking these different critiques and alternative accounts into consideration 
facilitates a critical application of the framework. They highlight the shortcomings 
in regards to its own narrative of European statebuilding, and they demonstrate 
that Tilly’s account cannot be applied as a progressive account towards a 
particular standard state. In fact, analysing this account, statebuilding could be 
seen as an ‘ongoing and open-ended process’ rather than as a pathway to a 
                                                   
57 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon cited in ibid., 183. 
58 The last census dates from 1984. For electoral purposes, in 2011 a registry of adult 
population was undertaken. Carter Center, “Final Report: Presidential and Legislative 
Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nov. 28, 2011,” October 30, 2012, 
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59 UNDP, United Nations Development Programme, “Le PNUD En RD 
Congo:Recensement Biométrique,” accessed January 24, 2013, 
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particular institutional arrangement.60 The critiques also highlight the need to 
contextualise in order to understand the particularities of each process and 
historical moments. However, Tilly’s account also illustrates that statebuilding as 
a process that is mediated, heterogeneous and plural reflects historical patterns. It 
also identifies coercive and extractive practices as core to statebuilding and hence 
to resistance.  
 
 
4.  The Bellicist Account as Practices and Processes in the 
DRC 
 
In the last chapter, it was seen that in the DRC war has tended to be directed 
against the civilian population. Authority tends to be shared, either as a way of 
extending state authority, as a way of fostering alliances or as a compromise in 
light of external and internal pressures. The exercise of coercion and extraction 
has been undertaken by a myriad of state and non-state actors. It was also 
mentioned that this reflected not just the DRC’s statebuilding process but also that 
of neighbouring countries. The standard narratives of the DRC seen in the 
resource wars thesis and elements of the localist and regionalist accounts illustrate 
the limitations of narratives premised on state failure and not taking account of 
patterns of statebuilding more generally. As seen, while the DRC’s administration 
remains sclerotic, and its population are amongst the poorest in the world, the 
DRC is one of the fastest growing countries in Africa. As such, practices and 
processes of coercion and accumulation need a further contextualisation of how 
they take place. Having outlined above a schema of what the practices of 
statebuilding are, this section contextualises how plurality and decentralisation in 
the exercise of authority, coercion and extraction takes place and links these to the 
ways the discourse of statebuilding provides a legitimating mechanism to those 
practices and their actors. 
                                                   
60 Jung, “State Formation and State-building: Is There a Lesson to Learn from Sociology?,” 
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S h a r i n g  A u t h o r i t y  
 
The forms of private indirect government that Mbembe speaks of have been a 
prominent way of asserting authority in the Kivus. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the government has shared means of coercion and tax extraction with 
armed groups, neighbouring countries, state and non-state actors. Both the 
government and the UN officials acknowledge that the presence of 
MONUC/MONUSCO where the government is not present acts as a form of state 
authority.61 This is not just a feature of contemporary African states. As Krasner 
argues,  ‘rulers have frequently departed from the principle that external actors 
should be excluded from authority’.62 This has taken place through invitation, 
intervention or negotiation.63 In the DRC, the presence of Rwanda, for instance, 
has taken place through a mixture of the three. The strategies attached to the 
STAREC and ISSSS programmes coexist with other multiple statebuilding projects 
including that of the DRC, Rwanda, and others, leaving a plural and 
heterogeneous picture. At any given time, authority could be represented by state 
or non-state representatives; national or international, political, economic or 
military actors. As Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot state, ‘the post-
election security predicament in the DR Congo […] combines elements of non-
state governance such as military control over resources and cross-border 
regulation with a reinvigoration of patrimonial state practice’.64 It is not 
uncommon to see multinational corporations, international NGOs, UN mission 
representatives, FARDC and poorly equipped government officials undertaking 
what could be seen as state functions. They patrol, provide civil order, tax the 
                                                   
61 This was a common view amongst the 17 UN officers interviewed. A UN officer stated 
in an interview what is otherwise a visible fact in Eastern Congo: ‘in some places we are 
the only visible authority’. Interview with MONUC Civil Affairs Representative (no. 14), 
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Interview with North Kivu Provincial Assembly representative, Goma, July 23, 2010. 
62 Stephen D Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 8. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Timothy Raeymaekers, Ken Menkhaus, and Koen Vlassenroot, “State and Non-State 
Regulation in African Protracted Crises: Governance Without Government?,” Afrika Focus 
21, no. 2 (2008): 16. 
 122 
population, build infrastructure, provide arbitration, amongst others. Hence, as 
will be illustrated in the empirical chapters, they become targets of resistance.  
 
This was the case of Anvil mining operations in the village of Kilwa (Katanga).65 
Most villagers worked for the company, who operated as a de-facto government. 
When in 2004 villagers revolted against the mine, they created a poorly armed 
group to start looting the mine. Their reason was that the mine was not providing 
the village with jobs. They had expelled most local workers except the security 
guards. Anvil mining in this case retaliated by flying the army into the village and 
massacring up to 100 people. Although this case caused outrage not only for the 
number of deaths, but also for how the MNC-army linkage operated as a despotic 
government, the actual strategy of allowing companies to operate as de-facto 
governments is still in place.  
 
In Twangiza (South Kivu), for example, the MNC Banro is the de-facto 
government.66 The old town was on the site of a gold deposit that Banro wanted to 
mine. As such, negotiations with the customary chief and the mediation of an 
NGO, whose Banro’s representative was not allowed to name, resulted in the 
moving of residents to a new re-built town a few kilometres away from the old 
one.67 As Jana Hönke argues, this is nothing new in the DRC, whose trinity of 
colonial authority was exercised by the state, the corporation and the church.68 
However, in the context of war, mining companies take on special security roles.69 
These roles include putting in place an indirect form of government by providing 
services to the population such as patrolling operations, recruitment of private 
security and cooperating with government intelligence agencies to assure civil 
                                                   
65 Alain Deneault, Noir Canada: Pillage, Corruption et Criminalité En Afrique (Vancouver: 
Ecosociété, 2008), 67 – 71.The information in this paragraph comes from this source. See 
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66 Interview with Banro Representative, Bukavu, August 10, 2010.  
67 Ibid.  
68 Jana Hönke, “Multinationals and Security Governance in the Community: Participation, 
Discipline and Indirect Rule,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 6, no. 1 (2012): 57–73. 
69 Ibid. 
 123 
peace.70 This is actually promoted by international agencies, especially IFIs and 
MONUC/ MONUSCO, which seek to reconstruct state sovereignty, being able ‘to 
legitimize deals with foreign firms and creditors.’71 This strategy also ‘leaves in 
place an interlocutor who acknowledges debts and provides a point of contact 
between foreign state officials and strongmen’.72 What Mbembe calls private 
indirect government is a common view in the literature, which have been seen 
within a logic of Weberian discharge,73 as ‘governance assemblages’,74 
‘privatisation and socialisation of violence’.75 Still, the result is the plural 
constitution of political authority.  
 
The existence of plural authority also brings us back to the more sociological 
elements of statebuilding. The myriad of practices that make post-conflict 
statebuilding ‘messy’,76 ‘experimental’,77 resting on multiple ‘trade offs’78 as much 
as on the militarised and extractive strategies illustrates its historical sociological 
nature. The high modernist version of post-conflict statebuilding policy 
documents goes alongside multiple agendas and informalised practices in which 
both national and international actors participate.  
 
                                                   
70 Speaking in general of the link between businesses and the government a representative 
of a security company said that they supported and, at times, took over policing tasks. 
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S h a r i n g  c o e r c i v e  a n d  e x t r a c t i v e  a u t h o r i t y  
 
The sharing of the use of violence still represents ‘a resource and a mode of 
political action’.79 This has been examined as a form of ‘privatisation’,80 working 
through private groups and contractors, and as a form of ‘socialisation’81 in the 
sense that community groups form their own armed groups, remain armed or ally 
themselves with other armed groups. Added to these forms of violence 
management, there is the formalised use of violence as a peace-enforcing practice 
(UN, military means and military deployment) together with the government-
sponsored violence of foreign troops (e.g. by the DRC and Rwanda). The DRC is 
thus illustrative of the need to account for the international historical and 
sociological factors influencing violence production.  
 
In the DRC, the relation between coercion and extraction and statebuilding has 
been seen as unproductive. This has had an effect regarding how state-society 
relations have been seen. For instance, the public/private, formal/informal, 
state/non-state divide in the use of violence has been seen as a mark of state 
failure, where social struggles have ceased to engage in political contestation. As 
an example, Crawford Young argues that the DRC conflict is part of a trend in 
which armed groups exhausted anti-colonial and socialist ideologies, turning into 
gangs and jumping on the bandwagon of the resource revenues, fostered also by 
an increasing state weakness.82 Rulers, no longer able to count on the support they 
received during the Cold War, have been forced to engage in criminal strategies of 
illegal trafficking, support of armed groups and to depend on non-state economic 
alliances.83 ‘These rulers’, Reno argues, ‘reject the pursuit of a broader project of 
creating a state that serves a collective good or even of creating institutions that 
                                                   
79 Achille Mbembe, “Pouvoir, Violence et Accummulation,” Politique Africaine 39 (1991): 
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81 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 45 and Chapter 2. 
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are capable of developing independent perspectives and acting on behalf of 
interests distinct from their rulers’ personal exercise of power’.84 Under this 
perspective, the use of violence, both by the state and by those who contest it, has 
only been explored as an unproductive failed practice. The underlying assumption 
is that this violence has not served a social revolution or a developmental project 
as in Europe, giving rise to the view of the DRC as a ‘cancer’.85  
 
The argument about unproductive violence is closely related to the argument about 
unproductive rent extraction. Bayart argues that the ‘politics of the belly’, that is, 
‘the social struggles that make up the quest for hegemony and the production of 
the State bear the hallmarks of the rush for spoils in which all actors – rich and 
poor – participate in the role of networks’.86 Taking account of the historical 
trajectory of African politics, Bayart’s argument concentrates on the failure of 
elites to transform people into labour and capital into investment. Rent extraction 
is presented only as a tool of gathering elite support and foster kin-links. In other 
words, there is economic production but the surplus is ‘dilapidated’.87 
Challenging these theses, Mbembe notes that they: 
 
seem to argue that it is only in Africa that the economy is inserted in social 
relations. And that… [the economy] is not (as we imagine it must be) a 
domain separated, autonomous, of the social organisation. The relations of 
reciprocity, redistribution and circulation are, therefore, treated as “extra-
economic”.88  
 
The consequence is the need to account for pluralism in the political sphere, not as 
a way to assert, as Bayart does, that social struggles merge everyone into a 
corrupted struggle for the state, but to account for how relations of domination 
and resistance take place within those struggles. Not only are there ‘many 
economic regimes’ but also ‘[t]he processes of accumulation are, consequently, 
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multi-formed’.89 Rent and productivity, far from being incompatible, are a source 
of authority.90 In the DRC, military and economic actors provide a presence of 
authority, sourcing domination and provoking resistance. This is not a parallel 
state order, but one on which statebuilding in the DRC rests. Certainly, when the 
state is not particularly present, state agents and those on which consent is 
claimed can and do subvert roles. This means that subordinate classes might use 
the opportunity to enter into exchanges to get a mutual benefit from this relation, 
as much as those representing authorities might use the opportunity to garner 
their support.   
 
H i g h  M o d e r n i s m  a s  L e g i t i m a c y  
 
The authority of statebuilding stems from a discourse that defines it as the 
necessary process to foster peace, promote democracy and enable economic 
development after conflict. Embedded in this discourse are not only a claim to 
decision-making, but also one that asserts the knowledge and capacity for 
undertaking the task of statebuilding. This discourse portrays the state as an 
institution of protection and social change. On the one hand, war, oppression and 
poverty are the effect of state failure; on the other, the state is the embodiment of 
liberty, peace and development. These two premises have provided a sort of auto-
generated legitimacy to statebuilders, making the state and their interventions 
public goods in themselves. Scott’s vision of statebuilding as ‘high modernism’ 
fits here in that it is primarily a ‘faith’ and a ‘belief’. In Scott’s words, high 
modernism is:  
 
the belief in the capacity of technicians and engineers to design and 
implement comprehensive new forms of living and production that would 
be superior – that is, more “progressive”, productive, healthy, and humane 
to anything thus far devised.91  
 
                                                   
89 Ibid., 16. 
90 Ibid., 17. 
91 James C. Scott, “Geographies of Trust, Geographies of Hierarchy,” in Democracy and 
Trust, ed. Mark Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 284, emphasis in 
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Nevertheless statebuilding provides neither protection nor social change in the 
form that is stated. In Chapter Five, it will be observed how this failure gives way 
to a blame exchange between the DRC government and the 
MONUC/MONUSCO. What is important to remark on here is that the discourse 
plays two important functions in terms of legitimacy: 1) it turns statebuilding into 
authority without the need for popular consent and 2) it maintains legitimacy in 
the face of failure.92 The assertion to undertake statebuilding for the maintenance 
of international peace and security, and for the protection of the population does 
not need negotiation or consent by the population. In last two years in the Kivus 
an increased militarisation of the region, a subsequent increase in violence against 
the civilian population and the fostering of networks of patronage against 
economic development means that the effects of military/corporate rule is 
externalised on to population while leaving few mechanisms of accountability.  
 
Statebuilders whether national or international are under no illusion that a 
Keynesian-type state will be built in the DRC in the near future, nor that their own 
practices are totally representative of what it says in policy documents. A 
MONUC Political Affairs representative put it succinctly: 
 
 
Our main focus is to build the minimum necessary for institutionalisation 
– the state will take 50 – 100 years to function. Civil society needs to play 
an advocacy role and also be a partner for reconstruction. We also need to 
rebuild the morale.93 
 
This is representative of a discourse that is deployed as an authority claim, but 
that externalises any failures or blames on the actual target. What examining the 
DRC case brings out is that the DRC is an instance of a pattern rather than an 
exception. Defining the problem as the lack of the state, allows the solution to be 
defined in both technical and ethical ways. The technocraticism infused in 
                                                   
92 John Heathershaw argues that the failure of statebuilding to attain its goals survives in 
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statebuilding is also based on an ethic of ‘doing something’. As Chandler argues, 
‘[t]his simplistic focus sets up an interventionist discourse where western 
governments are seen to have the solution to problems of non-western states and 
where any western government action, regardless of its outcome, can generally be 
portrayed as better than acquiescence and passivity’.94 The underlying 
construction of local inadequacy reifies simultaneously an image of international 
responsibility, knowledge and capacity.  
 
C o n t i n u i t i e s  a n d  C h a n g e  
 
These practices are part of a logic of state authority assertion as much as a practice 
of domination. Tilly’s account captures patterns in statebuilding that allow us to 
observe the more historical and sociological aspects of post-conflict statebuilding. 
These aspects identify post-conflict statebuilding as a combination of the micro-
politics of the DRC, the politics of the region and the politics of post-conflict 
statebuilding. This interaction reflects factors of historical continuity and change. 
How these are present through governing arrangements, proxy wars and UN-
supported military operations, leads us to contextualise how these practices take 
place. One of the distinctive features is that centralisation of authority, of coercion 
and extraction, is not as central as is the management of state authority 
throughout the territory. However, this opens new sources of violence and not 
always guarantees the extension of state authority. In this regard, the discourse of 
protection and social change provides a stronger mechanism for legitimacy, even 
in the face of failure, than popular consent. However, if the bellicist account can 
identify statebuilding practices, it may pose a problem to explore resistance. As 
already seen in the localist and, to a certain extent, regionalist and resource wars 
accounts of the DRC, the idea that subordinate classes participate in the processes 
of extraction and war highlights a series of complexities necessary to address. 
                                                   
94 David Chandler, “Rhetoric without responsibility: the attraction of 'ethical' foreign 
policy,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 5, no. 3 (2003): 305. 
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What particularities of the political context impinge on how resistance takes place 
requires not a standardised theory but an analysis of those particular factors.   
 
 
5.  A ‘Chaotically Pluralistic’ Political Space  
 
Achille Mbembe is representative of a heterogeneous Africanist school that has 
theorised African politics and social processes taking its historicity as part of their 
theoretical and methodological framework. This historical approach also accounts 
for the transversal relations that have forged Africa as co-constituted by and co-
constituting of broader world politics. The challenge that Mbembe brings is that 
analysing practices of coercion and accumulation are hardly illustrative of 
practices of resistance. Mbembe stands out for having developed a framework in 
which pluralism is the mark of the political space and of modes of governance. 
Conversely, he has also developed a negative outlook of African politics. By 
denying resistance and declaring the postcolony an ‘economy of death’, Mbembe 
falls prey to his own critique of making sense of Africa only as a crisis.95 For 
Mbembe, plurality and heterogeneity do not determine resistance, but subjection.  
 
In theorising the nature of political power in Africa, Mbembe develops several 
useful arguments about statebuilding. Firstly, Mbembe argues that violence, 
accumulation and symbolic representations are inseparable. Secondly, these take 
place across several divides that are ultimately irrelevant: dominants/dominated, 
formal/informal, local/global, public/private and historical/present. Finally, this 
can only be grasped through the notion of ‘entanglement’, meaning mutual 
                                                   
95 Arguably this is a departure from earlier thought, where he captured the fluidity of 
relationships, the modes of excercising domination and its subversion. See: Achille 
Mbembe, Afriques Indociles: Christianisme, Pouvoir Et État En Société Postcoloniale (Paris: 
Karthala, 1988); Achille Mbembe, “Domaines De La Nuit Et Autorité Onirique Dans Les 
Maquis Du Sud-Cameroun (1955-1958),” The Journal of African History 32, no. 1 (1991): 89–
121; Achille Mbembe, “Pouvoir, Violence Et Accummulation”; Mbembe, “Désordres, 
Résistances Et Productivité.” In his latest work, Mbembe nuances the argument asserting 
that change and emancipation are possible through a reinvention of the subject. See: 
Achille Mbembe, Sortir de La Grande Nuit: Essai Sur l’Afrique Décolonisée (Paris: La 
Découverte, 2010).   
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transformations and syncretism, not only of actors and processes, but also of time 
and space. This notion includes practices, structures and systems of 
representation. Entanglement is for Mbembe also a methodological approach to 
challenge binaries that, according to him, do not account for the plurality and 
complexity of this entangled space called the ‘postcolony’. For Mbembe: 
 
The notion “postcolony” identifies specifically a given historical 
trajectory—that of societies recently emerging from the experience of 
colonization and the violence which the colonial relationship involves. To 
be sure, the postcolony is chaotically pluralistic; it has nonetheless an 
internal coherence. It is a specific system of signs, a particular way of 
fabricating simulacra or re-forming stereotypes. It is not, however, just an 
economy of signs in which power is mirrored and imagined self-
reflectively. The postcolony is characterized by a distinctive style of 
political improvisation, by a tendency to excess and lack of proportion, as 
well as by distinctive ways identities are multiplied, transformed, and put 
into circulation. But the postcolony is also made up of a series of corporate 
institutions and a political machinery that, once in place, constitute a 
distinctive regime of violence. In this sense, the postcolony is a particularly 
revealing, and rather dramatic, stage on which are played out the wider 
problems of subjection and its corollary, [in]discipline [ - and of the 
emancipation of the subject].96 
 
At its core, what characterises “the political” in post-colonial Africa is its own 
historicity, its pluralism, its institutional structure and its practices, 
simultaneously constituted by violence, symbolism, and a modus operandi of 
excess, improvisation and subjection. In many ways Mbembe captures what has 
been a hallmark of historical sociology – the account of how past and present, 
global and local processes are co-constituted. The war in the DRC, its institutional 
structure and the future of the region need to be understood in relation to these 
historical-present, global-local, cultural-political factors.  
                                                   
96 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 102 – 103, emphasis added. Please also note that on p. 103 of 
the cited English version, the translation ends the quote with the word ‘discipline’. 
However, the French version is as follows: ‘Voilà pourquoi la postcolonie pose, de façon 
fort aiguë, le problème de l’assujettissement, et de son corollaire, l’indiscipline ou, pour 
ainsi dire, de l’émancipation du sujet’. It is an important nuance. It is more likely that, 
after having identified the characteristics, features and structures of domination in the 
postcolony, Mbembe ends up the paragraph reflecting how the subjection, indiscipline 
and emancipation play out in such political space. Achille Mbembe, De la Postcolonie: Essai 
sur l’Imagination Politique dans l’Afrique Contemporaine, 2nd. ed. (Paris: Karthala, 2000), 140.  
 131 
It is not surprising for Mbembe that the post-colonial state is ‘itself a form of 
domination’ due to the use of ‘universal techniques (a state and its apparatus)’.97 
What has shaped post-colonial states’ ‘institutional machinery’ is the 
confrontation and symbiosis of the new educated elites (evolués) and the old 
colonial administration.98 Elites’ struggles were aggravated by foreign 
interventions and the new ways in which African economies were inserted in the 
global economy. During the Cold War great powers forcefully removed 
democratically elected leaders across Africa (e.g. Lumumba, Krumah, Sankara, 
amongst others). Additionally, the introduction of cash crops, of economic 
adjustments dictated by the Bretton Woods institutions and corporate pressures, 
served both international demand as well as local agendas.99 These fostered 
externally-backed factionalism, social inequality and even wars.100 
 
The conclusion to draw from Mbembe’s analysis has implications for the analysis 
of statebuilding strategies: the change of actors and the introduction of political 
and economic schemes does not necessarily change the nature of domination. The 
DRC’s political infrastructure is still conditioned by those broader historical and 
international political economy processes. The DRC is also still based on a dual 
customary and administrative system, conditioning present sources of war, land 
conflicts and the deployment of authority. Customary chiefs today play a role as 
agents of state power, in statebuilding strategies, or as necessary accomplices, 
either voluntarily or by force, for the extractive activities of MNCs, armed groups 
and foreign governments.  
 
A m b i g u i t i e s  a n d  t h e  C h a l l e n g e  t o  R e s i s t a n c e  
 
However, these complex relations and blurred divides lead Mbembe to cast doubt 
on resistance and argue that political relations are convivial. This means for 
Mbembe that the political landscape is more defined by an agency of subjection, 
                                                   
97 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 60. 
98 Ibid., 40.  
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid., 41. 
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of accommodation and ‘entanglement’ than conflict between a category of 
resisters and dominants. Mbembe provides us here with a fundamental challenge 
that is important to address. But let us return for a moment to the present context 
of the DRC.  
 
Since 1996, the DRC conflict has been characterised more by the targeting of the 
civilian population than by a conflict between armed groups. Civilian population 
have been systematically subjected to different forms of domination, through war, 
forceful displacement, killings, torture, sexual violence, forced labour, and forced 
marriages.101 This has at times been carried out by foreign and national armies, as 
well as by popular militias who were operating as part of a broader government 
strategy. Throughout the different wars, the DRC has gone through the toppling 
of a long-term dictator, two moments of genocide, and several international 
interventions (by the AU, EU and UN). Although the most common strategy 
followed by population against war has been flight, civilians have actively 
participated in it in different roles, either by contesting or facilitating these forms 
of violence.  
 
When Mbembe calls the African post-colonial political space an ‘economy of 
death’ and a ‘regime of impunity’, it partly resonates with the cacophony of 
events in present DRC. What Mbembe wants to capture is a condition, on the one 
hand, which is that of the nature of the political space in Africa as one that has 
become co-habited by those who kill and get killed; and, on the other hand, a sort 
of “agency” of subjugation.102 Killing and being killed have become not the 
domain of any particular class or state agent or the domain of power anymore. 
Rather, there is an entanglement meaning actual, even intimate, hybridisation 
between domination and subjugation. For Mbembe this is a reflection of the 
system of domination that took place during the colonial experience whereby 
                                                   
101 Pillay, UN Rapport Mapping, 289; Human Rights Watch, Always on the Run (New York: 
HRW, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/node/92770/section/3 Accessed 22/08/2012.  
102 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 11 – 18; 200 – 205. 
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‘[j]ust as the ruminant [..] feels an attraction to the salt in man’s urine, one could 
say that the colonized individual feels attracted to the colonizer’s excrements, and 
vice versa’.103 The conclusion from this is not only that ‘resistance’ is an irrelevant 
category, more so, looking at forms of domination implies a profound analysis of 
cultural, historical, economic and political relations that have made African 
societies ‘chaotically pluralistic’. 
 
The result however is an exaggerated theory of domination, or as Judith Butler 
puts it, a sort of ‘extravagant power’.104 While Mbembe rejects almost all social 
theoretical concepts for doing violence to the nature of African politics, society 
and culture, his notion of domination as an inescapable desired ‘masculine 
Thanatos’ projects a vision of Africa that reproduces the assumptions Mbembe 
wants to challenge.105 Mbembe is ignoring here not only the capacity for 
insubordination within structures of domination, but also the important relations 
of solidarity and mutual support that come to add, chaotically so, to the relations 
of death and abuse. What Mbembe points out is that beyond international 
intervention and processes of international political economy, the source of 
domination is not just the state, or neoliberalism, or liberal peace, but the intimate 
encounter of those who kill and coerce and those who in their desires contribute 
to their own coercion and killing.  
 
Yet, resistance in colonial and post-colonial times has tended to subvert the terms 
of such co-habitation. For example, Mamdani points out that whereas the colonial 
state apparatus relied on ethnic and religious authorities, ‘one finds it difficult to 
recall a single major peasant uprising over the colonial period that has not been 
either ethnic or religious in inspiration’.106 But this fragmented resistance.107 
                                                   
103 Ibid., 237. 
104 Judith Butler, “Mbembe’s Extravagant Power,” Public Culture 5, no. 1 (1992): 67 – 74. 
105 Jeremy Weate, “Achille Mbembe and the Postcolony: Going Beyond the Text,” Research 
in African Literatures 34, no. 4 (December 1, 2003): 39. 
106 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism (Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1996), 24. 
107 Ibid. 
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Nzongola also argues that resistance in colonial times emerged in the ‘new 
structures that colonialism had itself created: colonial army, workers, camps and 
compulsory agricultural labour’.108 These analyses indicate the need to account for 
practices of resistance in the daily experience of relations of domination. Mbembe 
shows that relations of domination and resistance are not necessarily a story of 
good and bad, not even about the advance of an ethical agenda. This warning 
against simplifying an analysis of resistance points to embracing the ambiguous 
realms in which relations of domination take place.  
 
 
6.  Ambiguity and Pluralism in Statebuilding and Resistance 
 
This chapter has consolidated three key ideas that run through the thesis. Firstly, 
that statebuilding is a process of asserting, consolidating and exercising rule 
through coercive and extractive practices. This takes the form of improvised 
discharge and statebuilding becomes mediated by multiple actors creating plural 
authority. Post-conflict statebuilding discourse provides a way to legitimise this 
process as a claim to authority. Secondly, it has highlighted that resistance is 
rooted in the coercive and extractive practices through which statebuilding is 
carried out. Finally, and most importantly, the relationship between statebuilding 
and resistance speaks of a historically contingent process rather than a dynamic of 
liberal/international statebuilding and local resistance. Developing a Tillean 
account, with its critiques, especially from an Africanist perspective, has provided 
the theoretical standpoint from which to observe how the nature of the political 
context determines practices of resistance. To this extent, practices of violence and 
extraction refer to patterns in statebuilding. However, it has been highlighted that 
not only concentration of coercive means and accumulation account for 
statebuilding. Its management, distribution and sharing can provide further 
coercive and extractive power, and a way to represent state authority in the 
absence of it.  
                                                   
108 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo, 13 and 41. 
 135 
The context of power relations in which multiple statebuilding projects coalesce 
impinges on resistance. Plural forms of domination give rise to a series of 
resistance strategies that make resistance heterogeneous. This is not an ad-hoc 
response to the particular context, but the prosaic forms of resistance against the 
coercive and extractive practices of statebuilding. The ISSSS programme under 
which government and non-governmental organisations operate does not 
reproduce a different structure of authority nor a different type of resistance. 
Zücher sees this as ‘the local’ being imposed on ‘the international’.109 But as seen, 
it is more that these two spheres do not provide adequate analytical categories for 
studying resistance or statebuilding. There is no “international” statebuilding as 
an outcome.  
 
By all means this resonates with a Scottian framework. The use of Scott in peace 
and conflict studies has been done to theorise the ways in which local practices 
have subverted internationally-led policies. The trade-off has been the loss of 
significant historical and sociological depth. Not only in regards to the 
statebuilding process, but in regards to the political spaces where these processes 
have taken place. As such, if Scott’s framework is to be fully applied for its 
conceptual framework of resistance it would have to respond to the nature of 
statebuilding not as an international policy, but as a process entangled in the 
historicity of Africa, muddled by ambiguities, improvisations, continuities and 
changes. The Scottian framework would have to live up to the challenge of a 
‘chaotically pluralistic’ political space and even become an insight into it. 
                                                   
109 Christoph Zürcher, “The Liberal Peace: A Tough Sell?,” in A Liberal Peace? The Problems 
and Practices of Statebuilding, ed. Susana Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera 
Sabaratnam (London: Zed Books, 2011), 69 – 88. 
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Chapter 4 
A Framework of Everyday Resistance for Post-Conflict 
Statebuilding Contexts 
 
 
 
1.  What is Everyday Resistance?  
 
The informalities, ambiguities and contradictions statebuilding runs into reflect 
the political nature of the process. Chapter One examined a new generation of 
literature on post-conflict statebuilding, which pointed out statebuilding’s lack of 
coherence, and the poor record of success. This literature started exploring 
resistance, which deepened a critique of statebuilding and a theory of 
hybridisation. Yet it has left resistance only rudimentarily theorised. Richmond’s 
work with elements from De Certeau, Scott and post-colonial theory does not 
sufficiently elaborate his argument that resistance is ‘critical agency’ and its 
nature ‘fragmented, hidden, disguised and localised’.1 The tendency of this critical 
literature to portray resistance as a response to the international and liberal nature 
of statebuilding has missed important insights of examining resistance as a 
response to statebuilding more generally.  
 
Part of the advantage of making the everyday the site for theorisation and 
research is precisely the possibility of contextualising the research, and taking into 
account the more complex texture and depth of the processes societies go through. 
The focus on everyday resistance has identified a variety of practices ranging from 
violent responses to protests, boycotts, non-compliance and unintended actions, 
but with subversive outcomes. How these different categories relate to each other 
and to a concept of resistance has remained limited to making a stronger 
argument about how these practices hybridise statebuilding. Resistance has thus 
                                                   
1 Richmond, “Critical Agency”; Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, 13. 
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been theorised in relation to an outcome more than in relation to its practices. The 
result has been that more has been said about statebuilding than about resistance 
per se. Bringing in the framework of James Scott provides a definition of 
resistance that examines ongoing practices of domination and resistance from a 
more general angle of class and state-society relations. Scott’s framework is not 
without problems. His focus on intentions, how individual acts prove to be 
political and social, and the over-simplification of relations of domination are 
ongoing critiques. In the previous chapter, the critique advanced by Achille 
Mbembe of the failure to grasp the chaotically pluralistic nature of the political 
space in Africa, and speaking directly to the limited applicability of frameworks 
such as Scott’s, rejected any binary categories of domination and resistance. 
 
It was also seen that the DRC case offers the possibility of examining both certain 
generalities and particularities, making it particularly suitable to exploring the 
framework of everyday resistance in a post-conflict context. The DRC illustrates 
how the post-conflict practice of consolidating and extending state authority 
reflects practices of state accumulation and violence. Pointing out how these 
practices are resisted should not be seen as stemming from a conception of the 
world as structured around a binary of domination and resistance. It is argued 
that any resistance framework has to embrace the ambiguity of the context and 
the acts. The DRC also introduces the possibility of exploring the relationship 
between different categories of practices including the ‘weapons of the weak’ (e.g. 
mockery, slander/denigration and reworked statebuilding vocabulary), guerrilla 
warfare and survival tactics that largely subvert elite appropriation. However, 
different practices do not account for what resistance is, nor are they decisive to 
distinguishing resistance, rebellion and revolution.2 Seen as isolated “acts”, 
                                                   
2 E.g. Eric Selbin argues that what distinguishes resistance from rebellion and revolution 
is its less threatening character to power, and its actions being linked to long-term 
processes and to societies’ memories of social struggle. Rebellion, by contrast, is ‘a type of 
insurgency or uprising which rarely seeks to change the entire system’ but manages to 
threaten it generally with violence. Revolution finally is a ‘dramatic upheaval involving a 
group of united people overthrowing their government’. Eric Selbin, Revolution, Rebellion, 
Resistance: The Power of Story (London: Zed, 2009), 11, 12 and 13.  
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slander, denigration, mockery and violence can be dominating strategies too. For 
these acts to be seen as resistance, they need to be explored as patterns of 
behaviour in situations of subordination.  
 
In response to these issues, this chapter explores how and why Scott’s account of 
resistance can provide an answer to the question of what resistance is and serve as 
guidance to identify what practices constitute resistance in post-conflict 
statebuilding. It will be argued that a framework of resistance needs to connect 
patterns, intentions, motivations, acts and actors in a relation of domination. The 
Scottian framework does so to a certain extent, but it is not explicit enough. While 
unintended resistance becomes an exercise of abstraction, intentionality is hard to 
grasp. A ‘translation’ is required between what is observed and how it is 
described. The chapter first explores Scott’s framework. Secondly, there is a 
discussion of the critiques leveraged against the Scottian framework, and of the 
challenges that a post-conflict statebuilding context poses to it. This is done 
through three subsections: a) the relation between intentions and motivations; b) 
the ambiguity of the actors and the question of binaries; and c) how different 
types of “acts” can be part of the framework, with a special attention to violence. . 
As a guidance to forthcoming empirical chapters and in response to a debate that 
places the complexity of resistance in terms of its existence or not, violence or not, 
its oppositional nature or not, the last section provides a reworked account of 
resistance discussing how some of its elements can be gradated to better grasp the 
complexities of resistance.  
 
 
2.  The Art of Theorising Resistance 
 
James Scott’s theory of resistance has developed over thirty years and four major 
publications: The Moral Economy of the Peasant, Weapons of the Weak, Domination and 
the Arts of Resistance and The Art of Not Being Governed.3 The main line of argument 
                                                   
3 James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia 
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in these works is that resistance is rooted in the daily individual and collective 
covert acts of opposition and self-help against domination; it does not need 
recourse to political or labour organisations, but rather to actions like foot-
dragging, mockery and fake compliance. Several other propositions follow from 
these: that subordinates have their own political agendas; that, on those bases, 
they make political choices about their lives and about the daily experience of 
different forms of power; that relations of domination have material and 
ideological bases; and that consent is limited. Scott’s work is mainly driven by a 
response to a body of Gramscian literature that saw domination as resting on 
consent, and those who defined resistance as an area of formally organised and 
revolutionary activity.4 According to Scott, this literature assumed that 
subordinate classes acquiesced, that they were relatively disadvantaged in regard 
to the transmission and absorption of hegemonic ideas, and that they were not 
directly coerced.5 So resistance was elitist and partial. Scott argues that to see 
resistance only as a collective enterprise with a revolutionary end is to subject 
millions of actions to the unwritten records of history.6 Rather, Scott argues that 
modest, covert actions, concerned with immediate gains and self-help, constitute a 
permanent layer of resistance in which struggle against domination takes place 
and in which class consciousness and even revolutions may take root. Scott’s 
                                                                                                                                                   
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977); Scott, Weapons of the Weak; Scott, 
Domination and the Arts of Resistance; Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed. In Seeing Like a 
State, Scott outlines a theory of ‘practical knowledge’ about state-making, where 
resistance is present but it is not the central focus. Scott, Seeing Like a State. 
4 Scott, Weapons of the Weak. esp. ch. 6 and 8; Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance esp. 
chap. 4. That Scott misunderstood or misused Gramsci has been an ongoing critique. E.g. 
Gavin Smith, Confronting the Present: Towards a Politically Engaged Anthropology (New York: 
Berg, 1999); Carol J. Greenhouse, “Hegemony and Hidden Transcripts: The Discursive 
Arts of Neoliberal Legitimation,” American Anthropologist 107, no. 3 (2005): 356–368; 
Kalyanakrishnan Sivaramakrishnan, “Some Intellectual Genealogies for the Concept of 
Everyday Resistance,” American Anthropologist 107, no. 3 (2005): 346–355. In this special 
issue of American Anthropologist reviewing Scott’s work, the critiques of Greenhouse 
and Sivaramakrishnan allow Scott, in his reply, to provide ‘a belated apology to the ghost 
of Gramsci himself’. Scott argues that all along he would have better spoken of 
‘Domination’ and not of ‘Hegemony’. James C. Scott, “Afterword to ‘Moral Economies, 
State Spaces, and Categorical Violence’,” American Anthropologist 107, no. 3 (2005): 398. 
5 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 71. 
6 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 30 – 36. 
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conclusion in Weapons of the Weak summarises these arguments, and it is worth 
quoting at length: 
 
Resistance in Sedaka[7] begins as, I suspect, all historical resistance by 
subordinate classes begins: close to the ground, rooted firmly in the 
homely but meaningful realities of daily experience. The enemies are not 
impersonal historical forces but real people. That is, they are seen as actors 
responsible for their own actions and not as bearers of abstractions. The 
values resisters are defending are equally near and familiar. Their point of 
departure is the practices and norms that have proven effective in the past 
and appear to offer some promise of reducing or reversing the losses they 
suffer. The goals of resistance are as modest as its values. The poor strive to 
gain work, land, and income; they are not aiming at large historical 
abstractions such as socialism, let alone Marxist-Leninism. The means 
typically employed to achieve these ends –barring the rare crisis that might 
precipitate larger dreams- are both prudent and realistic […] When flight is 
available – to the frontier, to the cities – it is seized. When outright 
confrontations with landlords or the state seems futile, it is avoided. In the 
enormous zone between these two polar strategies lie all the forms of daily 
resistance, both symbolic and material, that we have examined.8  
 
Scott does not mean that there is no acquiescence amongst the peasantry, or that 
peasants are all innate revolutionaries, but that there is no evidence to suggest 
that even when the dominant ideology is to a certain extent internalised, this 
limits the possibilities for social conflict.9 Scott identifies working relations, land 
ownership and moral behaviour as the realm in which to observe the daily 
experience of domination and resistance. This highlights the material basis of 
resistance, while noting that resistance as well as power operate on world-views, 
symbols and idealisations. Agendas of work, land and even social justice are 
advanced through an idealisation of the past or of a future of salvation. These 
tend to simultaneously project an idea of a good leader or king, the arrival of god 
or a liberator.10 All of these are ways of de-legitimising present arrangements or 
                                                   
7 The name given to the small village in Malaysia where Weapons of the Weak’s fieldwork 
takes place.  
8 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 348 – 349, emphases in the original. 
9 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 77. 
10 Especially developed in Domination and the Arts of Resistance and in the Art of Not Being 
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changes implemented and articulating political alternatives. Although Scott’s 
work on resistance focuses primarily on the peasantry in South East Asia, it has 
expanded to generalise to other situations of subordination, going from the 
relatively narrowed class relations to state-society relations.11  
 
In constructing these arguments, Scott provided a categorisation of two types of 
resistance: the formally organised and the everyday forms of resistance. At its 
core, this typology represents Scott’s response to the literature on hegemony and 
false consciousness. In establishing such a distinction, Scott simultaneously 
outlined the nature of everyday resistance: prosaic, covert, unstructured, 
individual or collective, informal and focused on modest demands and immediate 
gains. 
 
Everyday Formally Organised 
Continuous/Ongoing/ Prosaic When Possible 
Covert Overt/ Public 
Uncoordinated/Fragmented Organised/ Structured 
Individual/Collective Collective 
Immediate gains/Sustainable Long term gains 
Informal Formal/ structured 
 
Table 3. From Scott Weapons of the Weak12 
 
Although Scott later proved that the peasantry has greater ideological 
commitments and that they make use of all kinds of available figures (whether 
gods or kings) to think of emancipation and long-term change, his point was that 
everyday resistance differed from formally-organised resistance in that self-
                                                                                                                                                   
Governed. 
11 From the exclusive, narrow focus on Malay and Burmese Peasantry in The Moral 
Economy of the Peasant and Weapons of the Weak, to an overall argument about 
subordination in Domination and the Arts of Resistance. State/society relations are explored 
most notably in the Art of Not Being Governed and in Seeing like a State.  
12 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 33. 
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centred and immediate gains did not dislodge the political element in these acts. 
As Scott argued: ‘[t]o insist on such distinctions as a means of comparing forms of 
resistance and their consequences is one thing, but to use them as the basic criteria 
to determine what constitutes resistance is to miss the wellsprings of peasant 
politics’.13 Scott was opening the ground for exploring politics and relations of 
domination, not in the open field of structural and formal politics, but in the 
everyday relations of the workplace, village life and the home.  
 
Nevertheless, in this transition away from a narrow account of resistance, Scott’s 
version has been seen as stretched.14 Orter for instance wonders: ‘When a poor 
man steals from a rich man, is this resistance or simply a survival strategy?’15 
Hibou defines the ‘infrapolitical approach’ to the study of relations of domination 
as the one that sees ‘resistance everywhere’.16 Underlying these critiques is a 
question of the relation between the particular practices of resistance, the 
possibility to grasp intentionality and the interpretation of power relations. The 
debates the concept of everyday resistance continues to generate demonstrate that 
this framework is not straightforward. Still, one of the advantages of using a 
Scottian approach is that it provides a clear definition and a framework within 
which to categorise practices. 
 
 
D e f i n i n g  R e s i s t a n c e  
 
For Scott, resistance is  
 
any act(s) by members(s) of a subordinate class that is or are intended 
either to mitigate or deny claims (for example, rents, taxes, prestige) made 
on that class by superordinate classes (for example, landlords, large 
                                                   
13 Ibid., 294. 
14 Jon Abbink, Mirjam de Bruijn, and Klaas van Walraven, A Propósito de Resistir: Repensar 
La Insurgencia En Africa, trans. Dídac Lagarriga Prunera (Brussels: Oozebap, 2008), 18; 
Hollander and Einwohner, “Conceptualizing Resistance,” 534; Leroy Vail and White 
Landeg, “Forms of Resistance: Songs and Perceptions of Power in Colonial Mozambique,” 
in Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa, ed. Donald Crummey (London: James 
Currey and Heinemann, 1986), 194 – 227.  
15 Ortner, “Resistance,” 175. 
16 Hibou, Anatomie Politique de La Domination, 18. 
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farmers, the state) or to advance its own claims (for example, work, land, 
charity, respect) vis-à-vis those superordinate classes.17 
 
On this account, resistance is not so much defined by the particular ‘act’ used 
(which could be ‘any’) but more by its intention, that is, by the conscious use of 
that act to mitigate, deny or advance an agenda. The advantages of this account, 
which Scott already notes, are the identification of both material and symbolic 
underpinnings of class relations and of relations of domination, which are present 
in both claims of authority and resisters’ agendas.18 Resistance can be both 
individual and collective, and does not need to be organised or politically 
minded.19 The emphasis on intent is to point out that resisters may not be 
successful in their attempts. However, Scott also acknowledges the ‘enormous 
difficulties’ in proving intent.20 Intentionally mitigating a claim does not mean the 
existence of a developed class-consciousness; nor does it mean that these acts 
entail a struggle against capitalism or for socialism in the abstract. As such 
intention is gathered from the actual practice, of for example avoiding tax, or 
avoiding increases in land rent.21 For Scott, these acts are political and their 
significance goes beyond not having paid the tax or having avoided rent 
increases. As these practices do not exist in a vacuum, but are part of a relation of 
domination, they represent the ways in which everyday mechanisms of 
domination and resistance operate.  
 
Although Weapons of the Weak was written as an account of class relations, Scott 
later extended this definition to a general theory of resistance, arguing that 
‘similar structures of domination, other things being equal, tend to provoke 
responses and forms of resistance that also bear a family resemblance to one 
another’.22 The context of gender, racial and state-subject relations would foster 
similar responses. For Scott then a superordinate position, and more generally, 
                                                   
17 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 290.  
18 Ibid., 290 – 291. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 290. 
21 Ibid., 296. 
22 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 21. 
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domination entailed a material and symbolic extractive capacity (land, rent, 
labour and taxes, as well as prestige, honour, deference) as well as a productive 
capacity delimiting the realm of what is possible (to do, to aim or to achieve) and 
not possible (delimit ‘the realm of idle dreams [and] wishful thinking’23). For Scott 
these were not “given” categories or represented a permanent state of being, but 
were firstly rooted in the historical experience of the actors.24 As discussed below, 
critics see in this account unambiguous categories in a binary of domination and 
resistance that do not grasp the complexity of everyday life. Nonetheless, Scott’s 
framework is developed with close relationships in mind, allowing for a 
significant degree of ambiguity.  
 
The political significance of these individual acts of self-help is not due to their 
capacity to change the structures of domination that they aspire to mitigate or 
deny, but their widespread prevalence, and their amenability to the largest 
working class in the world: the peasantry.25 These forms are prosaic, and thus for 
Scott ‘[t]o understand these commonplace forms of resistance is to understand 
much of what the peasantry has historically done to defend its interests against 
both conservative and progressive orders’.26  So everyday forms of resistance have 
a historical and present value for their prevalence, but they also have a future 
value. Later Scott said that everyday forms of resistance are a pre-history of 
revolution.27 They are significant in themselves as the permanent layer of 
resistance that illustrates the relative success of domination and limited consent.  
 
The problem is that, while opening the ground for an account of commonplace 
forms of resistance, it simultaneously becomes harder to account for what is not 
resistance, or as Ortner noted earlier, distinguishing between pilfering as an act of 
resistance and as an egotistic act. In this regard Scott noted:  
                                                   
23 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 326. 
24 Scott asserts to ‘subscribe wholeheartedly to the judgment reached by E. P. Thompson’ 
that class struggle precedes class and class-consciousness. Ibid., 296. 
25 Scott, “Afterword,” 396. 
26 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, xvi. 
27 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 203. 
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To ignore the self-interested element in peasant resistance is to ignore the 
determinate context not only of peasant politics, but of most lower-class 
politics… When a peasant hides part of his crop to avoid paying taxes, he 
is both filling his stomach and depriving the state of grain… When such 
acts are rare and isolated, they are of little interest; but when they become 
a consistent pattern (even though uncoordinated, let alone organized) we 
are dealing with resistance.28 
 
Scott argues that the aims to be achieved are not selfless but by definition self-
centred. Avoiding a tax, stealing part of the crop, denigrating or slandering 
authority does not advance a collective agenda of “the working class” or of 
“liberation”; yet they are individual representations of class struggle. Scott’s 
definition, nevertheless, by equating ‘agenda advancing’ with ‘mitigation’ and 
‘denial’ does not sufficiently recognise that pursuing an agenda is not just another 
aim but a permanent motivation. From Scott’s definition, ‘agenda advancing’ is 
resistance because it does so at the expense of elite claims. Hence, agenda 
advancing necessarily mitigates and denies elite claims. This agenda has 
embedded the values and modest goals that Scott describes which tend to do with 
land, work and pre-existing arrangements. Therefore, agenda advancing, which 
provides an account of motivations, needs to be accounted for alongside 
intentions. Ultimately, what is important is that beyond intentionality, these acts 
are not accidental, at the discretion of one opportunistic individual; they become 
the individual opportunistic representation of the patterns in which everyday 
resistance takes place.  
 
 
3.  Critical Analysis of the Everyday Framework 
 
In Chapter One it was noted that a limitation in both Richmond and Mac Ginty is 
that neither of them sufficiently address the issues and critiques that the everyday 
framework of resistance has received. Not only are the critiques that Scott has 
received important to articulate resistance in the context of statebuilding, they 
need to be addressed to assess the suitability of the framework in Eastern DRC. 
                                                   
28 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 295 – 296, emphasis added.   
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There have been four main critiques: (1) The category of resistance is too broad, 
unable to differentiate resistance from coping strategies or whinging without 
particular political significance.29 (2) Intentions are ungraspable.30 (3) Scott pays 
insufficient attention to peasant agendas, providing univocal readings of certain 
acts as resistance.31 (4) Scott conceives reality only through a binary of domination 
and resistance, over-simplifying the dynamics and structures of power and state-
society relations.32  
 
These critiques overlap with the challenges that emerge from applying this 
framework to a context of actual conflict, statebuilding and Eastern DRC. This 
context poses three other challenges: how to conceive of violence and the use of 
different oppositional or non-oppositional practices; how to articulate resistance 
in a context of plural authorities, where authority is ambiguously represented and 
where statebuilding is not a process of social transformation; and, finally, how to 
grasp resistance in a context characterised by many Africanist literature by 
ambiguity and conviviality. In response to these challenges, this thesis proposes 
that any account of resistance needs to connect those who resist (the actors), their 
intentions and motivations, with patterns of social and political interaction 
around extraction, violence and privilege. This raises many questions about the 
interpretation of each and one of these elements is given within an account of 
resistance. Rather than examining the critiques one by one (a discussion that has 
                                                   
29 Hibou, Anatomie Politique de La Domination, 18; Peter Geschiere, “Le Politique ‘Par Le 
Bas’: Les Vicissitudes D’une Approche,” in Trajectoires de Libération En Afrique 
Contemporaine: Hommage à Robert Buijtenhuijs, ed. P. J. Konings, G. S. Hesseling, and W.M. 
Binsbergen (Paris: Karthala, 2000); Jane Haggis et al., “By the Teeth: A Critical 
Examination of James Scott’s The Moral Economy of the Peasant,” World Development 14, 
no. 12 (1986): 1435–1455. 
30 Ortner, “Resistance.”  
31 Ibid.; Achille Mbembe, “Domaines de La Nuit et Autorité Onirique Dans Les Maquis 
Du Sud-Cameroun (1955-1958),” The Journal of African History 32, no. 1 (1991): 106; 
Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 110; Jean François Bayart, “Introduction,” in Le Politique Par Le 
Bas En Afrique Noire: Contributions à Une Problématique de La Démocratie (Paris: Karthala, 
1992), 14.   
32 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 103 – 130; Hibou, Anatomie Politique de La Domination Ch. 1; 
James Ferguson, “Seeing Like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital in 
Neoliberal Africa,” American Anthropologist 107, no. 3 (2005): 377–382.  
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been held over many years), this section analyses how the framework applies and 
how these challenges can be addressed.  
 
3.a. Connecting Intentions and Motivations 
 
The relation between intentions and motivations needs to be established. Intent 
may be defined as the aim of denying or mitigating an authority claim or the 
effects of domination. Motivations are the reasons, justifications, and agendas 
behind those aims. Both have been raised as key elements that determine what is 
and what is not resistance. Abbink, Bruijn and Walraven for instance argue that 
‘resistance must be defined not so much as a set of concrete acts but by the intent 
of those acts, with the object of defending preexisting sociopolitical situations’.33 
They note how the historiography of African resistance changed from studying 
nationalist elites in the 1960s to studying unorganised individual resistance, 
including silences and dreams in the 1970s.34 The inclusion of unintended and 
unconscious acts had broadened the definition of resistance ‘too much’.35 In the 
early debates in Anthropology, in the 1980s, for instance, Brian Fegan already 
argued that intent was a necessary element of resistance.36  
 
Although Scott also defines resistance in terms of intent, he is less categorical.  
Scott draws attention to the fact that despite these acts failing in their intent more 
often than not, they are politically significant. These aims may or may not be 
expressed that way by their practitioners, the practices themselves are a way to 
gather intent.37 The intent of tax avoidance may be no more than not paying tax, 
but it denies the state its taxes. The intent of an insult might be denigration or 
delegitimisation, but it denies authority deference and legitimacy. Additionally, 
cultural and historical elements may be more important than intention. For 
                                                   
33 Abbink, Bruijn, and Walraven, A Propósito de Resistir, 22, emphasis in the original. 
34 With reference respectively to Donald Crummey and Achille Mbembe in Ibid., 17.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Brian Fegan, “‘Tenants’ Non-Violent Resistance to Landowner Claims in a Central 
Luzon Village,” Journal of Peasant Studies 13, no. 2 (1986): 87 – 106. 
37 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 296. 
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instance, Homi Bhabha argues that ‘[r]esistance is not necessarily an oppositional 
act of political intention’.38 Scott is close to Bhabha in that intentionality should 
not be seen as reflecting an already formulated ideology against power, but a 
collective memory and a culture of insubordination to authority.39 The meaning of 
‘practice’ itself reflects that historical legacy.  
 
However, this also raises a tension that is most distinct in De Certeau’s analysis. 
As mentioned in Chapter One, De Certeau was critical of Bourdieu’s portrayal of 
agents without agency, bearers of automated practices almost irrespective of the 
agent’s will. De Certeau argues that ‘tactics’ and the practice of insubordination 
have a historical and millenarian element, and embraces, with Freud, the realm of 
the subconscious. Conversely, he also argues that one could not think of these 
practices as escaping the subject’s consciousness. Walking following one’s logic or 
writing a letter to a friend in ‘company time’ are conscious activities in the sense 
that they are done in full knowledge by its agent.40 De Certeau draws attention to 
the possibility of seeing resistance as a self-regarding practice, where authority 
claims may not be directly confronted, but ignored, reappropriated or subverted.  
 
The difficulty of gathering intent, and linking with the debates about motivation, 
was the core of the critiques of Scott made within Anthropology studies in the 
1980s. Sherry Ortner, a primary representative of these critiques, argues that 
resistance studies are limited because they lack ethnographic ‘stance’ – a 
commitment to grasp the ‘thickness’ and the ‘depth’ of the complex relations.41 
According to Ortner,  
 
Resistance studies are thin because they are ethnographically thin: thin on 
the internal politics of dominated groups, thin on the cultural richness of 
                                                   
38 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), 110. 
39 Similar formulations can be seen in: Jennifer Browdy de Hernandez et al., 
“Introduction,” in African Women Writing Resistance: Contemporary Voices, ed. Jennifer 
Browdy de Hernandez et al. (Cape Town: Pambazuka Press, 2010), 3 – 11; Selbin, 
Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance. Ch. 3.  
40 De Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life, 50 – 60. 
41 Ortner, “Resistance,” 174.  
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those groups, thin on the subjectivity – the intentions, desires, fears, 
projects – of the actors engaged in these dramas.42  
 
The critique is that resistance studies simplify reality excessively by not 
considering the web of relations where subjects are embedded. Following from 
this, Ortner argues that scholars disregard how practices and meanings evolve for 
both resisters and scholars, and thus how ambiguous and subjective these acts 
are.43 Ortner ends up with a final objection, which resonates with recent 
arguments advanced by Mbembe and Hibou, to the category of resistance more 
generally.44 Because resistance, and especially its intentions, is ambiguous, Ortner 
proposes to account for the multiple ways in which practices can be ‘creative and 
transformative’ yet be the result of contradictory and mixed intentions.45 By this 
account, intentions may not be central and may provide a richer account of other 
aspects in everyday human relations, but doing away without intention 
undermines an account of the agency against the experience of domination.  
 
The implications of Ortner’s argument is that to claim that a category of resistance 
is irrelevant because one cannot grasp all desires, hopes, cultural constraints and 
aims in an individual, let alone in a collective, is to reduce resistance to a 
psychological category and devoid it of its historical, political and social meaning. 
Additionally, the existence of myriad of agendas, and of a self-centred element 
within it, do not necessarily point to ‘conviviality’ or to a lack of conflict in 
relations of domination. Similarly, the absence of principled motivations does not 
rule out resistance. It becomes necessary to link intent with the motivations, that 
is, the reasons, agendas and justifications behind those acts. Often practices have 
both self-centred and selfless motivations.  
 
 
                                                   
42 Ibid., 190. 
43 Ibid., 175. 
44 Mbembe, On the Postcolony. Ch. 3; Mbembe in Weaver Shipley, “Africa in Theory,” 666; 
Hibou, Anatomie Politique de La Domination.  
45 Ortner, “Resistance,” 190 – 191. 
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M o t i v a t i o n s :  S e l f - c e n t r e d  a n d  s e l f - l e s s  r e s i s t a n c e  
 
Self-centred acts may not necessarily entail self-gain, but the prioritisation of one’s 
own agenda in detriment of the fulfilment of authority claims. In De Certeau’s 
account, where intent is not present, prioritising one-self suggests ‘an alternative 
socio-political ethic’ that antagonises the logic of profit, whether represented in 
the factory or in patterns of consumption. As already seen in the examples De 
Certeau provides (pilfering – ‘a lathe to make furniture at home’ or ‘writing to a 
friend while at work) was at a loss, for the impact that being caught would have.46 
This makes more meaningful the fact that this ‘risk’ is taken, not out of a logic of 
self-profit, but out of solidarity with ones’ friends and families.47 Behind this 
account, and similarly to Scott, is the fact that resistance is not just the realm of 
public, collective and seemingly selfless agendas but also the realm of quotidian 
self-help acts.  
 
The problem is that whereas the former seems to be straightforwardly amenable 
to infer a political argument, the individual covert, self-centred ones are not. Yet 
by looking at the interaction between self-centred and selfless motivations as 
examined in resistance studies, the lines are blurred even in revolutionary 
organisation. Wolf for instance, in his studies of peasant revolutions in the 20th 
century, argued that peasants ultimately acted for themselves and that they 
carried a deep sense of injustice.48 Barrington Moore also argued that battles over 
land and the uses of land symbolises battles over power, morals and ideas about 
how society is best organised.49 Similarly Scott thought that peasants tend to be 
more radical at the level of ideas than at the level of action.50 Self-serving acts may 
not go as far as envisioning a new society, but they do not preclude them. They 
could rather be seen underlined by an idea of what is legitimate and an 
                                                   
46 De Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life, 25. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1971); 
Wolf, Europe and the People Without History. 
49 Moore, Injustice. 
50 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 331. 
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interpretation of one’s own position of subordination. The presence of an 
aspiration to change the effects of domination is a marker of resistance. 
 
3.b. Binaries,  Ambiguities and Pluralism 
 
If intentions and motivations become more meaningful when seen as patterns of 
behaviour, the critique as to whether the social and political world can be read in 
terms of a binary of resistance and domination still remains. This links to the 
challenge the complex, plural, and contradictory context of post-conflict 
statebuilding DRC brings to the framework. Three issues have been raised against 
Scott’s account in this regard. Firstly, that in order to understand the nature of 
political power and the post-colonial state, it is necessary to understand the 
heterogeneity of social and political relationships and how power operates not 
just from above but also horizontally and from below.51 Secondly, the extent to 
which any strategy of resistance could position anyone out of the reach of power 
is questioned, arguing that power relations are ambivalent.52 Thirdly, Scott’s 
framework might not be applicable to a context where the state cannot be 
conceived in the ‘high-modernist’ terms of Scott’s own account. 
 
Representing these critiques, Hibou argues that the exercise of domination is part 
of the common ‘desire of normality’ in which the pursuit of a ‘constellation of 
interests’ may involve the co-recreation of domination by dominants and 
dominated alike.53 This echoes Mbembe’s arguments about domination operating 
through people’s self-subjectification. It is remarkable that from different 
perspectives, all of these critiques translate heterogeneity, ambivalence and 
ambiguities into a framework of relative acquiescence. ‘Conviviality’ in the case of 
Mbembe, ‘symbiosis’ in the case of Bayart, and ‘accommodation’ in Hibou, 
accentuate the consensual rather than the conflictual elements of the political 
                                                   
51 James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, “Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of 
Neoliberal Governmentality,” American Ethnologist 29, no. 4 (2002): 981 – 1002.  
52 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 110; Hibou, Anatomie Politique de La Domination, 19, 140 – 
146.  
53 Hibou, Anatomie Politique de La Domination, 16. 
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space.54 Even so, if complexity means the denial of resistance, there might be a 
problem with the methods and frameworks employed. However, to deny the 
relevance of resistance or claim its ungraspability is a disservice to the 
heterogeneity that needs to be captured.  
 
Analysing resistance as a political category entails an exercise of simplification 
and hence a trivialisation of society. Scott captures the fluidity of social interaction 
to a certain extent. The context of Weapons of Weak is a small village, “Sedaka”, 
which is in many ways a cohabited context. Village politics entailed much tacit 
consent (something that is not far away from Hibou’s ‘accommodation’) not only 
of ‘poor’ to ‘rich’ but of ‘rich’ to ‘poor’. For instance, receiving and giving charity 
was, for Scott, an exercise of power and resistance. Charity benefited the poor, yet 
it reproduced their subordinate condition, glorifying the generosity of the rich. 
While disliking being patronised, if rich villagers did not give charity, they were 
systematically the targets of a moral attack by the poor who called them stingy 
and arrogant.55 Charity here represents a shared world of moral values, which not 
only does not impede class conflict, but facilitates it through the stretching of its 
interpretation, subverting the nature of the obligation such values entail and 
advancing subordinates’ agenda on the basis of these values.56 Negotiating the 
conditions of subordination to one’s advantage, including avoiding repression, or 
upholding dignity was for Scott a signal of everyday resistance. The idea of the 
‘third realm’, or the ‘pose’, which will provide in Chapter Five the basis for 
observing the post-conflict statebuilding discourse as platforms on which power 
and resistance operate, is also for Scott the more interesting ambiguous space 
between consent and opposition. 
  
However, if the state is not always present, or it is in a plural and ambiguous 
form, the challenge is not only how to conceptualise resistance and how it takes 
                                                   
54 Mbembe, On the Postcolony; Bayart, The State in Africa. Ch. 6 and 8; Hibou, Anatomie 
Politique de La Domination. 
55 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 197 – 204. 
56 Ibid., 204 – 208. 
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place, but what is resisted. Authority may be represented and mediated by a 
plurality of actors, but it enacts patterns of extraction and privilege.  
 
Current statebuilding process in the DRC is not characterised for aiming towards 
turning citizens into producing and consuming taxpayers. Yet, the ways in which 
the population is ignored, expelled off their lands, contained and repressed if 
perceived to be rebellious, or used in order to provide social services, represent 
continuities and change in forms of exercising domination. This is seen in the 
militarization of rural communities; in the indirect discharge enacted by both the 
government and the international actors through the STAREC programme; and 
the relative authority exercised by MNCs in some mining sites, or in the areas 
where state revenue and expenditure is focused.57  Thus patterns of extraction and 
violence in building state authority may be seen in myriad of actors, yet they lay 
symbolic and material claims on subordinate classes. 
 
In later works, Scott also advanced that both forms of governance by state 
authorities and forms of resistance could also be seen as a form of ‘reticence’.58 As 
such not just engagement but also disengagement, negotiation as well as 
imposition are fundamental to grasping the full picture of statebuilding and 
resistance in the DRC. In Weapons of the Weak, Scott argued that ‘only those 
survival strategies that deny or mitigate claims from appropriating classes can be 
called resistance’.59 In Seeing like a State, high modernism and its failure were also 
characterised by ‘state-initiated social engineering’ which was ‘transformative’, 
‘muscle-bound’, ‘coercive’ and ‘authoritarian’.60 The Art of Not Being Governed, 
although opening with a paragraph where ‘would-be conquering administrators 
were determined to subdue a recalcitrant landscape and its fugitive, resistant 
inhabitants’, not only advances a framework of mutual reticence but also one of 
                                                   
57 E.g. At the peak of Africa’s World War, 80% of state revenue was put towards the war 
effort. ICG, Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of An Ugly War, Africa Report (Nairobi: 
International Crisis Group, 2000), 41.  
58 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 32. 
59 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 301.  
60 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 4 –5. 
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mutual dependency.61 This later work captures better the current DRC context of 
continuity. For Scott, flight, oral history, nomad agriculture and remote settlement 
were all strategies to ‘keep the state at arm’s length’.62  
 
Security self-provision and strategies of survival could be seen as bridges towards 
this end of state evasion. They allow subordinate classes to mitigate state 
domination, by avoiding or bypassing it. The experience of the state as a predator, 
as partly absent and as another armed group, generates a reliance on personal 
solidarity networks and relations of reciprocity. The family, the clan, the ethnic 
group, the neighbourhood and INGOs allow for covering certain needs, without 
turning to the state. Yet, survival, and supporting or engaging in armed struggle 
is determined by an unequal, violent and extractive context as much as by 
reciprocity and solidarity. Exchanges, especially amongst unequal parties, can 
involve deceit, scamming, abuse and coercion. But this may in turn generate 
increasing social conflict. If relations are muddled by an exchange in conditions of 
‘conviviality’, ‘horizontality’ and ‘co-habited space’, they may be open to 
interpretation, but does not rule out resistance.63  
 
3.c.  Heterogeneity and Ambivalence of the practices:  
Violence, Hiddenness and Subversion in Acts of Resistance 
 
The fact that resistance should be understood as a practice – a pattern of acts – 
makes  ‘acts’ central to the account of resistance. Yet ‘acts’ on their own do not 
define resistance per se. They must be made part of a framework that accounts for 
them as patterns in which subordinate groups deny or mitigate domination. Two 
important points follow from this. Firstly, acts are ambivalent. In fact, an act of 
violence or of appropriation can be an act of domination. What makes this act an 
act of resistance is the fact that it is embodied and represents the challenge of a 
position of subordination. Secondly, it follows that different types of acts, whether 
                                                   
61 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 1. 
62 Ibid., x. 
63 Mbembe, On the Postcolony; Ferguson, “Seeing Like an Oil Company.” 
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confrontational, violent, subversive, covert or evasive, can account for how 
resistance takes place.  
 
A m b i v a l e n c e  o f  t h e  ‘ A c t s ’  
 
One of the ways in which Scott’s account provides both guidance and flexibility to 
analyse resistance, is the idea that ‘any act’ can be resistance if fulfilling a certain 
criteria. However, this requires putting both power and resistance in relative 
terms. With the example of discourses, Scott clarifies that: 
 
Power relations are not, alas, so straightforward that we can call what is 
said in power-laden contexts false and what is said offstage true. Nor can 
we simplistically describe the former as a realm of necessity and the latter 
as a realm of freedom. What is certainly the case, however, is that the 
hidden transcript is produced for a different audience and under different 
constraints of power than the public transcript.64 
 
More than the boundaries between these two transcripts, the real conflict takes 
place in the space in between. Scott premised his central argument on the 
existence of a ‘third realm’, a ‘pose’, where the ‘politics of disguise’ and ‘double 
meaning’ are a hint to understand that ambiguity is the key to understand the 
politics of resistance.65 Reflecting this ambiguity speaks to the different gradients 
in the elements of resistance. Previous applications of this framework to the study 
of statebuilding have analysed the dynamics of domination and resistance while 
representing the levels of ambiguity and complexity of the context. Heathershaw, 
for instance, deploys a Scottian framework to observe how multiple public 
transcripts represent multiple selves that create and recreate statebuilding and 
peace, despite its failures.66 These transcripts provide knowledge and shape 
practices, whose contradiction with the rhetoric is a feature rather than a problem 
or a deviation of peacebuilding as such.67 This is what Heathershaw captures with 
                                                   
64 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 5.  
65 Ibid., 18 – 19.  
66 Heathershaw, “Seeing Like the International Community”; See also: Heathershaw, Post-
conflict Tajikistan. 
67 Heathershaw, “Seeing Like the International Community,” 331. 
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the idea of statebuilding as a ‘simulation’.68 The high-modernist rhetoric of 
protection and social change is a pose on which both agendas of state authority 
and resistance are premised.  
 
V i o l e n c e / N o n - v i o l e n c e  
 
When Scott categorises everyday resistance as covert, latent and unorganised, he 
does so by identifying the means that are generally available to the ordinary 
peasant. As Scott argues: 
 
Most forms of this struggle stop well short of outright collective defiance. 
Here I have in mind the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups: 
foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned 
ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on. These Brechtian – or 
Schweikian– forms of class struggle have certain features in common. They 
require little or no coordination or planning; they make use of implicit 
understandings and informal networks; they often represent a form of 
individual self-help; they typically avoid any direct, symbolic 
confrontation with authority.69 
 
Whatever ‘acts’ are deployed for resistance is determined by the possibilities 
available to political action. Everyday resistance is ultimately carried out in the 
safety of anonymity and at the lowest risk of repression, to assure the 
sustainability and permanency of a struggle. Selbin, who has examined the 
relationship between resistance, rebellion and revolution, argues that the covert - 
‘I obey but I do not comply’ –type of acts ‘often form the basis of resistance’.70 For 
Selbin, whereas revolution is rare, resistance is commonplace, integrating acts that 
defy authority, mostly in covert ways. However, as in the debates around intent, 
lack of confrontation has generated doubt as to whether these acts can be seen as 
opposing domination and indeed as resistance. On the contrary, emphasis on the 
hidden, latent and covert nature of everyday resistance has created a tension 
between the everyday framework and more confrontational, even violent 
                                                   
68 Ibid., 346.  
69 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, xvi. 
70 Rowe and Schelling cited in Selbin, Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance, 11. 
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practices. Scott does not fully elaborate on violence and this is particularly 
relevant in the context of statebuilding.  
 
Everyday resistance needs to be read in a continuum of different practices of 
resistance. The different acts used need also to be analysed as reflecting the larger 
political context in which they are embedded. It is therefore problematic to equate 
everydayness with non-violence. While Scott was writing from a pacific context of 
South-East Asia, he did not mean to outline a framework of pacific resistance. 
Scott noted that ‘low-grade, hit-and-run, guerrilla action’ was not unusual in 
everyday resistance.71 He also made clear that peasants were ready to oppose 
land-owners and employers, violently if necessary, to stop changes in property 
law, salary losses, social arrangements and living standards.72 In later work, Scott 
explored the ways in which peasants engaged in armed rebellions, violent actions, 
banditry and crime as a form of resistance.73 Similarly, analysing violence as 
amenable to the practice of resistance does not necessarily equate or reduce 
‘violence’ to dynamics of power and resistance.74  
 
In peace and conflict studies literature the relationship between violence and 
resistance has been analysed differently. Violence in Mac Ginty is linked to the 
coercive and violent political context of post-conflict interventions. Violent 
resistance comes alongside other practices that range from ‘outright resistance’ 
and ‘forms of non-compliance’.75 The relationship between them is the capacity 
they have to hybridise statebuilding and not the link they have to an account of 
resistance. In exploring the transformative capacity of peace processes, conflict 
                                                   
71 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 241. 
72 Ibid., 98, 254 – 259. 
73 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 146 – 150.  
74 Das for instance argues that violence is part of everyday life experience and that this 
daily experience surpassed a narrow framework of power and resistance. Das, Life and 
Words, 78. This is the framework adopted by Mitchell see: Mitchell, Lost in Transformation; 
Audra Mitchell, “Quality/control: International Peace Interventions and ‘the Everyday’,” 
Review of International Studies 37, no. 4 (2011): 1623–1645. 
75 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, 80.  
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and violence, Mitchell has examined the relationship between violence and 
resistance in peace processes. Following De Certeau, Mitchell argues that  
 
the ‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’ described by De Certeau can be engaged by 
citizens and governing bodies alike, not to mention groups such as 
paramilitary organizations that do not fit neatly into either category. […] 
As such, both the ‘powerful’ and the ‘weak’ are the subjects and objects of 
resistance […] Resistance, then, is a mutual dynamic in which all parties 
feel capable of (at least to some degree) controlling, shaping or intervening 
in the acts, powers or logics that shape their lives.76  
 
Beyond the element of conflictuality that can take the form of violence, what, if 
anything, distinguishes resistance from agency, from power politics, and 
‘resistance from governing bodies’ from ‘resistance from citizens’ is left 
unexplained. 
 
Richmond, by contrast, has provided the most extensive account of everyday 
resistance but has equated it with non-violent practices. Richmond’s account of 
resistance as hidden and disguised leads to the identification of what he calls 
emancipatory forms of critical agency, which concern non-violent, civil forms of 
resistance. As Scott, Richmond does not argue that everyday resistance is literally 
invisible.77 Richmond sees resistance as covert discourses and non-confrontational 
activities against the standardised locally unaware promises of the international 
community.78 Case studies include local NGOs, which refuse to be compliant with 
the dictates of the statebuilding vision of civil society, and are marginalised as a 
result in their lobbying efforts towards reform and welfare demands.79 These often 
non-violent forms of resistance, as they are developed in Richmond’s work, resemble 
more the politics of organised movements than the infrapolitics of the weak Scott 
developed.80 For Scott, hidden acts and the politics of disguise, or the ‘pose’, have 
                                                   
76 Mitchell, Lost in Transformation, 31 
77 See resistance as “invisible” in Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, 89, 94. 
78 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace See Ch. 3. 
79 Ibid.. Ch. 3. 
80 Ibid., 117.  
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to do with the politics of repression and the relation resisters have to power, not 
to an ethic of non-violent resistance. 
 
Nothing captures better the meaning of hidennness and infrapolitical than the 
Ethiopian proverb with which Scott opens his Domination and the Arts of Resistance. 
It reads as follows:  
 
When the great lord passes the wise peasant bows deeply and silently farts.81  
 
That before authority those in a subordinate position may act as showing respect 
to such authority should not be mistaken for acquiescence or consent. Rather, the 
scripted roles in which authority and subordination are enacted in front of each 
other should be contrasted with the ways in which actors behave when they are 
among their equals. These acts are visible, even public, but not confrontational. It 
could be also argued that taking violence out of resistance provides a Manichean 
analysis. Richmond’s ethical and political agenda ends up creating a good and 
bad statebuilding project and a good and bad form of resistance. However, this 
does a disservice to the analysis. Not only can resistance not be sanitised, violence 
too has to be analysed as a central aspect of the constitution of state authority.  
 
O p p o s i t i o n / S u b v e r s i o n  
 
The above raises the question of the extent to which resistance is necessarily an act 
of opposition in the form of denigration or direct attack, or whether it can also be 
grasped in its subversive capacity. Subversion may be understood as a form of 
aikido, meaning ‘self-defence [or self-help] using the strength of the dominant 
group’.82 Seen from the differences between Scottian ‘acts’ and De Certeau’s 
‘tactics’, different practices may have different referents. For De Certeau, 
resistance tactics are ‘innumerable practices by means of which users 
                                                   
81 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, v.  
82 Didier Bigo, “Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices 
of Power,” International Political Sociology 5, no. 3 (2011): 233. 
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reappropriate the space organized by techniques of sociocultural production’.83 
Resistance is not so much an attack against and a confrontation of power as a 
transformative force that produces its own outcomes. For Scott, ‘acts’ are intended 
to mitigate or deny domination.  
 
This means that whether the primary referent of an act is ‘opposing’ a claim, or 
whether the primary referent is one self (individual or collective), they can be both 
seen as ways of denying or mitigating those claims and the effects of domination. 
In the Art of Not Being Governed, the condition of relative statelessness of the 
population in the high plateaux of South East Asia was due to their long historical 
patterns of escaping state power.84  Here, population have managed to preserve a 
way of life relatively protected from state interference using tactics including 
escapism, agricultural nomadism, oral history and, when necessary, armed 
resistance.85 It follows that resistance does not always need to be an attack, let 
alone in a violent form, but rather an ‘act’ upon one’s position of subordination. In 
this respect, for example, solidarity and self-organisation may actually provide the 
means for such mitigation without entering into direct opposition. Analysing 
different acts may entail that the everyday resistance is not necessarily always 
covert, especially in militarised contexts. 
 
 
4.  Gradients of Intentionality, Intensity, Exposure and 
Engagement  
 
Three important consequences follow in order to develop a framework of 
everyday resistance in post-conflict statebuilding. First, Scott’s framework 
provides good foundation for that purpose, although with some reworking. A 
second consequence is the need for a framework that connects patterns, 
intentions, motivations, acts and actors. This does not mean to pre-empt a 
                                                   
83 De Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life, xiv.  
84 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed. 
85 Ibid. 
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particular account but a need for justification. Precisely because, as Hollander and 
Einwohner point out, resistance is ‘socially constructed’ between claimers, 
resisters and observers, it requires the exposure of the underlying assumptions in 
any account of resistance.86 A third and final consequence is that resistance cannot 
be conceptualised in terms of all or nothing. As will be explored in this section, 
some elements of resistance such as intentionality, the intensity and exposure of 
its acts, and how directly authority claims are targeted can be gradated in order to 
provide a rich account that captures the complexity and ambiguities of resistance. 
 
Bearing these issues in mind, the account of resistance this thesis proposes is as 
follows:  
 
Resistance is the pattern of acts undertaken by individuals or collectives in a 
subordinated position to mitigate or deny elite claims and the effects of 
domination, while advancing their own agenda.  
 
This definition establishes resistance as a practice (a pattern of acts). It follows 
Scott in identifying both individuals and collectives in a position of subordination 
as the bearers of this practice, thus presenting it as part of a relation of 
domination. This means that, similar to Scott, those acts are directed towards elite 
claims and the experience of domination. It adds an explicit link between intent 
(denial or mitigation) and motivations (agenda advancing). It is an analytical 
category and does not represent any kind of permanent position that individuals 
are in, nor does it claim to capture all daily interactions that take place in a 
complex environment like statebuilding in Eastern DRC. However, it represents 
resistance as a political category. Beyond the individual act, these acts concern 
patterns and trends in relations of domination.  
 
The definition also sets some limits to what counts as resistance. Resistance is not 
an effect, it is a patterned practice. Unintended acts sit at the edges of its scope. 
                                                   
86 Cf. Hollander and Einwohner, “Conceptualizing Resistance,” 548. 
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This is different from accounting for the fact that self-regarding actions may have 
a lesser clear intent. What it means is that, for instance, forgetting to pay one’s 
taxes could hardly be seen as resistance. Similarly, random acts that do not target 
authority claims or the effects of domination do not qualify as resistance. 
However, as mentioned above, the discussion is rather unhelpful if couched in 
terms of the actual existence or absence of resistance. This definition is not 
intended to provide an all or nothing measure of resistance. Rather it identifies the 
core elements of an account, some of which can be gradated.  
 
Hollander and Einwohner propose not to become trapped in futile definitions and 
to account for resistance directly through a typology. They provide a category 
following what they consider the pith of cross-disciplinary debates on resistance: 
intention and recognition. In their typology, they combine resisters’ intentions 
and the recognition of resistance by resisters, targets and observers. Hollander 
and Einwohner categorise seven activities according to whether the resister 
intended there to be resistance, and how this is recognised by the targets and the 
observer.  Their typology is as follows: 
 
Table I. Types of resistance 
Is act recognized as resistance by Is act intended as 
resistance by actor? 
target? observer? 
Overt resistance Yes Yes Yes 
Covert resistance Yes No Yes 
Unwitting resistance No Yes Yes 
Target-defined resistance No Yes No 
Externally-defined resistance No No Yes 
Missed resistance Yes Yes No 
Attempted resistance Yes No No 
Not resistance No No No 
Table 4.3. Hollander and Einwohner’s types of Resistance.87 
 
One of the greatest achievements of this typology is to represent ‘the fact that the 
concept of resistance is socially constructed […] and that resisters, targets, and 
                                                   
87 Ibid., 544. 
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observers all participate in this construction’.88 Nevertheless, the typology reflects 
more the relationship between the practices and the literature than the nature of 
resistance.  
 
Hollander and Einwohner see resistance as concerning primarily action and 
opposition and fundamentally as a relational concept. As they argue, ‘the 
interactional nature of resistance also highlights the central role of power, which is 
itself an interactional relationship, not a characteristic of individuals or groups’.89 
It is precisely this interactional nature that categories should attempt to grasp. 
Despite the basic conceptual framework provided based on ‘action and 
opposition’, Hollander and Einwohner’s typology does not reflect this. Nor does it 
show what makes each actor or the observer recognise the act as resistance. There 
is still a need to provide an account for the ‘acts’ themselves. However, Hollander 
and Einwohner’s proposal of categorising acts according to different aspects of 
resistance and levels of intent can set the basis for a typology that encapsulates 
both the conceptual framework and these different aspects.  
 
Taking stock of the core arguments advanced in this chapter, and as an 
introduction to how different practices of resistance will be discussed in the 
following chapters, the table below categorises the different elements of resistance 
and its gradients. Whereas all the elements (patterns, intentions, motivations, acts 
and actors) need to be present, these can be categorised and display different 
gradients (clarity of intentionality, intensity of acts, and how directly claims have 
been opposed).  
 
Categories in the table respond to the now familiar arguments: Elite claims and 
resistance can be symbolic and material; resistance practices may attempt to deny 
the claims entirely or mitigate them partially; it can be individual and collective, 
and use different acts. Gradients reflect Scott’s account, complemented by De 
                                                   
88 Ibid., 548, emphasis in the original. 
89 Ibid., emphasis in the original. 
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Certeau’s. They can affect intentionality, appearing to the observer in a visible or 
less visible form. Acts can have different gradients of intensity, as they confront 
authority ‘face to face’, in an overt manner, or even violently. The different ways 
in which Scott and De Certeau understood resistance as a practice of engaging 
against authority claims or as a practice that follows self-logics illustrates two 
different kinds of practices. 1) Practices through acts that engage against authority 
claims more directly (claim regarding) and that take the form of a more 
oppositional form of resistance and even of attack. 2) Actions taken in a self-
centred, self-help manner or in the form of ‘aikido’, actually using the claim to 
one’s advantage, and taking generally form of subversion.  
 
The table below illustrates how these different categories and gradients relate in 
regards to the practices discussed in the empirical chapters. Although, as stated, 
outcomes are not relevant to an account of resistance because acts may have no 
impact or may result in the opposite of what was intended, the table offers a 
category of possible outcomes, which also reflects the relationship between claims 
and resistance practices as discussed in the next chapters. They do not exhaust 
other practices that may be more prevalent in other post-conflict contexts.   
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These examples and as they are interpreted above are not meant to be read in 
absolute terms, implying for example, that in all situations an ‘insult’ may be 
more overt than slandering or self-management. Ultimately, as there are not 
unambiguous acts of resistance, and there are plural intersecting relations of 
domination, which are changing and contingent, any framework of resistance 
needs to embrace heterogeneity, ambiguity, but also patternedness in relations of 
domination.  
 
 
5.  The Way Ahead 
 
We have come full circle in that, as stated in Chapter One, one of the most 
problematic aspects of the accounts of resistance in the post-conflict statebuilding 
literature was that they had provided a series of arguments about its practices, its 
nature and how it affected statebuilding, without having fully elaborated what 
resistance is. Methodologically, it has been stated that while focusing on practices 
is a rich ground for theorising, generalisations have to be limited. The practice of 
statebuilding and resistance is, as seen in Chapter Three, necessarily affected by 
the political space in which they are part of. This means that although certain 
features of resistance may apply generally to post-conflict statebuilding and 
certain practices would be similar, they would recover meaning once they are 
contextualised. 
 
From the above, there are three important ideas to retain for the empirical 
chapters. Firstly, that an everyday framework of resistance is not necessarily one 
of non-violent invisible action, but rather an account of the quotidian practices of 
subordinate individuals and collectives that deny or mitigate domination. This 
quotidian element means that these practices aim to be repression-proof and 
easily applicable without the need for a special political organisation. Despite 
their self-help character, they represent a political category. They can have 
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different gradients of intensity, exposure, of engagement against claims and of 
intentionality.  
 
Secondly, Hollander and Einwohner’s point that resistance is ultimately socially 
constructed needs to be born in mind. Having a conceptual framework becomes 
imperative for any account of resistance. As one of the main arguments put 
forward, the account of resistance needs to link the different main defining 
elements of resistance: patterns, intentions, motivations, acts and actors. Only 
through the discussion of how the observer sees these elements interrelating, 
necessary, prevalent or gradated can one account for resistance and be able to 
respond to the different challenges that theorising and researching everyday life 
generate. Finally, resistance requires an account of the historical and sociological 
features of statebuilding as a contingent process.  
 
The next three chapters provide a practical application of this framework. While it 
notes how uncoordinated and self-help actions are prevalent, it also takes account 
of the muddled context, and different interpretations. Thus while bearing in mind 
that there are no unambiguous accounts of resistance, this is necessary in order to 
understand social relations in any political process like statebuilding.   
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Chapter 5 
Discursive Attacks and Redefining Ideals 
 
 
We don’t believe in the authorities anymore. When you say… ‘there, that’s the new 
administrator, everyone may clap but with a certain mockery…’ Him also, what is 
he going to do?1   
 
We could wonder about the role of that whispered language within the political 
system of unanimity. It is, to my mind, a way of softening the overwhelming and 
restrictive official language in order to make it more bearable; it is an antidote. Irony 
and humour are the weapons of the powerless in the face of arbitrary ruling… We 
can also see in it a runaway reaction… But I think that it is more just to consider 
derision as a consciousness-raising exercise, and as a consequence, a way of social 
contestation.2  
 
[I]t is in fact more plausible to contend that so far as the realm of ideology is 
concerned, no social order seems inevitable... the imaginative capacity of subordinate 
groups to reverse and/or negate dominant ideologies is so widespread –if not 
universal– that it might be considered part and parcel of their standard cultural and 
religious equipment.3 
 
 
1.  Statebuilders and State-Recipients,  a pose  
 
Authority is generally claimed with an underlying morality. Statebuilding, in 
particular, is deployed as the best solution to the problems of war, 
authoritarianism and poverty.4 In Eastern DRC this authority claim has 
materialised as a discourse of protection and social change. Against this 
discursive construction, mockery, denigration and slandering operate as a 
primarily intentional mechanism to deny the legitimacy and authority of 
                                                   
1 Interview with Peasant Union Member (no. 151), Bukavu, September 2010.  
2 Comi Toulabor, “Jeu de Mots, Jeu de Vilains: Lexique de La Dérision Politique Au 
Togo,” in Le Politique Par Le Bas En Afrique Noire, ed. Jean-François Bayart, Achille 
Mbembe, and Comi Toulabor, Nouvelle Édition (Paris: Karthala, 2008), 112.  
3 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 331.  
4 David Chandler, International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance, Epub - 
Adobe Digital Editions 2.0.67 (New York: Routledge, 2010), 1.  
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statebuilding. Resistance is not necessarily against the ideals of democracy, 
development and peace, but to the fact that neither protection nor social change is 
being delivered. It also shows that by using the same language of post-conflict 
statebuilding, referring to the state, democracy, peace and development, the 
discourse is used as a denial of legitimacy and as a platform for advancing 
alternative agendas. Post-conflict statebuilding discourse is not only resisted, but 
also subverted.  
 
The three quotes above capture three ways in which discursive resistance takes 
place in the DRC. First, the union representative articulates what Scott calls the 
‘pose’, (the roles that the powerless and the powerful adopt towards each other). 
A politician’s parade without the clapping would be an act of denying an 
authority its share of pomp, and with that, her/his delegitimisation. What Scott 
and this union representative convey is that resistance does not often operate as a 
direct defiance in front of authority. Generally, one may clap at the parade, but 
express reticence and discontent somewhere else. Secondly, resistance is to be 
found in how Congolese non-elites judge authorities from their lived experience, 
even if this is only shown in the ‘whispered language’ far from the hype of a 
politician’s parade. Thirdly, discursive resistance unearths that critique is a form 
of resistance to the unanimity statebuilding claims, subverting its own discourse 
and revealing dissent.   
 
Ideals constitute a platform on which both power and resistance operate. The 
claim to construct the good state, bring democracy, development and peace, 
become long-term claims on which statebuilders legitimise their interventions and 
demand consent. They are also discursive formulas to justify ‘failure’. As John 
Heathershaw argues, the ‘survival’ of peacebuilding is due to the resilience of its 
discourse. Seen from its goals of transforming society through the construction of 
a positive peace, democracy and state-society relations, it actually ‘fails’, and 
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becomes a ‘simulacra’ of its own discourse.5  This captures the situation in the 
DRC where despite the ongoing war, the increasing authoritarianism and the 
deterioration of living conditions, post-conflict statebuilding survives on its 
discourse as a long-term claim to rearrange society under a particular worldview.6 
Simultaneously, these ideals become a way to hold statebuilders to account, to 
voice discontent and elaborate a vision of how things should be.  
 
In Scottian terms, these ideals correspond to the battleground on which elite and 
non-elites’ public and hidden transcripts are enacted. Although as Heathershaw 
argues, post-conflict statebuilding contexts generate multiple transcripts, these 
two serve as a standpoint to observe how authority claims are laid out and how 
they are denied or mitigated.7 The different discourses found for instance in 
government and UN officials as forms of blame exchanges end up articulating 
what Barrington Moore calls the moral authority of suffering.8 Post-conflict 
statebuilding’s discourse is projected with a sense of inevitability and unanimity 
demanding consent, despite ongoing armed conflict and deteriorating living 
conditions. These conditions however give way to criticisms and political 
alternatives.  
 
Although the hidden transcript cannot be simplistically seen as an arena of 
freedom, it provides a safer audience among relative equals.9 The public transcript 
                                                   
5 John Heathershaw, “Seeing Like the International Community: How Peacebuilding 
Failed (and Survived) in Tajikistan,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2, no. 3 (2008): 
329 – 351. 
6 Applying a similar argument to aid agencies operating in countries in conflict, and the 
DRC in particular, Zoe Marriage argues that these agencies operate justifying their actions 
under a moral authority, which simultaneously allows them to externalise blame on 
recipients for the short-comings of their own activities. Zoe Marriage, Not Breaking the 
Rules Not Playing the Game: International Assistance to Countries at War (London: Hurst & 
Co., 2006).  
7 Heathershaw, “Seeing Like the International Community”; See also: Heathershaw, Post-
conflict Tajikistan. 
8 Barrington Moore, Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (London: Macmillan, 
1978), Ch. 2.  
9 The example of the quietness in the classroom in comparison to the burst of talking 
when the teacher leaves illustrates the point. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 
25. 
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has several functions including: concealment (hiding the nasty aspects of power 
and elites’ disagreement), unanimity (giving a sense of agreement between elites 
and non-elites and denying dissent), euphemism and stigma (beautifying power 
and uglifying dissent) and public parade (dramatising the grandeur of power).10 
These functions are visible in that post-conflict statebuilding’s claim to authority 
is done by projecting an image of unanimity and grandeur. It also operates as 
concealment and stigma, as a way of externalising blame for failure, and as a way 
to stigmatise dissent. They create a pose, which illustrates that authority claims 
generate mutual constraints of behaviour on both authorities and subordinate 
classes, and also that consent is not ‘the whole story’.11 In the DRC although these 
discourses are part of the public domain, they are constructed in the safety of 
anonymity. 
 
The chapter will proceed as follows. First, it analyses post-conflict statebuilding’s 
public transcript and its construction of a moral authority, and secondly, non-
elites’ hidden transcript. This latter part will be done in two sections, one that 
analyses mockery, denigration and slandering as ways of negating legitimacy and 
demanding accountability. The second section analyses the redefinition of 
standard post-conflict statebuilding vocabulary, such as the ‘state’, ‘democracy’, 
‘peace’ and ‘development’ where the creation of alternative political agendas is 
particularly visible. Taking these factors together offers non-elites what De 
Certeau sees as the ‘opportunity’ of transforming ‘“belief” into “mistrust”, into 
“suspicion”, and indeed” denunciation […] to manipulate politically what serves 
as circular and objectless credibility for political life itself’.12  
 
 
 
                                                   
10 Ibid., 45 – 66. 
11 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1990), 2.  
12 Michel De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984), 189, emphasis in the original. 
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2.  Elite Claims and the Moral Authority of Suffering 
 
The dynamics of claiming authority while justifying and externalising failure turn 
statebuilding’s public transcript into what Moore called the moral authority of 
suffering. For Moore, authority implied obedience to the social arrangements by 
which ‘some human beings extract an economic surplus from other human beings 
and turn them into culture’.13 Suffering for Moore meant that ‘pain and suffering 
[become] to a degree morally desirable […] unavoidable or even inevitable’.14 
Although Moore theorised this moral authority as the basis for obedience to some 
of the most tyrannical systems, in Congo, this moral authority enables elites to 
demand obedience and justify the ongoing crisis on the basis that they can 
provide, even if not right now, the goods of statebuilding.  
 
The discordance between discourse and practice makes statebuilding not only a 
justification of power, but also a morality of power. However, Scott shows that no 
moral order is inevitable. Peasants, Scott argues, even try to change the fate of the 
weather through prayers, rituals and planting strategies.15 Yet statebuilding is 
deployed with a sense of inevitability and necessity, serving two main functions, 
as a discourse of legitimacy and a justification for failure. Firstly, it has the 
capacity to create a shared vocabulary and meaning on which to justify authority. 
Subsequent claims attached to the position of authority, i.e. extracting taxes, 
negotiating international agreements, allowing foreign investments or articulating 
military operations are premised on an aspiration towards a good state, 
democracy, development and peace. Secondly, the public transcript functions as a 
projection of statebuilding as necessary and inevitable in order to demand 
consent. Its failures are externalised in a dramatisation of power doing all it can 
                                                   
13 Moore, Injustice, 17. 
14 Ibid., 80.  
15 This is best elaborated in James C. Scott, “Protest and Profanation: Agrarian Revolt and 
the Little Tradition, Part I,” Theory and Society 4, no. 1 (1977): 27; See also: James C. Scott, 
Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1985); Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 79 – 80.  
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against an extremely averse context. This section examines these two functions of 
authority claims and the justification or externalisation of failure found in two 
main actors: the MONUC/MONUSCO and the government. 
 
a.  MONUC/ MONUSCO 
 
MONUC was set up with the legalistic wording of the UN Charter for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, but this was in the spirit of 
addressing the ‘well-being and security of the population’ as well as the ‘adverse 
impact of the conflict on the human rights situation’.16 Similarly, Resolution 1925, 
that changed MONUC to MONUSCO, established as its priorities civilian 
protection, peace stabilisation and consolidation, and restoration of state 
authority.17 More than ever before, Resolution 1925 put the responsibility of peace 
and order on the Congolese government, while defining the UN mission as an 
external supportive actor, primarily concerned with civilian protection and 
political oversight.  
 
The success in civilian protection nevertheless remains limited. The same peace 
agreements that have brought about a relative truce have in many ways 
legitimised armed actors and armed struggle as a vehicle for political power. 
Many of these agreements are at the basis of an almost blanket impunity 
operating in the DRC. Statebuilding provides, in this case, the capacity to deploy 
authority claims while externalising responsibility. For instance, in discussing the 
challenges of civilian protection with a Civil Affairs MONUC officer in relation to 
the Kiwanja massacre in 2008, the officer narrated the protests against MONUC 
that took place in Sake, Goma and Bukavu after the CNDP attacks in 2008.18 In 
this occasion, the population protested by throwing stones and Molotov cocktails 
                                                   
16 UN Security Council, Resolution 1279, S/RES/1279, 1999, http://documents.un.org/ 
Accessed 04/05/2010, 2.  
17 UN Security Council, Resolution 1925, S/RES/1925 (2010), 2010, 
http://documents.un.org/ Accessed 13/12/2010.  
18 Interview with MONUC Civil Affairs Representative (no. 14), Goma, July 14, 2009. 
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at the UN compound in Goma for failing to protect them.19 The CNDP attacks 
included the killing of approximately 150 people in the town of Kiwanja, ‘half a 
mile’ from the MONUC’s base, hosting 138 peacekeepers.20 MONUC’s response 
generated a series of inquiries and calls for greater coordination of the 
peacekeepers and the FARDC.21 For MONUC Civil Affairs easing the intensity 
and persistence of these protests and criticisms rests ultimately in population’s 
understanding what the UN mandate is and its limits. In regards to the same 
protests, an officer in Kinshasa stated: 
  
This is what we try to do now because there was lots of criticism towards 
MONUC from civil society on protection issues. Hopefully that is why we 
also have the logistic part as one of our pillars. We try to take them [civil 
society organisations] with us as much as we can on the ground, so that 
they see the situation on the ground and they can also inform the 
population and see how we can better protect people. We do that with the 
government, so that they take responsibility and they don’t just sit and 
criticise.22 
 
The fact that protection depends on Congolese actors understanding ‘the situation 
on the ground’, and providing solutions, reveals the dynamics of a discourse of 
legitimacy in the face of failure. But contrary to the overall aim stated in the quote, 
criticism has not gone away.  MONUC and MONUSCO have a substantial Public 
                                                   
19 Ibid.; See also: OCHA - MONUC, “DR Congo/North Kivu: MONUC Condemns Attack 
on UN Convoy,” Reliefweb, October 28, 2008, http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-
republic-congo/dr-congonorth-kivu-monuc-condemns-attack-un-convoy 26/01/2009; 
BBC, “UN Joins Battle with Congo Rebels,” October 27, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7692932.stm Accessed 26/01/2009; CNN, 
“U.N. Gunships Battle Rebels in East Congo - CNN.com,” October 27, 2008, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/10/27/congo.united.nations/index.html 
26/01/2009. 
20 Human Rights Watch, Killings in Kiwanja (New York: HRW, 2008), 1.  
21 OCHA - MONUC, “DR Congo: MONUC Team Carries Out Preliminary Investigation 
into Deaths of Civilians at Kiwanja,” Reliefweb, November 8, 2008, 
http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-monuc-team-carries-
out-preliminary-investigation-deaths 26/01/2009; OCHA - MONUC, “RD Congo: Le 
Conseil de Sécurité a Examiné La Possibilité de Modifier Le Mandat de La MONUC,” 
Reliefweb, November 27, 2008, http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-
congo/rd-congo-le-conseil-de-s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9-examin%C3%A9-la-
possibilit%C3%A9-de-modifier Accessed 26/01/2009. 
22 Interview with MONUC Civil Affairs Representative (no. 1), Kinshasa, July 7, 2009. 
 175 
Information department.23 In 2009, in Kinshasa, aside from the staff working to 
produce the MONUC Magazine and the emission of MONUC Realités, two staff 
were focused on the monitoring of national and international press, key blogs and 
political commentators, ‘to record and if necessary respond when MONUC is 
cited’.24 MONUSCO now produces Echos of MONUSCO magazine and broadcasts 
MONUSCO Realités.25 The first issue published under MONUSCO, giving 
information about its new mandate is entitled: ‘A new mandate for MONUSCO: 
priorities: civilian protection, elections and development’.26 The whole issue 
shows how the claim to protect civilians and work towards democracy and 
development provides the legitimate bases for UN action in the DRC and, as 
shown below, blames the DRC government for these goals not being achieved. 
 
Similarly, in a video from MONUC Realités, the topic is ‘to what extent has 
MONUC’s presence economically benefited the Congolese population?’27 Two 
Congolese economists argue that MONUC’s impact has been positive. The 
argument is made by pointing out the surplus of capital that enters the Congolese 
economy through the employment of both international and Congolese nationals 
as well as through the building of infrastructure, using UN money, not Congolese 
                                                   
23 Interview with MONUC Public Information Officer, Kinshasa, July 9, 2009; See also: 
MONUSCO, “Information Publique,” 2012, 
http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11276&language=fr-FR Accessed 
6/12/2012. 
24 Interview with MONUC Public Information Officer, Kinshasa. 
25 It should be noted that the UN radio in the DRC, Radio Okapi, is one of most reliable 
and arguably most-listened sources of information in the DRC. It is able to reach very 
remote areas 24/7; twice a day it produces news in the five official languages of the DRC, 
and there are daily breakages for news on each province. However, it not only works as a 
partnership between the UN and the ONG The Hirondelle Foundation, and has several 
independent sources of funding; it was also conceived from the start as a permanent 
project of independent information, regardless of the UN presence. See Radio Okapi, “A 
Propos,” Radio Okapi, 2012, http://radiookapi.net/a-propos/ Accessed 08/08/2012; 
Radio Okapi, “Grille Des Programmes,” Radio Okapi, February 21, 2011, 
http://radiookapi.net/programmes/ Accessed 08/08/2012. 
26 MONUSCO, “Un Nouveau Mandat Pour La MONUSCO - Priorités: Protection Des 
Civils, Élections, Développement Socio-économique,” Echos de La MONUSCO, July 2011, 
http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11355&language=fr-FR Accessed 
15/05/2011. 
27 MONUC REALITES 59, vol. 59 (Kinshasa, 2010), http://wn.com/monuc_realites 
Accessed 8/08/2012. 
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money. One of the economists gives a first-hand example: a UN staff member 
rents their apartment for $3,000 per month, which has allowed the owner of the 
apartment to reinvest this money into a pork farm in the rural outskirts of 
Kinshasa, which employs 15 people. The video does not show that where the UN 
has their main headquarters, the cost of living has rocketed, pressing popular 
classes out of the central urban centres where offices and personnel tend to live.28 
It emphasises the overall positive impact of the mission, hinging on the discourse 
of statebuilding and externalising blame onto the government.  
 
MONUC’s blame externalisation is exemplified in most of the UN Secretary General 
reports to the UN Security Council. The December 2009 report, for instance, opens 
with a paragraph where UNSG states the common goals and strategies of 
MONUC and the Congolese government, while putting the blame on the 
government and FARDC for the continuation of instability: 
  
Despite the enhanced and innovative measures taken by MONUC to 
protect civilians, the operations also took a heavy toll on civilians, who 
were displaced and subjected to reprisal attacks by retreating armed 
groups. Furthermore, the actions of undisciplined and recently integrated 
FARDC elements seeking to settle old ethnic scores resulted in serious 
violations of international humanitarian law, including killings of 
civilians.29 
 
Lack of resources and sufficient training is often raised as part of the problems 
                                                   
28 UN-Habitat notes how in Kinshasa, high-income luxury housing expels the poor to the 
periphery, while profiting political and economic elites. UN-Habitat, The State of African 
Cities 2010: Governance, Inequality and Urban Land Markets (Nairobi: UN-Habitat, 2010), 178 
– 179; See also data quoted on house prices in: Jason Stearns, “Life Gets Better for 
Kinshasa Elites, but Is a Struggle for Most,” Congo Siasa, March 22, 2012, 
http://congosiasa.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/life-gets-better-for-kinshasa-elites.html 
Accessed 13/08/2012. 
29 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, Thirtieth Report of the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2009/623 (New York: 
UN Security Council, December 4, 2009), 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2009/623 para. 2. 
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MONUC/MONUSCO faces in doing its tasks properly.30 However, in these over 
ten years, the UN missions in the DRC have increasingly placed the responsibility 
of war and statebuilding on the government, while portraying themselves as a 
neutral third party, mediating between political and military authorities and the 
civilian population. This was made explicit in an interview where a UN official 
emphasised the role the UN plays in creating a particular kind of civil society, 
which intimates the government to provide social goods and services without 
generating dissent or antagonism. 
What we do is to make sure that civil society lives up to their goals and 
statutes. Their role is to check the government… In Sun City they were 
given seats. These have been the main constraints for civil society to stay 
away from politics and stay loyal to their own statutes and to safeguard 
the interest of the population: demanding improvements in social services, 
demanding accountability from politicians; fighting for rights; 
development, advocacy… some political advocacy is OK, but not 
exclusively! We got to the stage where civil society was doing 90% of 
political activity: questioning processes, questioning things and advocating 
for appointment – actual advocacy and position, that was all they were 
doing! They were not doing such things as demanding services or rights, 
but actually questioning processes, that is, typical things that should be 
done by political opposition.31 
 
Here it is possible to see the articulation of an ideal that establishes a division of 
labour in society and in the undertaking of statebuilding tasks. It furthers the idea 
of a representative government having a civil society that is focused not on the 
structural problems of society, but on lobbying politicians on particular issues. It 
is also possible to see a reverberation of the hidden transcript of the UN and the 
underlying image of the DRC as dysfunctional. This dysfunctionality is seen in 
statements like ‘elections are still tribal here’,32 ‘the government does not even 
                                                   
30 Interview with Political Affairs Representative (no. 46), Kinshasa, July 7, 2010; Interview 
with MONUSCO Civil Affairs Officer (no. 142), Uvira, September 5, 2010. 
31 Interview with MONUC Civil Affairs Representative (no. 14), Goma.  
32 Interview with Political Affairs Representative (no. 45), Kinshasa, July 6, 2010, 45. 
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have figures of its own population’, 33 ‘there is no sense of progress’,34 ‘here, there 
are no political parties or real civil society’.35  
 
In several informal conversations with UN officials, UN agency members and 
other international representatives, there is a commonly held view that civil 
society is a collection of individuals that attempt to access international money by 
acquiring the vocabulary that funding bodies and international organisations 
want.36 In a similar way that popular classes negate the existence of the state, 
creating an image of what the state should be, elites’ negation of civil society is a 
way to delegitimise ‘civil society’. This works as a hidden transcript redressing 
international actors and demonising those who in the public transcript were the 
heroes of their policies. Furthermore, underlying this criticism there is an 
assumption about the Congolese being corrupt, not really interested in 
undertaking such noble aims such as ‘democracy’ and ‘good governance’ but 
instead using the vocabulary to access international funding.  
 
A MONUC officer, for instance, affirmed:  
 
We are dealing with people who are helpless… The mass of the people in 
this country are illiterate… there are no real political parties here, we are 
trying to build this country from scratch, there is no real civil society… it is 
in a state of infancy.37  
 
Portraying the Congolese as helpless only gives a pretext to the strategies of the 
intervention. Other common “tags” used by MONUC/MONUSCO or diplomatic 
officials in interviews and informal conversations were ‘corrupt’, ‘lazy’, 
                                                   
33 Inteview with MONUSCO Civil Affairs Officer (no. 158), Goma, September 9, 2011. 
34 Interview with Political Affairs Representative (no. 45), Kinshasa; Interview with 
Political Affairs Representative (no. 46), Kinshasa; Interview with MONUSCO Electoral 
Division Officer, Kinshasa, July 6, 2010. 
35 Interview with MONUC Political Affairs Officer (no. 7), Kinshasa, July 9, 2009. This 
sentiment was recorded amongst the 17 UN officers interviewed and other international 
bodies.  
36 Informal Conversation with UNOPS representative, Goma, July 14, 2009; Interview with 
GTZ representative, Goma, July 13, 2009; Interview with EU PAG representative, 
Kinshasa, September 15, 2010. 
37 Interview with MONUC Political Affairs Officer (no. 7), Kinshasa, July 9, 2009. 
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‘opportunistic’, ‘selfish’ or ‘backward’. This seemed to be saying that ultimately it 
was the fault of the Congolese, both the elites and non-elites, that they are in this 
situation. A former MONUC officer stated that ‘the Congolese elite, that is, the 
political, economic and military elite have destroyed the state’.38 While these 
analyses about the role of Congolese elites in fostering an economic and political 
crisis are not necessarily wrong, they highlight the way international staff 
complaints seek an exoneration of their responsibility for the state of affairs and 
an acknowledgement that they are doing their best against all odds. Through 
these views there is an affirmation of the rightness of the strategies, and of the 
difficulty of the task. In the process, statebuilding is idealised and societies, in this 
case the DRC, are pathologised.  
b.  Government  
 
The vocabulary of the state as an engine and receptacle of peace, democracy and 
development is deployed in a similar manner by the government. Statebuilding 
provides a model, both to mirror government’s public image and justify action. 
Electoral campaigns have illustrated statebuilding vocabulary very clearly. The 
programme of each political party has revolved around their capacity to restore 
state authority and bring peace, democracy and development. For instance, 
Joseph Kabila based his 2006 campaign on the ‘five pledges’ (cinq chantiers) 
referring to development.39 This was pushed forward in the 2011 elections with 
the ‘Revolution of modernity’.40 The programme is based on the promise of 
development, to make the DRC an emergent country by 2030 and a world power 
to join BRICS countries by 2060.41  
 
                                                   
38 Interview with Ex-MONUC officer (no. 2), July 7, 2009. 
39 Marcel Nzazi Mabidi, “Joseph Kabila Candidat Du Peuple,” RDC Presidency Website - 
Archives 2006, March 2006, 
http://www.presidentrdc.cd/edito%20joseph%20kabila%20candidat.html Accessed 
13/08/2012. 
40 Na Raïs - Independent Candidacy of Joseph Kabila, “Vision, Idées-Forces et Programme 
de Joseph Kabila Pour Un Congo Émergent” (Na Raïs Electoral Programme, 2011), 
http://votezjosephkabila.com/IDEE_FORTE.pdf Accessed 26/05/2012. 
41 Ibid., 2. 
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Kabila’s media platforms also revolve around the cohesiveness of state authority. 
Kabila TV, which is linked to the presidential website, and his own private media 
platform, DigitalCongo, which includes a TV channel and a news website, both 
display a focus on developmental projects, and on the official and solemn acts of 
Kabila as President.42 State unity, development and peace have been Kabila’s 
discourse drivers. Not only do these resonate with people’s political aspirations, 
they have been presented as arguments to ask the UN to leave. In December 2009, 
in a conference broadcasted by the Congolese National Radio and Television 
(RTNC), Kabila emphasised ‘the good relationship between the UN and the 
Congolese government’ but stated that there should be ‘a plan of progressive UN 
retreat and disengagement’ based ‘on the net improvement of the security 
situation in the Eastern part of the country’.43 From this vantage point we can see 
that the image the government projects reflects the broad foundations of 
statebuilding discourse. These include the cohesiveness of state authority in being 
able to maintain its territory, to secure its population, to be the democratically 
elected representatives, and to have an economic development and modernisation 
plan. For the DRC government too, peace, democracy, and development operate 
as a shared vocabulary on which to premise legitimate state authority. 
 
The responsibility for not achieving those goals is a matter of exchanging blame. 
For instance, when putting the complaints heard from MONUC/MONUSCO 
officials and those of the population to a few government representatives, the 
response was usually to blame the “international community”. One of these 
government representatives stated:  
 
The DRC needs social democracy but it is not possible because of lack of 
investment and lack of financial means. The DRC is asphyxiated because 
                                                   
42 Kabila TV, “Kabilatv’s Channel,” September 9, 2012, 
http://www.youtube.com/user/kabilatv; Multimedia Congo s.p.r.l., Digitalcongo.net, 
2012, http://www.digitalcongo.net/ Accessed 09/08/2012. 
43 RTNC, Conference de Press Presidentielle (Kinshasa, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6-JXV8ByRH0&feature=youtube_gdata_player 
Accessed 08/08/2012. 
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the policy from the big powers is ‘you pay us first before we give you the 
money’... also everyone is having a piece of the cake here. The US and 
France take the petrol, the US and Belgium take the Cobalt, Germany 
operates in the Katanga mining, the gold is taken by Canada and the UK 
and a bit by the US, diamonds are taken by Israel, Holland and South 
Africa. I have no problem with investment in resources, but in the context 
of a neo-colonial model, there is no hope for the Congolese.44 
 
The narrative is not simply one of absolving themselves of responsibility, but of 
pointing out the constraints they suffer to fulfil their promises. Similarly, for a 
member of the North Kivu National Assembly, the DRC was a place for everyone 
to get rich through programmes of development and peacebuilding. He 
complained that the vehicles of MONUC always seemed to be parked and that 
they were not travelling to the interior of the country. He added:  
We don’t understand MONUC’s politics. After 2005, they are there, we see 
them patrol with the helicopters during the night, if the enemy is in the 
skies, we don't know… they come for example to support elections, or 
giving some bureaucratic support to the government, but regarding 
security, in comparison with the arsenal they have, the weapons… if we 
had such capacity all the problems will be finished by now.45  
 
The vision this representative shows is that of the Congolese being victimised 
while not having the necessary capacity to face the problem. Statebuilding’s 
discourse is enacted as a public transcript that serves as a tool to legitimise 
inaction and externalise blame. Authority is deployed on moral grounds, where 
the legitimacy for intervention and action of elites is premised on the benefit and 
protection of the population. However, at the same time, this creates an exit 
strategy through which to externalise blame for the promises of statebuilding not 
being realised. A common vocabulary is created around idealised versions of the 
state, democracy, development and peace, that serves as a platform for authority 
claims. In the view of Congolese officials this is not an appropriation of 
                                                   
44 Interview with Government Representative (no.31), Kinshasa, July 22, 2009. 
45 Interview with North Kivu Provincial Assembly representative, Goma, July 23, 2010. 
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“international” vocabulary but their own aspirations. Thus ‘democracy’, 
‘decentralisation’, and many strategies for reform are the initiative of the 
Congolese government, and not of the ‘international community’.46   
 
As long as they remain more of a discourse than a real undertaking, they are 
better seen as claims which have embedded symbolic and material demands on 
Congolese subordinate classes. There is a demand of recognition and legitimation, 
as well as of bearing their suffering, of consent, of waiting and getting by despite 
all odds. Thus the morality on which statebuilding is justified makes discourses a 
fruitful arena on which to observe resistance. The creation of ideals, the 
justification of power on moral grounds and the normative commitments 
deployed with the statebuilding mission are part of the tools that authority uses. 
Conversely, these are turned into weapons of delegitimisation and a into a 
platform from which to advance alternative agendas. 
 
 
3.   The Denial of Legitimacy 
 
If post-conflict statebuilding operates as a claim to legitimacy and consent, and 
resistance is defined by the denial of these claims, what follows is that de-
legitimisation and disobedience should be seen as a primary area of resistance. 
For Scott, it is here where the hidden transcript develops. Mocking, denigrating 
and slandering authority, both in the claims of MONUC/MONUSCO and the 
government, are widely used tools. Although these discourses take place in the 
open, it is done through the safety of privacy or anonymity of the crowd. They are 
not necessarily hidden as much as they are non-confrontational.  
 
As Toulabor argues, humour and derision are often used as methods for 
confronting the established social order and as such, should been seen within a 
                                                   
46 Interview with Representative of Ministry of Planning, September 7, 2010; Interview 
with Deputy for Uvira, Kinshasa, September 23, 2011; Interview with Deputy for Beni, 
Goma, July 22, 2010. 
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sphere of social contestation. Mockery, denigration and slander constitute a form 
of resistance in that they configure a pattern of action which denies the legitimacy 
of power, turning its claims to authority into an exercise of domination. That is, if 
power is justified by its capacity to create the good state that can deliver peace, 
democracy and development, resistance denies this claim by pointing to the 
hypocrisy of power, to other possible agendas and to the lack of commitment to 
statebuilding’s own discourse. Mockery, denigration and slandering are hidden 
transcripts. They run beneath official proclamations, challenging or at least 
contrasting, with the image of unanimity that authorities wish to project in 
regards to their actions. 
  
a.  Mockery  
 
O f  M O N U C / M O N U S C O  
 
Mockery reflects a critique in which politicians, but also MONUC/MONUSCO, 
are pictured as lazy and corrupt. This practice constitutes a pattern. Any visitor to 
the DRC can identify how the MONUC is mocked, almost to the extent of arguing 
that it is thanks to the Congolese people that MONUC officers have a job. For 
instance, a common mockery of MONUC is in the form of ‘its name says 
everything, they are just here to observe how we are killed’.47 This is an old 
criticism from when MONUC was only authorised as an observation mission.48 
This has not only been a form of covert resistance, but a demand on MONUC to 
take stronger action against armed groups and foreign intervention.49 
                                                   
47 Interview with Representative from Association des Femmes Violés, Kinshasa, July 8, 
2009; Interview with Representative from Association de Femmes pour la Pacification et 
le Developpement (AFEPADE), Goma, July 26, 2010; Interview with Cojeski 
Representative (Collectif des Organisations des Jeunes Solidaires de Congo-Kinshasa), 
Goma, July 26, 2010; Interview with Bukavu Resident, Witness of 2004 Nkunda Attacks, 
Bukavu, September 4, 2010. 
48 MONUC was placed under Chapter VII by Resolution 1291 in 2000 but not in its 
original authorisation in 1999. MONUC/MONUSCO have not tended to use force overall. 
See Chapter Two this thesis.  
49 Louis-Paul Eyenga Sana, “La Société Civile Interpelle La Monuc,” Le Potentiel, 
November 5, 2008, 4489 edition, sec. Politique Nationale, 
http://www.lepotentiel.com/afficher_article.php?id_edition=&id_article=73560 
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Another mockery common in the Kivus, during the peak of violence from 
renegade soldier Nkunda, was the popular saying against MONUC: ‘no Nkunda, 
no job’.50 This inferred that MONUC needed seemingly artificial justifications for 
being in the country. It was not that the threat of Nkunda was not real, it was that 
people saw the emergence of the likes of Nkunda as a consequence of MONUC 
not doing its job properly, thus perpetuating the need for the mission to be there. 
A common criticism claiming ‘they do nothing’, ‘they just run up and down their 
cars’ or inquiring ‘what do they do?’ raised the same issues.51 The criticism is done 
from lived experience, illustrating how popular classes see themselves as bearing 
the suffering of the shortcomings of the decisions and strategies of power. From 
this criticism it is possible to observe an articulation of ‘what should be 
happening’, or ‘what MONUC should be doing’.  Thus showing that in this case, 
denial of legitimacy goes along a projection of an agenda. 
 
In Kinshasa, the same day that MONUC changed to MONUSCO, with a change of 
mandate, the mission was renamed ‘MONUSKOL’ (as in the beer Skol, portraying 
a vision of UN workers as more interested in alcohol and night-life than in 
peace).52 In Bunyakiri and Bukavu, MONUC or MONUSCO were said to be 
abbreviations for ‘Milice Onusienne au Congo’ (UN Militia in Congo).53 This not 
                                                                                                                                                   
Accessed 7/03/2010. 
50 Interview with Group Jeremie Representative, Kinshasa, July 9, 2009; Interview with 
Group Jeremie Representative 1, Bukavu, August 25, 2010; Interview with MONUC Civil 
Affairs Representative (no. 14), Goma; Interview with MONUC Civil Affairs 
Representative (no. 1); Interview with Ex-MONUC Officer (no. 2),Kinshasa, September 17, 
2010; Valeria Izzi argues that this sort of slandering illustrates mistrust and the obstacles 
for the work of peacebuilders, in “‘No Nkunda No Job:’ Rumours, Local Narratives and 
Peacebuilding in the Kivus, Democratic Republic of Congo,” Human Security Perspectives 
no. 1 (2011): 165 – 181.  
51 Although this was raised in many interviews, the sentiment reflected here is something 
observed as prevalent in all fieldwork locations in ordinary interactions outside 
interviews.  
52 Interview with MONUSCO Electoral Division Officer, Kinshasa, July 6, 2010. This was 
corroborated in daily outgoings in Kinshasa, and echoed in several interviews and 
informal conversations elsewhere E.g. Informal Conversation with International Alert 
Research Assistant, Goma, July 7, 2010. 
53 E.g. Interview with Group Jeremie Representative, Kinshasa; Interview with 
Representative of Women’s Group Femmes Père Saint-Simon, Bunyakiri, August 20, 2010; 
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only refers to the multiplicity of armed groups that people confront regularly, but 
also to a common criticism levelled at the UN that they are not there to make 
peace. 
O f  ‘ P o l i t i c i a n s ’  a n d  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  
 
The president and the government are not exempt from mockery. Joseph Kabila is 
called ‘Kinyago’ (marionette) or ‘Kanambe’ implying he has “Rwandese 
origins”.54 Portraying Kabila as manipulated to serve external agendas or denying 
his Congolese nationality is a direct challenge to his legitimacy. A flipside of 
nicknames is the technique of refusing to say Kabila’s name.55 Although this could 
follow voting patterns and oppositional lines, it is striking that this is observable 
in Kinshasa, the two Kivus and Equateur.56 Across these provinces it is not 
uncommon to hear people referring to Kabila as ‘that one’, ‘him’ or ‘the one you 
know’. This silence seems to be both a protest but also a defence, which 
simultaneously deny and mitigate authority.  
 
In addition to nicknames and silences, jokes are a common way to mock the 
government. For instance, very soon after the government committed to its ‘five 
pledges’, people renamed them the ‘five songs’. This effectively portrays the 
government as not being serious in their realisation.57 In Goma, a common joke 
asks ‘what has changed?’ and people respond, ‘well, BunaZa [Zaire’s beer] is now 
BunaCo [Congo’s beer] and the market CadeZa now it is called CadeCo’. The joke 
                                                                                                                                                   
Focus Group Young People Bunyakiri, Bunyakiri, August 21, 2010; Interview with 
Bukavu Resident, Witness of 2004 Nkunda Attacks, Bukavu; Informal Conversation with 
Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant, Bunyakiri, August 20, 2010. 
54 Those who assert that Kabila is Rwandese say that his real name is Hipolite Kanambe 
and not Joseph Kabila Kabange.  
55 The use of silence as sabotage is not a new nor an uncommon practice of resistance in 
Africa. See Jon Abbink, Mirjam de Bruijn, and Klaas van Walraven, A Propósito de Resistir: 
Repensar La Insurgencia En Africa, trans. Dídac Lagarriga Prunera (Brussels: Oozebap, 
2008), 17. 
56 This was observed in during fieldwork in Kinshasa, North and South Kivu, and in 
Equateur as an electoral observer from September – December 2011.  
57 In French from the ‘cinq chantiers’ to the ‘cinq chansons’. For the programme visit 
President Joseph Kabila Office, “Cinq Chantiers de La RDC - President’s Program,” Cinq 
Chantiers, 2009, http://www.cinqchantiers-rdc.com/English/home.php Accessed 
17/01/2011. 
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contends elites’ assertion that they are creating a ‘new’ state, by implying that 
nothing has changed. Similarly, the popular saying, ‘Mobutism without Mobutu’, 
implies that politics today are indistinguishable from the former Mobutu era.58  
As justice is one of the domains in which there have been fewer improvements,59 
it is also a site of mockery and critique.60 An evaluation study of UNDP activities 
in 2006 asserts that ‘the justice system is […] distrusted and reputed to be 
corrupt’.61 In the study, ‘most respondents stated that they would rather put their 
trust in institutions such as churches and human rights organizations or proximity 
community leaders’.62 During the 2006 election campaign Kabila promised to 
reform the justice sector through the slogan ‘the doors of prison are big’.63 For 
Kabila this statement conveyed his government’s commitment to ‘zero tolerance’ 
against corruption and to prosecuting crimes no matter who was responsible. As 
corruption is seen as one of the biggest obstacles towards conflict resolution and 
access to justice, people added a simple sentence to the slogan to change its 
                                                   
58 This has resonated in the literature that maintains that Congo remains a corrupt neo-
patrimonial state, sustained by a ‘dysfunctional international community’ Hans Hoebeke, 
“DRC: The Politics of Continuity?,” The African Institute for Security Studies, 2010, 
http://www.iss.co.za/, http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/10/afr/100201-
Hoebeke-politics-of-continuity-DRC.html para. 1; Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, “Mobutism 
Après Mobutu: Reflexion Sur La Situation Actuelle En République Démocratique Du 
Congo,” Politique Africaine 72 (1998). 
59 Interview with EU PAG representative, Kinshasa; UN Security Council, Resolution 2053, 
S/RES/2053, 2012 para. 8-9 and 12; UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, Report of the 
Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. S/2012/355 (New York: UN Security Council, May 23, 2012) para. 57 
and 81; Theodore Trefon, Congo Masquerade: The Political Culture of Aid Inefficiency and 
Reform Failure (London and New York: Zed Books, 2011), 14; Thierry Vircoulon, “Re ́forme 
de La Justice: Re ́alisations, Limites et Questionnements,” in Réforme Au Congo (RDC): 
Attentes et Désillusions, ed. Theodore Trefon (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009), 87 – 102. 
60 Direct mockery was recorded in 10 interviews with subordinate groups/civil society 
representatives. That there is a sentiment of distrust to the justice system in Congolese 
society was directly raised in all 75 interviews with civil society/ordinary people and 4 
government officials speaking of a popular sentiment.  
61 Carrol Faubert, Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries: Case Study - 
Democratic Republic of Congo (New York: United Nations Development Programme - 
Evaluation Office, 2006), 9. 
62 Ibid. There are several organisations, now funded by INGOs that do justice settlements 
as a way to avoid having to go to the courts, e.g. Life and Peace Institute and Alliance 
pour la Paix et la Concorde. 
63 The press noted this commitment in Kabila’s inaugural speech. See for example: Hilaire 
Kayembe, “RDC: Le Président Kabila Pris Au Mot, Des Détenus S’évadent, Persuadés 
D’être Graciés,” December 11, 2006, 
http://www.lepotentiel.com/afficher_article.php?id_edition=&id_article=38417. 
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meaning. The slogan then read: ‘the doors of the prison are big, to take all the big 
thieves out’.64 The expression was a critique of the lack of justice, in particular to 
the impunity of those who commit the major crimes.65 
 
This slogan was reflected in many forms and shapes in Bukavu, but also in other 
cities and territories. A Group Jeremie representative complained that ‘one could 
go to prison for stealing a chicken while big thieves are out’.66 In Bunyakiri, where 
a prison had just been built next to an almost-ruined hospital, one of the doctors 
complained that the prison would be just for ‘the poor’ while the real thieves 
enjoyed ‘the benefit of power’.67 The tweaking of meaning recalls De Certeau’s 
argument that ‘a lucid discourse cunningly turned up fake words and 
prohibitions on speaking in order to reveal an ubiquitous injustice’.68  
 
This mockery expresses in humour what otherwise is a violent experience. As 
seen in previous chapters, the military strategies that have taken place under the 
programmes of Umoja Wetu, Kimya II and Amani Leo have succeeded to a 
certain extent in demobilising thousands of combatants. But this has come at a 
high price for the civilian population. People in local villages not only have to host 
and feed soldiers with special privileges under these operations, but also to take 
care of the daily needs of demobilised soldiers dumped in the villages without 
                                                   
64 This has been brought up explicitly in 5 interviews: Interview with Group Jeremie 
Representative, Kinshasa; Interview with representative from Union Paysanne pour le 
Developpement Integral (UPDI), Bukavu, September 8, 2010; Interview with Group 
Jeremie Representative 1, Bukavu; It resonated as well in many of the student groups 
organised to speak of corruption and justice in College Alfajiri, Bukavu. Participant 
Observation III, Peace workshop organized by Group Jeremie, College Alfajiri, Bukavu, 
July 19, 2009. References to double standards in applying the law, and to experiences of 
repression came up also in Interview with UniKin Student Union Representative, 
Kinshasa, July 24, 2009; Interview with CODHOD Representative Comité pour la Défense 
des Droits de l’Homme et le Développement, July 25, 2009; Interview with Representative 
from NGO Observatoire des Droits de l’Homme et Contre la Torture, Kinshasa, July 29, 
2009; Interview with Cojeski Representative (Collectif des Organisations des Jeunes 
Solidaires de Congo-Kinshasa), Goma. 
65 Interview with representative from Union Paysanne pour le Developpement Integral 
(UPDI), Bukavu.  
66 Interview with Group Jeremie Representative 1, Bukavu. 
67 Informal Conversation Bunyakiri Hospital Doctor, Bunyakiri, August 21, 2010. 
68 De Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life, 16. 
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resources for their reintegration into civil life. Those combatants that join the army 
or the national police are also likely to keep settling ethnic rivalries while living 
off the population, not least because of a lack of salary payment.69 Further, issues 
of land, housing and ethnic rivalries brought by the return of refugees and IDPs 
are left for the villagers to deal with. As such, when people on the ground mock 
the programme ‘Amani Leo’ (Peace Today) calling it ‘Amani Kesho’ (Peace 
tomorrow) it reflects an underlying reality of armed conflict, poverty and 
impunity.  
 
b.  Denigration, Slandering and  ‘Radio Trottoir’70  
 
A less humorous way to delegitimise and criticise the actions of both the 
government and MONUC/MONUSCO is through rumours and insult. Whether 
particular politicians, blue helmets or, in general, MONUC/MONUSCO and the 
government, rumours portray them as purposely continuing the conflict or 
trafficking with resources. In Bunyakiri, for example, many residents believed that 
MONUC was giving food and clothes to the FDLR.71 The story was developed in 
more detailed in a focus group held with young people of the town. One of the 
participants stated: ‘Not long ago one FARDC shot a FDLR, and when they were 
going to recuperate the body, he was dressed with the MONUC uniform and had 
biscuits and even the shoes of MONUC’.72 Put this story back to a MONUSCO 
official, she responded by acknowledging that these rumours are commonplace 
and that the problem is that ‘there is not good public information [public 
relations]’.73 These rumours are for MONUC/MONUSCO officers evidence of the 
                                                   
69 Global Witness, Faced with a Gun, What Can You Do? War and the Militarization of Mining 
in Eastern Congo (London: Global Witness, July 31, 2009), 16 – 17, 
http://www.globalwitness.org/library/faced-gun-what-can-you-do Accessed 
5/05/2011. 
70 Rumour in French.  
71 Brought up in the two focus groups done in Bunyakiri. Interviews with four Bunyakiri-
based NGOs confirmed these were common rumours: Alliance pour la Paix et la 
Concorde, Association de Dèfense de Droits l'Homme Bunyaki, Voix Sans Voix and 
Femmes Père Saint Simon. Also in Interview with Juma Pili Kabambi, Imam of the Islamic 
Community, Bunyakiri, August 20, 2010. 
72 Focus Group Young People Bunyakiri. 
73 Interview with MONUSCO Civil Affairs Officer (no. 145), Bukavu, September 7, 2010. 
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manipulation of politicians.74 What these rumours show is not that MONUSCO is 
not doing enough “propaganda”, it is that people are not willing to look at 
MONUSCO in a positive light. Rumour resonates with a deeper political agenda. 
Whether these stories are true or not, whether they originate from a specific 
politician’s agenda or even FARDC, they are used to discredit MONUSCO.75 As 
such they are also a symbol of social conflict. 
 
The government, after all, is not absent from it. As seen above, Kabila is accused 
of working for Rwanda’s benefit. Rumours run about politicians too. In Baraka, 
some Fizi deputies are accused of arming Yakutumba both from an ideological 
perspective but also as a way to access mineral resources.76 It is striking that in a 
stretch of about 800 km between Fizi and Beni and of over 3,000 km between these 
and Kinshasa, in a country with hardly a communication and road network, the 
same rumours are found word for word: ‘The FDLR is an invention to continue 
the war’; or ‘MONUC’s soldiers traffic with coltan’;77 Some of these have become 
part of the mainstream discourse: ‘MONUC is there to serve Rwandan interests’ 
or ‘UK, US and Rwanda want the balkanization of Congo’.78 In Bunyakiri, Fizi and 
                                                   
74 Six out of 17 MONUC/MONUSCO officers directly made reference to this issue.  
75 E.g. Bemba’s 2006 campaign ‘100% Congolais’ reflected the rumour that Kabila was 
Rwandese.  Also in the latest reports on the 2011 elections both the Carter Centre Electoral 
observation missions points out that politicians tended to spread hatred discourses and 
slandering as a political weapon. Carter Center, “Final Report: Presidential and 
Legislative Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nov. 28, 2011,” October 30, 
2012, 71 and 97, http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/drc-022312.html Accessed 
01/11/2012. 
76 The veracity of the rumour could not be ascertained but several interviewees confirmed 
that this was an extended belief in Baraka. Interview with Fizi SOCICO representative, 
Baraka, September 1, 2010; Interview with Human Rights NGO Representative (no. 127), 
Uvira, August 29, 2010. 
77 For example similar rumours to those in Bunyakiri were expressed by residents of 
Masisi who specified that ‘In Nyabiondo et Pinga the Indian contingent has profiteered of 
mineral resources’ Informal Conversation with Masisi Parish Priest, Masisi, July 25, 2010.  
78 Interview with Freddy Monsa Iyaka Suken, Director of News Group Le Potenciel, 
Kinshasa, July 23, 2009; Radio Okapi, “Les Évêques Catholiques Congolais Mettent En 
Garde Contre La Balkanisation de La RDC,” October 6, 2006, http://radiookapi.net/sans-
categorie/2006/10/06/les-eveques-catholiques-congolais-mettent-en-garde-contre-la-
balkanisation-de-la-rdc/ Accessed 9/07/2012; Radio Okapi, “RDC: Les Catholiques 
Marchent Contre La Balkanisation, Avec Le Soutien Du Gouvernement,” Radio Okapi, 
August 1, 2012, http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/08/01/rdc-les-catholiques-
marchent-contre-la-balkanisation-avec-le-soutien-du-gouvernement/ Accessed 
01/08/2012. 
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Masisi, for example, a similar rumour circulated: MONUC provided FDLR 
elements with uniforms, weapons and food to sustain a war in Congo in order to 
keep Congo weak and easily exploitable. It is remarkable that inquiring about 
these rumours demonstrates they rarely come from first-hand experiences and 
that, acquiring details highlights contradictions in the facts. Rumour is used to 
deny the benign purpose of MONUC’s mission itself, its authority and its rhetoric.  
 
Although rumours are widely known, they remain something to be commented 
on in the quiet. Denigration through insults also takes place this way. The words 
of the union representative opening this chapter were followed by a more direct 
statement: ‘yes, you can do the parade and the show and everyone might give you 
a big round of applause, but it is to mock you, inside they are saying ‘so, yes, you 
come again to piss us off’.79 The catalogue of insults is extensive. It tags politicians 
and international agents as ’traffickers’, ‘murderers’, ‘thieves’, ‘lazy’ and ‘liars’, 
amongst others.80 As Scott noted, insults should be seen as a more direct, less 
covert tactic of resistance. They do not confront authorities face to face, and they 
are part of the hidden transcript.  
 
Portraying international and national political actors as incapable, greedy, 
hypocritical and anti-democratic is a form of discursive resistance that denies the 
claim of legitimacy and consent. To state that these tactics are a form of 
delegitimation, and hence of more intentional (claim-regarding) resistance, does 
not mean that people would articulate the consequences of such discourses in 
such manner. Nor does it necessarily mean that there is a second agenda that the 
observer cannot know. What it means is the intent of mocking and slandering 
authorities is precisely mocking and slandering authorities, the intent, in other 
words, cannot be inferred beyond the act. It is reasonable to assume from here 
                                                   
79 Interview with Peasant Union Representative (no. 151). 
80 This was gathered most significantly in informal conversations. The words of an airport 
porter are revealing: ‘Here everyone comes, take what they want, the politicians are liars, 
the state is a thief and the MONUC does nothing, they are accomplices in all this’ 
Informal Conversation with Airport Worker - Luggage Porter, Goma, July 15, 2009.  
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that actors are aware that they are, at least to a certain extent, targeting the 
deference, credibility, respectability and reputation of authority. These forms of 
discursive resistance have embedded a political critique of the statebuilding 
strategies and agenda advancing. In mocking or portraying a negative image of 
the state of current affairs, these forms of resistance carry out an idea of how 
reality should be. 
 
 
4.  Ideals and the Articulation of Social Justice as Agenda 
Advancing  
 
Going back to how claims of authority are justified on the basis of long term 
idealised promises, this section analyses how these promises become a platform 
on which to launch a critique of authority, hold it to account and articulate 
aspirations for social justice. As the discourses seen above, this rearticulating also 
functions as a denial of legitimacy but it is done as a self-regarding practice. While 
the critique normally takes the form of a complete negation of the existence of the 
state, of democracy, peace and development, this negation acts as a way to 
subvert the agenda. Against top-down, self-serving elite structures and processes, 
the state, democracy, development and peace are redefined as needing bottom-up 
decision making, local control and a focus on delivering well-being and public 
service.  Using seemingly conservative discourses, these rearticulating end up 
being idealisations that reflect political alternatives. Although everyday resistance 
is not always underpinned by these ideas and may be motivated by more banal 
and immediate goals, these redefinitions are an important insight into prevalent 
political aspirations and do underpin many other practices that will be explored 
in the next chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 192 
T h e  G o o d  S t a t e  
 
The state is a primary example of the dynamics of denial and subversion. Against 
the critique and discourses seen above, the state becomes rearticulated as 
something like a ‘good king’. For a Caritas representative, ‘the state doesn’t exist, 
it doesn’t protect people, its services are taken over by NGOs and its role must be 
that of distributing wealth’.81 A UPDI representative believed that the state should 
be there to guarantee a good standard of living for the peasants and provide the 
same protection to agriculture as in Europe.82 The denominated ‘government of 
national unity’ brought by the 2002 Sun City agreements, was renamed ‘1+4=0’. 
As in the most idealised versions of what the state can and should do, seen in 
Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan or what Chandler calls the ‘silver bullet’, the state 
is redefined also in non-elite discourses as the engine for development, peace, 
well-being and public service. The creation of an ideal picture of the state, as 
something like a “good king” or a “prophet”, is a form of resistance against the 
lived reality.  
 
In the DRC, idealising the state as a saviour is not new. However, as Englebert 
notes: 
 
Congolese identity, the imagination of Congo and of the Congolese nation, 
serve as ideological foundation for the reproduction of the state, denying 
legitimacy to alternative scenarios and confining political action to 
factionalism for control of the state itself, or to the non-threatening realm 
of ‘civil society’.83 
 
                                                   
81 Interview with Caritas Representative, Justice and Peace Commission, Goma, July 13, 
2009. Similar statements were repeated in multiple interviews. For example: ‘There is no 
state here, no roads, no water, no free education […] Those are the real problems and in 
order to address them, they need to start identifying the local initiatives that are already 
in place [but] we are replaced by everyone’. Interview with Researcher at Pole Institute, 
Goma, July 22, 2010. 
82 Interview with representative from Union Paysanne pour le Developpement Integral 
(UPDI), Bukavu. 
83 Pierre Englebert, “A Research Note on Congo’s Nationalist Paradox,” Review of African 
Political Economy 29, no. 93 (2002): 592. 
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Englebert notes that the co-idealisation of the Congolese nation as both resistance 
against domination and as its reproduction is a discursive battleground in which 
elites finally take the upper hand. Yet the significance of the critique, which 
operates as a way to hold decision-makers into account, and the political 
aspirations it simultaneously projects are not to be disregarded. An image of a 
good chief is projected onto the state, resulting in an inversion of terms, where 
state authority is legitimised in so far it serves the most vulnerable. As Sophia 
Mappa points out, amongst most ethnic communities across Eastern DRC, 
authority is seen as an obligation that the chief cannot avoid. Authority is then 
premised on its value to serve and not for its capacity to command.84 Similarly, the 
image constructed of what the state should be becomes a mirror of what 
subordinate groups wish the state would provide for them.  
 
As such, what Congolese subordinate classes seem to be waiting for is an ideal 
that does not exist in any country in the world. They paint a picture of leaders that 
are caring and honest, delivering the services the population needs, respecting the 
law and protecting citizens.85 All non-elite participants made a link between the 
state and its responsibility for security. In some instances, security was seen as the 
only thing that citizens could not provide for themselves.86 In other instances it 
meant a notion of public service.87 The idealised state as a public service and 
providing social wellbeing is counter-posed to an experience of the state as 
dominating, coercive and extractive. Agendas of political participation, 
development and peace are inextricably attached to it. 
 
                                                   
84 Sophia Mappa, Pouvoirs Traditionnels Et Pouvoir D’Etat En Afrique: L’Illusion Universaliste 
(Paris: Karthala, 1998), 57 –59. 
85 All 75 non-elite participants made a link between the state and its responsibility for 
security.  
86 Interview with FEPSI representative Massica Cafana, Butembo, July 30, 2010. 
87 Interview with Political Science Professor, University of Kinshasa, July 7, 2009; 
Interview with CENCO - Episcopal Conference representative, Kinshasa, July 8, 2009; 
Interview with Representative from l’Eglise de Cristo, Kinshasa, July 25, 2009; Interview 
with RAS Representative Renuveau de l’Accion Syndical, Kinshasa, July 7, 2009; 
Interview with Representative from Centre pour la Gouvernance Participative, Goma, 
July 14, 2009. Additionally participants in the small survey with street sellers in Goma and 
residents in Butembo regarding the payment of taxes also shared this view of the state.    
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D e m o c r a c y  o r  ‘ D é m o n - c r a c y ’ 8 8   
 
Against a practice of democracy that is almost exclusively premised on the 
organisation of presidential and national elections, democracy for non-elites is 
premised on direct participation in decision-making processes. In a workshop for 
secondary school students on ‘participatory governance’ organised by the Group 
Jeremie in Bukavu, it became clear that even if ‘participatory governance’ 
sounded as if it had just been taken from any policy report from the UN 
Department of Political Affairs, it had been appropriated to mean that people 
should participate directly in the decision-making processes of the country.89 This 
included a vision in which people had a say in the management of the country’s 
resources and its distribution. An NGO representative made this point clearly: 
 
The state lives now on the shoulders of people, their agents do not get 
paid… the problem here in the DRC is that democracy is also badly 
distributed. We should have started by local elections… but we have 
started by the presidential elections, legislatives, then provincial, and they 
have stopped there, and from there they take what they need, they share 
power amongst themselves, they take whatever land they need, without 
taking care of their real responsibilities.90 
 
This representative is arguing that having started with local elections rather than 
national would have provided greater accountability, political control, and would 
have solved the institutional problems linked to problems of development. While 
there is a critique of how democracy works at the moment, democracy is being 
                                                   
88 A form of mocking democracy around Kinshasa in Lye M. Yoka, “Kinshasa: Bien-e ̂tre et 
De ́veloppement? Bien-e ̂tre Ou De ́veloppement?,” in Réforme Au Congo (RDC): Attentes et 
Désillusions, ed. Theodore Trefon, vol. 76, Cahiers Africains - Afrika Studies (Paris: Muse ́e 
royal de l’Afrique centrale (MRAC) and L’Harmattan, 2009), 250. 
89 Participant Observation III, “Peace Workshop Organized by Group Jeremie, College 
Alfajiri, Bukavu.” 
90 Interview with Representative of Association pour la Defense de Droits de la Femme 
(ADDF), Butembo, July 30, 2010. Other similar statements were as follow: ‘the resources, 
minerals, forestry, water, etc, have to be distributed equally amongst the population’ 
Interview with Eric Kajemba, diretor of the Observatoire Gouvernance et Paix, Bukavu, 
July 16, 2009. ‘The population must participate in how the public economic resources are 
distributed’ From the summary of a group of students in High School Workshop. 
Participant Observation III, Peace workshop organized by Group Jeremie, College Alfajiri, 
Bukavu. 
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redefined as actual participation from the citizenry. Similarly, Tibère Dunia, from 
the Observatoire Gouvernance et Paix asserted that ‘peace and development have 
to come from the grassroots’.91 Not only is this statement arguing that democracy 
is constructed from the bottom up, it is also arguing that the elite versions of 
peace and development are devoid of democratic and participatory content.  
 
These criticisms are prevalent and have been present at different landmarks of the 
transition after the wars. At the time of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (2002) the 
demand to participate in negotiations of peace meant that peace and democracy 
had to involve all sectors of society. However, many groups participating in this 
event argued that, in the end, the process only facilitated a dialogue between the 
government and the MLC.92 As such, at the time of the March 23 Agreement in 
2009, which put an end to the uprising of CNDP (Nkunda) and other armed 
groups such as PARECO, people complained that what was being created was an 
incentive to take up arms, raid the population and then partake in government.93 
The negotiations included that these groups would become political parties and 
would have the opportunity to partake in power.94 Notwithstanding the 
complexity and challenges of ending armed conflict, these discourses are 
challenging the legitimacy of the actors who partake in government and 
redefining this version of “peace” as a truce of warlords.  
 
D e v e l o p m e n t  
 
Because war and extraction go hand in hand, the idea of development is a site of 
subversion. Against a vision that authorities illegitimately take and distribute 
                                                   
91 An organisation that focuses on denouncing and trying to improve working conditions 
of mine workers and receives international aid for doing research in relation between 
resource-extraction, conflict and armed groups. Interview with Tibere Dunia Researcher 
at the Observatoire Governance et Paix, Bukavu, July 16, 2009. 
92 Irin News, “DRC: Focus on the Results of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue,” April 25, 2002. 
93 Interview with Activity Animator of the League des Organisation de Femmes 
Paysannes de Congo (LOFEPACO) Clarisse Ngemulo, Butembo, July 31, 2010; Interview 
with Representative of Women’s Group Femmes Père Saint-Simon, Bunyakiri. 
94 Programme Amani Leo, “Conference de Goma,” Programme Amani, 2009, 
http://www.amanileo.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=37&Itemid
=15. Accessed 17/04/2010 
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wealth and that they continue a war for further enrichment, the alternative put 
forward is that development implies participation in decision-making at all levels 
and that it needs to come from a grassroots level. As such, alongside the idea that 
wealth stays ‘in the pockets of the politicians’ and that the real wealth of the 
country goes elsewhere, there is the idea that development aid does not arrive, 
and that ultimately for development to be properly carried out, and not just from 
aid agencies, people in the lowest ranks of society have to be involved. This was 
articulated most forcefully by a representative of a peasant cooperative in 
Bukavu.95 Since the mid-1990s The Co-operative felt the logic of development was 
marginalising and disempowering them, something that they continue to see 
presently. The peasant o-operative representative stated: 
 
We realised that those organisations hadn’t changed much, they are within 
a logic of experts, so much a logic of experts that they have forgotten to 
engage the beneficiaries of their projects. So our members did not see 
themselves in those projects, they do them for us, without us?... that’s 
against us! So we wondered, would it not be possible to express and do 
things by ourselves?96  
 
The logic behind the creation of their organisation was a belief in the need to 
engage more fully in the processes of development for development to be 
effective. This has been a constant in the way development projects are read. A 
women’s NGO representative in Butembo also regretted the approach of certain 
INGOs (that she did not wish to cite) affirming that ‘instead of supporting us, they 
replaced us... They execute projects, without engaging the population or the local 
NGOs’.97 This participation is a way of expressing that development has to 
contain a democratic element, where there is direct control over the distribution 
and use of resources.  
                                                   
95 Other interviewees made the same point. E.g. Interview with Researcher at Pole 
Institute, Goma, interview; Interview with Group Jeremie Representative 1, Bukavu; 
Interview with Representative of Association pour la Defense de Droits de la Femme 
(ADDF), Butembo; Interview with Representative from Syndicat de Protection des 
Intérets Paysans, Beni, August 2, 2011. 
96 Interview with Peasant Union Member (no. 151), Bukavu 
97 Interview with Representative of Association pour la Defense de Droits de la Femme 
(ADDF), Butembo. They have accessed International Alert funds. 
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So participation and direct involvement in the decision-making process of 
resource distribution and development projects is the flip side of a critique about 
why development does not move forward and why it is not effective on a 
grassroots level.  The implication, which is also linked to the critique of 
democracy, is that if this reading of development is very similar to the concept of 
good governance in any standard UN policy document, it is subverted. From the 
alternative perspective generated in these critiques, there is an aspiration not just 
to be implicated in all stages of the process and aspects of development, but a 
belief that this is the right way for development to be both legitimate and 
effective.    
 
P e a c e   
 
Peace is one of the most ambiguous and multifaceted ideas in the Congo. Whether 
it is used to critique the shortcomings of post-conflict statebuilding strategies or to 
argue that they have succeeded, peace is defined in multiple ways – with each 
meaning signalling a different political agenda. Autesserre, for instance, has 
demonstrated how international actors, including international organisations, 
diplomatic missions and INGOs view Congo as innately violent.98 This 
assumption has resulted in that peace has been seen as a return to normality, where 
violence was still present.99  
 
However, this is not only an issue for international elites. For Programme Amani, 
‘peace is a very long process’, but it is a process that is settled at the top and 
experienced at the bottom.100 But they are clear that ‘the war is over’.101 This vision 
of non-war/peacebuilding resonates with non-elites’ critique of the post-conflict 
statebuilding strategies, in which peace is about the signature of a ‘peace 
agreement’ and ‘power-sharing’. Defining peace therefore sets the priorities and 
                                                   
98 Séverine Autesserre, “Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International 
Intervention,” International Organization 63 (2009): 249–80. 
99 Ibid., 251. 
100 Programme Amani Leo, “Conference de Goma,” 2.  
101 Interview with Starec - Amani Leo representative, Goma, July 14, 2009. 
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strategies to be undertaken. For those who still confront armed groups, violence, 
poverty, repression and absence of basic services, speaking of peace is 
simultaneously a critique and the voicing of what could be seen as an articulation 
of social justice. Peace is redefined as being both a process and a product of 
political participation, development, personal and collective well-being. What to 
do about it and how to set priorities is a matter of putting non-elite agendas at the 
fore front and of having access to decision-making processes. 
 
In this spirit, a Group Jeremie representative stated: 
We must start from the proposals that are made at the grassroots. What we 
want and what the international community wants is diametrically 
opposed. I am from Kinshasa, here in Kinshasa things don’t go, people 
suffer. Peace has multiple dimensions: social, environmental, economic... 
We are oppressed, exterminated, our women are raped, the children 
abducted by the military… The peace in Congo is a global thing, we need a 
global approach and not a sectored approach like the MONUC does. It 
reforms the justice sector here, it does democracy promotion there… Peace 
here is less important than money. The Congolese context is unique... But 
you, the internationals, you come here with laboratory theories, 
preconceived models and try to impose them on the Congo. No, that is not 
peace.102 
 
The ‘diametrical opposition’ that this interviewee is referring to seems to point 
fundamentally to how peacebuilding is undertaken. Most likely the ‘international 
community’, as he states, would agree that peace has all of those dimensions. 
What he is pointing out is that the strategies enacted are not conducive with 
addressing all of those dimensions, and that contrary to the discourses of peace, 
‘money’ is the underlying real motivation. This is representative of similar 
responses gathered. As an indication, the representatives of all 21 non-
internationally funded NGOs interviewed denied living in a ‘post-conflict’ or non-
war context, linking ‘real peace’ to well-being and political participation. 
Additionally and simultaneously, an alternative agenda is being drafted that 
redefines peace as social justice with multiple dimensions.  
                                                   
102 Interview with Group Jeremie Representative, Kinshasa. 
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S u b v e r t i n g  D i s c o u r s e s  
 
Shared vocabulary does not mean shared meanings. Moreover, the fact that 
authority claims are made as idealised promises offers a fertile ground on which 
to hold authority to account. As Scott notes: 
 
Perhaps the greatest problem with the concept of hegemony is the implicit 
assumption that the ideological incorporation of subordinate groups will 
necessarily diminish social conflict. And yet, we know that any ideology 
which makes a claim to hegemony must, in effect, make promises to 
subordinate groups by way of explaining why a particular social order is 
also in their best interests. Once such promises are extended, the way is 
open to conflict.103 
 
Statebuilding is deployed as a moral necessity to which subordinate classes need 
to consent, wait and suffer the consequences, for this will benefit people in the 
long run. Yet, the same promises are taken literally, holding power to account, 
confronting the ideal that statebuilding paints against the reality on the ground. 
This is not a new critique. Paul Gilroy, for example, has analysed how black music 
has provided a way to confront reality and voice aspirations. He argues that, 
  
The politics of fulfilment practised by the descendants of slaves demands 
that bourgeois civil society lives up to the promises of its own rhetoric and 
offers a means where by demands for justice, rational organization of the 
productive processes, etc, can be expressed.104  
 
These are not necessarily found overtly, but rather as a hidden transcript. Or as 
Gilroy puts it, by ‘opaque means’:  
 
Created under the nose of the overseer, the utopian desires which fuel the 
politics of transfiguration must be invoked by other deliberately opaque 
means. This politics exists on a lower frequency where it is played, danced 
and acted, as well as sung about.105 
 
                                                   
103 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1990), 77. 
104 Paul Gilroy, Small Acts: Thoughts on the Politics of Black Cultures (London: Serpent’s Tail, 
1993), 134. 
105 Ibid. 
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The inversion of statebuilding’s vocabulary, as discussed below, illustrates ways 
in which statebuilding is delegitimised, critiqued, held to account and counter-
reacted with the articulation of how things should be. The ‘subtle’ difference in 
meaning, as Toulabor notes, ‘consists, grosso modo, in doubling the usual or 
conventional sense of the words in giving them second semi-hermetic 
meanings’.106 The state becomes a ‘good king’ with the capacity for salvation that 
effectively works for the poor; democracy means direct participation in the 
decision making processes at all levels; development means wealth distribution 
and access to its management; and peace encompasses a sense of tranquillity, free 
from threats of violence and linked to a sense of justice. They are a transformation 
of power’s own idealisation of its capacities, together with the political aspirations 
of subordinate classes. The creation of ideals represents not only the negation of 
the present order, but also the formulation of an alternative one that premises 
well-being on access to decision making, local control and wealth distribution.  
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
In Congo there is no social-political movement that resists statebuilding. Rather, 
there is a consistent pattern of acts that challenge the actions and inactions of 
national and international elites. At the discursive level, this entails contrasting 
lived experience to the promises of a state as rightful authority and service 
provider, which while not being rejected as an ideal, is rejected in practice. Elite 
discourses imply a morality that lays a claim to legitimate authority, while 
exempting them from responsibility for failure. For non-elites discourses are ways 
of voicing discontent, while remaining pragmatic both about possibilities and 
repression. They are relevant because they are part of a shared critique. The fact 
that these discourses are found everywhere and resonate across a broad construct 
                                                   
106 Comi Toulabor, “Jeu de Mots, Jeu de Vilains: Lexique de La Dérision Politique Au 
Togo,” in Le Politique Par Le Bas En Afrique Noire, ed. Jean-François Bayart, Achille 
Mbembe, and Comi Toulabor, Nouvelle Édition (Paris: Karthala, 2008), 99. Italics in the 
original.  
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of ‘Congolese identity’ and ‘Congolese nation’, indicate how everyday resistance 
operates as a covert strategy, attempting to escape repression while mitigating its 
effects and advancing one’s own political agenda.  
 
What this chapter has illustrated, beyond how the discursive arena is fertile 
ground for everyday resistance, is the ambivalence of these discourses as 
platforms on which both domination and resistance operate. Statebuilding and its 
promises are claims of authority in spite of failure. These same claims are then 
used as a subversion strategy to deny the morality of authority and to articulate 
alternative political aspirations. In Scottian terms, post-conflict statebuilding 
creates public and hidden transcripts where rhetoric, image and expected 
behaviour are enacted for different audiences, following a shared vocabulary, 
including that of state authority, democracy, development and peace. The 
relationship between different actors to these ideals is enacted as a ‘pose’; that is, 
there is a level of ambiguity in how public images of authority, deference and 
obedience are exercised. Discourses are significant because statebuilding 
strategies are established and justified as a form of inevitable good. The moral 
authority of the good state and its subsequent delivery of peace, democracy and 
development facilitate a way to justify a reality of war, poverty and impunity. As 
such, an obvious starting point from which to look for resistance is the idealism 
on which promises are made. These powerful promises seem to be enough to 
request the population to keep waiting, obeying, paying taxes, providing for 
themselves and facing repression for raising concerns.  
 
The implication in this respect is that post-conflict statebuilding’s discourse is 
premised on people’s aspirations and not the other way around. To this extent, 
statebuilding is hardly Western or liberal, but it is better seen as an example of the 
discursive practice of authority, and more as a populist discourse. Demands to 
participate in the decision-making processes, to be protected, heard and to enjoy 
the wealth of their own country are seemingly modest demands. However, these 
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demands are idealised in such a way that they pose a fundamental challenge to 
statebuilding practices. In a context of limited capacities for political action, the 
discursive is a fruitful site of resistance, although, as seen in the following 
chapters, not the only one.  
 
The following chapters will complement many of the discourses surveyed in this 
chapter. The hidden transcript runs through Mai Mai militias, justifications for tax 
evasion and in the undertaking of a myriad of creative survival strategies. 
Underlying these tactics is a process of delegitimisation, of advancing alternative 
agendas and raising political aspirations. These discourses and the political 
alternatives embedded within them are realised not just in mechanisms of critique 
and the voicing of aspirations, but in the processes of denial and mitigation 
undertaken for navigating a context of violence and poverty.  
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Chapter 6 
Everyday Violence and Mai Mai Militias  
 
 
What would you do if the state was a man? I’ll kill him1 
 
 
 
1.  From Words to Weapons 
 
The fact that everyday resistance is based on the lack of direct confrontation and 
on practices undertaken to attract the minimum amount of repression does not 
necessarily mean that it is without violence. The transition from discourse to 
violence reflects the argument of this thesis: that resistance is shaped by the 
political context in which it is embedded, practices respond to such context and 
do not define resistance per se.  
 
Three aspects need to be analysed in order to understand the role of violence as a 
tool of resistance: the context of war, the motivations subordinate classes have to 
support or create armed groups, and how extensive this popular support is. 
Whereas the first part of this thesis analysed the context of war, this chapter will 
focus on the other two aspects (motivations and support). These two aspects 
account for the defining elements of resistance including the intentional 
denial/mitigation of claims and the agenda advancing on the part of non-elites. 
They also show different gradients in the practices. It will be shown that attacking 
the military or other armed groups is a denial of the state’s claim on the 
distribution of violence and a form of mitigating statebuilding-related violence. 
                                                   
1 Majority response in 2005 World Bank survey in ‘DRC, economic sector, Governance 
and Service Delivery’ cited in Theodore Trefon, Parcours Administratifs Dans Un Etat En 
Faillite: Récits Populaires de Lubumbashi (RDC) (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007), 27. 
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This is a claim-regarding overt practice of resistance. Conversely, using Mai Mai 
militias to provide security is a self-regarding practice. The violence generated by 
the context is used and transformed as a self-serving mechanism to counter 
precisely the effects of violence. In so far as the state is experienced as a form of 
predation and insecurity, subordinate classes’ motivations have at their core the 
rejection of state authority and statebuilding agendas. They strive to provide 
security and protection, while advancing agendas of political participation, 
representation and land. However, these motivations are not static, neither is the 
support subordinate classes give to these militias. The support is contingent and 
changing. Mai Mai militias tend to be formed from specific ethnic groups, or those 
who are closely related. This does not mean that all members of an ethnic group 
or of a particular area would support the local militia.  
 
Mai Mai militias pose multiple challenges to an account of resistance. In order to 
address these challenges and to analyse violence as part of the everyday practices 
of resistance, the chapter first provides a brief background of the context, history 
and variety across different militias. The following two sections discuss the 
motivations and support for these militias. The focus of this chapter is on Mai Mai 
Yakotumba (Fizi) and Simba Mai Mai/ MRS (Bunyakiri) as cases displaying an 
anti-government agenda (having less government interference as a result), as 
cases that have confronted the effects and policies of statebuilding, and whose 
relation to their constituencies illustrate the dynamics and motivations for 
popular support. These militias do not represent a continuous popular uprising or 
a model for ethical resistance. They are an effect of war. They are ultimately 
representative of the heterogeneity in the practices of resistance. 
 
 
2.  Important considerations about the context 
 
Although there was skirmishes, especially throughout the 1990s, Chapter Two 
already exposed how both the AFDL war and RCD/Africa’s World War were the 
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defining moment in which subordinate classes’ armed mobilisation took place. 
The fact that the AFDL war was conducted under the guise of a national liberation 
movement and led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila succeeded at reviving the Mai Mai 
historical sentiment of fighting against oppression and colonial conquest.2 In 
addition to being a member of Lumumba’s cabinet, Kabila had fought with 
revolutionary leader Pierre Mulele, who led one of the biggest revolts against 
Mobutu and was a driving force for the creation of the Simba and Mai Mai 
popular militias in the 1960s.3 During the 1996 and 1998 wars, Mai Mai militias 
generally fought on the side of the government to repel the RCD rebellion and the 
Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian invasions. They however remained 
autonomous from the army, and since the transition most groups have developed 
an anti-government stand. The Mai Mai militias consider themselves as inheritors 
of a tradition of resistance that dates back to the struggle against colonialism and 
beyond. In a note from a Mai Mai Padiri combatant, this historical tradition of 
resistance is explained as follows: 
 
                                                   
2 Kevin Dunn, “A Survival Guide to Kinshasa: Lessons of the Father, Passed Down to the 
Son,” in The African Stakes of the Congo War, ed. John F. Clark (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), 55. 
3 Young notes that Mulele’s rebels ‘eliminated a central government presence for some 
months in the northeast quad- rant of the country and some parts of the Kwilu district in 
the southwest’. Young, “Contextualizing Congo Conflicts,” 20; Ndaywel è Nziem, 
Nouvelle histoire du Congo, 496 – 499. Ibid., 496 – 499.  
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We cannot stop thinking and we cannot stop sending the calls to the 
mystery that surrounds us everywhere; that is, we cannot stop resisting 
evil. It is within that approach that the Movement of Mai-Mai resistance 
was born, which has its distant origins in the domination of man by man 
[…] Already in 1481, the king Nzinga Panju was opposed to Portuguese 
occupation in his kingdom; in 1682, the prophet Chimpa Vita resisted 
against the implantation of foreign power in the kingdom of Kongo, she 
was burnt alive. In 1942, in the kingdom of the Bahunde, where the 
Bakumu live, in Masisi, in one of the hunters villages, in Ntoto; Mandayi 
told Sindikiza that his brother Yusufu Kitawala in the cultural struggle 
against foreign occupation had a formula that protected men against all 
attacks from bladed or fire weapons by the enemy. In 1951, Simon 
Kimbangu died in exile, Patrice Lumumba and Pierre Mulele and recently 
Desire Kabila, killed 16/01/2001 for having brandished and lifted the 
spirit of a profound love for the homeland.4 
 
Hence the AFDL rebellion awakened a latent revolt. However, the subsequent 
militarisation has set peasants on the path to a permanent state of armed conflict.5 
This permanent conflict is not because rural classes have since maintained a 
popular uprising, but because the war has made them primary targets. The RCD 
rebellion with the Rwanda/Uganda/Burundi invasion in 1998 - 2003, the 
insecurity provoked by the different CNDP uprisings and the ongoing presence of 
foreign and national armed groups represent a continuation of an agenda of self-
defence and liberation. The strategies undertaken for surviving and confronting 
war are inseparable from the strategy of joining armed militias as a way of 
‘reacting against their marginalisation and exclusion’.6 The choice of means is 
largely conditioned by the historical moment in which actors are embedded. 
 
Nevertheless, there is great variety amongst Mai Mai militias. While some groups 
abide by a firm code of conduct and are attached to an agenda of liberation and 
social justice, others have also turned into predators of population (E.g. Rasta).7 
                                                   
4 Unknown Author, “Brevet Historique Sur Le Mai-Mai [Document Attached to the 
Interview Mayi-Mayi Réalisée Par Anouk Devillé - Signed by Fidèle, Bunyakiri, 2005],” 
ed. Anouk Devillé (Royal Museum of Africa, Tervuren, 2005), 1. 
5 Fraternel Divin Amuri Misako, “Les Milices Maï-Maï Au Maniema (août 1998-2003): Un 
Mode d’Affirmation Politique Des Masses Rurales?” (Master Dissertation, Political 
Science, Université de Kisangani - Faculté des Sciences Sociales, Administratives et 
Politiques - Département des Sciences Politiques et Administratives, 2008), Royal 
Museum of Africa, Tervuren, Belgium. 
6 Vlassenroot, “Violence et Constitution de Milices Dans L’Est Du Congo,” 150. 
7 UPDI and LPI, Violence et Insecurité à Nindja/Kaniola: Le Phénomène Rasta, ed. Union 
 207 
The example of Cheka in Walikale, mentioned in Chapter Two, is a primary 
example. They carried out the attacks in July-August 2010, which included 
systematic rape and other crimes in 15 villages in Walikale in alliance with the 
FDLR. Mai Mai Cheka was born out of a power-struggle for the control of the 
largest Cassiterite mine in the DRC, which had been given to FARDC/CNDP after 
the March 23 agreements, in 2009, in detriment of the FARDC/ex-Mai Mai 
brigade of Colonel Samy that had controlled it since.8 Other militias, as already 
seen, have been successfully co-opted into state/elite networks to be used for 
proxy wars between the DRC and Rwanda.9 The popular character of some 
militias is therefore challenged by the fact that militias ally with and pursue elite 
agendas. Yet this is not static. There is an important element of unreliability and 
contingency, meaning that Mai Mai groups are likely to betray these elites and 
form new groups to confront new sources of insecurity.  
 
Despite these complexities, the history and current dynamics in many Mai Mai 
militias make them representatives of the ways in which rural classes have used 
or joined these militias as a form of resistance to the effects of domination. The 
deepening of the statebuilding strategies during the 2009-2011 period has implied 
the militarisation of the Kivus, of which Mai Mai militias have been the primary 
targets. The terms set for Mai Mai demobilisation, the ongoing context of war and 
poverty, and the FARDC being deployed as a representation of state authority, are 
all sources of distrust and rejection of state authority. Additionally, during this 
period, the CNDP has consolidated administrative and military positions along 
the Kivus fuelling Mai Mai nationalist sentiments. The role of the Mai Mai as 
                                                                                                                                                   
Paysanne pour le Développement Intégral and Life and Peace Institute (Uppsala: Life and 
Peace Institute, 2009).  
8 UN Group of Experts, Final Report of the Group of Experts S/2010/596, para. 34 - 43. 
9 E.g. The DRC government through PARECO, and Rwanda through the now defunct 
Mundundu 40, the new alliances made between Cheka and Raia Mutomboki, added to 
the ongoing links with CNDP. See: UN Group of Experts, Report on the DRC (2008), para. 
100 – 103; Hans Hoebeke et al., “‘Monsieur Le Pre ́sident, Vous N’avez Pas D’arme ́e...’ La 
Re ́forme Du Secteur de Se ́curite ́ Vue Du Kivu,” in Réforme Au Congo (RDC): Attentes et 
Désillusions (Tervuren: Muse ́e royal de l’Afrique centrale (MRAC) and L’Harmattan, 
2009), 132.  
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militias of self-defence and vehicles of political participation has become even 
more prevalent. They provide a way to defend and advance agendas of security 
provision, control of land and local political authority. This last element 
permeates Mai Mai ideology and represents the long-term aspirations of the 
Congolese peasantry. 
 
 
3.  Motivations 
 
Most studies of Mai Mai militias have identified marginal conditions of living, 
poverty and general disenfranchisement as the main reasons for combatants to 
join them.10 However, in the DRC this cannot be separated from the context of 
war. What Misako calls the ‘militianisation’ of life means that self-management 
and security provision, in the context of relative state absence as well as the 
pursuit of political agendas and aspirations through armed groups is an ‘effect’ of 
the context of violence.11 Violence becomes a form of political participation where 
power is asserted through violence. In the war context of the DRC, Acker and 
Vlassenroot argue, violence is the language through which many young 
marginalised Congolese demonstrate their distrust of state institutions, resist the 
conditions in which they live in and aim at a more egalitarian order.12 Joining an 
armed group could be generally inscribed in the dynamics of contestation of the 
state since these conditions of living tend to be seen as the consequence of an 
unjust social order in which the state is directly responsible or complicit.  
                                                   
10 Emmanuel Lubala Mugisho, “L’e ́mergence D’un Phe ́nome ̀ne Re ́sistant Au Sud-Kivu 
(1996-2000),” in L’Afrique Des Grands Lacs: Annuaire 1999-2000, ed. Stefaan Marysse and 
Filip Reyntjens (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000), 209 – 210. Mugisho adds historical factors as 
important for the emergence of these militias; See also: Koen Vlassenroot, “The Promise of 
Ethnic Conflict: Militarization and Enclave Formation in South Kivu,” in Conflict and 
Ethnicity in Central Africa, ed. Didier Goyvaerts (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of 
Languages and Culture of Asia and Africa, 2000), 94 – 96. 
11 Fraternel Divin Amuri Misako, “De La ‘Démocratisation’ de La Violence à La 
‘Milicianisation’ Des Jeunes: (Re)Découvrir La Rationalité Du Désordre,” in Des Conflits 
Locaux à La Guerre Régional En Afrique Centrale. Le Congo-Kinshasa Oriental 1996 - 2007, ed. 
Alphonse Maindo Monga Ngonga (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007), 21. 
12 Franck Van Acker and Koen Vlassenroot, “Les «mai-̈mai ̈» Et Les Fonctions De La 
Violence Milicienne Dans l’Est Du Congo,” Politique Africaine no. 84 (2001): 104 and 106. 
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These dynamics of state contestation, which as Prunier argues, come both ‘from 
above and from below’, added to a context of war, signal that uses of violence can 
be read as furthering elite or personal agendas.13 The political meaning granted to 
these motivations is a defining factor in analysing popular classes as politically 
minded or as politically manipulated.14 Amongst the widespread scholarly 
research that Mai Mai militias have received, there have been different 
approaches.15 Some authors have seen these militias as a form of rural political 
mobilisation, motivated by a rejection of the status quo, and aspirations for social 
justice.16 Others have seen these militias as a personal self-promoting strategy, 
where any discourse of social justice and grievances is just a façade.17 Following a 
Scottian framework, it is argued that self-centred individual and collective 
motivations come together in the everyday politics of non-elites. These militias 
represent an arena where patterns of resistance to statebuilding unfold. This 
                                                   
13 Prunier, “Violence et Histoire En Afrique,” 4. 
14 This includes academic and policy literature, both international as well as Congolese. 
See section ‘Social Justice as a Façade?’ below. CCAP representative coordinating the first 
dialogue between Banyamulengue and Babembe stated: ‘the problem was not the 
capacity of the communities to live together, but the influence of the war, the flow of 
weapons into the area as well as the political discourses that some governments and 
politicians started to play with’. Interview with Representative CCAP, Uvira, August 28, 
2010. 
15 For example: Vlassenroot, “Violence et Constitution de Milices Dans L’Est Du Congo”; 
Acker and Vlassenroot, “Les «mai ̈-mai ̈» et Les Fonctions de La Violence”; Alphonse 
Maindo Monga Ngonga, Des Conflits Locaux À La Guerre Régionale En Afrique Centrale: Le 
Congo-Kinshasa Oriental 1996-2007, Mémoires Lieux de Savoir (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007); 
Amuri Misako, “De La ‘Démocratisation’ de La Violence à La ‘Milicianisation’”; Amuri 
Misako, “Les Milices Maï Maï Au Maniema”; Kasper Hoffmann, “Militarised Bodies and 
Spirits of Resistance. Armed Governmentalities and the Formation of Militarised 
Subjectivities in South Kivu/DR Congo: The Case of the Mai ̈-Mai ̈ Group of General 
Padiri” (Master Dissertation, International Development Studies Roskilde University, 
2007); Luca Jourdan, “Being at War, Being Young: Violence and Youth in North Kivu.,” in 
Conflict and Transformation in Eastern DR Congo, ed. Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy 
Raeymaekers (Gent: Academia Press, 2004), 157 – 176. There are also a series of NGO 
reports and monographs. For example: Hélène Morvan, Reinventer Le Quotidien: La 
Cohabitation Des Populations Civiles et Des Combattants Maï Maï Au Kivu (Östervåla: Life 
and Peace Institute, 2005); ADEPAE et al., Au-delà Des “Groups Armés”: Conflits Locaux et 
Connexions Sous-Regionales L’Exemple de Fizi et Uvira (Sud-Kivu, RDC) (Uppsala: Life and 
Peace Institute, 2011). 
16 Vlassenroot, “Violence et Constitution de Milices Dans L’Est Du Congo”; Acker and 
Vlassenroot, “Les «mai ̈-mai ̈» et Les Fonctions de La Violence”; Amuri Misako, “Les 
Milices Maï Maï Au Maniema”; Hoffmann, “Militarised Bodies and Spirits of Resistance.” 
17 Alden, Thakur, and Arnold, Militias and the Challenges of Post-conflict Peace; ADEPAE et 
al., Au-delà Des “Groups Armés.” (Although this monograph remains ambiguous, also 
accounting for both socio-political factors). 
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section reflects, firstly, on the rejection and distrust of the state as markers of 
intentionality. Two examples from Fizi and Bunyakiri illustrate this point.18 The 
section moves on to discussing how these motivations are linked to community 
protection and security as important underlying agendas, and land and political 
representation as important aspirations.  
 
3.a. Rejection and Distrust 
 
F i z i  –  Y a k o t u m b a  
 
Mai Mai Yakotumba was created in 2007 but has a significant rebel history.19 Its 
core members fought in the various brigades that were part of the second biggest 
Mai Mai structure in South Kivu, led by General Daniel Dunia, during the 1998-
2003 war. General Dunia’s troops resisted both Kabila’s AFDL and the RCD 
rebellion. Not only were both of these uprisings seen as an invasion, Dunia’s 
resistance was the only form of protection against the brutal violence with which 
these uprisings were undertaken. Yakotumba’s and the previous Dunia’s troops 
were composed mostly of Babembes, who are the majority ethnic group in the 
area of Fizi.20 The Babembe take pride in claiming that they resisted Mobutu for 
over 25 years arguing that they ‘vehemently hate all dictatorial political systems 
that violate fundamental human rights’.21 The same articulation has been seen in 
                                                   
18 For an earlier analysis of these two areas see Vlassenroot, “Violence et Constitution de 
Milices Dans L’Est Du Congo.” 
19 This is the area from where Che Guevara attempted to organise a revolutionary 
movement with Laurent Kabila. Speaking of the latest development of this group, Judith 
Verweijen pointed out that ‘some of the “brigades” forming part of the larger Mai Mai 
movement built by Yakutumba in 2007/2008, operated de facto as entirely autonomous 
groups, and later left the movement. It concerns the: the 5th brigade under Assani 
Ngungu Ntamushobora, the 6th under Aoci Behekelwa and the 7th under Mulumbathe 
5th brigade under Assani Ngungu Ntamushobora, the 6th under Aoci Behekelwa and the 
7th under Mulumba’. Judith Verweijen, “Personal Communication - FRF/Yakotumba,” 
September 10, 2012, emphasis in the original. 
20 Babembe literally means Bembe people. 
21 Author Unknown, “Territoire de Fizi Ou Le Pays de Babembe” (Document provided by 
Mai Mai Yakotumba Combatant, September 3, 2010), 16. 
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the increasing distrust towards the government throughout the transitional 
period.  
 
When the transition in 2006 brought in the different plans for Mai Mai 
demobilisation and reintegration, not all of General’s Dunia’s troops were 
successfully disengaged. Refractory elements, especially William Amuri 
Yakotumba, rejected the demand to redeploy his troops out of Fizi. Several 
military and political factors were in place for this decision.22 Militarily, the 
Banyamulengue Mai Mai group operating in the high plateaus of South Kivu, the 
FRF, did not reintegrate into the army and pushed for the constitution of the 
territory of Minembwe (affecting a part of Fizi’s territory).23 The Rwandan-
supported CNDP had already rejected reintegration, continuing its military 
activity, which entailed several uprisings. Finally, many Yakotumba members felt 
disillusioned with the DDR process.24 Politically, the Mai Mai movement created 
out of the 1998 – 2003 war was marginalised from the power distribution of the 
1+4 formula. They reproached the government for not acknowledging that 
successful resistance against the rebellion and foreign occupation in the East had 
been due in large part to their actions. Additionally, the electoral results were 
contested. These military and political concerns went hand in hand with the Mai 
Mai criticism about the lack of social and economic development. As such, 
according to a member of Mai Mai Yakotumba, in 2007, they understood that ‘the 
DRC kept being open to foreign intervention’ and, although this had turned from 
a military to a political strategy, they had ‘judged it necessary to create the maquis 
and oppose the government’.25  
                                                   
22 Especially the period immediately preceding the 2009 – 2011 as described in Chapter 
Two. 
23 Banyamulengue literally means people from Mulengue in Swahili. Traditionally, this 
term has been given in South Kivu to people associated with the wave of migrations from 
Rwanda and Burundi in the early 20th century, who settled in the high plateaux of the 
Minembwe massif in between the territories of Kalehe, Mwenga and Fizi, and who tend 
to be of a Tutsi ethnic background.  
24 Interview with Demobilised Combatant from Mai Mai General Dunia, Baraka, 
September 3, 2010; Informal Conversation with Yakotumba members, Bukavu, August 8, 
2010. 
25 Interview with Mai Mai Yakotumba Combatant, Baraka, September 3, 2010. 
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Interpreting the Fizi conflict within patterns of statebuilding and resistance is not 
straightforward. The dynamics of conflict in Fizi have been read as one of ethnic 
conflict, challenging discourses about social justice as being manipulated by local 
elites. The so-called autochthonous/ allochthonous conflict became even more 
salient in the context of Mobutu’s Zairianisation and Bisengimana’s policies 
concerning land, political representation and nationality.26 Currently in Fizi, there 
is an important ethnic element in the connection between, on the one hand, 
Yakotumba’s perceptions of Kabila as a Rwandese or as a facilitator of Rwandan 
economic expansionist agendas in Eastern DRC; and, on the other, the fact that the 
Banyamulengue community are of Tutsi origin, having been supported at crucial 
times by the CNDP and Rwandan officials.27 This is added to the fact that FARDC 
deployment in the area was ex-CNDP after the March 23 agreement.28 This 
discursive connection illustrates a rejection of state and foreign agendas, and the 
hailing of traditional modes of political authority and representation. Even if we 
were to equate ethnic claims with political ones, or problematise the boundaries 
between the categories of ethnic identity and the political,29 we would still see that 
discourses of communal identity are simultaneously discourses of resistance and 
liberation.30 This does not mean necessarily an ethical modus operandi. This is the 
challenge violence brings. Mai Mai Yakotumba have been accused of killing, 
stealing cattle and hassling Banyamulengue herders.31 Violent actions need to be 
seen as conditioned (not justified) by a broader context of war, where there is a 
                                                   
26 As seen in Chapter Two this included the transferring of Belgian and white-owned land 
to selected Rwandan/Tutsi who were made Congolese nationals after the changes in the 
nationality law.  
27 UN Group of Experts, Final Report of the Group of Experts S/2008/773 (New York: UN 
Security Council, December 12, 2008), para. 65 - 66. 
28 Interview with FARDC Colonel in Baraka (no. 129). See below the discussion on 
civil/military relations in Baraka under section 4.c.  
29 Thanks to Judith Verweijen for pointing this out. The extent to which ethnic identities 
are fixed or not is also debatable. E.g. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict 
(California: University of California Press, 2000); K. Anthony Appiah, “Ethnic Identity as 
a Political Resource,” in Explorations in African Political Thought: Identity, Community, 
Ethics, ed. Teodros Kiros (New York, London: Routledge, 2001), 45 – 53; Kanchan 
Chandra, “What Is Ethnic Identity and Does It Matter?,” Annual Review of Political Science 
9, no. 1 (2006): 397–424.  
30 Hoffmann, “Militarised Bodies and Spirits of Resistance,” 24. 
31 Interview with Banyamulengue Sheep Herder, Baraka, September 4, 2010; ADEPAE et 
al., Au-delà Des “Groups Armés,” 62.  
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vicious circle of armed conflict and arms trafficking, and where the existence of 
several government projects (DRC and Rwanda included) is also an important 
element.  
 
B u n y a k i r i  -  S i m b a - M a i  M a i  
 
A similar dynamic is found in Bunyakiri. It was the headquarters of the ‘biggest’32 
Mai Mai group in the two Congo Wars under General Padiri.33 Although in the 
first instance his troops fought the AFDL uprising because it was largely seen as a 
foreign affair, this developed into a fragile agreement to later make Padiri 
Secretary General of the resistance movement, which was attached to the FARDC 
(FAC at the time).34 Hoffmann points out that Padiri had significant influence 
since the Mai Mai had become the de facto government in many rural areas that 
were under their control.35 As such, the exclusion of Mai Mai representation from 
the 1+4 formula had a special impact amongst Padiri’s supporters. Many 
interpreted this as the exclusion of rural population and of foreign intervention in 
Congolese affairs. Although Padiri was able to reintegrate, the politics of a 
government that they see as continuing policies of exploitation with no real 
development of the economy or peace has been a fundamental factor for new 
militias to form in Bunyakiri.36 Similarly, there are those who have reintegrated 
into the army but whose sons continue as members of the Mai Mai militias in their 
villages (Eg. Colonel Samy operating in the areas of Numbi, Nyawarowa, 
Katasoko, Busurunki).37  
                                                   
32 Vlassenroot, “Violence et Constitution de Milices Dans L’Est Du Congo,” 138.  
33 His real name is Joseph David Karendo Bulenda. 
34 According to Kasper Hoffmann: ‘In 1999 the Mai-Mai were officially recognised as a 
part of the Congolese army by decree of the then president Laurent-Désiré Kabila, but 
their operations on the ground were not coordinated by Kinshasa’  in “Militarised Bodies 
and Spirits of Resistance,” 77.  
35 Ibid., 78.  
36 This feeling was transmitted by all 16 Mai Mai combatants interviewed in formal 
conversations and in 5 informal conversations. According to APC representative and ex-
Mai Mai Padiri combatant, in the case of Bunyakiri this has been felt particularly amongst 
Mai Mai leaders like General Ziralo, General Kirikicho, Major Janvier and Colonel Sadam. 
Interview with APC Representative, Bunyakiri, August 20, 2010; Interview with 
Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant, Kinshasa, July 10, 2009.  
37 Interview with APC Representative. 
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An ex-Mai Mai Padiri combatant expressed the view that, after being 
disappointed by the government after the transition, his group saw it necessary to 
renew the group Simba Mai Mai/ MRS in 2006.38 Not all members broke with the 
government immediately. Indeed, between 2008 and 2009 he served as a STAREC 
demobilisation officer for 18 months.39 However, he regretted that at the time of 
the interview in August 2010, he had only been paid for 3-months. Likewise, 
when his demobilisation team (formed of other ex-Mai Mai combatants) had to go 
on a demobilisation mission, STAREC gave them a vehicle without petrol and 
they received no stipends or food for their journey.40 This combatant has since 
stopped believing in the programme, questioning whether the government was 
really committed to demobilisation, and has rejoined the Simba Mai Mai/MRS.41  
 
The examples of Mai Mai Yakotumba in Fizi and Simba-Mai Mai/MRS in 
Bunyakiri illustrate that a discursive critique and a denial of state legitimacy can 
take the form of armed struggle too. These two groups represent trends across 
Mai Mai groups in the Kivus.42 Statebuilding is read largely as an elite affair, 
which maintains the exploitation of rural areas while placing them under military 
rule. As a form of rejection and mitigation against this, militias become a tool of 
opposition and a source of security and protection provision.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
38 Interview with Simba Mai Mai/ MRS Combatant, Bukavu, August 5, 2010.  
39 May May Simba/MRS - Axe Bunyakiri [Authors anonymised], “Rapport de Mission de 
Service Effectuee a Bunyakiri En Territoire de Kalehe” (Programme Amani Sud-Kivu. 
Structures Provinciales de la C.T.M.P.S., January 6, 2009), 4 – 5. 
40 Interview with Simba Mai Mai/ MRS Combatant. 
41 The issues raised by this combatant were shared by the other 16 Mai Mai combatants 
interviewed formally and in the 5 informal conversations. In conversation with a DDR 
and a STAREC officer, although not directly acknowledging lack of payment, challenges 
for funding were raised as a challenge for demobilisation. Interview with UPN-DDR 
Officer, Goma, 21 2010; Interview with Starec - Amani Leo representative, Goma, 
interview, July 20, 2010.  
42 Interview with Demobilised Combatant from Mai Mai General Dunia; Informal 
Conversation with Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant. 
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3.b. Protection and Security  
 
The militarised context pushes population into a defensive stand. Militias are 
what Scott calls a ‘state effect’ – a ‘symbiosis’ of state expansion, state violence and 
its rejection.43 Popular militias are a response to militarised rule, land seizures and 
a context of increased insecurity. Security is a constant concern not only for Mai 
Mai militias but also for the population where they belong.44 Although, as 
explored below, popular support for Mai Mai militias is not generalised across 
time and space, and although many times militias have become a menace for 
population, whenever this support is granted it responds largely to a protection 
concern. Seeking protection through the Mai Mai militias is a denial of state 
authority and of legitimacy to the post-conflict statebuilding discourse of 
protection. Seeking protection from the Mai Mai militias is done as the least bad 
option and could be seen as a self-regarding claim.45 The denial/mitigation of the 
violence generated by statebuilding is not the intention as much as individual or 
collective survival. Yet it is undermining of statebuilding’s authority.  
 
A professor from the Catholic University of Bukavu argued that the war has made 
popular classes use the Mai Mai militias not only to defend themselves from 
foreign armed groups but also from the state.46 For this professor, this is in the 
context of the clash between customary and state land policies. In Congo there are 
two land ownership systems. Customary law makes traditional chiefs guarantors 
of land access to those that belong to his chiefdom. Administrative law provides 
access to land through a land title given by the state’s central administration. If 
property is in question, whoever has a land title is the one who is recognised as 
owner. The result is that this privileges rich owners who can have access to a land 
title.47 So popular militias in this case confront the state because ‘it behaves as a 
                                                   
43 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 26. 
44 Scott too notes that rural rebellions have been many times underpinned by a concern for 
security: Scott, Seeing Like a State, 37. 
45 Morvan, Reinventer Le Quotidien, 95 – 98.  
46 Interview with Professor from the Université Catholique de Bukavu. 
47 Koen Vlassenroot, “Households Land Use Strategies in a Protracted Crisis Context: 
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foreign power and not a power that is at the service of the population’.48 The 
implication is that in the context of war, Mai Mai militias are also used to protect 
population from land expropriation.  
 
F i z i  
 
For Fizi residents, the major threat they face is the FARDC, even if Mai Mai 
Yakotumba has also committed abuses against them.49 Interviewees in Baraka 
criticised Yakotumba, but they felt closer to the Mai Mai.50 This is exemplified by 
the way a member from a NGO articulated her complaint about the negative 
effects of the war on women. She stated: 
 
We continue with all those armed groups… here, there are the regular 
army, the government and the militias that are in the forest, they continue 
to make violence. The women, they go from Baraka to Kafolo for example 
to get provisions, and they [the mentioned armed groups] continue the 
violence. They all put a problem for us, the FDLR, the FRF, the Mai Mai 
and the army… The Amani Leo came here to get the FDLR that are located 
at 250km from here. But instead of going there, they have stayed here. 
They have started in Makobola towards Fizi centre, there were no FDLR 
there! Yesterday the FDLR attacked the post of FARDC in Nyange, in the 
border between Fizi and Kalembe… now, the Amani Leo have come to do 
what? … They should go.51  
 
Another NGO worker stated that the solution for the ongoing insecurity in the 
area was for all militias to demobilise or reintegrate into the army. However, he 
recognised that for the ordinary people it was the army and not the militias that 
created the main problem. He stated: ‘if you ask the population, what do you 
                                                                                                                                                   
Land Tenure, Conflict and Food Security in Eastern DRC” (Conflict Research Group 
University of Ghent, 2006). 
48 Interview with Professor from the Université Catholique de Bukavu. 
49 Illegal taxation, cattle theft, especially of Banyamulengue farmers, and recruitment of 
children, although denied by Mai Mai Yakotumba members. UN Group of Experts, Final 
Report on the DRC (2011), para. 184 – 187; 657 and 663. 
50 During the fieldwork period in 2010 in particular, 12 NGO representatives were 
interviewed in Baraka. This interpretation was reflected in four interviews with 
MONUSCO staff and one UNHRC staff working in Baraka, as well as two officers 
working from Uvira and Bukavu, but with direct responsibility of the Baraka-Fizi region. 
Multiple informal conversations with residents, local NGOs, INGOs and MONUSCO 
operating in Baraka also supported this view. See also: Alden, Thakur, and Arnold, 
Militias and the Challenges of Post-conflict Peace, 116 – 117.  
51 Interview with Women’s NGO FEDI representative, Baraka, September 1, 2010. 
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want to be done here? They are going to say: that the Amani Leo go. The 
militarisation of the area is a problem’.52 He then continued to argue that the 
reason for the militarisation was the resistance found in the area.  
 
There is a lot of resistance, there are a lot of weapons that do not come 
from the government and that do not submit to the orders of the 
government. Yes the presence of Amani Leo is a problem for the 
population, even more than the Mai Mai, but I think the problem of the 
continuation of the Mai Mai is an ideological and ethnic problem.53  
 
These words summarise many of the arguments that have been put so far forward 
in this Chapter. The reliance on popular militias to provide security, added to a 
sentiment that sees the state either as directly responsible for the situation or not 
doing anything about it, illustrates the patterns in which resistance takes place. 
Even if this is seen, as the interviewee does, from the perspective of ideology and 
ethnic confrontation, the reflection illustrates the popular perception that the 
FARDC is a menace whereas the Mai Mai militias are the least bad option. Those 
who are not engaged directly in the militias regret the militarisation of the 
environment. However, they generally feel more threatened by the FARDC and 
protected by the Mai Mai, with whom they have a more equal relationship. After 
all, Mai Mai combatants could be members of their families, including husbands 
and sons.   
 
B u n y a k i r i  
 
In Bunyakiri, residents have been threatened by both the FDLR and the FARDC. 
In August 2010 (during fieldwork), the FARDC brigade stationed there had been 
able to reduce the abuses committed against the population by the previous 
brigade. However, population were still threatened by the special operations at 
the time, the Amani Leo troops.54  The cycle of FDLR activity linked to the Amani 
Leo presence had a direct impact on displacement out of cultivation areas and 
                                                   
52 Human Rights NGO Representative (no. 127). 
53 Ibid. 
54 See Chapter Two for the specifics of MONUC/MONUSCO support of these operations. 
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hence on impoverishment. Bunyakiri had turned into a sort of island of refugees 
because the FDLR had the area almost completely surrounded. There were often 
incursions into the town and many residents had been displaced or could not 
access cultivated lands.55  
 
Speaking in Maibano, the Secretary General from the Chefferie of Buloho pointed 
out several local conflicts related to land and to customary leadership. However, 
for him, the existence of local armed groups was a direct consequence of the 
persistence of the FDLR in the region.56 A local human rights organisation stated 
that the local Mai Mai groups had their own interests, but they were combating 
the FDLR and they were not there to abuse the civilian population.57 Similarly, a 
representative from an NGO of women survivors of rape stated the situation of 
threat that women faced generated by all armed groups. However, she regretted 
that: ‘We have to live with the Amani Leo and we never know with which 
intentions they are coming’.58 The sentiment she transmitted was that whereas 
they had an opportunity to react, even if minimal, against the Mai Mai and the 
FDLR, in front of the army they felt defenceless.59  
  
The solution against the FDLR brought by the government and supported by 
MONUC/MONUSCO was for Bunyakiri residents, as for many in other Eastern 
regions of the DRC, more a curse than a blessing. Secretary General of the Buloho 
chiefdom spoke against the FARDC strategies to fight the FDLR: ‘Kimya II has 
been a disaster, they were there to hunt the residents, their fields and their crops, 
                                                   
55 Action Pour la Paix et la Concorde, Analyse de Contexte Du Territoire de Kalehe (Bukavu: 
Life and Peace Institute, April 2009). 
56 Interview with the Secretary General of the Buloho Chiefdom (Bunyakiri), Maibano, 
August 19, 2010. 
57 Interview with Voix de sans Voix Human Rights NGO Representative, Bunyakiri, 
August 21, 2010. 
58 Interview with AFIP Representative - Association de Femmes pour les Initiatives de 
Paix, Bunyakiri, August 29, 2010. 
59 A local human rights NGO representative said that normally complaints about the army 
could go to the customary security council. However, as the military could participate, the 
extent to which residents could voice their concerns about the army were limited. 
Interview with APDHUD Representative - Action pour la Protection des Droits Humaines 
et le Développement Communautaires, Bunyakiri, August 20, 2010. 
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they pillage, they destroy everything... Then they brought Amani Leo, which has 
done exactly the same, the population does not have any hope anymore’.60 This 
administrator summarised a widespread sentiment amongst residents in 
Bunyakiri, Bulambika and Maibano.61 Most political representatives whether 
administrative or customary expressed their regret against an army that was ‘a 
disorder’, while pointing out that ‘we cannot speak about it’.62  
 
The situation had a direct impact on the perception residents had of MONUC/ 
MONUSCO. Residents kept wondering what the role of MONUC/MONUSCO 
was if the FDLR’s positions were known and yet not targeted. Not surprisingly, 
rumours of UN collaboration with the FDLR, as seen in the previous chapter, 
spread easily amongst residents. In a focus group with the youth of Bunyakiri, 
most participants stated that they could not understand why the FDLR was 4 km 
away from the village without the UN doing anything, a situation that has already 
been like that for approximately 15 years. ‘Today’ – one of them said – ‘we cannot 
go to Bukavu as we used to without feeling threatened; our parents long ago 
stopped cultivating their lands because they have been occupied by the 
Interahamwe’.63 As such, they said, ‘this situation has made people furious and as 
a result, some have taken up the machetes, others the rifles, in order to constitute 
themselves as militias of popular defence’.64 The motivation here to create a militia 
is protection from the FDLR, but it goes hand in hand with the need to cultivate 
and get on with their life. That is, the desire for normality, to put it in Hibou’s 
                                                   
60 Interview with the Secretary General of the Buloho Chiefdom (Bunyakiri). 
61 The interview took place in the form of public audience attended by 15 people. These 
words resonated amongst the group. This was the general sentiment gathered across the 
fieldwork in the area of Bunyakiri, including Maibano and Bulambika. It included 14 
interviews with residents, five of which had a similar public setting. This was also 
reflected in two focus groups, one of 5 people with local youth, and another with 8 
women.  
62 Informal Conversation with Notables at Maibano, Bunyakiri, August 19, 2010; Interview 
with Voix de sans Voix Human Rights NGO Representative. 
63 Focus Group Young People Bunyakiri. 
64 Ibid. Note that Raia Mutomboki has displaced FDLR as of March 2012 and has now 
troops in Walikale. JMAC Officer, Personal Communication, “Security Update - CNDP,” 
August 30, 2012; David Zounmenou and Naomi Kok, “A Growing Humanitarian Crisis in 
Eastern DRC,” ISS News, May 29, 2012, http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php?ID=1490 
Accessed 1/09/2012. 
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terms, is not to ‘accommodate’ to the situation of insecurity and army rule, but to 
act upon it even if by violent means.  
 
Overall, the search for protection and security is a pattern in all Mai Mai groups. 
What it shows is that the need for protection is not generated by a lack of state 
authority, but from the ways in which state authority is asserted. Although some 
Mai Mai groups illustrate the engagement of the civilian population into forms of 
state violence, the cases seen above, especially through the provision of protection 
and security to civilian population, illustrates patterns of resistance in 
statebuilding contexts. This becomes more clearly visible when explored 
alongside the aspirations embedded in Mai Mai ideology.    
 
3.c.  Aspirations and Agenda Advancing 
 
Rejection of, and protection from, government agendas, war and statebuilding do 
not stand alone. Rather they are embedded in a broader system of ideology, 
religious beliefs and political aspirations. These include the reaffirmation of forms 
of local political authority, political participation and land distribution. Although 
these refer explicitly to the current context, they resonate with broader historical, 
religious and cultural understandings in Congolese rural areas. The Mai Mai 
militias and their leaders, as previously noted, contextualise themselves in the 
specific traditions of resistance against domination that have taken place in the 
DRC. Thus these agendas are better seen as aspirations, which simultaneously 
overlap with and reinforce elements of rejection and protection. 
 
Mai Mai militias articulate their agendas around a “nationalist ideology”, aiming 
for the development of the DRC. It is based on a common reference across the 
DRC where a “patriotic mentality” means acting for the well-being of all 
Congolese. Although vague, it reflects the construction of ideas of social justice 
that were explored in the last Chapter. The articulation of specific political 
agendas comes with a religious armour that links cultural understandings of 
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justice with historical traditions of oppression and liberation.65  In an analysis of 
the Mai Mai groups of the Uvira-Fizi region, the underlying prophetic and 
religious element of these groups is noted: 
 
Fizi also has numerous mistico-religious movements, where the leaders 
present themselves as local “gods”, porters of messages about the 
liberation and emancipation of the population. At the heart of that society, 
security-wise in crisis, that messianism of war and self-liberation is alive 
within the “armed groups” where the core of their prayers devote 
themselves to prophecies of victory. Those links with the “armed groups” 
make of those religious movements spaces of popular mobilisation.66 
 
This study illustrates that popular aspirations for liberation are expressed through 
religious and mystical discourses, sifting through Mai Mai ideology and practice. 
Important to Mai Mai ideology is the discourse of “hatred” against the 
“foreigners”. As noted in many previous studies of Mai Mai militias, this needs to 
be understood not as ethnically-based, but rather as a construction of the 
“unpatriotic element” as a symbol of oppression.67  The resurgence of militia 
activity in the Kivus, and elsewhere, maintains these ideas.68 For instance, a 
representative of Mai Mai Yakotumba notes:  
 
We were convinced by our brothers in the government that it was a 
nationalist government, but in reality, we have realised after the transition 
that it is a government that just wants to capitulate the Congo, they are the 
thieves that want to leave the country in the mess it is now, only to keep 
pillaging… it has come in by the window, it is not even a legitimate 
government.69  
 
Against this, a discourse of emancipation is simultaneously created by critiquing 
the government for pursuing foreign agendas and by locating themselves in a 
                                                   
65 Amuri Misako points out how prophetic religion, the syncretism of Mai Mai militias is 
part of its radicalisation. Amuri Misako, “Les Milices Maï Maï Au Maniema,” 127.  
66 ADEPAE et al., Au-delà Des “Groups Armés,” 85.  
67 Lubala Mugisho, “L’e ́mergence D’un Phe ́nome ̀ne Re ́sistant Au Sud-Kivu (1996-2000),” 
214 – 216; Vlassenroot, “Violence et Constitution de Milices Dans L’Est Du Congo,” 130 – 
133.  
68 Milita activity is also seen in other provinces like in Ituri, Maniema, Equateur and Bas 
Congo. Mbembe argues this is across Africa. See Mbembe, Sortir de La Grande Nuit: Essai 
Sur l’Afrique Décolonisée, 196 – 221. 
69 Interview with Mai Mai Yakotumba Combatant.  
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historical tradition of resistance: ‘We want sustainable peace, not a peace that goes 
in three seconds… not a peace in servitude, a peace of subjection… that we will 
never allow… our kids here are resisters by birth’.70 The government represents 
for them this ‘fragile peace’ understood as an order of submission. They are hence 
convinced that ‘sustainable peace’ is only achievable through ‘conquest and not 
through dialogue’. The exercise of conquest is not only aimed at Baraka or Fizi, 
but is national in scope. ‘We want a responsible government for the Congo that 
respects human rights, brings a prosperous society, where we do not speak of war 
any more, where there is no discrimination, with the aid of god’. As he continued 
to elaborate, the ‘national’ ideal is formulated not as a project of expelling the 
foreigners, but as eradicating oppression and implementing development and 
political participation.  
 
In a similar way, the reconstitution of Mai Mai Simba/MRS was justified as a 
critique against the government for being ‘foreign’ and as a need to realise 
population’ aspirations:  
 
Kabila is not Congolese, they say he is from Hewabora, but we know he is 
not… he does everything opposite of what people want… the teachers are 
not paid, the army is not paid, the public servants are not paid… there is 
social injustice… our politicians are liars, thieves, corrupt politicians that 
go against the constitution.71  
 
The constitution encapsulated to a certain extent popular aspirations and explains 
the popular support it received: ‘People voted “yes” to the constitution, their 
aspirations are seen there, they want justice, schools, good public service…’ These 
aspirations are well captured by what this combatant called ‘the movement’. Mai 
Mai Simba/MRS aims to: ‘establish a government that is based on the ideals of 
socialism, which promotes civic and moral education and endogenous political 
and economic development for the restoration of Congolese dignity’. So although 
Mai Mai militias have a local attachment and an ethnic component, their ideals go 
                                                   
70 Information in this paragraph comes from: Ibid.  
71 This and the following quotes come from: Interview with Simba Mai Mai/ MRS 
Combatant. 
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beyond these identities. In fact, the way in which they speak of liberation and a 
national agenda has been interpreted as a façade to justify criminal activity. 
 
S o c i a l  J u s t i c e  a s  a  F a ç a d e ?  
 
Some scholars, policy makers and NGO researchers have argued that these 
motivations are just a façade. For example, Alden, Thakur and Arnold argue that 
the continuation of militias in Congo follows an impulse for personal enrichment 
where Mai Mai’s discourses of social justice are a masquerade without 
substance.72 Others argue that the real drivers for these militias are historical 
conflicts over land and customary leadership.73 Some Mai Mai themselves have 
criticised the mushrooming of militias as an opportunistic, self-serving activity 
devoid of political significance.74 They criticise this as ‘hillism’,75 articulated as a 
mockery of those who defend their own ‘hill’ and do not have a broader political 
programme for the ‘nation’. It is also in this vein that the ‘true’ and ‘false’ Mai 
Mai, the ‘warrior’ against the ‘adventurer’76 comes in. The difference is articulated 
between those who ‘truly’ protect the population under a patriotic agenda and 
those who do not.  
 
These aspirations illuminate the patterns in which resistance unfolds. Although 
existing land and ethnic-based conflicts could have caused tensions and even 
violence at earlier times, this was far from the devastating war that has been 
taking place since 1996. Additionally, as advanced in the first two chapters, one of 
the distinct characteristics of the DRC conflict is the challenge to the notion of the 
local as a distinctive sphere from national and international. Rather it is their co-
constitution that unearths how different agendas are intertwined in a fluid 
                                                   
72 Alden, Thakur, and Arnold, Militias and the Challenges of Post-conflict Peace, 15.  
73 Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales”; Autesserre, “Local Violence, National Peace?”. 
74 14 Mai Mai combatants interviewed spoke of this divide but the others thought these 
were false accusations coming from the government, the MONUC/ MONUSCO and the 
INGOs. 
75 From the French colline (small hill), they speak of ‘collinisme’. Interview with Simba 
Mai Mai/ MRS Combatant. 
76 Opportunistic, motivated for self-gain or self-swaggering. 
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changing context. At times they are the most reliable security provider, even 
against the FARDC, yet others are predatory and impose authoritarian rule. They 
also represent the militarised masculine version of a struggle for social justice. 
Amidst this, it is not possible to ignore that many combatants blame state agendas 
for the militarised context and the subsequent political, social and economic 
underdevelopment. Despite these fluid boundaries, the motivations underpinning 
Mai Mai militias and their support illustrate that resistance is defined by a context 
of domination. Even though, examining more carefully to what extent popular 
militias’ have a popular membership is imperative to analysing them as tools of 
everyday resistance in a statebuilding context. 
 
 
4.  The Popular Element in the Mai Mai Militias  
 
This thesis has been arguing that everyday resistance is better conceived as an 
activity of subordinate groups. Not only is this a closer application of the Scottian 
framework, but it also allows for narrowing the scope of the concept. 
Additionally, the practices of statebuilding generate violence and extraction, 
creating conditions of domination, war and poverty. This context and the way 
subordinate groups confront it make Scott’s framework insightful. Nevertheless, if 
Mai Mai militias have been used as proxies by different governments, elite 
factions and MNCs for their own agendas, it is imperative to elucidate the extent 
to which Mai Mai militias are tools for popular classes’ resistance and the extent 
to which this popular element is represented in their membership.  
 
Additionally, when popular support is granted, it is neither unconditional nor 
generalised in any one village. It is more accurate to speak of a tendency to rely on 
these militias to confront the army, other armed groups and advance security, 
land and political participation agendas. The fact that some of these militias 
represent another source of violence and domination against the population 
makes this popular support contingent. Violence remains a minority response in 
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comparison with discourses and survival. Yet it is another tool of a broader 
catalogue by which subordinate classes confront everyday forms of domination. 
This section gives a brief account of popular support through membership and 
goods provisioning. It then provides a more extensive discussion through the 
analysis of government and UN strategies to break the solidarity between 
civilians and militias.  
 
4.a. Membership 
 
In 2002 the UN estimated the number of Mai Mai combatants active in the two 
Kivus to be between 20,000 and 30,000.77 In 2009, a report by HRW calculated that 
there remained around 22 Mai Mai groups with up to 12,000 combatants.78 
However, as stated in an unpublished report, a UN DDR action in 2010 was 
expecting to demobilise 28,375 Mai Mai troops only from South Kivu.79 Although 
voluntary membership is contested through practices of abduction, their members 
are largely young men, coming from the rural, unemployed, and unschooled 
sectors of the population, living with few economic resources.80  
 
Additionally, although Mai Mai militias’ leaders and original instigators are the 
more educated, military and notables of particular villages, these are hardly 
representative of the elite.81 They do not represent state-based authority or large 
                                                   
77 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, First Assessment of the Armed Groups Operating in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2002/341 (New York: UN Security Council, April 5, 
2002), 13. 
78 Human Rights Watch, “You Will Be Punished”: Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo (New 
York: Human Rights Watch, 2009), 4, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/12/14/you-
will-be-punished Accessed 07/03/2010.  
79 Situation Synthétique des opération de désengagement et intégration/Sud Kivu, April 
14 - 23 June, MONUC DDR Unpublished Report cited in ADEPAE et al., Au-delà Des 
“Groups Armés,” 69. Only 1,749 attended. 
80 Abduction and forced recruitment  have been reported in: Human Rights Watch, 
Killings in Kiwanja, 18; UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, Children and Armed Conflict 
(New York: UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, March 26, 2009), para. 39. 
For an overview of membership see: Vlassenroot, “Violence et Constitution de Milices 
Dans L’Est Du Congo”; Lubala Mugisho, “L’e ́mergence D’un Phe ́nome ̀ne Re ́sistant Au 
Sud-Kivu (1996-2000)”; Maindo Monga Ngonga, Des Conflits Locaux À La Guerre Régionale 
En Afrique Centrale. 
81 An exception is the FRF in Minembwe, which was formed out of a split in the military 
 226 
landowners. Rather, they should be seen as what Scott calls ‘translators’ or 
‘vehicles’, whose more educated position enables them to play as 
representatives.82 In a study focused on the militias of the Maniema province, 
Amuri Misako argues that ‘the resurgence of Mai Mai responds to a reinforcement 
of influential ethnic groups and their elites rather than their replacement or 
insertion of subordinated ones’.83 However, for Misako this did not affect the fact 
that Mai Mai militias were a ‘mode of political participation of rural masses’.84 
Misako also points out that the upsurge of popular militias corresponds to a 
reorganisation of the rural political space.85 As seen in the works of Wolf and also 
Scott, peasants’ political struggles and political aspirations need to be analysed in 
light of their reliance on their own authorities and their reticence towards 
outsiders, whether they are foreign or nationals.86 The overwhelming perception 
gathered in interviews from representatives of subordinate groups, civil society, 
the government, the army and UN officials is that there is substantial overlap 
between the civilian population and Mai Mai militias.87 This idea, it must be 
stressed, is expressed throughout the militias’ non-elite membership. However, it 
is also the fact that non-military active population provide key support for the 
continuation of these militias. 
 
4. b.  Provisioning: Weapons, Food, Protection and 
Information  
 
Another area where popular support is visible is in the provision of different 
goods and services for the militias to operate and survive. Although militias may 
                                                                                                                                                   
leadership. Still many disillusioned unemployed youth in the area may have joined ever 
since. Interview with FARDC General (no. 146), Bukavu, interview; See also: ADEPAE et 
al., Au-delà Des “Groups Armés,” 47 –48. 
82 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 296 and 309. 
83 Amuri Misako, “Les Milices Maï Maï Au Maniema,” 13. 
84 Ibid., 3.  
85 Ibid., 13.  
86 Cf. Eric R Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 
1971); Scott, Weapons of the Weak. 
87 This was the view gathered from 13 government and local administration officials, 5 
military officers, 10 UN officials and 2 UNHCR representatives. The desolidarisation 
strategies discussed below also support this view. 
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receive incentives from deputies in Kinshasa, the bulk of their support in terms of 
weapons, ammunition, protection and information comes from subordinate 
classes.88 Many of these militias have also settled around mining areas and are 
now part of networks of resource plundering and parallel exploitations.89 
However, this is further evidence of the overlap between the civilian population 
and popular militias. At times resources are exchanged or services are paid 
fostering relations of mutual support and reciprocity. These networks of support 
and exchange represent a great challenge not only to the authority of 
statebuilding but also to the DDR(RR) programmes that are at the heart of it.90    
 
W e a p o n s  
 
Significant funding has been put towards a programme of disarmament by which 
for every weapon, the government pays $100 in Kinshasa and $50 everywhere 
else.91 However, these incentives have been subverted by the availability of 
weapons and their ongoing use. Many interviewees and informal interlocutors 
declared how easy it was to buy a Kalashnikov for $30.92 The same is true of the 
programmes of demobilisation, finding it very difficult to persuade combatants to 
                                                   
88 Two MPs spoke of these dynamics as an obstacle for ending the conflict. Interview with 
Deputy for Goma, Kinshasa, September 23, 2011; Interview with Deputy for Masisi, 
Goma, August 4, 2010. 
89 E.g. Yakotumba in the Mukera, Ngandja and Milimba mines in Fizi. ADEPAE et al., Au-
delà Des “Groups Armés,” 119. 
90 UN Security Council, Resolution 1291 (2000) and subsequent mandates. 18 December 
2003, President Kabila issued three presidential decrees: 
Government of the DRC,  Décret n° 03-
041 portant Création du Comité Interministériel chargé de la Conception et de l’Orientation en ma
tière de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion ;  Décret n° 03/042 relatif à la Commission N
ationale de Désarmement, de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion;  Décret n° 03/043 du 18 décembre 2
003 portant création, organisation et fonctionnement du comité de gestion des FDDR. All publish
ed in  Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo, vol. 1, 2004. Available from: ht
tp://www.glin.gov/ Accessed 28/08/2012 
91 The World Bank created a multi-million donor trust for Disarmament and Reintegration 
that in 2009 had invested $275. World Bank, DDR in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
Programme Update (Kinshasa: World Bank, September 2009), 1.  
92 This was available information in all fieldwork locations. It was confirmed by the two 
demobilisation officers interviewed, all Mai Mai and ex-Mai Mai combatants and it was 
raised in detailed in several interviews including Interview with Masisi Territory 
Administrator, Masisi, September 14, 2011; Interview with MONUSCO JMAC Officer (no. 
156), Kinshasa, September 23, 2011. 
 228 
leave the armed groups, even with substantial economic benefits.93 The problem 
civilians’ resistance to disarmament poses to DDR programmes is that authorities 
believe their weapons can then be handed over to Mai Mai combatants.94 Mai Mai 
Yakotumba members narrated how they make use of solidarity kin and religious-
based networks to access the weapons held by villagers.95 Other Mai Mai 
combatants also recognised their use of family and kin networks to take 
advantage of the trafficking in conventional weapons and to gather bamboo and 
gunpowder to fabricate their own guns.96 
 
The Mai Mai do not only rely on these networks to gain access to weapons. They 
also steal them from the army. One strategy they claim to use is magic formulas 
that protect them from dying which enable them to attack the army to collect their 
arms. There are several formulas. A traditional one, giving the Mai Mai their 
name (Mai or Mayi means water in Swahili and Lingala), is based on the 
combatants bathing in water blessed by prophet Kimbangu. This bathing protects 
them from the bullets, which at the moment of impact are turned into water. 
Another formula is the fabrication of a potion called ‘dawa’, ‘Formula 115’ or 
‘grigri’.97 Once this potion is swallowed, it provides protection from death. Being 
under the effects of these formulas, they would attack a battalion, killing its 
members or making them flee, and then collect their weapons.98  
  
                                                   
93 Interview with Demobilised Combatant from Mai Mai General Dunia; Interview with 
representative from Comité de Paix, Baraka, September 1, 2010; Zoë Marriage, “Flip-flop 
Rebel, Dollar Soldier: Demobilisation in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Conflict, 
Security and Development 7, no. 2 (2007): 281 – 309. 
94 Interview with DDRRR Officer, Uvira, August 28, 2010; Interview with Assistant 
Administrator to the Civil Authority Representative, Baraka, September 1, 2010; Human 
Rights NGO Representative (no. 127). 
95 Informal Conversation with Yakotumba members. 
96 Informal Conversation with Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant; Interview with 
Mai Mai Yakotumba Combatant; Interview with Demobilised Combatant from Mai Mai 
General Dunia. 
97 Dawa is a generic name across territories but the others are also used in Bunyakiri and 
Uvira respectively.  
98 Interview with Mai Mai Yakotumba Combatant; Informal Conversation with 
Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant; Interview with Simba Mai Mai/ MRS 
Combatant. 
 229 
Another source of weapons and ammunition is illicit trafficking, mainly of 
minerals. Mai Mai Yakotumba is a case in point. Being in control of part of the 
coast in Lake Tanganika gives them access to Tanzania and Burundi. They have 
been known to capture boats.99 They also control mines whose profit is used to 
purchase armaments.100 However, the transport and hiding of many of these arms 
is carried out through networks amongst the civilian population and not 
necessarily amongst combatants.  
 
F o o d ,  p r o t e c t i o n  a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n  
 
Although weaponry is fundamental for the continuation of the militias and their 
military successes, they rely on other services such as food, protection and 
intelligence for survival and strategic planning. Militias tend to be hidden in the 
forest although some of their members live in the villages. Most of the time they 
do not have the resources to set up self-sustaining camps. So for instance, an NGO 
representative who was active in training women in self-defence in the territory of 
Kabare (South-Kivu) states that ‘their enemy were the FDLR and the FRF… the 
Mai Mai [General Padiri] just came here to eat and get provisions’.101 Although 
this would be typical of a family connection, the support network seems to be 
much greater.  
 
Speaking about Fizi and Yakotumba, an NGO researcher noted that the strongest 
support Mai Mai had were from their own clans and families. ‘It is from here that 
they take what they need: provisions, munitions, information…’102 However, 
support has to be bigger than the clan by necessity. The interviewee noted that 
‘they also have their networks from which they can send a messenger even to the 
                                                   
99 Interview with Representative CCAP, Uvira; Evariste Mfaume, Rapport Synthese de 
Monitoring (Baraka: Solidarité de Volontaires pour l’Humanité, September 13, 2010); 
ADEPAE et al., Au-delà Des “Groups Armés.” 
100 UN Group of Experts, Final Report on the DRC (2011), 4 –5 ; Interview with MONUSCO 
JMAC Officer (no. 150), Bukavu, September 8, 2010.  
101 Interview with Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant, Kinshasa. 
102 Human Rights NGO Representative (no. 127). 
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heart of the army to gather information’. Different services are sought ranging 
from the closer environment of the family, to the clan, to the ethnic group to the 
broader political, military and economic networks and other Mai Mai militias. As 
will be noted in the next chapter, these networks and exchanges are also part of 
strategies of everyday survival against poverty. 
 
A FARDC Colonel in charge of Fizi had no doubt about the solidarity and overlap 
between the Mai Mai and the population. He pointed out firstly that Kimya II had 
failed because of a lack of population support, and that ‘in fact they [the 
population] kept passing information to the armed groups’.103 For this FARDC 
colonel, it was clear that ‘what makes the whole thing complicated is the 
population’, adding ‘what enrages me when I see how a soldier is killed is to 
think, how many houses has he passed by to arrive there? Why has he been 
hidden? Why hasn’t the population given any information?’104  
 
On the whole, Mai Mai’s strongest and most reliable support is the population. 
Gradients of support are likely to develop from the family to the clan to the ethnic 
communities and then onto broader networks. This support, even if it cannot be 
generalised across the whole of the population, represents a challenge to the 
statebuilding mission. A main obstacle to inter-community dialogue and local 
peacebuilding strategies is Mai Mai’s conviction that the laying down of arms 
means subjection to the rule of the army. Evariste Mfume from the NGO 
Solidarites de Volontaires pour l’Humanité summarised it succinctly: ‘If the 
communities were to get together and say no to the armed groups, the problem 
would be finished… but each sees in their armed group their protector’.105 In 
Masisi, Bunyakiri, Fizi and Baraka, fieldwork illustrates not hatred against other 
communities but mainly fear of the army, the FDLR and other armed groups.106 
                                                   
103 Interview with FARDC Colonel in Baraka (no. 129). 
104 Ibid. 
105 Interview with SVH Director Evariste Mfume, Baraka, September 16, 2011. 
106 Interview with Representative CCAP, Uvira; Interview with Banyamulengue Sheep 
Herder, Baraka; Interview with Women’s NGO FEDI representative; Interview with Fizi 
SOCICO representative, Baraka; Interview with Father Thèofile Gakunzi, Bukavu, August 
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Peace is highly desired but there is a general distrust that the government and the 
military can provide it. Significantly, the breaking of ties between the civilian 
population and their armed groups lies at the heart of many UN and government 
statebuilding strategies.   
 
4. c.  Desolidarising popular classes and Mai Mai militias  
 
The popular support given to Mai Mai militias becomes a visible fact when the 
government and the MONUC/MONUSCO invest significant resources to 
‘desolidarise’ the population from the Mai Mai militias and ‘sensitize’ ‘civil 
society’ to ‘accept state authority’, ‘lay down the arms’ and ‘live pacifically with 
the army’.107 UN Civil Affairs for instance has these ‘sensitization’ exercises as 
part of its mandate for supporting state authority restoration.108 ‘Since 2011’ 
MONUSCO Civil Affairs claims to have ‘reached about 7000 people in 17 different 
localities in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri District’ in a ‘sensitization 
campaign on the rights and responsibilities of the administrative authorities and 
local population’.109 STAREC has done their own ‘sensitization forums’ 
throughout those provinces with the support of civil society organisations.110 
STAREC sessions are done by civil society representatives because ‘people do not 
                                                                                                                                                   
26, 2010. 
107 These words are part of the technical vocabulary of used by MONUC/MONUSCO and 
STAREC. See: MONUSCO Civil Affairs, “What Do We Do?,” United Nations, 2012, 
http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=10708&language=en-US Accessed 
15/10/2012. esp. Q.1 and 3; Pothin Ahoussi, “Forums de Sensibilisation Des Populations 
Au STAREC: Le Top Départ a Beni,” STAREC Programme, Amani Leo, November 23, 
2009, 
http://www.amanileo.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=133&catid
=3&Itemid=2 Accessed 02/09/2011. ‘Sensitisation’ activities were already attempted by L. 
Kabila after the 1996 war and at beginning of 1998 war. ADEPAE et al., Au-delà Des 
“Groups Armés,” 39 – 40.  
108 MONUSCO Civil Affairs, “Restoration and Extension of State Authority,” United 
Nations, 2012, http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=10714&language=en-
US Accessed 27/03/2012. 
109 MONUSCO Civil Affairs, “From Resolving Conflict to Restoring State Authority, Civil 
Affairs Understands the Reality on the Ground” (MONUSCO, 2012), 7, 
http://monusco.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=sbKJDmllJWQ=&tabid=10715
&mid=13709&language=en-US Accessed 14/12/2012. 
110 As example: Ahoussi, “Forums de Sensibilisation Des Populations Au STAREC.” 
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have any trust in the political class’.111 Their aim is to convince people to stop 
supporting the armed groups, to stop guarding their weapons, and to ‘pacifically 
co-habit with the army’.112 
 
A n  E x a m p l e  f r o m  B a r a k a  a n d  F i z i  
 
One such ‘sensitization’ activity is the workshop organised by MONUC Civil 
Affairs in Fizi and Baraka (South Kivu) to ease the sour relationship between civil 
society (population) and the military.113 The purpose of this workshop is best 
described in the words of the Civil Affairs officer in his opening speech: ‘there 
needs to be collaboration and cohesion between society and power in order to 
render results towards peace and stability’.114 This officer is voicing not only the 
perception that people’s solidarity with the armed groups is a real impediment for 
the statebuilding mission, but the extent to which resistance is successful in 
denying and subverting state agendas. 
 
The significance of the Fizi territory has already been noted. Aside from the tense 
relations that have developed between the Tutsi-Banyamulengue population and 
the Bembe population, the March-23 agreement, by which CNDP elements 
integrated into the army and were spread throughout the Eastern provinces were 
also felt in this region. This military deployment fed the theories claiming that 
Rwanda would be infiltrating the army in their attempt to annex a part of the 
Kivus. Many of these reintegrated CNDP elements are of Tutsi origin and include 
many who only speak Kinyarwanda.115 This situation, in addition to the military 
                                                   
111 Interview with SOCICO - North Kivu representative, Goma, July 23, 2010. [Official 
Structure for Civil Society organisations] Also in Interview with Sofie Kikongo Kisimila, 
Member of Justice and Peace Commission, Masisi, July 24, 2010; Interview with President 
of Civil Society - Masisi Centre, Masisi, September 12, 2011. 
112 Interview with SOCICO - North Kivu representative, Goma. 
113 Participant Observation XIV, UN Civil Affairs Sensitization Workshop between the 
Military and Civil Society, Fizi and Baraka, September 3, 2010.  
114 Civil Affairs Officer, Opening Speech Sensitization Workshop between the Military and 
Civil Society, Fizi, September 4, 2010. 
115 Kinyarwanda is a Rwandese language. Some of these elements reintegrated in the army 
do not speak the official languages of the provinces (Swahili and French), let alone the 
local languages. I was able to observe this during my field trips in Baraka, Fizi and Masisi.  
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strategy of scattering an utterly under-resourced and undisciplined army 
throughout the territory, has created a low intensity war between the population 
and the military. As previously noted, this strategy entails those military elements 
living with and off the civilian population. Although many brigades engage in 
multiple commercial activities which complement local commercial networks, 
residents are forced to provide the military with labour, food, housing, sex and 
information, while the military are a source of violence and predation.116  
 
As such, this so-called ‘sensitization workshop’ illustrated that the military is 
perceived as an enemy by the civilian population, and that the military and state 
authorities needed “civil society” in order to establish state order. The military 
were complaining that people would side more with the Mai Mai militias than 
with them, that people would not give them information, that the population was 
hostile to them and that they did not respect authority.117 NGOs present at the 
workshop complained about the military’s human rights abuses, the fact that they 
did not speak their language and that they were treated like criminals, because of 
the perceived support to their own local militias.118 One of the UN officers 
moderating the sessions at one point explained what role each was supposed to 
play: ‘the army, the police and civil society all have a role to play in society under 
legality’; for example, he said, ‘the teachers must teach and not take up arms’; ‘the 
soldiers must protect the population and not steal from them’.119  
 
This workshop demonstrated two interesting factors. One was that the civil 
society/population component, represented by local NGOs and religious 
                                                   
116 Some of these were raised in the workshop. It came in several interviews and has been 
reported extensively as dynamics in civil/military relations. E.g. Interview with Women’s 
NGO FEDI representative; Interview with Representative of Women’s Group Femmes 
Père Saint-Simon, Bunyakiri; Human Rights Watch, “You Will Be Punished”: Attacks on 
Civilians in Eastern Congo, 3; Free the Slaves, The Congo Report: Slavery in Conflict Minerals 
(Washington: Open Square Foundation, June 2011), 13. 
117 Participant Observation XIV, UN Civil Affairs Sensitization Workshop between the 
Military and Civil Society. 
118 Rape, arbitrary arrests, extortions, theft and abuse of authority. 
119 Participant Observation XIV, UN Civil Affairs Sensitization Workshop between the 
Military and Civil Society. 
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organisations had links to the Mai Mai militias. Two days after the workshop, 
members of this “civil society”, in an attempt to show good will, passed 
information to the commander of the area to notify them of an incoming attack on 
one of their battalions. Similarly, despite the imbalance of power, it was 
demonstrated that people retained a substantial amount of control over what 
takes place on the ground. Army and state administrators had much to gain from 
the withdrawal of civilian support to militias and they could obtain concrete 
compromises from the population: pass information, stop making donations, stop 
giving food and shelter to the militias. However, there were not similar 
commitments on the part of the military and the state administrators: stop abuses, 
rape, robbery, abuse of authority and illegal tax collection. Still, the frustration of 
the military and administrators was that without the help of the population they 
could not get rid of the armed groups.120 
 
The experience of the workshop also reveals “civil society” as an ambiguous 
partner for statebuilding strategies. This ambiguity has been established by 
research conducted both within policy and academic circles.121 Mac Ginty, for 
instance, has also shown the thin line in Northern Ireland between “civil society” 
and “armed groups”.122 This is important because whereas civil society is seen as a 
pillar for liberal peace in order to legitimise a project of statebuilding based on 
good governance; civil society’s role in this situation is not straightforward. It can 
act as an antagonist rather than a partner.  
 
 
 ‘ P e o p l e  a r e  i n t o x i c a t e d ’  
 
Examining the efforts to ‘desolidarise’ civilian population from the Mai Mai 
militias illustrate the non-elite support to these militias and the motivations for 
                                                   
120 Interview with FARDC Colonel in Baraka (no. 129); Interview with FARDC Officer in 
Baraka (no. 162), Baraka, September 17, 2011. 
121 DFID, The Politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens and States - Findings from Ten Years of DFID-
funded Research on Governance and Fragile States 2001–2010 - A Synthesis Paper, 56– 57; Mac 
Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, 15 – 17 and chapter 8. 
122 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, 194. 
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doing so. Firstly, it is possible to establish a significant overlap at the non-elite 
level of the population, even if the boundaries of class, resistance and domination 
are blurred and complicated in the DRC context. Second, these efforts highlight 
underlying elite assumptions. Precisely because these militias represent the 
subordinate groups in society, far from making an analysis of people’s political 
agendas, it is not uncommon to observe how DRC government representatives, 
UN officials and NGO members think of the Mai Mai as ‘the poor’ or ‘marijuana 
smokers’ or just remnant ‘embers’.123 The reasons explaining popular support for 
Mai Mai militias from these analyses can be summarised in the statement of an 
NGO officer: ‘people are intoxicated’.124 People’s support of the militias is seen as 
the action of helpless, ignorant, ‘lumpenproletariat’-type of people, manipulated 
by politicians to fulfil their own interests. These assumptions illustrate the elite’s 
hidden transcripts. Delegitimising and mocking the militias by denying them any 
political significance and linking them to drug-use and human rights abuses is a 
discursive attack of the form seen in the previous chapter.  
 
Conversely, that state authority is not straightforwardly accepted resonates 
strongly with what De Certeau would see as a popular mechanism that subverts 
discipline.125 The denial of state authority, whether symbolised in the rejection of 
the army in Fizi, of the MONUC/MONUSCO-backed military operations in 
Bunyakiri, in the self-defence mechanisms against the FDLR in Bunyakiri, added 
to the continuous provisioning for the militias, illustrates political choices with 
collective dimensions that cannot be seen as anything but forms of resistance.  
 
 
                                                   
123 Interview with Amani Leo Operations Officer, Goma, September 13, 2010; Interview 
with MONUSCO Political Affairs Officer (no. 63), Goma, July 21, 2010; Interview with 
Heal Africa representative, July 13, 2009; Interview with Seminarist Catholic University of 
Bukavu, Bukavu, July 17, 2009; See Joseph Kabila’s reference to Mai Mai as “embers” in 
Jason Stearns, “Resolving the Kivus Crisis: Beyond Khartoum and Kampala?,” Congo 
Siasa, August 5, 2012, para. 1, http://congosiasa.blogspot.co.uk/2012/08/resoliving-
kivus-crisis-beyond-khartoum.html Accessed 22/08/2012.  
124 Human Rights NGO Representative (no. 127). 
125 De Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life, xiv. 
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5.  Conclusion: Militarised Peace, Militarised Authority and 
Violent Resistance  
 
The militarisation of peace and the dynamics of violence in the DRC are carried 
out through both official and unofficial channels in relation to how ideals and 
practices stick or deviate from the kind of ideal state. Although at an official level 
strategies may attempt to concentrate the use of legitimate violence on the hands 
of the sate, the practice of statebuilding has achieved what Mbembe calls the 
‘socialisation’ of violence. For Mbembe, this means that community groups form 
their own armed groups, remain armed or ally themselves with armed groups as 
an effect of domination and not as an action of resistance.126 Although Mai Mai 
militias represent this form of socialisation and many times have become a source 
of domination and violence to their own constituencies, they represent a challenge 
to statebuilding. Mai Mai militias signal self-reliance for community protection 
and hence a challenge to the discourse of protection on which post-conflict 
statebuilding is premised. They are a vehicle towards political aspirations. These 
are articulated through a discourse of survival, security, political participation and 
land distribution, which are equated to emancipation. Although their ongoing 
military activity reifies a militarised context that provokes further domination, 
they represent an everyday form of resistance. Not only they generally operate in 
typical self-defence and non-confrontational ways, there is also significant overlap 
between the militias and the non-elite sectors of the population. Either directly or 
in representation of a larger constituency they deny the actions or mitigate the 
effects of those that cause insecurity, which is experienced as a form of 
domination. The cases of Bunyakiri with the presence of the FDLR and the Amani 
Leo troops, and Fizi with the FARDC are exemplars.  
 
Both MONUC/MONUSCO and the government defeat their idealised vision of 
the state in the very praxis of statebuilding. The idealised vision of the state, 
                                                   
126 Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 45 
and Chapter 2. 
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deployed in the sensitization workshops to desolidarise the population from the 
militias, involves a civil society that demands services, an army that secures 
people and a government that provides services to the population. That the 
government and the army act as predatory armed groups and the fact that 
MONUC/MONUSCO, knowing this, still supports a strategy of disarming the 
population while supporting the military strategies of the government and the 
army challenges the approaches by which they want to restore public service, 
order, development and peace. A significant response from the population when 
flight is not possible or unwanted is to join or support the Mai Mai militias.  
 
The fact that these ‘poor marijuana smokers’ present a challenge to the 
government is not just in their capacity to mobilise illegal resources from mines or 
weapons from overseas. Rather, the main challenge is that they convey a 
significant sector of the population’ sentiments against domination and are a tool 
to protect peoples’ agendas of security, political authority and land. These broader 
political agendas and not just the difficult economic circumstances they endure 
should be seen at the root of the challenges many demobilisation programmes 
face. In conversation with a demobilisation officer, it was stated that without 
programmes providing reinsertion to a life with enough means of living and a 
motivating job, it was difficult to persuade combatants to return to civil life.127 
However, as Marriage and Hoffmann show, it is not just the lack of motivating 
elements to return to civil life, but the ideological commitments to the armed 
groups that demobilising strategies do not take into account.128  
 
Mai Mai militias represent a violent way of claiming popular aspirations. Yet 
these weapons of the weak need not be seen as the summation of other strategies, 
or a step forward from the others. Rather, they need to be seen alongside others. 
Armed resistance, whether it is by the direct participation as combatants or by 
                                                   
127 Interview with UPN-DDR Officer, Goma. 
128 Marriage, “Flip-flop Rebel, Dollar Soldier: Demobilisation in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo”; Hoffmann, “Militarised Bodies and Spirits of Resistance.” 
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their support should also be seen as an effect of war and statebuilding. Denying 
and mitigating their effects while advancing alternative agendas is an example of 
everyday resistance. The next chapter will illustrate in a similar manner how the 
context of poverty pushes people to organise their own forms of survival as well 
as challenging authority’s claim on the distribution of wealth.  
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Chapter 7 
Creative Survival as Subversion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 1. Self-made broom, photo taken June 2010, private dwelling, Yolo Nord, Kinshasa. 
 
 
 
1.  Solidarities and Creative Tactics Against ‘Conditions of 
Death’1  
 
In Chapter Three it was argued that the patterns of coercion and extraction within 
the different statebuilding processes underway determine conditions for the 
continuation of poverty on the ground. This statement had a caveat: that the 
exercise and consolidation of state authority did not necessarily imply social 
transformation or a real commitment of the state to impose itself, but rather the 
management of state absences and state presences through a plurality of 
                                                   
1 Cf. Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture 15, no. 1 (2003): 11 – 40. 
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authorities. As such, neither post-conflict statebuilding nor state absences can be 
seen per se as single causes of poverty. These have a long and complex historical 
legacy. Still, the process of producing state authority is part and parcel of 
processes of production, distribution and social hierarchy.2 Kankwenda notes that 
predation in the DRC, or as he calls it, ‘predatocracy’3 is ‘as old as the country’.4 
As such, the strategies of resistance against the impact of war and statebuilding on 
livelihoods are inscribed in a long historical trajectory. Some would argue that 
these strategies are characteristic of the material relationship between states and 
societies or even of the natural struggle against poverty.5 Although a similar 
argument should be made of discursive and violent practices so far observed, 
creative survival figures prominently as an example of how patterns of resistance 
are recontextualised alongside changes in political and economic circumstances. 
 
Post-conflict statebuilding in this sense represents a contemporary snapshot of a 
historical process in which political, economic and cultural relations connect the 
local to the global. Whether resistance is exercised discursively, violently or, as 
will be explored in this chapter, as a form of survival, it is conditioned by the way 
authority is asserted along the axis of state absence and presence. Nonetheless, in 
                                                   
2 An interesting reflection on the role of the state in post-war reconstruction as a vehicle 
for a capitalist economy can be found in Noam Chomsky, World Orders Old and New (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996). Ch. 2. 
3 Mbaya J. Kankwenda, L’Économie Politique de La Prédation Au Congo Kinshasa: Des 
Origines à Nous Jours 1885 - 2003 (Kinshasa, Montréal and Washington: Icredes, 2005), 10. 
4 Ibid., 17. 
5 E.g. Colin Ward, Anarchy in Action (London: Freedom Press, 1973); Latouche, Serge, La 
Otra África: Autogestión y Apaño Frente Al Mercado Global, trans. Dídac Lagarriga Prunera 
(Barcelona: Oozebap, 2007); Norbert N. Ouendji, “Téléphonie Mobile et Débrouille en 
Afrique: Réflexions sur le Statut des Call Box au Cameroun,” in La politique des modèles en 
Afrique: Simulation, dépolitisation et appropriation, ed. Dominique Darbon (Karthala: 
KARTHALA Editions, 2009), 213 – 229. To say that there is a natural way of surviving 
poverty resonates with Manfred Max-Neef’s observation that universal strategies against 
poverty include being alert, creative, imaginative and make use of networks of solidarity 
and mutual aid. Manfred MaxNeef, From the Outside Looking In: Experiences in “Barefoot 
Economics” (London: Zed, 1992). Note also the reflections on survival strategies and state-
society relations in the DRC: Janet Mac Gaffey, The Real Economy of Zaire: The Contribution 
of Smuggling and Other Unofficial Activities to National Wealth (London: James Currey, 1991); 
René Lemarchand, “African Peasantries, Reciprocity and the Market: The Economy of 
Affection Reconsidered,” Cahiers d’Études Africaines 113, no. XXIX–I (1989): 33 – 67; Janet 
Lee Roitman, “The Politics of Informal Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa,” The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 28, no. 4 (1990): 671–696.  
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this interstice, solidarity, and not just coercion and extraction, is an important 
element of the everyday political landscape.  
 
Creativity, as the art of la débrouille, is defined here as the use of imagination, 
solidarity and reciprocity to produce anything that allows or improves survival.6 
Although a rumba-song would have captured the concept better, the image above 
is also illustrative of the ways in which creativity provides everyday needs.7 It is a 
broom made out of needle like palm leaves held by a tomato can, which serve 
simultaneously as a holder. Making this broom is the fruit of a myriad of 
monetary, symbolic and reciprocal exchanges. The final product is testimony to 
how Congolese creativity facilitates survival and that this is a collective project.8 
This creativity is applied to the delivery of all sorts of services (food security, 
health, education, conflict resolution, and even national army and police 
                                                   
6 French for ‘survival’ or ‘to get by’. The term makes reference to Mobutu’s command in 
1973 ‘débrouillez vous’ (fend for yourself), literally meaning that the state was 
withdrawing of many social services. Other terms are used: “article 15”, “opération qui 
cherche “, “6e chantier”, “horoscope”, “libanga”, in Lye M. Yoka, “Kinshasa: Bien-e ̂tre et 
De ́veloppement? Bien-e ̂tre Ou De ́veloppement?,” in Réforme Au Congo (RDC): Attentes et 
Désillusions, ed. Theodore Trefon, vol. 76, Cahiers Africains - Afrika Studies (Paris: Muse ́e 
royal de l’Afrique centrale (MRAC) and L’Harmattan, 2009), 246. 
7 Music is most representative of creativity in the DRC. Not only is it part of Congolese 
historical heritage in a special manner, but also it is ever present in daily life as an 
essential part of its recreation. Music has thus particular significance in la débrouille. 
Arguably music, even mainstream, is a tool of political engagement rather than simple 
entertainment. See: Paul Tiyambe Zeleza and Dickson Eyoh, Encyclopedia of Twentieth-
century African History (London: Routledge, 2003) See historical legacy, p. 71 and the roots 
of Congolese rumba, p. 130. Note the lyrics of rumba-song by Koffi Olomide: ‘Toza na 
systeme ya lifelo moto ekopela kasi tozo zika te (‘‘We are in hell. The fire is burning, but 
we don’t burn’’’ cited and translated in Ibid., 307. See also: Marcel K. Mangwanda, 
“Subverting the Dominant Gender Discourse in Congolese Popular Music: Mbilia Bel’s 
‘Eswi Yo Wapi’ and Mpongo Love’s ‘Monama Elima’,” Muziki Journal of Music Research in 
Africa 6, no. 1 (2009): 120 – 130.  
8 Note here the notion of Jean Marc Ela whereby the ‘Africa at the bottom’ has a common 
project of survival where solidarity is an imperative, an expression of a common cause 
and an acknowledgement of a common destiny. Jean-Marc Ela, Innovations Sociales et 
Renaissance de l’Afrique Noire: Les Defis Du Monde D’en-bas (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998); Jean-
Marc Ela, Afrique: L’irruption Des Pauvres: Société Contre Ingérence, Pouvoir et Argent (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 1994). This is a different notion to that of Göran Hyden. Hyden’s economy 
of affection where the peasantry is ‘uncaptured’ outside the sphere of action of the state 
by its own survival activities. On the contrary, it is argued, survival is an effect of 
domination and resistance reflects a social conflict, not non-dominated spheres of action. 
Göran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry 
(London: Heinemann Educational, 1980). 
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provisioning). By taking control of these services, subordinate classes are 
simultaneously articulating modes of political authority and social organisation in 
a way that deny, mitigate, ‘de-totalise’ and provide alternatives to state authority.9 
 
This is not necessarily an attack, or a direct denial. Rather it is a self-regarding 
activity, a form of aikido, that subverts forms of extraction by enacting channels of 
reappropriation. This reappropriation provokes denial of extractive claims and 
facilitates the mitigation of the effects of domination. Within these practices of 
survival, there are different practices and grades in the visibility of intent. For 
instance, while tax evasion or defending land ownership through armed groups 
could be seen as a more direct claim-regarding form of resistance, non-violent 
self-help tactics of land seizure, negotiating the terms of military rule and social 
service and infrastructure provision could all be seen as self-regarding activities 
that subvert the effects of poverty, appropriation and authoritarianism.10  
Revisiting De Certeau’s language, they are tactics that follow self-logics, they 
redirect wealth, reappropriate it and defend it, subverting the logic of power. This 
interpretation is nonetheless contested.  
 
This chapter is structured in four sections around the topics just mentioned. It first 
addresses these critiques as a way of analysing how the framework applies to 
survival. The following three sections offer examples that illustrate different 
aspects of statebuilding and resistance practices. Starting with tax evasion and 
practices against elite land appropriation;11 it follows a section illustrating the 
mitigation of the authoritarian nature of military rule through negotiation. This 
deployment has to do with the military approach against armed groups, as part of 
                                                   
9 Jean François Bayart, “La Revanche Des Sociétés Africaines,” Politique Africaine 11 (1983): 
119. An exercise against the totalitarian effects of certain forms of authority.  
10 Self as both individual and collective.  
11 In order to simplify the analysis, the term elite-land appropriation will be used to refer 
to those strategies that are in the orbit of statebuilding including as a consequence of the 
policy to grant ownership to land holders in detriment of collective holdings via 
customary law, or as the result of new wealth allocations and development policies. The 
term non-elite land distribution refers to peasant’s agendas, which imply collective or 
customary land ownership, land rights, and food security.  
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the political compromises with the CNDP and Rwanda, and as a form of palliative 
to state absence. The chapter finishes with a section examining various examples 
of social service provision.  
 
All these examples illustrate that surviving and mitigating the effects of 
dispossession is simultaneously a way to provide self-management and 
rearticulate the social and political space. They reaffirm mechanisms of self-
reliance and assert alternative political agendas. In all these areas, although it 
might not be explicitly stated, women take a central role, being the main service 
providers.12 The note on gender division should not be seen, especially after the 
last chapter, as a portrayal of war-mongering men and caring women.13 Far from 
establishing an image of women as ‘peace-makers’ and men as ‘war-mongers’, 
these divisions need to be seen as part of the imperative of a broader war context, 
determining labour roles through gender roles. It should also be noted that the 
examples discussed here, including taxation, land distribution, negotiating 
military rule and social service provision, are all complex areas from which one 
could generate volumes of analysis. They have been chosen as illustrations of the 
dynamics between post-conflict statebuilding and resistance, as they pertain to the 
sphere of livelihoods and material extraction. 
 
 
2.  Appropriation and Extraction in the Interstice of State 
Presences and Absences 
 
The reliance for survival on the débrouille has been a feature of Congolese history. 
The response to the ‘delinquency’ of this relatively absent state, as Kankwenda 
puts it, has been ‘the emergence of an active and dynamic civil society, organised 
to take control of everyday survival, education, health, neighbourhood security, 
                                                   
12 Yoka, “Bien-e ̂tre Et De ́veloppement?,” 11; Interview with Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri 
Combatant, Kinshasa; Interview with Peasant Union Member (no. 151), Bukavu. 
13 See reflections on these categories and identities: Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Women and 
War: Ten Years On,” Review of International Studies 24 (1998): 447 – 460. 
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etc’.14 ’People being in charge’ has a dual political value as social services and as 
political organisation.15 For Mac Gaffey, for example, ‘through the second 
economy, the citizenry may not only evade civil obligations but also express 
resistance to the state and to the class which controls it’.16 It follows that with the 
humanitarian crisis of the different wars in Congo, the economy has once again 
relied on people’s capacity for survival, reflecting the tenstion between necessity 
and resistance.  
 
Many have seen survival as an effect of governmentality, signalling 
accommodation, not resistance, to a successfully imposed neoliberal agenda.17 
Some have also argued that the relative absence of the state facilitates the creation 
of mechanisms of domination where the state and the effects of a particular 
political economy transcend private life.18 Subjection, or at least, negotiation, is 
henceforth the key for surviving domination, but may not be seen as a form of 
resistance.  
 
The work of Chabal exemplifies this view. He argues, firstly, that ‘the state may 
not be able to do what it is mandated to do but it is still vigorous enough to keep a 
check on what is being done informally’.19 As a result, the state keeps a degree of 
control on the ground and maintains informal networks of power linked to state 
agents and bureaucrats. Secondly, Chabal argues that subordinate classes, by 
                                                   
14 Kankwenda, L’Économie Politique de La Prédation Au Congo Kinshasa, 176. 
15 Cristina Barrios, “The People in Charge: Civil Society and State Building in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo,” Ideas Today, no. 2.10 (2010): 6 - 9. 
16 Mac Gaffey, The Real Economy of Zaire, 10. 
17 For Foucault, government practice had a certain rational about not only what 
government means but about the best way to achieve it. ‘Governmental ratio is what will 
enable a given state to arrive at its maximum being in a considered, reasoned, and 
calculated way. [To govern is] to arrange things so that the state becomes sturdy and 
permanent […] wealthy [and] strong in the face of everything that may destroy it’. Michel 
Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978 - 79, trans. Graham 
Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 4; Chabal, The Politics of Suffering and 
Smiling.  
18 Chabal, The Politics of Suffering and Smiling; Be ́atrice Hibou, The Force of Obedience: The 
Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia (Cambridge: Polity, 2011); See also: Hamza 
Meddeb, “Tunisie: La Prise de La Kasbah N’a Pas Eu Lieu” (Doctoral Thesis in Political 
Science, Sciences Po, Paris, 2011). 
19 Chabal, The Politics of Suffering and Smiling, 132.  
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providing all sorts of social services, from security to electricity, and hospitals to 
rubbish management, are actually involved in a form of state extortion. ‘Civil 
servants’ he argues ‘prey on those who cannot afford to resist them: police harass 
ordinary people; nurses demand bribes; teachers require payment; the providers 
of official paperwork (ID cards, passports, market licences, etc.) sell their ‘good 
offices’’.20 
 
Chabal identifies what has been noted in previous chapters, that the capacity of 
peace strategies to claim success is the capacity of subordinate classes to absorb 
their negative consequences. Leaving people to ‘fend for themselves’ whether it is 
rubbish collection, dealing with armed groups or sustaining the national army, 
can be viewed, within the context of DRC, as a mode of extortion only benefiting 
those who would otherwise be responsible for dealing with these things. 
However, the problem with Chabal’s arguments is that he does not afford agency 
to the political choices subordinate classes make. This is not to say that people opt 
to be exploited. But to observe this is to ignore the daily strategies of resistance to 
exploitation and the capacity of subordinate classes to exercise control over their 
circumstances.21 Whereas predatory strategies are seen in many state-residual 
services, self-provision helps to placate poverty, violence and war, and mitigate 
the extraction of labour, land and taxes. 
 
These strategies also create mutual obligations where ideals concerning what 
authorities should be doing provide a measure of legitimacy. Chabal himself 
states that  
 
[a]t the heart of the politics of belonging and partaking [,] relations of 
proximity and reciprocity provide the foundations upon which rulers and 
ruled, elite and populace, relate to each other within and across 
communities [and] notions of ethics and morality are based on the 
honouring of relations of social exchange and on how these relations 
                                                   
20 Ibid., 151, emphasis in the original.  
21 As Scott argues in relation to inhabitants in the high plateaus of ‘Zomia’, people do not 
reject ‘development’ but domination. The Art of Not Being Governed, e.g. 113 - 115. 
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influence the nature and conduct of politics on the continent.22  
 
Therefore ‘bartering’ puts authorities and subordinate classes on a more equal 
footing. It grants non-elites a space for subverting the relationship by imposing on 
elites the requirement to negotiate. In all of this, as mentioned before, there is an 
element of exploitation and abandonment. As a resident of a Butembo 
neighbourhood put it: ‘if we have to wait for the state, nothing gets done’.23 This 
self-management and self-provision palliates the effects of domination, 
identifying alternative political agendas of food security, land, and political 
participation. The examples provided in this chapter are not exhaustive. They 
illustrate instances of everyday survival where the elements of denial, mitigation 
and the advancing of subordinates’ own agendas are present.  
 
 
3.  Confronting Extraction, Subverting Distribution 
 
State authority assertion and consolidation is done through the levying of taxes, 
and the transfer and allocation of property rights. Despite in some areas, as seen 
for instance in the negotiation of refugee settlement or in the ‘sensitization’ 
exercises to ease civil-military relations, statebuilding has a predatory effect. This 
effect, and the resistance it generates, is seen in the areas of land property 
management and tax levy. In the DRC, since land belongs to the state by law, its 
allocation can be arbitrary, yet remaining within the law. Land links state 
administrators to multiple state institutions and private elites. Similarly, taxes are 
not only a tool for state financing but also a survival strategy for public servants.24 
Contradictorily, the resilience of customary and collective land administration, in 
addition to the fact that the state cannot efficiently raise taxes, offer an insight into 
                                                   
22 Ibid., 136. 
23 Interview with “Nyumba Kumi” Neighbourhood Representative of 10 houses, 
Butembo, July 2010.  
24 Callaghy notes that at the time of the copper crisis in 1978, the state had already stopped 
collecting much of its taxes in a formalised form. Thomas M. Callaghy, “From Reshaping 
to Resizing a Failing State? The Case of the Congo/Zaire,” in Right-Sizing the State: The 
Politics of Moving Borders, ed. Brendan O’Leary, Ian Lustick, and Thomas Callaghy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 102 – 137. 
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how everyday creative survival denies and mitigates the impact that taxation and 
elite-land distribution have on peasants’ livelihoods.25   
 
T a x  
 
Non-elites see tax collection as illegitimate. Whether in a formalised or 
informalised way, there is widespread concern that taxes are paid to enrich the 
pockets of the politicians.26 There is nothing unusual about this. The same patterns of 
discourses and tax evasion could be found worldwide. However, in the DRC, 
taxes not reaching the state take an important dimension. Those that are collected 
on the ground generate revenues. This is illustrated by the dynamics in which tax 
collection and tax evasion take place. The tax revenue in the DRC was 13.5% of 
total GDP in 2010 (as opposed to for instance the 37.8% of the UK).27 According to 
the World Bank, in all countries, generally, 1% of the registered tax-payers 
provide 70% of the tax revenue.28 Thus while non-elite tax contributions to the 
state treasury are marginal or inexistent, they are fundamental for the myriad of 
state-representatives that are on the ground.  
 
Still, the way taxation works also means that there is widespread tax avoidance.29 
In a focus group in Butembo (North Kivu), five out of six participants confirmed 
that they did not pay their taxes, firstly because the tax officer rarely came to their 
houses, and, secondly, because they felt that they did not owe anything to the 
                                                   
25 African Development Bank, Democratic Republic of Congo, 4. 
26 Cf. Discourses explored in Chapter Five. 
27 World Bank, “Tax Revenue (% of GDP) in Congo,” 2012, 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/congo/tax-revenue-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html 
Accessed 25/10/2012; The Guardian, “UK Tax Receipts Since 1963: Full Data,” Data Blog, 
Simon Rogers, accessed November 25, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/apr/25/tax-receipts-1963. 
28 International Finance Corporation, Taxation as State-Building: Reforming Tax Systems for 
Political Stability and Sustainable Economic Growth - A Practitioner’s Guide (Washington: 
FIAS/The World Bank Group, 2009), 17. 
29 This interpretation resonates with studies including Jeroen Adam and Koen 
Vlassenroot, “‘La Fiscalité de Poche’: The Politics of Taxation in Eastern Congo” 
(presented at the Annual Meeting, San Francisco: African Studies Association, 2010); 
Earlier studies include: Roitman, “The Politics of Informal Markets in Sub-Saharan 
Africa”; Mac Gaffey, The Real Economy of Zaire. 
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state.30 The Chief of this neighbourhood stated that before they paid their taxes, 
the state had to fix the streets (only three major roads were asphalted).31 In 
informal conversations, many residents stated their refusal to pay their taxes if 
they were not going to get anything back from them. Interestingly, the idealised 
version of the state works as a tax avoidance strategy: if the state does not work 
for them, people will not pay the state its dues.  
 
This was a constant in all places where fieldwork was undertaken. Conflict 
around tax seemed to be especially prevalent around small commerce where tax 
officers are more present. In Goma, in a small survey carried out with street 
sellers, all participants confirmed that they had found ways to avoid taxation.32 
This included hiding merchandise, packing and leaving, and alternating selling 
days. In the central market at Baraka (South Kivu), sellers complained about the 
variety and cost of the taxes. They said that the benefit they receive is too low and 
the taxes too high. As a result, they invented mechanisms for tax evasion.33 For 
instance, people selling the same products tend to gather together in the same 
place. They keep checking whether a tax officer might be coming. If an officer 
arrives, several sellers of the same product will go away, while one remains. This 
individual tells the officer that all the products are hers so that the tax paid is 
substantially lower than if each person had to pay for their product separately. 
The result is a mutual reticence. Neither the tax officers nor the taxpayers are 
happy with the tax system, but cohabit as a kind of a stalemate. This does not 
mean a lack of conflict. On the contrary, there is a constant "toeing and froing", 
which, in the context of war, entails negotiation, but also armed confrontation. 
 
                                                   
30 Focus Group Butembo Residents, Butembo, July 31, 2010.  
31 Interview with “Chef de Quartier” (Neighbourhood representative)  Matumaini 
Walikomba, Butembo, July 31, 2010. 
32 Small survey sampling 10 street sellers in the Boulevard Kanyamuhanga in Goma 
including: 3 phone credit sellers, 2 tomatoes, chillies and peanut sellers, 1 music seller, 3 
bread sellers and 1 photocopy maker.  
33 Interviews with Baraka Market Sellers, Baraka, September 2010.  
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As with the workshops organised to de-solidarise population from armed groups, 
tax payment has its own ‘sensitization’ workshops. For example, a SOCICO 
representative in Masisi was asked by the government to carry out seminars to 
‘demand people to pay their taxes’; but as he says ‘that didn’t pass well through 
their ears’.34 A representative of Itinerant Traders Association in Bunyakiri spoke 
about the arbitrariness with which taxes were charged. In an exemplary instance 
of negotiation, he indicated that often ‘when there is a tax that traders see as 
unfair or that they cannot pay, the association speaks to the inspector or the 
authorities so that traders are relieved of the payment’.35 This cautious negotiation 
style was reflected in the taxation campaign started by the provincial government 
of South Kivu. The message on a poster, displayed in one of the poorest 
neighbourhoods in Bukavu, gently asked: ‘Dear tax-payer, pay your taxes and 
duties in order to aid your provincial government to finance the 5 pledges and 
other projects of development’.36 As Mkandawire has shown, unpaid taxes are a 
sign of the weakness of the state and the success of resistance in many African 
countries.37 The result is a mutual ‘arm’s length’ distance. The government makes 
the people responsible for the lack of development, while people are not willing to 
pay taxes until they see the government work for development.  
 
However, negotiation and coercion go hand in hand. The state seeks alternative 
ways to finance its own presence and support elite networks, including both 
threats and the imposition of penalties, including prison.38 The state shares 
taxation levy power with armed groups, the army and the police. This kind of 
taxation is often negotiated, but if not accepted, it is done at gunpoint. The use, or 
                                                   
34 Interview with President of Civil Society - Masisi Centre, Masisi. 
35 Interview with Bamwicho Bikanaba, Representative of the Committee of Itinerant 
Traders Association, Bunyakiri, August 21, 2010. 
36 Provincial Government of South Kivu, Bukavu's Kadutu neighbourhood. Poster seen on 
August 8, 2010.  
37 Thandika Mkandawire, “The Terrible Toll of Postcolonial Rebel Movements: Towards 
an Expanation of the Violence Against the Peasantry,” in The Roots of African Conflicts: The 
Causes and Costs, ed. Alfred G. Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (Oxford: James Currey, 
2008), 119 – 120.  
38 Interview with Philomène Mukendi Representative of local NGO “Angels du Ciel,” 
Kinshasa, July 6, 2010. 
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the threat of, violence makes this taxation difficult to evade and further spurs 
armed contestation. As an example, the chart below shows the taxes extracted by 
the FARDC and Amani Leo forces.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5. Oxfam Protection Survey39 
The table above only shows estimates, from multiplying the extraction observed 
in one day by the thirty days in a month. Although these are not exact figures, 
extortion by FARDC and Amani Leo troops has been widely reported.40 However, 
it would be limited to conclude that the above supports Chabal’s arguments about 
successful domination. These activities should not be looked at from the 
perspective of whether the state has been “successful” in extracting taxes and 
whether resistance has been “successful” in avoiding them. Rather, both of these 
practices should be seen as ongoing processes. For statebuilding, this process 
entails negotiation and sharing fiscal authority. For resistance it means a denial of 
taxation legitimacy to the state. 
 
                                                   
39 Oxfam International, Enquete de Protection, 5. 
40 UN Group of Experts, Final Report on the DRC (2011), para. 301 - 302; UN Group of 
Experts, Final Report of the Group of Experts S/2010/596, p. 3 and para. 177; Global Witness, 
Faced with a Gun, What Can You Do?, 27 – 30; Global Witness, The Hill Belongs to Them, 8.  
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L a n d  
It could be argued that all of the above regarding taxation applies also to land. 
However, land has a special symbolic and historical meaning. Changes in its use 
and property have a direct impact not just on revenue and political authority, but 
also on the social order and identity attached to it. As such, the conflict over land 
is not one of livelihoods but of political projects. One project is based on 
community control, participation in political representation and defence of land 
access; another concerns increasing land privatisation and concentration; yet other 
concerns state security and managing military and elite conflicts. These have been 
underlined by a process of militarisation, as war has acted as a conveyor belt 
between statebuilding and changes in land tenure. Land seizure and allocation in 
the DRC have become militarised both through direct occupation by armed 
groups and by the military response these seizures have prompted. As with the 
operations of armed groups, wars over land, and subsequent lack of access to 
land, have caused massive flight.41 Even if the land becomes empty, it still fulfils a 
series of statebuilding purposes: production of revenue through its sale, allocation 
or transfer to politicians, entrepreneurs or MNCs and the production of shared 
authority. Similarly, even if armed groups occupy land, if sufficiently powerful, 
they are likely to join elite and statebuilding networks.42  
 
Creativity has subverted elite-land distribution in three ways: as survival against 
deteriorating livelihoods, as cooperation for production and distribution, and as a 
form of negotiation with elites.43 These practices do not necessarily demonstrate a 
victory against elite-land redistribution, but they subvert the logic of 
                                                   
41 This was the tactic used for instance by the APR against the Interahamwe but it has also 
been used by CNDP and the FDLR. Navanethem Pillay, Rapport Du Projet Mapping 
Concernant Les Violations Les Plus Graves Des Droits de l’Homme et Du Droit International 
Humanitaire Commises Entre Mars 1993 et Juin 2003 Sur Le Territoire de La Re ́publique 
De ́mocratique Du Congo (Geneva: UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2010), para. 
150; Fernando Andreu Merelles, Auto Judicial Sumario 3/2008 - D (Madrid: Juzgado de 
Instrucción n. 4 Audiencia Nacional, February 6, 2008), Facts 18 and 27, p. 14 and 23.  
42 This has been the case of CNDP entering the orbit of Rwanda’s statebuilding effort and 
PARECO for the DRC government to counter it.  
43 Other responses include flight and use of militias. This section explores practices of 
resistance directly linked to creative survival strategies. 
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appropriation, mitigating its effects and serving non-elite agendas. The effect is 
also a denial of legitimacy to elite claims, the de-totalisation of coercion, the 
imposition of negotiation, and the projection of political alternatives. Networks of 
proximity and kin, cooperative schemes, relying on solidarity and reciprocity, are 
often used as the ‘workers’ wig’, in De Certeau’s terms. They are the foundation 
for maintaining and recreating forms of political authority and self-organisation. 
There is a caveat to this affirmation. As the conflict over land has followed ethnic 
lines, one may argue that the elite/non-elite distinction is inadequate. This is 
partly true. However, the elite/non-elite division identifies the political and 
economic status linked to land tenure, even if social mobility makes these 
identities fluid.44 As such, without making permanent statements about who 
belongs where on the basis of class or ethnic identity, this division gains currency 
because it illustrates the patterns in which those who hold the power to grant land 
access are resisted by those who do not.  
 
In a study on land tenure, conflict and household land use strategies in the 
territories of Masisi, Lubero (North Kivu) and Walungu (South Kivu), Vlassenroot 
identifies several mechanisms of survival within a context of increasing 
dispossession and food insecurity.45 They go from collective responses such as 
shared production and cooperative membership to individual methods such as 
crop theft and militia membership.  
 
 
                                                   
44 For instance, while Banyarwanda Hutu peasants had felt discriminated by Hunde chiefs 
in Masisi through at least the beginnings of its largest migration movement from Rwanda 
in the 1950s, they now currently hold political and military leadership in Masisi, having 
joined the CNDP under Banyarwanda Tutsi elite and Rwanda’s government 
(Banyarwanda meaning literally people of Rwanda, which is a term traditionally used in 
North Kivu to denominate people of Rwandan origin or with Rwandan ancestors). Jmac 
reports point to CNDP being majority Hutu but minority Tutsi leadership. Koen 
Vlassenroot, “Households Land Use Strategies in a Protracted Crisis Context: Land 
Tenure, Conflict and Food Security in Eastern DRC” (Conflict Research Group University 
of Ghent, 2006); JMAC Officer, Personal Communication, “Security Update - CNDP,” 
August 30, 2012; Interview with NRC representative, Goma, July 23, 2010.  
45 Vlassenroot, “Households Land Use Strategies in a Protracted Crisis.” 
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Table 2 summarises the research and findings. 
 
Constraints to food production Constraints to food access Household strategies 
 
Shifts in land tenure systems: 
     * from a system of relative 
equality, proximity and mutual 
dependency based on 
customary chiefs to a system of 
alliances based on proximity to 
Kinshasa’s authorities; 
      * collective tenure 
increasingly privatised and 
expropriated to large ranches  
- Limited access to land  
- Crop restrictions on rental land  
- Reduction of plot sizes 
- Conflicts over land ownership  
- Loss of livestock 
 
Other Conditions: 
- Decrease of land fertility due 
to over-exploitation 
- Demographic pressure 
- Presence of armed elements 
- Pillaging of harvests 
 
- Reduction of purchasing 
power 
- Limited availability of food 
- Increase in the amount and 
number of taxes 
- Limited access to markets 
due to insecurity 
- Absence of cooperatives that 
protect merchants 
- Lack of organization 
- Pillaging of stocks 
- Degradation of road network 
- Destruction of market 
infrastructures 
- Disappearance of microcredit 
systems 
 
- Cultivation of small plots in 
wetlands 
- Shift from monoculture to 
polyculture 
- Adaptation of crop 
diversification to (lack of) 
tenure security 
- Shift from agriculture to 
petty trade 
- Shifts in food consumption 
patterns 
- Harvest and consumption of 
immature crops 
- Cash for work 
- Joining of farmers 
associations 
- Cultivation on shared plots 
- Migration to urban centres or 
mining sites 
- Joining of local militias  
- Theft of crops 
Table 6. ‘Food constraints and household strategies’46 
Many of these strategies are present in the activities of the League of Women 
Peasants Cooperative (LOFEPACO).47 It is a federation of peasant organisations 
for the protection of peasant interest but with a special regard for women’s issues. 
Most organisations integrated in LOFEPACO are women-only. According to 
                                                   
46 Adapted and edited table from Ibid., 3. Clarifications on land tenure changes from pp. 6 
- 7.  
47 Unless noted the information on this organisation provided in the following two 
paragraphs relies on the following source: Interview with Activity Animator of the 
League des Organisation de Femmes Paysannes de Congo (LOFEPACO) Clarisse 
Ngemulo, Butembo. 
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Clarisse Ngemulo, LOFEPACO’s activity animator, the creation of these 
organisations and the federation responded to a need to provide women with a 
space to deal with their specific problems. These problems included a sense of 
disempowerment, inequality and marginalisation. In particular, in the Hira 
culture women have inferior cultural status.48 Around the year 2000 they decided 
to create a federation to reinforce the strength and effectiveness of other 
organisations in the empowering of women and peasants.49 The league facilitated 
exchanges and training in different domains, including government lobbying. 
What is striking is that in the middle of one of the worst periods of armed conflict, 
they felt that the struggle they had started and the campaigning tools the 
cooperative was granting them became even more meaningful. Not only did 
women feel like the main targets of war, they also considered that part of the 
solution to war relied on solving the problems of poverty, inequality, corruption 
and certain customary traditions that kept women disadvantaged.  
 
As such, the federation constituted an economic solution, a funding mechanism 
for war-related effects, a campaigning tool, and a vehicle for political and social 
change.50 Their activities included the creation of a credit cooperative, assuring 
food security, creating a seed bank and exchanging products and skills training. 
The women only spaces promoted discussion on empowerment, self-esteem, 
leadership, awareness of land tenure rights, customary rules, sexism, and what 
they called listening spaces. These were spaces where women who had been raped 
                                                   
48 This is the ethnic community many members of LOFEPACO belong to. Women are not 
allowed to own land. When their husband dies, the land is re-distributed by the 
customary chief or through the male-members of the family. Interview with Activity 
Animator of the League des Organisation de Femmes Paysants de Congo (LOFEPACO) 
Clarisse Ngemulo, Butembo, July 31, 2010; “Chef de Quartier” (Neighbourhood 
representative)  Matumaini Walikomba, Butembo, July 31, 2010.  
49 Their activities were focused in North Kivu and their name was in fact LOFEPANOKI. 
After 2005 they acquired a national focus, chaging their name to LOFEPACO, although at 
the time of the interview their radio of action was still North Kivu and more so the Beni-
Butembo axis. Maintaining a national coverage even if nominally can be a way to have 
access to certain national and international funding.  
50 Information in this paragraph comes from Interview with Activity Animator of the 
League des Organisation de Femmes Paysannes de Congo (LOFEPACO) Clarisse 
Ngemulo, Butembo. 
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could be heard by other women. This has been reinforced by INGOs funding and 
training and has now developed into a psychological and economic support for 
survivors of sexual violence.51 They have organized sit-ins to demand the de-
militarisation of certain areas like Mangango and Beni. They have also been 
successful in allowing many widows to access land titles. This has been achieved 
through campaigning and accompanying claimants to the territorial administrator 
office. 
 
These activities demonstrate an associative tendency when addressing needs and 
engaging in political claims. Most importantly, they demonstrate that the 
constraints imposed by the political context do not make peasants lower their 
political aspirations, instead they become imperative. Of the six peasant 
cooperatives encountered during this project, all emphasised that the end of war 
should bring well-being, development, education, equality and political 
participation.52 For instance, a representative of the Union of Peasant Cooperatives 
of North Kivu (UCOOPANOKI), a cooperative of farms and cultivators in North 
Kivu, said that the main problems they faced were the appropriation of land by 
politicians, big landowners and MNCs, as well as the incursions by armed groups 
stealing their crops.53 Their aspirations were stated in terms of land access, 
security and fair prices to assure life in dignity.54  
                                                   
51 In particular the INGO Vredesilanden.  
52 Ucoonakopi, Lofepaco, Association of Manioc producers (Bunyakiri), Syndicat de 
Protection des Intêrets Paysans (Beni), UPDI and Association Nutrition Assisse 
Communautaire (ANAC). The first three are federations of cooperatives operating across 
different territories within the province. UPDI and ANAC also operate as broader 
platforms for peasants to exchange products, cultivation techniques, provide community 
service, conduct lobbying activities and attract international funding. UPDI has 8 
cooperatives associated in five territories in South Kivu (Kabare, Kalehe, Walungu, 
Mwenga and Uvira), and ANAC works in Mabuku and Beni (North Kivu). This was also 
the sentiment transmitted in other interviews with peasant unions and producer 
associations. Interview with Representative from Syndicat de Protection des Intérets 
Paysans, Beni, interview; Interview with Representative from Association of Market 
Sellers and Buyers of South Kivu, Bunyakiri, August 20, 2010. 
53 As an example, they stated that 725 hectares of land in Kabiso (North Kivu) that 
belonged to the cooperative were threatened to be expropriated by the provincial 
government. According to Ucoopanoki representative, the issue had been taken to court, 
but ‘the approximate 1000 residents were threatened to have to leave in favour of 3 or 4 
new proprietors’. Flight normally happens to another area where other family members 
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Likewise, in Bukavu, the Union Paysanne pour le Developpement Integral 
(UPDI), was born in 1994 out of peasant members feeling disempowered and 
marginalised from INGOs development projects.55 Although land seizures and 
changes in land tenure had been already in place with Mobutu, the war has 
accentuated it. Peasants feel victims of all parties including politicians, armed 
groups, and MNCs, yet marginalised of decision-making. Peasants see themselves 
as an essential part of development, being at the heart of agricultural production. 
Significantly, the activities of the cooperatives mentioned above included a project 
of food security and a project of social change. They all claimed a need for 
empowerment and land conflict resolution.  
 
S u b v e r t i n g  L o g i c s  
 
Extraction through taxation and elite land distribution illustrates the mechanisms 
whereby statebuilding and resistance could be seen simultaneously in direct 
conflict as in conditions of mutual reticence. The models of private ownership 
pursued by the DRC government and international agencies, added to the 
favoured model of extraction whereby artisanal precarious and militarised mining 
serves large corporations but not necessarily local communities poses a threat to 
some of the core subsistence mechanisms the peasantry has traditionally relied 
on.56 Tax levy, although not a source of state income serves the purpose other 
political and military purposes that foster state authority presence. In this context, 
resistance delegitimises authority, reduces its extractive impact and imposes 
negotiation. More so, resistance produces self-organising mechanisms that 
resonate with non-elite aspirations for social justice and alternative forms of 
                                                                                                                                                   
can host them, migrate to the city or attempt to work in mines. Most farms belonging to 
the cooperative had suffered attacks from all armed groups, in particular, Mweso and 
Nyanzale. Interview with Louis Batenda General Director of Ucoopanoki Cooperative, 
Goma. 
54 Ibid. Access to just prices was also raised in Bunyakiri by Manioc Producers 
Association. Interview with Representatives of Association Manioc Producers, Bunyakiri, 
August 21, 2010. 
55 Interview with representative from Union Paysanne pour le Developpement Integral 
(UPDI), Bukavu.  
56 Global Witness, Faced with a Gun, What Can You Do?, 59 – 69. 
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political authority. It is argued that these subversive practices follow self-
regarding logics and operate as self-help mechanisms for reappropriation and 
well-being, they are a form of resistance to the modes of accumulation. This raises 
the question of the relationship between these forms of resistance and post-
conflict statebuilding. As has been argued, statebuilding produces externalities 
that are felt by the civilian population on the ground. An additional use of 
survival strategies and cooperative schemes is to tame the effects of the 
authoritarian nature of the army. This is a direct implication of having a strategy 
that privileges the needs of armed groups, security and economic interests over 
those of the civilian population. 
 
 
4.  Taming the Military  
 
The strategy of scattering the army throughout the North and South Kivu 
territory serves political compromises acquired by the military operations coming 
out of the Goma Accords, those acquired through the March 23 agreement, and 
the purpose of having some form of state authority presence. Despite much 
criticism against the poor discipline, lack of control and disorganisation of the 
FARDC, the actions of MONUC/MONUSCO have supported the government in 
what seems to be a “better than nothing” approach. MONUC/MONUSCO, the 
EU and a plethora of foreign government aid agencies have provided operational 
support, training and funding.57 But aside from militarising the environment, 
which in practice is a tool for hierarchisation and the reaffirmation of positions of 
domination, army deployment is also an extractive tool. On a daily basis, the 
political, social and economic cost of this military deployment is assumed by local 
residents, particularly in rural areas. As seen in previous chapters, this 
deployment has generated resistance, and met with discourses of delegitimisation 
and armed attacks. However, the dependency the military has on the population 
                                                   
57 Interview with Starec - Amani Leo representative, Goma; Interview with MONUSCO - 
ISSSS/STAREC liaison Officer, Goma. 
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has provoked an ambiguous ground on which survival tactics have been both a 
way to meet the military’s needs and to mitigate its effects. Notwithstanding the 
abuses of the military, these tactics have subverted the effects of the military 
presence so that they serve the self-help logics of the civilian population. 
Although Chabal, Hibou and Mbembe, for instance, argue that there is not 
resistance but accommodation, and even a logic of subjection, the dynamics of 
negotiation highlight that arrangements are contingent, thus allowing for 
redefining the limits of domination.  
 
In this case, the process of negotiation taps into the logics of reciprocity and 
creativity that sustain daily life. Militarisation and authoritarianism, imposed by 
the conditions on which the army is deployed, is de-totalised through expectations 
of mutual obligation and the creation of mutual dependency. On the one hand, 
FARDC expects the population to respect their authority, provide security 
intelligence, assume their families’ livelihood needs, supply labour and grant 
them privileges in certain economic exchanges.58 On the other hand, residents 
expect FARDC to provide them with security, policing, labour, a greater 
guarantee or even ‘official’ stamp on conflict resolution processes, and reciprocity 
in economic and service exchanges. Judith Verweijen, who has extensively 
studied civil-military relations, notes that exchanges and civilian expectations of 
FARDC provisions include ‘conflict resolution, arbitration, policing, economic 
regulation and other governance practices’.59 In terms of conflict resolution, 
                                                   
58 Respect and intelligence became one of the most important demands of the FARDC to 
civil society in the MONUSCO Sensitization workshop in Fizi and Baraka to ease civil-
military relations. Participant Observation XIV, UN Civil Affairs Sensitization Workshop 
between the Military and Civil Society, Fizi and Baraka, September 3, 2010. How the 
civilian population provides for the everyday living needs of the military was directly 
raised in several interviews. This includes cooking, helping with childcare, aid with 
housework to military wives or directly host them at home. Interview with 
Representative of Women’s Group Femmes Père Saint-Simon, Bunyakiri; Interview with 
Women’s NGO FEDI representative; Interview with Representative of Association pour la 
Defense de Droits de la Femme (ADDF), Butembo; Interview with Representatives of 
Association Manioc Producers, Bunyakiri; Interview with FARDC Colonel in Baraka (no. 
129).  
59 Judith Verweijen, “Military Business and the Business of the Military in the Kivus,” 
Review of African Political Economy (forthcoming 2013). 
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arbitration and policing, they can go from settling chief succession or dowry 
disputes, to being present at football matches and markets, and prosecuting 
crimes such as cattle theft and poisoning.60 FARDC’s authority becomes mitigated 
and de-totalised by the process in which survival, including that of the FARDC 
troops themselves, is better assured by reciprocity and negotiation than force. In 
conditions of arbitrariness and inequality, the sphere of negotiation allows space 
for equalisation and brings a public eye to precisely the arbitrary and violent use 
of authority. 
 
This dual effect of creative survival applied to civil/military relations can be seen 
in the response the newly deployed battalion of Amani Leo in April 2010 had in 
Baraka. Arche d’Alliance Refugee Protection Supervisor, Ildefonse Masumbo 
Zongolo, relates what has been noted by many Baraka and Fizi residents: These 
troops were forcing the displacement of people just to steal their goats to eat, 
beating residents sometimes just to steal their mobile phone, or money.61 Some of 
their members were even accused of rape.62 The worst period was, according to 
Zongolo, between April and May 2010, which included the attack of Mai Mai 
Yakotumba in April 2010. Arche d’Alliance organised a series of encounters with 
these troops and with the Amani Leo Commandant deployed at Baraka. 
According to Mr. Zongolo, from then on they would be able to go to the 
commandant, tell him who had done what and the commandant would apply the 
according penalty. In a primary example of how DIY and personal reciprocal ties 
                                                   
60 Ibid. 
61 Interview with Ildefonse Masumbo Zongolo, Refugee Protection Supervisor of NGO 
Arche D’Alliance, Baraka, September 1, 2010. The interviewee did not mention that in fact 
the crimes committed by some FARDC members have amounted to crimes against 
humanity committed, condemned in 2011 by a military tribunal in Baraka. UN Secretary 
General Ban Ki-Moon, Rapport Du Secre ́taire Ge ́ne ́ral Sur La Mission de l’Organisation Des 
Nations Unies Pour La Stabilisation En Re ́publique De ́mocratique Du Congo S/2011/298 (New 
York: UN Security Council, May 12, 2011), para. 42; UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, 
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo S/2010/512 (New York: UN Security Council, October 8, 
2010), para 13. 
62 Interview with Ildefonse Masumbo Zongolo, Refugee Protection Supervisor of NGO 
Arche D’Alliance, Baraka. 
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produce direct control, they would come to verify whether those who had finally 
been sentenced were serving their sentence. According to Mr. Zongolo: 
 
Now when someone is the victim of misbehaviour by these troops, we visit 
the Commander and we say: ‘call in such and such because he has done so 
and so’ –the Commander applies to him maybe 15 days of imprisonment… 
then we verify whether he is really in the cell… we go there and may say: 
‘Commander, we have come to give him something to eat’ – each day, 
because it is necessary that he gets his punishment.63 
 
In many ways the hierarchy here has been subverted. This does not change what 
the military still means for many residents: disorder, violence and abuses. But 
engaging with them through collaboration, networking, solidarity, exchanges and 
mutual dependency is a way of equalising the relationship, and taming the 
arbitrariness and authoritarianism of their presence. As Scott noted of Jane Jacobs 
in her study of public order, she argues that order is not kept by the presence of 
the police, but by the presence of a multitude of bystanders, watchers, wanderers, 
shoppers, sellers, and commuters going ahead with their myriad activities.64 A 
similar argument could be made of the role of creative survival strategies put in 
place to host and feed troops. Their menace, disorder, disruption and distrust are 
mitigated by the same activities that are used to sustain family, neighbours and 
community. The hierarchically commanded militarising presence is subverted by 
making the military dependent, with a duty of reciprocity, on the landscape of 
‘uninstitutionalized, uncodified habits of street-level trust in the production of 
civic order’.65 Forms of mitigation allow for a possible equalising of civil/military 
relations. Rather than compliance, they signal social conflict and a rejection of 
militarisation and predation by state authorities.  
 
 
                                                   
63 Ibid. 
64 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 132 – 146. 
65 James C. Scott, “Geographies of Trust, Geographies of Hierarchy,” in Democracy and 
Trust, ed. Mark Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 280. 
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5.  Taking over:  DIY Everything and the Case of Social 
Services  
 
As Tollens argues, it is due to the Congolese art of survival and their creative 
strategies that, in the midst of one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes since 
World War II, there has not been a declared famine.66 The self-made broom above 
represents that when something is needed, it is created. However, this does not 
apply just to everyday needs but goes as far as peace and reconciliation, 
mitigation of armed groups operations and the army, and, as this section will 
illustrate, a variety of social services. Reciprocity, solidarity and mutual 
dependencies established through community networks, ethnic, clan or family 
links, cooperatives and other groups are channels used for survival strategies. As 
was pointed out in the previous Chapter, self-reliance takes priority over reliance 
on the government or state authorities. Its effect, however, is subversion and the 
undermining of statebuilding strategies to implement the state.  
 
As Vlassenroot and Romkena argue: 
 
People tried to rely on the trust of personal relationships to compensate for 
the absence of a functioning legal and judicial apparatus. They also tried to 
evade a venal bureaucracy and an oppressive state by operating in the 
second economy to find opportunities to better lives. This popular 
economy of survival, in the end, became an alternative system of economic 
development that completely escaped state control.67  
 
They also note that ‘these informal structures can pose a serious constraint to state 
building as part of reconstruction efforts’.68 Vlassenroot and Romkena identify 
three important reasons. Firstly, this provision undermines legitimacy both in the 
eyes of the population and of donors. This has a domino effect regarding the 
alternative channels sought by the population for provision, which include the 
                                                   
66 Eric Tollens, “Food Security in Kinshasa: Coping with Adversity,” in Reinventing Order 
in the Congo: How People Respond to State Failure in Kinshasa, ed. Theodore Trefon (London, 
New York and Kampala: Zed Books and Fountain Publishers, 2004), 47. 
67 Koen Vlassenroot and Hans Romkena, LocaL Governance & Leadership in Eastern DRC 
(Goma: Commissioned by Oxfam Novib, 2007), 9. 
68 Ibid., 8. 
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reliance on armed groups for security provision. Secondly, it places both the 
population and the state in competition for external funding. Thirdly, as a 
consequence, donors have felt more legitimate and secure in providing funds to 
NGOs rather than to the state, which has contributed to an even weaker state 
presence.69 
 
More importantly, these mechanisms of survival entail a deeper political 
statement that resonates with a logic of reappropriation over political affairs. They 
signal a ‘reinvention of order’70, as Trefon puts it, where there is a process of 
negation of the imposed order, a subversion of it, and a projection of alternative 
forms of social organisation and political authority. These points are illustrated 
with three concrete examples of how electricity and health are generally provided. 
A final example from the town of Mabuku (North Kivu), where there is no 
permanent presence of state authority, brings about an opportunity to observe the 
dynamics of bypassing the state through INGOs. 
 
E l e c t r i c i t y  
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, only 6% of the population in the DRC have access 
to electricity, although the DRC is an electricity exporter.71 However, Congolese 
people access electricity, not by demanding it from the government or the SNEL, 
but by self-organising mechanisms. In Butembo, for example, population started 
to create a system by which approximately every 60 houses would buy a 
generator together and set up its own electricity system. The system is basic but 
                                                   
69 Ibid., 8 – 9. 
70 Theodore Trefon, “Introduction: Reinventing Order,” in Reinventing Order in the Congo: 
How People Respond to State Failure in Kinshasa, ed. Theodore Trefon (London, New York 
and Kampala: Zed Books and Fountain Publishers, 2004), 1 – 19. 
71 EU Energy Initiative (EUEI), “Energy Policy Support to the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo” (EUEI, 2008), 1, www.euei-
pdf.org/sites/default/files/files/field_pblctn_file/FF_EUEI%2520PDF_Congo_Energy%
2520policy%2520support_Jun2008_EN.pdf  Accessed 10/09/2012; Katrina Manson, 
“World Bank to Delay Congo Hydro Project Three Years,” February 23, 2010, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/02/23/congo-democratic-inga-
idUKLDE61M2CT20100223 Accessed 18/04/2011.  
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orderly, set up with trunks and pieces of wood. One house hosts the generator 
and everyone contributes to the petrol. Electricity works from 6 to 10 pm. From 
Butembo it has now expanded to other provinces.  
 
In the photos below, it is possible to observe how there is now a whole electricity 
system created where meters of cables and wooden posts supply entire 
neighbourhoods.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 2. Street view with self-made electricity lines, Butembo, taken July 30, 2010 
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Image 3. Street in Goma, self-made electrical line, photo taken July 27, 2010. 
 
In Kinshasa people in poor neighbourhoods steal electricity from the official SNEL 
network. The problem is that this source does not always work. Hence the 
mockery and the renaming of the state electricity provider as the ‘National Society 
of Darkness’.72 Both strategies work to avoid government-provided services and 
their consequences, including taxes. As an electrician hosting one generator in a 
neighbourhood in Goma states: ‘we don't pay the tax for the electricity anymore 
because it is not provided, we do it ourselves’.73 The fact that it is less trouble and 
more straightforward to rely on proximity channels and one's own creativity for 
                                                   
72 From Société Nationale d’Electricité is called Société Nationale de l’Obscurité.  
73 Interview with Electrician in charge of Cooperative Generator, Goma, July 27, 2010. 
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survival, rather than engaging with the government to provide the services, 
demonstrates that self-provision is simultaneously a political disengagement from 
the government.  
 
The work of electricity, as with other activities, such as road maintenance and 
house construction, is often done through what is called ‘Salongo’. Salongo has 
had several adaptations. It was first a ‘perversion of a traditional custom of 
communal labor in service […] by colonial administrators to justify forced labor’.74 
It was then made ‘obligatory civic work’ by Mobutu as one-day a week work 
towards community service.75 Under Salongo, FARDC, armed group leaders and 
government authorities have justified forced labour, including mining, porter-
services, cooking and housework.76 In Butembo, it has been reappropriated as a 
way to provide community service and improve living conditions.77 In this case, 
the beneficiaries of a subverted Salongo are those who initiate these works and 
they are also those who need it or otherwise they will not have electricity. 
 
H e a l t h  
 
Health provision is a paradox because, as Zoë Marriage has pointed out, while a 
substantial amount of aid goes towards health services in Congo, it does not 
address the causes of why there is not a health service in the first place.78 As such, 
this is another area where the population provides for their own needs. Aside 
from the doctor per population ratio being 0.6 doctor per 1,000 inhabitants, 
infrastructures are either lacking or in very poor condition.79 Although funding 
                                                   
74 Free the Slaves, The Congo Report: Slavery in Conflict Minerals (Washington: Open Square 
Foundation, June 2011), 13. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., 13 – 14. 
77 Interview with “Chef de Quartier” (Neighbourhood representative)  Matumaini 
Walikomba, Butembo; Interview with “Nyumba Kumi” Neighbourhood Representative 
of 10 houses, Butembo; Focus Group Butembo Residents; Interview with Representative 
of Association pour la Defense de Droits de la Femme (ADDF), Butembo. 
78 Zoë Marriage, “Congo Co: Aid and Security,” Conflict, Security & Development 10, no. 3 
(2010): 353. 
79 UN Population Fund, The State of the World’s Midwifery (New York: United Nations, 
2011), 68; Interview with Ministry of Health representatives Fidel Ngoma and Tomas 
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may come from an INGO or foreign government aid agencies, population will still 
be asked to help with the repairs and construction of hospitals and health 
centres.80 
 
Health Ministry representatives confirmed this and added that ‘if someone does 
not have money, they can bring a goat so that it can be eaten by those working on 
the construction site’.81 The same applies to staff salaries and medicines provided. 
It relies on the contributions made by patients. There is a system in place that 
categorises the payment of the patients, A, B and C, according to each patient’s 
available means.82 This has been done through a combination of remnants of 
government health service, private practice and access to INGO funding. The 
South-Kivu provincial hospital in Bukavu works this way.83 State funds are 
unreliable and insufficient, and its management is done through a Catholic 
Church scheme. Each department is managed on a daily basis by the doctors and 
nurses working at the hospital, and their ongoing payment relies on the 
contributions made by the patients.84  
 
M a b u k u 8 5  
 
Much of this self-provision is illustrated by the town of Mabuku, a small town in 
the territory of Beni, North Kivu, where no official authority has a consistent 
presence. Police, intelligence officers (ANR) and administrators do not have a 
                                                                                                                                                   
Luzolo, Goma, July 20, 2010; Participant Observation XII South Kivu General Hospital, 
Bukavu, August 11, 2010. 
80 This is the case of the Walikale hospital, funded by Spanish Government aid agency, 
AECI, through the INGO, Rescate, and co-constructed and co-managed between Rescate, 
NGO Caritas-Goma, and local residents. Informal Conversation with Rescate and Caritas-
Goma representatives, July 23, 2010.  
81 Interview with Ministry of Health representatives Fidel Ngoma and Tomas Luzolo, 
Goma.  
82 Ibid. 
83 The same staff/patient management either directly or through the mediation of Catholic 
or Protestant Church schemes were present in Bunyakiri  (South Kivu), Butembo and 
Walikale (North Kivu) and Mbandaka and Gemena (Equateur).  
84 Informal Conversation with Emergency Unit Nurse, South Kivu General Hospital, 
Bukavu, August 11, 2010. 
85 Unless noted the information relies on: Participant Observation II, “Mabuku 
Environments and Village Life” Mabuku, August 2010. 
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permanent post. The Catholic Church, the hospital and a school are the closest 
forms of institutional authority present, where the population has a direct input, 
even in the decision-making process. There is an established payment scheme for 
teachers, nurses and doctors, who also provide a loose form of authority. For 
instance, the women of the village built the maternal wing of the small hospital/ 
health centre by collecting materials around the area and making their own bricks. 
They renamed it ‘Maternite Yetu’ (our maternity – figure below). They established 
a cooperative so that they can have a partnership with international organisations 
and thus distribute the money through different activities.86 Members of the 
cooperative receive training, a shovel, a hoe and a machete to work on their fields. 
They bring products to the cooperative from different villages nearby in order to 
trade them. They also contributed money to have a mill for flour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 4. Maternity Hospital, Mabuku, photo taken August 01, 2010 
Not only is it remarkable the extent to which all these important services are 
provided, and to which many more could be added, but also the extent to which 
this provision grants significant control over important social and political 
processes.87 This does not mean successful evasion of domination, but it entails 
                                                   
86 This included Veterinarios Sin Fronteras (VSF) and Doctors Without Borders. 
87 For an overview of DIY observations see summaries in Appendix III. Other prominent 
services include rubbish collection, road reparation, and house building. Interview with 
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resistance to it. As such, they could be seen, as Mac Gaffey noted of similar 
dynamics under Mobutu, as a ‘political option’ against ‘the interests of the state-
based class’.88 This ‘political option’ was seen for Mac Gaffey as one where ‘people 
confront a predatory state which fails to provide them with the opportunity to 
earn a living wage, with a functioning economic infrastructure or with basic social 
services’.89 These non-confrontational forms of resistance mitigate the effects of 
domination in which the production of social order and decision-making process 
are reappropriated. Retaking the language of the MONUSCO officer cited in 
Chapter Two, taking over these services provides the ‘software’ that 
operationalises the ‘state’. In this case, such operationalisation is being redirected 
to serve people’s needs, provoking, as Vlassenroot and Romkena argued the 
undermining of statebuilding in the process.  
 
 
6.  Conclusion: Reinventing authority 
 
The image at the start of this chapter represented those survival mechanisms that 
are not only a form of navigating a hostile environment, but an activation of 
multiple channels of exchange and production. These create mutual 
dependencies, resting on solidarity and reciprocity, and have the capacity to 
subvert the effects of domination. As Aili Mari Tripp states, the provision of, and 
control over, these services speaks to a broader issue of self-reliance and self-
organisation of the social and political arena:  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Goma’s Town Hall representative, July 27, 2010. 
88 Janet Mac Gaffey, Entrepeneurs and Parasites: The Struggle for Indigenous Capitalism in 
Zaire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 157. 
89 Ibid. 
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By pursuing their various survival strategies, people were not just 
responding to necessity, they were actively remoulding their own destinies. 
They were not only seeking new and innovative ways of obtaining an 
income, they were consciously and vigorously resisting the state. In the 
course of defying various anachronistic state policies, they were reshaping 
the political and economic structures that surrounded them.90 
 
Resistance, then, should be seen in the survival strategies as a mitigation of 
predation. And this predation is, in the eyes of many people, mainly the 
responsibility of state action. In the process, as Tripp reminds us, alternative 
forms of political organisation are being created. In this sense a further argument 
could be advanced: If, as Mbembe states, Africa has been portrayed as the 
‘embodiment of nothingness’, we might have to rethink Africa as the embodiment 
of creativity. Survival/DIY activities ‘signal renewal and creativity’ in ways that 
show ‘Africa… immeasurably more alive’.91 This goes from everyday needs, 
including facing the effects of war, to the recreation of new forms of social and 
political organisation.  
  
The chapter addressed one of the pillars of statebuilding: extraction and wealth 
distribution. Although extraction in the DRC has been seen as state-destructive 
rather than state-constructive, there is a certain logic to the way in which it is 
carried out.92 It produces authority. It is not necessarily invested, nor is there a 
project of turning subordinates into working and consuming taxpayers, but it 
allows for sectors of the elite to retain channels of appropriation and distribution. 
It is self-serving. These forms of authority assertion have been examined from the 
point of view of the effects they have on the civilian population’s living 
conditions. The chapter has indicated three areas of resistance through the 
dynamics of state presence, the layer of ‘post-conflict’ strategies, and the 
                                                   
90Aili Mari Tripp, “Everyday Forms of Resistance and Transformations of Economic Polic
y”, 161. 
91 Basil Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (Oxford: 
James Currey, 1992), 293. 
92 Kankwenda, L’Économie Politique de La Prédation Au Congo Kinshasa; Dominic Johnson 
and Christiane Kayser, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Shadow Economies in the ‘Heart 
of Darkness’,” in Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. Matthias Basedau and Andreas 
Mehler (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 2005), 145 – 171. 
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dynamics of state absence and the taking over of social provisions by the 
subordinate classes. These three areas illustrated patterns of responses and 
different characteristics of how resistance unfolds.  
 
The intent to impose taxes and elite-land distribution is directly rejected through 
tax evasion, disobedience and multiple strategies to retain land ownership and 
food security, especially through peasant cooperatives. Army deployment 
provokes a direct impact in the economic and political order. Its success is not 
only externalised politically and economically onto the population, it ends up 
depending on the population. Finally, taking over all sorts of social services 
provides simultaneously opportunities for avoiding state control and for 
establishing forms of social organisation where people have a more direct 
participation in decision-making processes. This may not be a ‘political threat’ as 
Maliyamkono and Bagachwa point out, ‘but they certainly pose an economic 
challenge to the official establishment’.93 This challenge has a significant political 
dimension since the ways in which state authority is resisted have embedded 
forms of reinventing social organisation and modes of political authority. 
 
This challenge is both theoretical and practical. On the one hand, statebuilding 
shows itself to be a less peaceful and committed method to building a developed, 
peaceful, democratic Congo, than it claims. On the other, it shows that as far as 
the practice of statebuilding is exercised on the ground in ways that contradict 
subordinate classes’ aspirations, it is stripped of legitimacy, attacked and 
subverted. Mac Ginty's ‘tale of two economics’ in Iraq, one official and one of 
survival, reflects how in the absence of an economy that is able to serve the needs 
of the population, the people go outside of the official channels, subverting one of 
the most important foundations of the liberal peace project.94 In other words, 
                                                   
93 Cited in Mac Gaffey, The Real Economy of Zaire, 157. 
94 Roger Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 15; chapter 5. 
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creative survival mechanisms prepare a fertile ground not to accept the state but 
to reject it.  
 
However, the balance between reciprocities and solidarities, on the one hand, and 
violence, inequalities and hardships, on the other, demonstrates the ambiguous 
character of survival. Trefon points out that the reinvention of order in Congo ‘has 
been characterized by tension, conflict, violence and betrayal, as much as by 
innovative forms of solidarity, networks, commercial accommodation and 
interdependencies’.95 Daily exchanges are the target of scams, deceits and 
chicanery. But from here important features of resistance can be extracted that 
relate back to the themes that have been explored in the course of this thesis.  
 
The analysis of resistance should not project onto the practices used or its actors 
the vision of an ethical world that characterises their own aspirations. Resistance 
is contradictory because it is not a permanent state of being for the actors 
concerned. Nor is it a neat succession of events that connect actors’ ideas with 
their everyday actions and outcomes. On the contrary, seen from the point of view 
of the actors, resistance is an ad-hoc limited and conditioned response to a 
particular context and various changing relationships. More so, the ambiguity of 
survival as both a site of domination and subversion makes resistance not 
something that can be analysed by its strategies, nor by its outcomes. From the 
point of view of the everyday micro level, resistance rests more on intent, as Scott 
argued. However, this intent is gradated along a political spectrum that ranges 
from individual protection against a particular claim, the collective refusal of it, to 
the attack against it and the disengagement from it. More important are the 
patterns created at the macro level by this variety of actions, making resistance a 
permanent feature of the process of statebuilding.     
 
                                                   
95 Trefon, “Introduction,” 2. 
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Conclusion 
A Heterogeneous and Prosaic Presence  
 
 
Independence cha, cha, tozui e, 
Independence, cha, cha, the day after… 
 
Promises of the day after, promises of the dawn 
of a sovereign state where the soil disappears 
between militias and rebels, pillages and spoils. 
People are moved around like livestock 
from parcel to parcel, from governance to guardianship. 
The rule of law is essential 
to our ethnic groups, plural yet united, 
butterfly effect, buffering effect. 
Because here we change gold into lead, 
the way to revolution is voting; 
strength in numbers is the antidote 
to change the debt into dowry 
with as many rights as duties 
more points of connection than differences, 
the welfare state: an idea to forget 
 
Independence cha, cha, tozui e, 
Independence, cha, cha, the day after…1 
 
 
 
1.  The Day After 
 
Fusing the traditional rumba song of Independence in Congo with rap, ‘the day 
after’ reflects the flip side of what Roland Paris called ‘At War’s End’.2 Post-
                                                   
1 Baloji with Royce Mbumba, Le Jour d’Après / Siku Ya Baadaye (Indépendance Cha-Cha), 
Album Kinshasa Succursale. (Kinshasa: Crammed Discs, 2011). This is a version of the 
‘Independence hymn’ in the DRC.  In the original, in French and Lingala, the chorus is 
‘Indépendence cha, cha, tozui e [we’ve won it], Indépendence cha, cha, tobakidi [we’ve 
achieved it]’.  
2 The song was composed by Joseph Kabasele (Le Grand Kallé), who was a member of the 
delegation sent to negotiate independence with Belgium in 1960. The song became not 
only the symbol of a historical victory in the DRC but also ‘the hymn of emancipation of 
the black continent’ Alain Mabanckou, “«Indépendance Cha-cha»,” Libération, July 8, 
2010, http://www.liberation.fr/monde/0101645734-independance-cha-cha Accessed 
13/11/2011; Paris, At War’s End.  
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conflict statebuilding is premised on building state authority as a necessary means 
to achieve and consolidate peace, democracy and development. However, its 
practice makes these aims more of a claim on which to legitimise authority than a 
manifestation of what is actually done. The reality of the practices of post-conflict 
statebuilding demonstrates that the reconstitution of political authority after 
conflict is a plural, contradictory and improvised exercise. Understanding 
resistance illustrates not just the challenges post-conflict statebuilding faces, but 
also the relations of domination that are fostered by it. Lack of attention to 
resistance has long provided a view of post-conflict statebuilding as 
overpowering and monolithic in peace and conflict studies. The turn to study 
everyday forms of resistance has provided a more grounded critique of post-
conflict statebuilding, but has left resistance undertheorised.   
 
Using a Scottian framework the thesis explored practices of resistance embedded 
in everyday life, such as mockery, violence, and reappropriation. These had in 
common the denial and mitigation of domination, even if they presented 
qualitative differences and varied intensities. The lyrics of Baloji illustrate the 
political significance of the critique emanating from ordinary life, however covert 
and uncoordinated it may be. The song does not represent an organised 
movement under a structured ideology. Yet, we are told that what happens after the 
promises of liberation and change is more war, dependency, displacement and 
plunder. Baloji’s rap reflects that critique is simultaneously the art of exposing 
lived experience against the unfulfilled promises of authority, while furthering a 
world-view of redemption and justice: a diverse people causing a ‘butterfly effect’, 
uniting for the enjoyment of what rightfully belongs to them.  
 
This illustrates how everyday resistance unfolds: elite claims and the effects of 
domination are refused or mitigated by individuals or collectives in subordinate 
positions, while advancing their own agenda. These claims and effects are, in the 
DRC, as they are elsewhere, the reflection of the historicity of the space in which 
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they are embedded. The agenda that is advanced rejects the present, which is 
portrayed as unjust and illegitimate against an imaginary future of freedom and 
justice. Far from advancing a revolutionary agenda, this imaginary remains 
within the realm of modest demands and often within mainstream discourse (with 
as many rights as duties). However, it undermines the legitimacy of political 
alternatives so far given only as promises (the rule of law, voting, the welfare state), 
by exposing the experience of displacement, debt, poverty and pillaging. This 
does not mean a rejection of democracy or welfare per se, but the critique 
interprets them as contradictory to the everyday experience of dispossession and 
violence. Delegitimising authority and the projection of alternative political 
agendas go alongside other practices of resistance, which relate to the nature of 
the political space.  
 
Taking into consideration that statebuilding is characterised by plural authority 
and by the use of coercive and extractive practices, it was argued that resistance 
takes place in several forms and relating to how statebuilding is experienced. 
What defines resistance, regardless of how it is practiced, is that it is a pattern 
within relations of domination. Its aim, whether achieved or not, is to deny or 
mitigate this domination, in its multiple representations. Resistance is carried out 
with an agenda in mind, which reflects not just the self-centred interests of the 
individual or collectives undertaking it, but also a sense of injustice, of illegitimate 
authority or moral outrage. Practices of resistance reflect the political context. In 
the militarised and complex context of the DRC, both state absences and 
presences impact on the political order. This creates a context of self-help in which 
non-violent practices can be seen taking place alongside the formation and use of 
popular militias. Practices that overtly challenge authority, whether discursively 
or physically, go hand in hand with practices that are self-regarding, but still 
subversive of domination. In order to discuss the implications of these ideas, this 
chapter highlights the major contributions of the thesis to the study of its three 
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core elements: resistance, post-conflict statebuilding, and Eastern DRC. To 
conclude, the final section discusses the avenues opened for future research. 
 
 
2.  A Reworked Account of Resistance and its Practices   
 
The thesis explored everyday resistance in post-conflict statebuilding with several 
aims in mind: to analyse the practices that constitute it, to assess whether the 
framework of everyday resistance was applicable to such context, and to address 
the limitations identified in the peace and conflict literature. The result of this 
research has been to offer a contribution in those three areas. The critical 
assessment of Scott’s framework has provided useful guidance to identify 
practices of resistance and assess the validity of the framework, while developing 
the framework itself and adding elements of De Certeau to it. The thesis has also 
established several elements that any framework of resistance should follow, thus 
contributing more broadly to the interdisciplinary debates on resistance. This 
section takes these elements in turn. 
 
N o  s p e c i a l  f o r m s  o f  r e s i s t a n c e  
 
One of the main arguments advanced has been that resistance is heterogenous in 
its practices, but it is a prosaic, commonplace presence. This therefore also applies 
to statebuilding, suggesting that there is no special resistance found in 
statebuilding contexts, nor there is a need for a special framework. Resistance, as a 
pattern of practices by actors in a position of subordination, and post-conflict 
statebuilding, as a process of reconstituting political authority, reflect a 
historically contingent process, which fosters relations of domination, which are 
plural, contradictory, and improvised. The implication is that an analysis of 
everyday resistance requires an alternative account of post-conflict statebuilding 
highlighting its historical and sociological features. 
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D e v e l o p m e n t s  o f  t h e  S c o t t i a n  F r a m e w o r k  a n d  C o m p l e m e n t s  o f  D e  
C e r t e a u   
 
In applying Scott’s framework critically, the account of resistance has been 
reworked in three ways. Firstly, it was noted that this framework needed to 
emphasise more forcefully that beyond the particular acts employed, it is the 
patterns these follow and the relation in which they are embedded that gives 
these individual and collective acts political significance. They are not random. 
These acts respond to the ways in which domination is denied or mitigated as a 
constant in relations of domination.  
 
Secondly, it was noted that these acts also carry with them an alternative agenda 
that generally motivates actors to undertake resistance. It has been important to 
illustrate that agenda advancing is not an act of resistance alongside denial or 
mitigation of elite claims, as Scott had argued, but that this is a permanent 
motivation underlying whatever practices of resistance subordinate groups may 
take up.  
 
Thirdly, it was argued that the elements of resistance - intensity, visibility of 
intentionality and engagement with claims - should be gradated. Having different 
gradients provides a solution to the problem of gathering intent, its visibility, and 
the diverse range of acts. In regards to this last point, the framework provided a 
category of claim-regarding acts and another one, inspired in De Certeau, of self-
regarding acts. Thus everyday resistance can manifest itself as an attack or direct 
denial against authority claims in the form of insults, mockery, armed violence, or 
tax evasion. It can also take the form of subversion, including redefining the ideals 
embedded in the post-conflict statebuilding discourse, using armed groups to 
protect oneself, or mitigating the dominating effects of military rule through 
negotiation and creative survival. The De Certeaunian ‘self-regarding’ practices 
identify acts that deny or mitigate elite claims indirectly. These acts have the self 
(individual or collective) at the centre of the action. By using or ignoring the 
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claims, have the capacity to subvert these claims. Actions like entering into 
negotiations with the military or enacting forms of survival facilitate not only the 
mitigation of authoritarian forms of rule and the effects of poverty, but they also 
give way to alternative forms of social organisation and political authority. 
 
Fourthly, the framework addressed the relationship between the Scottian 
framework and violence. Although, as this thesis has argued, violence is part of 
Scott’s work, it remained underdeveloped. This thesis has provided a more 
consistent account of the fact that the framework of everyday resistance is defined 
by the nature of the relationship between authority and subordination, and not by 
the particular acts used. Everyday forms of resistance establish a framework to 
understand that the tendency to enact unconfrontational and unorganised self-
help practices against everyday forms of domination is connected to the ability 
these methods have to avoid repression. Thus, everyday resistance is not 
necessarily violent or non-violent, and it is not necessarily without effect. 
Different practices need to be seen alongside and in relation to the political 
context in which they are embedded. This is particularly significant in 
statebuilding, as processes that have the capacity to generate violence. Moreover, 
there is a need to account for the relationship between everyday violence and the 
everyday forms of resistance. Although this had already been advanced by 
authors theorising hybridity and transformation in peacebuilding contexts, this 
thesis has elaborated the ways in which violence relates to everyday forms of 
resistance, independently of its outcomes.3   
 
E l e m e n t s  o f  R e s i s t a n c e  
 
The implication from the above is to have also been able to establish that any 
framework of resistance needs to connect patterns with intentions, motivations, 
acts and actors in a relation of domination. This speaks to the interdisciplinary 
                                                   
3 In particular: Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance; Mitchell, Lost in 
Transformation. 
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debates on resistance and has the capacity to make a broader contribution. The 
thesis produced a robust conceptual framework while being flexible, establishing 
a series of elements and gradients that may adapt to other contexts. In particular, 
the framework embraced ambiguity, both addressing its own limitations and the 
complex relation between ‘reality’ and ‘interpretation’. The fact that resistance 
and domination do not speak of permanent states of being but of an ongoing, 
changing relation, requires theorising relations of domination in reference to their 
fluid boundaries. Daily life and its political context cannot be accounted for only 
by reference to a relation of domination and resistance. However, not only 
resistance represents an important dynamic in the DRC, as in other statebuilding 
contexts, it is a prosaic presence. A reworked account of resistance has to be seen 
in tandem with the alternative account of post-conflict statebuilding, and of the 
DRC.   
 
 
3.  An Alternative Account of Statebuilding 
 
The thesis applied a historical sociological perspective to account for patterns of 
authority assertion, extraction, and violence distribution in statebuilding 
processes. The thesis contributed in this respect to the political sociological and 
anthropological readings of statebuilding as sharing features with state-formation. 
Statebuilding was conceptualised as a contradictory, plural and improvised 
process of authority assertion in which multiple actors including state, non-state 
national and international are implicated. What it added was the possibility to 
identify resistance practices, not only for being part of the complex processes, and 
agencies that mould and hybridise statebuilding, but as part of a distinct 
relationship emerging from practices of appropriation and violence in 
statebuilding. It was also stated that there is not one but many statebuilding 
processes taking place. This idea highlighted the intersecting, improvised and 
second agendas that come into place from myriad of actors, whether local, 
national, regional or international.  
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An additional original contribution has been to draw historical sociology, peace 
and conflict and Africanist literatures into dialogue with each other. While the 
turn to practices as a methodological mechanism in peace and conflict studies has 
been fruitful, this thesis has linked everyday practices to broader historical 
patterns and contextualised the account with reference to literature theorising the 
nature of an African political context.  
 
Drawing on Tilly’s account that sees coercion and accumulation as fundamental 
driving forces in any statebuilding process, the thesis identified militarisation and 
extraction as prominent features of statebuilding in present DRC. These do not fit 
a narrative of centralisation and institutionalisation, but they reflect patterns in 
violence and wealth management as sources of state authority. Even though the 
post-conflict statebuilding discourse generates important dynamics regarding the 
‘pose’ statebuilders need to adopt to legitimise their actions, state authority 
assertion is linked to power-sharing agreements between warring parties, military 
strategies and political compromises. These include shared coercive and extractive 
capacity with foreign countries, state and non-state actors. The DRC case 
illustrates that state authority is seen as paramount to other post-conflict strategies 
like democratisation, economic reconstruction and even peace. However, it also 
illustrates that state authority may be represented, mediated, shared or 
compromised by other institutions, actors, and even other competing state 
authorities. These practices show the plural, chaotic and improvised nature of 
post-conflict statebuilding.  
 
The historical sociological reading of statebuilding has analysed how macro, 
micro, present and historical dynamics interrelate with patterns of continuity and 
change. The importance this has for future research on resistance is to place its 
study not so much as a response to an internationally-led project, or as an agency 
of hybridisation, but as a patterned denial and mitigation of the coercive and 
extractive practices of building state authority. The commonplace nature of 
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resistance in state – society relations has also shown the need to ‘pay attention to 
micro-developments that are often governed by contingency but taking care to 
place these within broader patterns of historical development’.4 Contextualising 
the account of statebuilding is also imperative for understanding resistance as 
well as the particularities of how statebuilding is conducted. 
 
 
4.  The DRC: Theory Development and its Challenges 
 
The status of Eastern DRC as a ‘tough case’ proved to be an insight for the study 
of everyday resistance and post-conflict statebuilding. It has expanded the variety 
of cases the peace and conflict literature on resistance has drawn on. Two 
implications should be highlighted regarding the extent to which the insights 
generated from the case study can be generalised. Firstly, for the account of 
resistance, Eastern DRC has offered the opportunity to explore ambiguities in the 
actors and practices of resistance. Secondly, Eastern DRC, with one of the highest 
war-related death tolls in post-Cold War conflicts, one of the few instances of 
multi-state war of this period, and hosting one of the largest and the longest 
missions in UN history, has provided an excellent case to explore the complex and 
contradictory nature of post-conflict statebuilding.  
 
A m b i g u i t i e s ,  C o m p l e x i t i e s  a n d  C o m p e t i n g  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  
 
The DRC facilitated a rich standpoint from which to observe the application of the 
developed framework and the possible challenges to it. Interestingly, the 
challenge posed by the context of statebuilding and the DRC highlighted a 
convergence of several literatures with implications for the study of resistance. 
Certain critical analyses of post-conflict statebuilding, in seeing it as a reflection of 
the structure of power in world politics, provided a monolithic and overpowering 
view of post-conflict statebuilding. Within this literature, those who have focused 
                                                   
4 Hobson, Lawson, and Rosenberg, “Historical Sociology,” 3360. 
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on resistance have advanced a more nuanced view of statebuilding, but their lack 
of regard for history and class in the analyses have disregarded an important 
account of accumulation and coercion in statebuilding.5 The political sociological 
analyses of intervention have seen resistance as part of the agencies and processes 
that mould statebuiliding. What this shows is that from the peace and conflict 
literature resistance has served a more nuanced and critical analysis of 
statebuilding, but not of resistance per se.  
 
Similarly, Africanist literatures have provided nuanced understandings and 
critiques of how structures of power operate in daily life. However, they have in 
turn portrayed an image of subjection, and an imbalanced account of power. 
Africanist scholars have objected to Scott’s unambiguous interpretation of certain 
acts as resistance, offering in return, a certain univocal reading of power relations, 
of subjection and accommodation. These competing interpretations are not 
surprising since power and resistance cannot be theorised with regards to 
independently existing facts. What has been surprising is to find a convergence of 
literatures seeing ‘agency’, ‘process’, ‘complexity’, and ‘hybridisation’ as limiting, 
or even skeptical of, the possiblity to account for resistance in its own right. These 
divergences need to be explained. 
 
For example, in regards to discourses and, mockery in particular, Mbembe 
criticises Scott, Toulabor and, more extensively, Bakhtin. In Mbembe’s articulation 
of post-colonial political authority, mockery, derision, and popular discourses 
should not be seen as tools of the governed but as the banal dramatisation of 
political power.6 For Mbembe, the way authorities become symbolised in jokes 
and derision with reference to the anus, genitals, sexual intercourse, defecations 
or belching, is evidence of power’s descent to the banal, its usurpation of popular 
                                                   
5 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, 13. 
6 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 104.  
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discourses and its own dramatisation.7 Henceforth, derision is not the domain of 
resistance against power but of power’s own reproduction.  
 
Mbembe and Scott are not far from agreement. Mbembe’s point is that post-
colonial relations are too complex and muddled to see them through a prism of 
categories that are based on structures that are not necessarily opposed but 
negotiated.8 But Mbembe agrees that despite these sophisticated tools of intimate 
and entangled power relations, oppressive structures and their subversion play a 
constant game of readjustment where none of them are completely able to subject 
or subvert the other.9 It is here where the ambiguity of the pose demonstrates how 
Scott’s framework is able to adapt to the gradients of social conflict and its 
plurality. According to Scott, the confluence in vocabulary between Karen 
millennial Buddhist sects opposing Burman rule was evidence that ‘the remedy 
for a bad king was a better king’.10 Likewise, the same ideals and vocabulary that 
serve to legitimise post-conflict  statebuilding, serve to challenge such legitimacy.  
 
Mbembe also reminds us that ‘the ways in which societies compose and invent 
themselves in the present—what we could call the creativity of practice—is always 
ahead of the knowledge we can ever produce about them’.11 Any practice of 
resistance has to be understood as embedded in the practice of everyday life, 
without trying to reduce daily life to a binary relation of domination and 
resistance. Survival strategies and non-elite reappropriation escape rigid 
categorisation, but they also display the elements of claims, denial/mitigation and 
agenda advancing that are present in relations of domination. These strategies 
facilitate non-elite denial of the state’s extractive and wealth distributive 
mechanisms; they mitigate statebuilding’s negative consequences, including the 
externalities of peace strategies; and they represent self-organisational 
                                                   
7 Ibid., 108 – 113. 
8 Mbembe, “Domaines de La Nuit et Autorité Onirique,” 106.  
9 Achille Mbembe, Afriques Indociles: Christianisme, Pouvoir et État En Société Postcoloniale 
(Paris: Karthala, 1988), 217. 
10 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 307. 
11 Weaver Shipley, “Africa in Theory,” 654, emphasis in the original. 
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arrangements closer to alternative political agendas of participation, distribution 
and social service. The particularity of these strategies is that the same way that 
militias are an effect of statebuilding, understood as the continuation of war and 
the militarisation of peace, survival strategies are an effect of statebuilding, 
understood within the context of presence and absence of multiple authorities and 
their distributive and extractive capacity.  
 
Regarding the use of violence, the thesis pointed out that Scott’s framework is not 
one of peaceful resistance per se, but a framework to analyse the political 
significance of these quotidian practices. Because Scott’s studies are not settled in 
a context of war, they concentrate on relatively peaceful practices. However, Scott 
acknowledges that even within these contexts, boycotts, hit-and-run and guerrilla 
tactics are habitual.12 ‘Such low profile techniques’ Scott argues ‘are admirably 
suited to the social structure of the peasantry – a class scattered across the country 
side, lacking formal organization and best equipped for extended, guerrilla-style, 
defensive campaigns of attrition’.13 That is, despite the use of violence, guerrilla-
style tactics are not rare and they follow the patterns of other practices regarding 
loose organisation and avoidance of direct confrontation. Moreover, in the words 
of Mkandawire, the thesis embraced the challenge that ‘fatally flawed and morally 
reprehensible though these movements may be, one needs to take their political 
roots and ideological cognitive components seriously, even as their banditry 
confounds their political agenda’.14 This ambiguous ground problematised the 
account of resistance but unearthed important nuances without imposing a 
Manichean vision on it. 
 
The militarised context and the historical dynamics of self-reliance generated 
interesting insights into different practices, showing that not just opposition and 
attack, but also reciprocity and solidarity are important mechanisms against 
                                                   
12 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 241.  
13 Ibid., xvi – xvii. 
14 Mkandawire, “The Terrible Toll of Postcolonial Rebel Movements,” 107. 
 284 
domination. Different practices run alongside each other, also affording the 
possibility to observe the interplay between violence, self-defence and political 
aspirations for social justice. Even if the same practices may give rise to different 
conclusions, the analysis has established a way to challenge uni-vocal readings of 
discourse, violence, and survival, as agencies of subjection, or as evidence of 
domination. 
 
I n s i g h t  o f  S t a t e b u i l d i n g  
 
Regarding statebuilding, the DRC illustrated the reconstruction of state authority 
as mediated by different national, international, state and non-state actors. This 
mediation has fostered the pursuit of state security agendas through formulas of 
shared sovereignty, proxy wars through militias and a militarisation of extractive 
capacity. These formulas have created a contradiction between the aim of 
reconstituting state authority and the aim of furthering peace. This contradiction 
responds partly to accommodate the interests of Rwanda and allies in the region, 
as well as to the perception that the instability of the region is primarily due to the 
DRC as a failed state.   
 
These dynamics are likely to continue. Nearly two decades into the conflict in 
Eastern DRC, a rebellion re-started in March 2012. Once again the CNDP, this 
time with Bosco Ntanganda (instead of General Nkunda), and renamed M23, has 
led a movement of desertion throughout the army, taking command in several 
territories in North Kivu (Masisi and Rutshuru) and taking the town of Goma in 
November 2012.15 There have been familiar developments and responses. Rwanda 
and Uganda have denied any involvement, while UN and Human Rights Watch 
                                                   
15 There has been debate as to whether they were the same movement or not. However, all 
official communiqués are signed as CNDP – M23. M23, “CNDP-M23 Communiqués,” Site 
Officiel Du M23, 2012, http://www.m23mars.org/category/communiques/ Accessed 
4/11/2012. Jason Stearns argues that their leadership, funding and positions, especially in 
Masisi and Rutshuru, make them the same, with the M23 having less social support than 
the heydays of the CNDP. Stearns, From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed 
Movement in Eastern Congo, 48. 
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reports argued the opposite.16 The DRC government has already entered into 
discussions with Angola to secure support in case of a full-on invasion by these 
governments.17 Up to 650,000 people have been displaced, war crimes have 
already been reported and Kabila has called on the population to attend the 
‘obligation to resist the imposition of war [and] for everyone to participate in the 
defence of the national sovereignty’.18 Several armed groups have been formed as 
a popular response to the CNDP’s uprising. Some are attached to the DRC and 
neighbouring governments, others are the ongoing popular response to the 
continued violence. The official responses from the government and the UN 
aiming to the reintegration of troops have been claimed as a ‘dead-end’ precisely 
because the old reintegration strategies have weakened the army, have 
incentivised the taking up of arms and have ultimately furthered militarisation 
and reproduced violence.19 
 
The DRC case illustrates that there are multiple statebuilding processes, multiple 
state agendas operating outside and through international organisations. Even 
when an actor like the UN could be seen operating in a relatively unified manner, 
                                                   
16 The reports were: UN Group of Experts, Addendum to the Interim Report of the Group of 
Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2012/348/Add.1; Human Rights Watch, 
“DR Congo: Rwanda Should Stop Aiding War Crimes Suspect,” June 4, 2012, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/03/dr-congo-rwanda-should-stop-aiding-war-
crimes-suspect-0 Accessed 04/06/2012. Rwanda’s response: Rwandan Foreign Affairs 
Ministry, “Conférence de Presse de La Ministre Des Affaires Étrangères Du Rwanda, Sur 
La Situation Dans l’Est de La République Démocratique Du Congo.” (Public Information 
Office, MONUSCO, June 25, 2012).  
17 Radio Okapi, “Mutinerie Aux Kivu: Le Ministre Des Affaires Étrangères de La RDC En 
Visite En Angola,” June 16, 2009, 
http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/06/16/mutinerie-aux-kivu-le-ministre-congolais-
des-affaires-etrangeres-en-visite-en-angola/ Accessed 17/06/2012. 
18 The UNHCR notes that there have been 650,000 new displaced since the beginning of 
2012 and that its partners had reported extra judicial killings and pillage. UNHCR - 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, “As Fighting Reaches Goma, UNHCR Asking States 
Not to Return Refugees,” UNHCR, November 20, 2012, 
http://www.unhcr.org/50ab67829.html Accessed 22/11/2012. Kabila’s statement: Digital 
Congo, “Le Président Joseph Kabila Appelle Les Congolais à Se Mobiliser,” November 21, 
2012, http://www.digitalcongo.net/article/88032  Accessed 21/11/2012. 
19 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen, “Guest Blog: The M23 Rebellion and the 
Dead-end Street of Military Integration in Eastern DRC,” Congo Siasa, August 1, 2012, 
http://congosiasa.blogspot.co.uk/2012/08/guest-blog-m23-rebellion-and-dead-end.html 
Accessed 22/08/2012. 
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as has been the case since 2008 regarding the military strategies and statebuilding 
in the DRC, the relation between statebuilding and resistance cannot be seen as 
one of international vs. local actors. Nor can this be solely be accounted for in 
terms of state-society relations. As was shown, practices of coercion and 
accumulation have been fostered, legitimised or created by international actors. 
Resistance in the DRC reflects these dynamics and thus becomes also complex.  
 
 
5.  Reflections and Openings  
 
The focus on resistance is a way of opening a debate. Embracing its ambiguities 
and complexities entails entering a multidisciplinary and long-standing 
intellectual discussion. The study of resistance is just beginning to be established 
as an integral part of the debates in post-conflict statebuilding and peacebuilding, 
generally. A first step has been to establish that exploring resistance is an 
important part of providing a more nuanced, realistic and critical account of 
statebuilding. The next step therefore is to have a more nuanced and critical 
account of resistance. This thesis has provided the ground for such an account and 
argued which core elements it should be concerned with. Different avenues may 
come to light with the comparison of more case studies, or with a comparison 
with other frameworks. There is ample scope to compare how more overt and 
organised practices of resistance relate to the more covert and uncoordinated ones 
under different frameworks. This has to do not just with the particular conceptual 
standpoint used to account for it, but also, with the need to gradate and categorise 
its practices.  
 
The thesis did not account for forms of resistance as a route towards political 
change in the form that Richmond has proposed. The implication, however, is not 
that the study of resistance is empty of ethical forms of activism or revolutionary 
capacity. Indeed, an important insight from the research has been that despite the 
war environment and the dominating effects of statebuilding, popular aspirations 
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for justice and well-being not only do not go away, they become even more 
relevant. The argument advanced is that resistance cannot be accounted for in 
Manichean ways. After all, ‘there are not good subjects of resistance’.20 Staying 
away from analyses along the ‘unmanly’ divides of  “good” and “evil” is to 
recognise the contradictions embedded in social and political action.21 Manichean 
analyses, as Mbembe argues, have a particular legacy in Africa, as part of ‘a moral 
economy—whose power of falsification derives from its opaque ties with the cult 
of suffering and victimization’.22 The implication is, Mbembe continues, that the 
‘African subject cannot express him- or herself in the world other than as a 
wounded and traumatized subject’.23 The intention of the thesis is to contribute to 
a breaking up with these divides. This does not mean a rejection of an ethical 
commitment to research, but it does seek to ‘avoid the philosophical pathology of 
demanding that the world reflect our conception of it’.24 
 
What these millenarian anthozoans of resistance mean for the realisation of the 
agendas of social justice embedded in its practice is another matter.25 In 
wondering whether the DRC might have a ‘Tahir Square moment’, Stearns argues 
that the main obstacle to such moment taking place is lack of leadership, whether 
on the part of the political opposition or on the part of social movements to 
channel support around them and build ‘social capital’.26 Everyday forms of 
                                                   
20 Colin Gordon cited in Scott, Weapons of the Weak, vii. 
21 ‘Our weak, unmanly social concepts of good and evil and their tremendous ascendancy 
over body and soul have finally weakened all bodies and souls and snapped the self-
reliant, independent, unprejudiced men, the pillars of a strong civilization’. Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, ed. Maudemarie Clark and 
Brian Leiter, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 100.  
22 Achille Mbembe, “On the Power of the False,” trans. Judith Inggs, Public Culture 14, no. 
3 (2002): 630. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Joseph Hoover and Marta Iñiguez de Heredia, “Philosophers, Activists, and Radicals: a 
Story of Human Rights and Other Scandals.,” Human Rights Review 12, no. 1 (2011): 191. 
25 Cf. James Scott: ‘[J]ust as millions of anthozoan polyps create, willy-nilly, a coral reef, so 
do the multiple acts of peasant insubordination and evasion create political and economic 
barrier reefs of their own’. Weapons of the Weak, xvii.  
26 Jason Stearns, “The Congo: A Revolution Deferred,” Possible Futures, March 8, 2012, 
http://www.possible-futures.org/2012/03/08/congo-revolution-deferred/ Accessed 
27/03/2012. 
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resistance are the ‘social capital’ of revolution, but they cannot be theorised as if 
they mattered only if they work towards it. Nonetheless, it would be a disservice 
to the analysis leaving with the idea that everyday forms of resistance do not 
change anything. They do. They are the microscopic reworking of political and 
social order.27 Everyday forms of resistance rework meanings, advance agendas, 
place limitations on how domination is imposed and create alternative forms of 
social organisation and political authority. These may not be enough to stop war, 
change the government and the rules of international political economy, but they 
may be the basis for more meaningful social and political order. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
27 Cf. ‘The actual order of things is precisely what “popular” tactics turn to their own 
ends, without any illusion that it will change any time soon’. De Certeau, Practice of 
Everyday Life, 26.  
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Appendix I  
List of Interviewees and Research material  cited  
 
 
1.  Formal Interviews 
 
 Interviewee Details Group Place Date Language 
1 Political Science Professor  
University of Kinshasa 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Kinshasa 7/07/2009 French 
2 CENCO - Episcopal 
Conference representative 
Kinshasa 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Kinshasa 8/07/2009 French 
3 Representative Association 
des Femmes Violés 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Kinshasa 8/07/2009 French 
4 Group Jeremie 
Representative 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Kinshasa 9/07/2009 French 
5 Freddy Monsa Iyaka Suken  
Director of News Group Le 
Potenciel 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Kinshasa 
 23/07/2009 French 
6 University of Kinshasa 
(UniKin) Student Union 
representative 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Kinshasa 
 24/07/2009 French 
7 Comité pour la Défense des 
Droits de l’Homme et le 
Développement (CODHOD) 
 
Civil 
society/ 
population Kinshasa 25/07/2009 French 
8 Eglise de Cristo 
representative 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Kinshasa 25/07/2009 French 
9 Renuveau de l’Accion 
Syndical (RAS) 
Representative 
 
Civil 
society/ 
population Kinshasa 27/07/2009 French 
10 NGO Observatoire des Droits 
de l’Homme et Contre la 
Torture 
 
Civil 
society/ 
population Kinshasa 29/07/2009 French 
11 Philomène Mukendi 
Angels du Ciel (NGO for 
street and orphan children) 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Kinshasa 6/07/2010 French 
12 Caritas Justice and Peace 
Commission Representative  
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Goma 13/07/2009 French 
13 Heal Africa representative Civil 
society/ 
population 
Goma 13/07/2009 English 
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14 Centre pour la Gouvernance 
Participative 
 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Goma 14/07/2009 English 
15 Researcher at Pole Institute 
 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Goma 22/07/2010 French 
16 SOCICO - North Kivu 
representative 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Goma 23/07/2010 French 
17 Louis Batenda  
General Director of 
Ucoopanoki Cooperative 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Goma 23/07/2010 French 
18 Cojeski Representative 
(Collectif des Organisations 
des Jeunes Solidaires de 
Congo-Kinshasa) 
 
Civil 
society/ 
population Goma 26/07/2010 French 
19 Association de Femmes pour 
la Pacification et le 
Developpement (AFEPADE) 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Goma 26/07/2010 French 
20 Electrician in charge of 
Cooperative Generator 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Goma 27/07/2010 
Swahili 
translated 
to French 
      
21 Eric Kajemba  
Diretor of the Observatoire 
Gouvernance et Paix 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Bukavu 16/07/2009 French 
22 Tibere Dunia  
Researcher at the 
Observatoire Governance et 
Paix 
Civil 
society/ 
population Bukavu 16/07/2009 French 
23 Group Jeremie 
Representative 1 
 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Bukavu 16/07/200925/08/2010 French 
24 Group Jeremie 
Representative 2 
Civil 
society/ 
population  
Bukavu 16/07/2009 French 
25 Seminarist Catholic 
University of Bukavu 
 
Civil 
society/ 
population  
Bukavu 17/07/2009 French 
26 Father Thèofile Gakunzi Civil 
society/ 
population 
Bukavu 26/08/2010 French 
27 Bukavu Resident, Witness of 
2004 Nkunda Attacks 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Bukavu 04/09/2010 French 
28 Peasant Union Member  
(no. 151) 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Bukavu 8/09/2010 French 
29 Representative from Union 
Paysanne pour le 
Developpement Integral 
(UPDI) 
Civil 
society/ 
population Bukavu 8/09/2010 French 
30 Sofie Kikongo Kisimila, 
Member of Justice and Peace 
Commission 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Masisi 24/07/2010 French 
 291 
31 President of Civil Society - 
Masisi  
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Masisi 12/09/2011 French 
32 Massica Cafana Femmes 
Engagés pour la Promotion 
de la Santé Integrale (FEPSI)  
Civil 
society/ 
Customary 
authority 
Butembo 30/07/2010 French 
33 Association pour la Defense 
de Droits de la Femme 
(ADDF) 
Civil 
society/ 
Customary 
authority 
Butembo 30/07/2010 French 
34 “Nyumba Kumi” 
Neighbourhood 
Representative of 10 houses 
Civil 
society/ 
Customary 
authority 
Butembo 30/07/2010 French 
35 Matumaini Walikomba  
“Chef de Quartier” 
(Neighbourhood 
representative)   
Civil 
society/ 
population Butembo 31/07/2010 French 
36 Clarisse Ngemulo Activity 
Animator of the League des 
Organisation de Femmes 
Paysannes de Congo 
(LOFEPACO)  
Civil 
society/ 
population Butembo 31/07/2010 French 
37 Syndicat de Protection des 
Intérets Paysans 
 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Beni 02/08/2010 French 
38 Secretary General of the 
Buloho Chiefdom in Maibano 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Bunyakiri  19/08/2010 French 
39 Association de Femmes pour 
les Initiatives de Paix (AFIP) 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Bunyakiri 19/08/2010 French 
40 Alliance pour la Paix et la 
Concorde APC 
Representative  
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Bunyakiri  20/08/2010 French 
41 Femmes Père Saint-Simon 
Representative of Women’s 
Group  
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Bunyakiri 20/08/2010 French 
42 Action pour la Protection des 
Droits Humaines et le 
Développement 
Communautaires (APDHUD) 
 
Civil 
society/ 
population Bunyakiri 20/08/2010 French 
43 Juma Pili Kabambi, Imam of 
the Islamic Community 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Bunyakiri 20/08/2010 French 
44 Association of Market Sellers 
and Buyers of South Kivu 
 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Bunyakiri 20/08/2010 French 
45 Bamwicho Bikanaba  
Representative of the 
Committee of Itinerant 
Traders Association  
 
 
Civil 
society/ 
population Bunyakiri  
 
 
21/08/2010 
 
 
 
French 
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46 Voix de sans Voix Human 
Rights NGO Representative  
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Bunyakiri 21/08/2010 French 
47 Representatives of 
Association Manioc 
Producers 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Bunyakiri 21/08/2010 
Swahili 
translated 
to French 
48 Commité de Coordination et 
des Activités de Paix (CCAP 
representative) 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Uvira 28/08/2010 French 
49 Women’s Rights NGO  
Femmes et Enfants en 
Détresse pour le 
Developpement Integrel 
(FEDI)  
Civil 
society/ 
population Baraka 1/09/2010 French 
50 Interviews with Baraka 
Market Sellers 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Baraka 1/09/2010 
Swahili 
translated 
to French 
51 Ildefonse Masumbo Zongolo 
Refugee Protection 
Supervisor of NGO Arche 
D’Alliance 
Civil 
society/ 
population Baraka 1/09/2010 French 
52 Fizi SOCICO representative Civil 
society/ 
population 
Baraka 1/09/2010 French 
53 Comité de Paix 
representative 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Baraka 1/09/2010 French 
54 Banyamulengue Sheep 
Herder 
Civil 
society/ 
population 
Baraka 4/09/2010 French 
55 Evariste Mfume 
Solidarités de Volontaires 
pour l’Humanité (SVH) 
Director  
Civil 
society/ 
population Baraka 16/09/2011 French 
      
56 Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri 
Combatant 
Mai Mai Kinshasa 10/07/2009 French 
57 Simba Mai Mai/ MRS 
Combatant  
Mai Mai  Bukavu 5/08/2009 French 
58 Mai Mai Yakotumba 
Combatant  
Mai Mai  Baraka 3/09/2010 French 
59 Demobilised Combatant from 
Mai Mai General Dunia  
Mai Mai  Baraka 3/09/2010 French 
      
60 Amani Leo Operations 
Officer 
Amani Leo Goma 13/09/2010 French 
61 FARDC General (no. 146) 
Bukavu 
FARDC Bukavu 7/09/2010 French 
62 FARDC Colonel in Baraka 
(no. 129) 
FARDC Baraka 31/08/2010 French 
63 FARDC Officer in Baraka (no. 
162) 
FARDC Baraka 17/09/2011 French 
      
64 Government Representative  
(no. 31)  
Government Kinshasa 22/07/2009 French 
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65 Ministry of Planning 
representative Government Kinshasa 07/09/2010 French 
66 Deputy for Uvira  Government Kinshasa 23/09/2011 French 
67 Deputy for Goma Government Kinshasa 23/09/2011 French 
68 North Kivu Provincial 
Assembly representative Government Goma 23/07/2010 French 
69 Fidel Ngoma and  
Tomas Luzolo 
Ministry of Health 
representatives 
Government 
 Goma 20/07/2010 French 
70 UPN-DDR Officer Government Goma 21/07/2010 French 
71 Starec - Amani Leo 
representative 
Government Goma 14/07/2009 20/07/2010 French 
72 Deputy for Beni Government Goma  22/07/2010 French 
73 Goma’s Town Hall 
representative 
 
Government 
Goma 27/07/2010 French 
74 Deputy for Masisi Government Goma 04/08/2010 French 
75 Assistant Administrator to 
the Civil Authority 
Representative 
Government Baraka 01/09/2010 French 
76 Masisi Territory 
Administrator Government Masisi 14/09/2011 French 
      
77 MONUC Civil Affairs 
Representative (no. 1)  
MONUC/ 
MONUSCO Kinshasa 7/07/2009 French 
78 MONUC Public Information 
Officer  
MONUC/ 
MONUSCO Kinshasa 9/07/2009 French 
79 MONUC Political Affairs 
Officer  
(no. 7)  
MONUC/ 
MONUSCO Kinshasa 9/07/2009 French 
80 Political Affairs 
Representative (no. 45) 
 
MONUC/ 
MONUSCO Kinshasa 06/07/2010 French 
81 Political Affairs 
Representative (no. 46) 
MONUC/ 
MONUSCO Kinshasa 07/07/2010 French 
82 MONUSCO JMAC Officer  
(no. 156) 
MONUC/ 
MONUSCO Kinshasa 23/09/2011 Spanish 
83 MONUSCO Electoral 
Division Officer 
MONUC/ 
MONUSCO Kinshasa 06/07/2010 English 
84 MONUC Civil Affairs 
Representative (no. 14) 
MONUC/ 
MONUSCO Goma  14/07/2009 French 
85 MONUSCO Political Affairs 
Officer (no. 63)  
MONUC/ 
MONUSCO Goma  21/07/2009 French 
86 MONUSCO - ISSSS/STAREC 
liaison Officer 
MONUC/ 
MONUSCO Goma  21/07/2010 English 
87 
 
MONUSCO Civil Affairs 
Officer  
(no. 145) 
MONUC/ 
MONUSCO Bukavu 7/09/2010 English 
88 MONUSCO Political Affairs 
Representative (no. 149) 
MONUC/ 
MONUSCO Bukavu 8/09/2010 English 
89 MONUSCO JMAC Officer  
(no. 150) 
MONUC/ 
MONUSCO Bukavu 8/09/2010 French 
90 Ex-MONUC officer (no. 2) 
Kinshasa 
MONUC/ 
MONUSCO Kinshasa 
07/07/2009 
17/09/2010 French 
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91 MONUSCO Civil Affairs 
Officer (no. 142) 
MONUC/ 
MONUSCO Uvira 05/09/2010 French 
92 DDRRR Officer MONUC/ MONUSCO Uvira 28/08/2010 French 
      
93 UNHCR Officer  UN Agency Goma 04/08/2010 French 
94 UN Habitat representative UN Agency Goma 10/09/2011 French 
      
95 Security Contractor  Local 
business Beni 2/08/2010 French 
96 Banro Representative  MNC Bukavu 10/08/2010 French 
      
97 EU PAG representative EU Kinshasa 15/09/2010 French 
98 GTZ representative Foreign gvt. 
Aid agency Goma 13/07/2009 Spanish 
99 Norweigan Refugee Council 
Goma, July 23, 2010. 
 
INGO Goma 23/07/2010 French 
 
1.  Informal Conversations 
 
 Conversation with Group Place Date Language 
1 Airport Worker - Luggage 
Porter  
Civil Society/ 
Population Goma 15/07/2009 French 
2 Informal Conversations with 
Masisi Parish Priest 
Civil Society/ 
Population Masisi 25/07/2010 French 
3 Emergency Unit Nurse  
South Kivu General Hospital 
Civil Society/ 
Population Bukavu 11/08/2010 French 
4 Notables at Maibano  Civil Society/ Population Bunyakiri 19/08/2010 French 
5 Hospital Doctor Bunyakiri Civil Society/ Population Bunyakiri 21/08/2010 French 
6 Yakotumba members  Mai Mai  Bukavu 8/08/2010 French 
7 Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri 
Combatant  Mai Mai Bunyakiri 20/08/2010 French 
8 UNOPS representative UN Agency Goma 14/07/2009 Spanish 
9 Pakistani Battalion Blue 
Helmet  MONUSCO Bukavu 13/08/2010 French 
10 Rescate and Caritas-Goma 
representatives 
Local and 
International 
NGO 
Goma 23/07/2010 Spanish 
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2.  Focus Groups 
 
Participants Focus Issue Place Date Language 
5 Residents  State-society relations - DIY  Butembo 31/07/2010 
French and 
Swahili 
translated  
5 Young 
residents  
Security and Civil-
Military relations Bunyakiri 21/08/2010 
French and 
Swahili 
translated 
 
3.  Participant Observations 
 
Reference in text Activity  Place Date Language 
Participant 
Observation III 
Peace Workshop Organized 
by Group Jeremie, College 
Alfajiri 
Bukavu 19/07/2009 French  
Participant 
Observation XII 
South Kivu General 
Hospital Bukavu 11/08/2010 French  
Participant 
Observation 
XIV 
UN Civil Affairs 
Sensitization Workshop 
between the Military and 
Civil Society 
Fizi and 
Baraka 
3 and 4 
September 
2010 
French and 
Swahili 
 
 
4.  Survey on Tax Levy and Tax Avoidance around Informal 
Commerce in Goma 
 
Location Participants Type of Sampling Language 
 
Goma,  
Boulevard 
Kanyamuhanga 
3 phone credit sellers 
2 tomatoes, chillies and peanuts 
sellers 
1 music seller 
3 bread sellers  
1 Photocopy maker 
Random 
French and 
Swahili 
translated to 
French 
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Appendix II  
Questionnaires 
 
 
1.  Subordinate groups and civil society representatives 
 
What have been your experiences of/engagement with the ‘international 
community’?1  
 
Which international agencies have you interacted with? 
 
What do you think the ‘international community’ is trying to achieve? 
 
What would you characterise as the positive and the negative aspects/impacts of 
what the ‘international community’ has been doing?  
 
Has there been opposition/resistance to what the ‘international community’ is 
doing/trying to achieve?  Why do you think this is taking place? 
 
How would you characterise the actions of the government?  
 
What do you think are the main obstacles for peace?  
 
What has been the positive and negative impact of the Amani Leo operations in 
your area? 
 
Has there been opposition/resistance to what the ‘international community’ or 
the government are doing/trying to achieve?  What form does it take? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
1 The notion of ‘international community’ has not served as lenses to explore post-conflict 
statebuilding or the action of international actors. It was used in the interviews to keep in 
line with a familiar language used by interviewees. Interviewees were prompted to 
disaggregate their experience with different aspects of the statebuilding process. The use 
of ‘international community’ followed again the Derridean ‘under-erasure’ approach in 
the same way ‘post-conflict statebuilding’ was used. However, in the case of ‘international 
community’, the thesis provided several alternatives by disaggregating the process of 
statebuilding, and conceptualising it as plural and contradictory. It also highlighted the 
clashing agendas, the contradictory policies, the formal and informal governance 
practices, and how different actors related to statebuilding as a process of accumulation 
and violence.  
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2.  UN / International representatives 
 
How would you characterise the aims/objectives of the ‘international community’s’ 
[the UN or the IMF/WB or your agency]  presence in the DRC?  What is it trying to 
achieve?   
 
What policies have been mobilised in pursuit of these objectives and why those 
particular policies? 
 
What would you characterise as the positive and the negative aspects/impacts of 
what the ‘international community’ has been doing?  
 
Has there been opposition/resistance to what the ‘international community’ is 
doing/trying to achieve?  What form does it take? Who is opposing/resisting it?   
 
Why do you think it is taking place? What do you think these forms of 
opposition/resistance are trying to achieve? 
 
How would you respond to the view/critiques of the international presence, of the 
statebuilding project as a form of neo-imperialism/colonialism/civilising 
mission/tutelage? 
 
 
3.  Government officials 
 
What are the priorities regarding the consolidation/extension of state authority?   
 
What policies have been mobilised in pursuit of these objectives and why those 
particular policies? 
 
What would you characterise as the positive and the negative aspects/impacts of 
these strategies?  
 
How would you characterise the action of the ‘international community’ regarding 
the completion of those objectives?  
 
Has there been opposition/resistance to what the government is doing/trying to 
achieve?  What form does it take? Who is opposing/resisting it?   
 
Why do you think it is taking place? What do you think these forms of 
opposition/resistance are trying to achieve? 
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4.  FARDC/ Amani Leo Officers 
 
How would you characterise the overall objectives/aims of [your troops/Amani 
Leo troops]? 
 
What are the strategies and resources that have been mobilised for those 
objectives? 
 
What support do [your troops/battalion] receive from the government/ 
MONUC/ MONUSCO? 
 
What have been the major obstacles for those objectives to be achieved?  
 
Have you found resistance or support amongst residence in the area?  
 
What are the major issues for civil/military relations? 
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Appendix III  
Breakdown of Fieldwork 
 
 
1.  Formal Interviews 
 
Kind of Participant/ Organisation Number of Participants 
Subordinate Groups / Civil Society/ Population 
Formal organisations with international funding 17 
Formal organisations with no international 
funding 21 
Not formally organised groups 2 
Street/market sellers (not on survey) 7 
Peasant cooperatives 6 
Credit cooperatives 1 
Catholic Church organisations 7 
Protestant organisations 2 
Muslim organisation 1 
University professors 4 
Journalists 3 
SOCICO representatives 4 
Local Customary Neighbourhood representatives 2 
Total Representatives of Subordinate Groups 
/ Civil Society/ Population 77 
 
Mai Mai Representatives 
Yakotumba 6 
Simba Mai Mai /MRS 5 
Ex-Padiri 2 
Ex-Dunia 3 
Total Mai Mai Representatives 16 
 
FARDC/ Amani Leo 
FARDC  3 
Amani Leo 2 
Total FARDC/ Amani Leo 5 
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Government  
Ministry of Planning 2 
Foreign Affairs Ministry 2 
Health Ministry 2 
DDR  1 
STAREC 1 
Total Government Representatives 8 
 
Provincial and Local Administration 
North Kivu Provincial Assembly  1 
Masisi MP 1 
Goma MP 1 
Uvira MP 1 
Goma Townhall  1 
Local (Government-appointed) Administrators: 
Masisi, Fizi and Bunyakiri  3 
Local Customary Authority (Maibano) 1 
Total Provincial and Local Administrators 9 
 
Opposition 
UDPS 2 
RCD  2 
Total Opposition 4 
 
MONUC / MONUSCO 
Civil Affairs 6 
Political Affairs 4 
Electoral Division 1 
JMAC 2 
ISSSS 1 
DDRRR 1 
Ex-MONUC officers 2 
Total MONUC/MONUSCO Representatives 17 
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UN Agencies 
UNHCR 2 
UN Habitat  1 
OCHA – South Kivu 1 
Total UN Agencies 4 
 
MNCs/ Entrepreneurs 
MNC 1 
Local Security Contractor 1 
Local mineral traders - Beni 3 
Local mineral trader - Goma 1 
Total MNCs/Entrepreneurs 6 
 
Foreign Government Agencies and Diplomats 
DFID 2 
Belgian Development Agency 1 
EU Programme for Governance Support  (PAG) 1 
German Diplomatic Mission 1 
Spanish Diplomatic Mission 1 
Total Foreign Government Agencies and 
Diplomats 6 
 
INGOs 
DRC Training Initiative – Wilson Centre 1 
Life and Peace Institute 2 
Forest Monitor 1 
Norwegian Refugee Council 1 
African Parks 1 
Total INGOs 6 
 
TOTAL FORMAL INTERVIEWS 158 
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2.  Focus Groups 
 
Participants Focus Issue Place Date Language 
5 Residents  State-society relations - DIY  Butembo 31/07/2010 
French and 
Swahili 
translated  
5 Young residents  
Security and 
Civil-Military 
relations 
Bunyakiri 21/08/2010 
French and 
Swahili 
translated 
8 Women linked to the 
NGO Femmes Père 
Saint-Simon 
Security and 
Civil-Military 
relations 
Bunyakiri 
21/08/2010 
French and 
Swahili 
Translated  
 
3.  Participant Observations, Visits and HAG Meetings 
 
Activity Place Date 
Peace workshop, College Alfajiri, Bukavu, 
Date  Bukavu 19/07/2009 
Atelier for Political Elites and Business 
representatives Kinshasa organised by DRC 
Training Initiative – Wilson Centre 
Kinshasa 14/07/2010 
CTO Masisi – Demobilised Child Soldiers and 
Integration process 
Masisi 24-25/7/2010 
11-12/09/2011 
March for Peace and Homily by Archbishop 
Francois-Xavier Maroy 
Bunyakiri 22/08/2010 
CAS sensitization Civil Society/ Military 
relations (Baraka and Fizi - centre) Fizi and Baraka 3 – 4/09/2010 
 
Visit to Public Information Section MONUC - 
Kinshasa 
Kinshasa 8/07/2009 
Visit to Bukavu Hospital Bukavu 11/08/2010 
Visit to Bunyakiri Hospital Bunyakiri  18/08/2010 
 
HAG/OCHA Security and Humanitarian 
Meetings  
Fieldwork 
period 
7 in Kinshasa  
2 in Goma 
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4.  Summary of General Observations of DIY and Everyday 
Survival Strategies 
 
Kinshasa 
June/ July 2009 June 
and September 2010 
- Electricity cable stolen and redirected in Communes Yolo Nord and 
Matongue.  
- Squatted land and Self-made housing in Commune Mount 
Ngaliema. 
- General Self-rubbish collection; self-water supply. 
- Women exchanging money operating as cooperatives around 
‘Patisserie Centrale’ and Boulevard 30 Juin.  
- Grand Marché Kinshasa – cooperatives for the commercialisation of 
manioc flour, corn flour and palm oil. Credit cooperatives. 
- Marché de Yolo – Cooperatives for commercialising smoked fish. 
Goma 
July 2009; 
July/August 2010; 
September 2011 
- Self-housing construction;  
- Self-rubbish collection;  
- Self-water supply and self-electricity supply in the neighbourhoods 
of Mabenga and Office. 
Bukavu 
July 2009; August 
2010; September 2011 
- Self rubbish collection; 
- Self-water supply and electricity;  
- Squatted houses around Cyangungu 
Masisi 
July 2010 and 
September 2011 
- Self-management refugees;  
- Accommodation of returned combatants. 
Beni and Butembo 
July 2010 
- Self-housing construction; Self-rubbish collection; self-water supply 
and self-provided electricity - Salongo and self-administration.  
- Security administration and community policing.  
Mabuku 
July 2010 
- House building and road maintenance 
- Health centre and maternity management 
- Food and agriculture cooperative 
Bunyakiri 
August, 2010 
- Housing construction including hospital 
- Management of refugees;  
- Rubbish collection and water supply 
- Monetary contribution and co-managed by workers and catholic 
church scheme. 
Uvira 
June - July 2009  
June and September 
2010 
- Fishing and transport cooperatives 
Baraka/ Fizi 
June/ July 2009 June 
and September 2010 
- Military/society relations 
- Product cooperative supply – exchanges around manioc flour, palm 
oil and soap.  
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5.  Informal Conversations 
 
Category of participants  Number 
Local NGO 8 
Local researcher 6 
Local Journalists 3 
Mai Mai Raïa Motumboki 3 
Mai Mai Yakotumba 2 
Mai Mai Ex-Padiri 1 
Business/Entrepreneurs 7 
Government  3 
Opposition 3 
FARDC 2 
MONUC/MONUSCO 5 
Blue helmet 6 
UN Agencies 2 
Diplomats 3 
INGOs 12 
Independent International Consultants 
and Researchers 9 
TOTAL INFORMAL 
CONVERSATIONS 75 
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Appendix IV 
DRC Maps 
 
 
1.  Map of the DRC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 5. DRC Reference Administrative Map. 1  
                                                   
1 Map provided courtesy of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
with the following disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations 
used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 
OCHA - MONUC, “République Démocratique Du Congo: Reference Map - Carte 
Administrative,” Reliefweb, July 2011, http://reliefweb.int/map/democratic-republic-
congo/r%C3%A9publique-d%C3%A9mocratique-du-congo-reference-map-carte-
administrative Accessed 12/06/2012.  
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2. North and South Kivu in Greater Context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 6. South and North Kivu. 2 
                                                   
2 Human Rights Watch, “You Will Be Punished”: Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo, 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This content has been removed for reasons of copyright 
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2.  Territorial Division of North Kivu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 7. Territorial Division of North Kivu.3  
                                                   
3 Map provided courtesy of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
with the following disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations 
used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 
OCHA - MONUC, “RDCongo: Reference Map - Province Du Nord Kivu - Carte 
Administrative,” Reliefweb, March 2012, http://reliefweb.int/map/democratic-republic-
congo/rdcongo-reference-map-province-du-nord-kivu-carte-administrative-mars 
Accessed 12/6/2012. 
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3.  Territorial Division of South Kivu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 8. Territorial Division of South Kivu4 
                                                   
4 Map provided courtesy of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
with the following disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations 
used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 
OCHA - MONUC, “RDCongo: Reference Map - Province Du Sud Kivu - Carte 
Administrative,” Reliefweb, March 2012, http://reliefweb.int/map/democratic-republic-
congo/rdcongo-reference-map-province-du-sud-kivu-carte-administrative-mars Accessed 
12/06/2012. 
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4.  Approximate Deployment of Armed Groups in North and 
South Kivu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 9. Armed Groups in North and South Kivu.5  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
5 Mark Doyle, “DR Congo’s Rebel Kaleidoscope,” BBC, December 5, 2012, sec. Africa, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20586792 Accessed 20/12/2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This content has been removed for reasons of copyright 
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Appendix V 
List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948 -  20126  
 
 Acronym Mission name Start Date End Date 
1 UNTSO  United Nations Truce Supervision Organization  May 1948  Present  
2 UNMOGIP  United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan  January 1949  Present  
3 UNEF I  First United Nations Emergency Force  November 1956  June 1967  
4 UNOGIL  United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon  June 1958  December 1958  
5 ONUC  United Nations Operation in the Congo  July 1960  June 1964  
6 UNSF  United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea  October 1962  April 1963  
7 UNYOM  United Nations  Yemen Observation Mission  July 1963  September 1964  
8 UNFICYP  United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus  March 1964  Present  
9 DOMREP  
Mission of the Representative of 
the Secretary-General in the 
Dominican Republic  
May 1965  October 1966  
10 UNIPOM  United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission  September 1965  March 1966  
11 UNEF II  Second United Nations Emergency Force  October 1973  July 1979  
12 UNDOF  United Nations Disengagement Observer Force  June 1974  Present  
13 UNIFIL  United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon  March 1978  Present  
14 UNGOMAP  
United Nations Good Offices 
Mission in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan  
May 1988  March 1990  
15 UNIIMOG  United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group  August 1988  February 1991  
16 UNAVEM I  United Nations Angola Verification Mission I  January 1989  June 1991  
17 UNTAG  United Nations Transition Assistance Group  April 1989  March 1990  
18 ONUCA  United Nations Observer Group in Central America  November 1989  January 1992  
19 UNIKOM  United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission  April 1991  October 2003  
20 MINURSO  United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara  April 1991  present  
21 UNAVEM II  United Nations Angola Verification Mission II  June 1991  February 1995  
22 ONUSAL  United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador  July 1991  April 1995  
23 UNAMIC  United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia  October 1991  March 1992  
24 
UNPROFOR  
 
United Nations Protection Force  February 1992  March 1995  
25 UNTAC  United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia  March 1992  September 1993  
26 UNOSOM I  United Nations Operation in Somalia I  April 1992  March 1993  
27 ONUMOZ  United Nations Operation in Mozambique  December 1992  December 1994  
                                                   
6 DPKO, “Peacekeeping Fact Sheet.” 
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28 UNOSOM II  United Nations Operation in Somalia II  March 1993  March 1995  
29 UNOMUR  United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda  June 1993  September 1994  
30 UNOMIG  United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia  August 1993  June 2009  
31 UNOMIL  United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia  September 1993  September 1997  
32 UNMIH  United Nations Mission in Haiti  September 1993  June 1996  
33 UNAMIR  United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda  October 1993  March 1996  
34 UNASOG  United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group  May 1994  June 1994  
35 UNMOT  United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan  December 1994  May 2000  
36 UNAVEM III  United Nations Angola Verification Mission III  February 1995  June 1997  
37 UNCRO  United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia  May 1995  January 1996  
38 UNPREDEP  United Nations Preventive Deployment Force  March 1995  February 1999  
39 UNMIBH  United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina  December 1995  December 2002  
40 UNTAES  
United Nations Transitional 
Administration for Eastern 
Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
Sirmium  
January 1996  January 1998  
41 UNMOP  United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka  January 1996  December 2002  
42 UNSMIH  United Nations Support Mission in Haiti  July 1996  July 1997  
43 MINUGUA  United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala  January 1997  May 1997  
44 MONUA  United Nations Observer Mission in Angola  June 1997  February 1999  
45 UNTMIH  United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti  August 1997  December 1997  
46 MIPONUH  United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti  December 1997  March 2000  
47 UNPSG UN Civilian Police Support Group  January 1998  October 1998  
48 MINURCA  United Nations Mission in the  Central African Republic  April 1998  February 2000  
49 UNOMSIL  United Nations Observer  Mission in Sierra Leone  July 1998  October 1999  
50 UNMIK  United Nations Interim  Administration Mission in Kosovo  June 1999  Present  
51 UNAMSIL  United Nations Mission in  Sierra Leone  October 1999  December 2005  
52 UNTAET  United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor  October 1999  May 2002  
53 MONUC  
United Nations Organization  
Mission in the Democratic  
Republic of the Congo  
November 1999  June 2010  
54 UNMEE  United Nations Mission in  Ethiopia and Eritrea  July 2000  July 2008  
55 UNMISET  United Nations Mission of  Support in East Timor  May 2002  May 2005  
56 UNMIL  United Nations Mission in Liberia  September 2003  Present  
57 UNOCI  United Nations Operation in  Côte d’Ivoire  April 2004  Present  
58 MINUSTAH  United Nations Stabilization  Mission in Haiti  June 2004  Present  
59 ONUB  United Nations Operation in  Burundi  June 2004  December 2006  
60 UNMIS  United Nations Mission in the  Sudan  March 2005  July 2011  
61 UNMIT  United Nations Integrated  Mission in Timor-Leste  August 2006  Present  
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62 UNAMID  African Union-United Nations  Hybrid Operation in Darfur  July 2007  Present  
63 MINURCAT  United Nations Mission in the  Central African Republic and Chad  September 2007  December 2010  
64 MONUSCO  
United Nations Organization  
Stabilization Mission in the  
Democratic Republic of the Congo  
July 2010  Present  
65 UNISFA  United Nations Organization  Interim Security Force for Abyei  June 2011  Present  
66 UNMISS  United Nations Mission in the  Republic of South Sudan  July 2011  Present  
67 UNSMIS United Nations Supervision  Mission in Syria  April 2012  August 2012  
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